Biagoiotti et al v. Home Depot USA, Inc.

Filing 185

DECISION AND ORDER: It is ORDERED that the # 139 Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and Plaintiff Sheryl Glickman's claims are DISMISSED. Signed by Senior Judge Thomas J. McAvoy on 6/3/2014. (nmk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

ARTHUR A. AMASH, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

1:12-cv-837

HOME DEPOT U.S.A., INC.,
Defendant.
THOMAS J. McAVOY,
Senior United States District Judge
DECISION & ORDER
I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs commenced this action asserting claims for unpaid overtime under the Fair Labor

Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., and New York Labor Law (“NYLL”), Article 19, §
650 et seq. See 2nd Am. Compl., dkt. # 43. Defendant Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. (“Home Depot” or
“Defendant”) moves for summary judgment dismissing the claims brought by Plaintiff Sheryl
Glickman (“Glickman” or “Plaintiff”). See Mot. dkt. # 139. For the reasons that follow, the motion is
granted.
II.

BACKGROUND
a.

Procedural

Glickman is a former Merchandising Assistant Store Manager (“MASM”) for Home Depot
who had joined a FLSA conditional certified collective action entitled Aquilino v. Home Depot, Inc.,
Civil Action No. 04-cv-4100, filed against Home Depot in the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey on December 21, 2006 (“Aquilino action”). See Defendant’s Statement of
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Material Facts Not in Dispute in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment (“DSOF”), at ¶¶10-11.
The Aquilino plaintiffs, including Glickman, alleged that they were misclassified as exempt employees
by Home Depot under the overtime requirements of the FLSA, and sought overtime compensation.
See DSOF at ¶¶8-9.
On February 15, 2011, the District Court of New Jersey granted Home Depot’s motion to
decertify the nationwide FLSA collective action. Aquilino, 2011 WL 564039, at *11 (ECF Nos. 341
and 347 in D.N.J. 04-cv-4100). After decertification of the collective action, by Order dated May 2,
2011, the District of New Jersey dismissed the opt-in plaintiffs without prejudice. Aquilino, 2011 WL
564039, at *1, (ECF No. 353 in D.N.J. 04-cv-4100); see Aquilino v. Home Depot. U.S.A., Inc., No.
06-cv-4100 (PGS) (D.N.J. May 2, 2011) (ECF No. 353 in D.N.J. 04-cv-4100).
In June 2011, Glickman joined with other opt-in plaintiffs, filing an action in the United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut, alleging violation of the FLSA and various state laws.
See Costello v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 888 F. Supp. 2d 258, 262 (D. Conn. 2012). The Costello
plaintiffs alleged violations of the FLSA and the wage and hour laws of New Hampshire, New York,
and Vermont. Id. at 261. On January 10, 2012, Home Depot filed a motion in the Costello action,
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 and 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), to sever the plaintiffs’ claims into seven
separate actions and to transfer six of those actions to districts in other states, including New York.
See id. (ECF No. 55 in D. Conn. 11-cv-0953). On April 10, 2012, the Costello Court granted Home
Depot’s motion. Id. at 271 (ECF No. 72 in D. Conn. 11-cv-0953).
In April and May 2012, the claims of Glickman and other New York plaintiffs were transferred
to the District Court for the Northern District of New York. See Order of Transfer, filed April 30,
2012, (ECF No. 77 in D. Conn. 11-cv-0953), and Amended Order of Transfer, filed May 2, 2012 (ECF
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No. 79 in D. Conn. 11-cv-0953). Discovery in this action closed on December 20, 2013. See ECF No.
95.
Factual1

b.

Home Depot operates large warehouse-style retail stores that sell home improvement products
and services. DSOF at ¶25. Each store is managed by a Store Manager and up to seven Assistant Store
Managers (“ASMs”), including MASMs, who are the second highest ranking employees, subordinate
only to the store manager. Id. at ¶26.
MASMs supervise from one to eleven merchandising departments, to wit: Lumber, Building
Materials, Flooring, Paint, Hardware, Plumbing, Electrical, Garden, Kitchen & Bath, Millwork, and
Décor. DSOF at ¶¶25-26. Each merchandising department is staffed by sales associates and a
department supervisor. Id. at ¶27. MASMs supervise the department supervisors and associates
assigned to the merchandising departments for which they are responsible. Id.
According to the Sales Assistant Store Manager Job Description that applies to MASMs, it is
Home Depot’s expectation that, inter alia, Assistant Store Managers:
work with the Store Manager to develop strategies and objectives to drive sales and
profitability. They provide leadership to Associates so that these strategies and objectives are
executed successfully. Sales ASMs must analyze trends, solve problems, and develop
themselves and their Associates in order to maximize contribution to store success.
Id. at ¶40. Other responsibilities include: “[r]ecruiting, interviewing applicants and making
recommendations to the Store Manager about hiring open positions,” as well as “making
recommendations to the Store Manager about terminations, promotions, demotions, new Associates

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Glickman’s response to Home Depot’s Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute admits that all
facts contained therein are true. See Dkt. # 169, at ¶4 (“Plaintiff makes no denials of the several paragraphs
of Home Depot’s Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute.”).

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rate of pay and Associates performance based pay increases.” Id. at ¶¶42, 49.
Between February 21, 2006 and March 18, 2006, Glickman was assigned as a MASM to Store
1266 located in Poughkeepsie, New York (“Poughkeepsie store”). Id. at ¶29. The Poughkeepsie store
was staffed with a store manager, three ASMs, including Glickman, and approximately 155-175 nonexempt hourly employees. Id. at ¶34; Store Manager Passerelli Decl. at ¶6; Brady Decl. As a MASM
in the Poughkeepsie store, Glickman supervised three merchandising departments: Millwork, Lumber
and Building Materials and at least two of those department supervisors reported directly to her.
DSOF at ¶¶35-36. Glickman was also responsible for the associates working in her assigned
departments. Id. at ¶36.
During the month Glickman worked as the Poughkeepsie store’s MASM, she spent
approximately 20 of her 55 hour work week acting as the Manager on Duty (“Mod”), and managing
the entire store in the store manager’s absence. Id. at ¶¶37, 91. In addition to store-wide responsibility,
Glickman also recommended the starting hourly rate for new hires, participated in interviewing sales
associates for promotion to department supervisor, as well as took part in a round table discussion with
other salaried members of the management team in order to identify candidates for promotion
considerations. Id. at ¶¶45-46, 51.
As a major responsibility of the MASM job description, Glickman spent a considerable amount
of her time “[c]oaching, training and developing Associates, ... both informal[ly] (e.g. on-floor
coaching) and formal[ly] (e.g. written evaluations).” See Sales Assistant Store Manger Job
Description; DSOF at ¶55. Additionally, Glickman was responsible for preparing performance reviews
for her department supervisors and approving performance reviews for associates prepared by
department supervisors. DSOF at ¶52. Glickman also had the authority to discipline associates
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working within the Poughkeepsie store, and once terminated a sales associate because of attendance
problems. Id. at ¶¶52-54. According to Glickman’s former Store Manager, Chantel Parserelli,
Glickman “also had the authority to commend good job performance with a merit badge (e.g. a
monetary award) and to select ... employee of the month.” See Store Manager Passerrelli Decl. at ¶10;
DSOF at ¶40.
On March 18, 2006 Glickman’s employment was terminated due to providing poor customer
service. Id. at ¶29.
III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
On a motion for summary judgment the Court must construe the properly disputed facts in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party, see Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1776 (2007), and
may grant summary judgment only where “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see O’Hara v. National
Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 642 F.3d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 2011).
If the movant is able to establish a prima facie basis for summary judgment, the burden of
production shifts to the party opposing summary judgment who must produce evidence establishing the
existence of a factual dispute that a reasonable jury could resolve in his or her favor. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The nonmoving party must show, by
affidavits or other evidence, admissible in form, that there are specific factual issues that can only be
resolved at trial. Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 872 (2d Cir. 1995).
IV.

DISCUSSION
Under both the FLSA and NYLL, there are statutory exemptions from overtime compensation

requirements for employees who are classified as bona fide executives. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1);
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NYLL Article 19 § 651(5)(c). An “employee employed in a bona fide executive capacity” is defined
as any employee:
(1) compensated on a salary basis at a rate of not less than $455 per week; (2) whose primary
duty is management of the enterprise in which the employee is employed or of a customarily
recognized department or subdivision thereof; (3) who customarily and regularly directs the
work of two or more other employees; and (4) who has the authority to hire or fire other
employees or whose suggestions and recommendations as to the hiring, firing, advancement or
promotion or any other change of status of other employees are given particular weight.
29 C.F.R. § 541.100(a).2
Plaintiff concedes that she satisfied three of the four prongs of the bone fide executive
exemption contained in 29 C.F.R. § 541.100 by not contesting that: (1) her salary payments met the
minimum requirements under both the FLSA and NYLL; (2) she customarily and regularly directed the
work of two or more other employees; and (3) her recommendations as to an employee’s change of
status were given particular weight by her store managers. Plaintiff solely contends that whether
management was her primary duty should be a question for the jury to decide. Plaintiff’s argument is
without merit.
In order to qualify as a bona fide executive, inter alia, an employee’s primary duty must be the
“management of the enterprise . . . or of a customarily recognized department or subdivision thereof . .
. .” Id. The term “primary duty” is defined as the “principal, main, major or most important duty that
the employee performs.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.700(a). “Determination of an employee’s primary duty must
be based on all facts in a particular case, with the major emphasis on the character of the employee’s
job as a whole.” Id.; see also Mullins v. City of New York, 653 F.3d 104, 106-07 (2d Cir. 2011).

2

With the exception of the required minimum salary, New York’s Codes, Rules and Regulations
mirror the United States Department of Labor’s definition of an “executive” employee. See 12 N.Y.C.R.R. §
142-2.14(c)(4)(i)(a)-(e).

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Certain factors courts consider in determining the primary duty of an employee include, but are not
limited to: (1) the relative importance of exempt duties compared with other types of duties; (2) the
amount of time the employee spends performing exempt work; (3) the employee’s relative freedom
from direct supervision; and (4) the relationship between the employee’s salary and wages paid to
subordinates who performed the same type of nonexempt work. 29 C.F.R. § 541.700(a).
Plaintiff relies on several cases to substantiate her claim that summary judgment here is
inappropriate. See Indergit v. Rite Aid Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32322 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2010);
Clougher v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 696 F. Supp.2d 285 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); Rubery v. Buth-NaBodhaige, Inc., 470 F. Supp.2d 273 (W.D.N.Y. 2007). However, these cases are distinguishable from
the present case. In each of these cases, the court determined that there were genuine issues of material
fact regarding the employee’s actual duties that precluded summary judgment. See Indergit, 2010 WL
1327242 at *6; Clougher, 696 F. Supp.2d at 291-92; Rubery, 470 F. Supp.2d at 277. Here, by
contrast, there are no genuine issues of material fact as to the duties that Plaintiff performed. As
indicated, Plaintiff has made no denials to Defendant’s Statement of Material Facts. Therefore, the
Court may determine whether, based on the undisputed facts, Plaintiff’s primary duty was management
of the enterprise or a customarily recognized department or subdivision thereof making summary
judgment appropriate.
1.

Determination of Glickman’s Primary Duty
a.

The Importance of Glickman’s Exempt Duties

One of the factors to consider in determining the primary duty of an employee is the relative
importance of exempt duties compared with other types of duties. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.700(a).
Plaintiff testified that she performed numerous managerial duties during her month as a MASM at the
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Poughkeepsie store. DSOF at ¶¶28-96. For example, she attests that she spent considerable time each
week as the store’s MOD during which she was responsible for managing the entire store in the Store
Manager’s absence. Id. at 90. When acting as the MOD, she had the authority to direct the work of all
of the associates within the store and was equally responsible for any and all customer complaints.
See. Store Manger Passerelli Decl. at ¶17; DSOF at ¶¶91-92. In her capacity as MASM, Glickman
also devoted time to coaching and training both associates and department supervisors on a daily basis.
DSOF at ¶¶55-56. She “was always” monitoring the associates in order to provide feedback as well as
identifying candidates for promotions. Id. at ¶59. In addition to training and supervising, Glickman
also testified, inter alia, that she: recommended changes regarding employee status which includes
hiring, firing, and promotions; scheduled and directed the work of other employees; disciplined
employees; managed the inventory; approved inventory orders; and managed the store’s financial
performance. See DSOF at ¶¶28-96. Further, the Poughkeepsie Store Manager stated she relied on
Glickman not only in her capacity as a MASM, but in her “store-wide,” responsibility, particularly
when acting as MOD. DSOF at ¶¶38-39.
Plaintiff’s brief posits that it has not been shown that her duties were critical to the store’s
success and argues that Glickman’s manager’s testimony does not alone remove any doubt as to the
importance of her duties. Pl. Mol at 5 (dkt. No. 167). However, based upon the undisputed record
there is no doubt that Plaintiff’s principal value to the enterprise was that she was responsible for at
least three departments as the MASM, and at times was responsible for all customers and associates in
the store when acting as MOD. DSOF at ¶¶37-39. Plaintiff has also failed to specifically contest any
of the above assertions concerning her responsibilities as MASM. Further, she has not identified the
amount, frequency, or nature of any non-exempt duties that she performed. Based on the totality of the
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uncontested facts, a reasonable fact finder could only conclude that Glickman’s most important duties
at Home Depot were managerial in nature.
b.

Glickman’s Time Spent Performing Exempt Work

Another factor to consider when determining the primary duty of an employee is the amount of
time the employee spends performing exempt work. 29 C.F.R. § 541.700(a). Glickman admits to
spending around 90 percent of her time each week performing management tasks. DSOF ¶95; ECF
No. 167-2; Pl. Mol at 3 (dkt. No. 167). In this regard, Glickman testified to spending the following
time during her scheduled 55 hour workweek:
-Five hours per day (20 hrs. per week) as the MOD;
-Five hours per week walking the store by herself, with her store manager, and with her
department supervisors;
- Two hours per week reviewing and working on scheduling issues;
- Two to three hours per day (10-15 hrs. per week) providing on-the-floor training;
- One hour per day (5 hrs. per week) handling customer complaints;
- Forty-five minutes a week providing classroom training;
- Forty minutes a day (3 hrs. 20 min. per week) writing work lists and assigning work;
- Fifteen minutes a day reviewing store reports (1 hr. 15 min. per week);
- Forty-five minutes a month on discipline issues (~11 minutes per week);
- Ten minutes a day reviewing and approving orders for merchandise;
DSOF ¶¶95-96.
Plaintiff further admits spending time training and coaching associates “as much as she could”
each day; supervising department supervisors and associates; observing the associates and providing
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feedback; training department supervisors and sales associates in her departments; directing the work
of department supervisors and sales associates by delegating and assigning tasks to them; following up
on delegated or assigned tasks to ensure completion; holding department supervisors and associates
accountable for their performance; approving overtime, price changes and shrink plans; disciplining
department supervisors and sales associates; resolving customer complaints; managing inventory,
ordering and the store’s financial performance; writing work lists and performance reviews; and
enforcing legal and safety compliance. DSOF ¶¶28-96.
Moreover, Glickman has not identified a single nonexempt duty she performed which would
require a fact finder to allocate time spent between exempt and non-exempt activities. Given the
uncontested record, a reasonable fact finder could only conclude that Plaintiff spent the majority of her
time performing managerial functions.
c.

Glickman’s Relative Freedom From Direct Supervision

Another factor to consider when determining an employee’s primary duty is the employee’s
relative freedom from direct supervision. 29 C.F.R. § 541.700(a). Plaintiff argues that even though
she performed some managerial tasks, she was not exempt because she could not complete those tasks
without approval from her superiors. Pl. Mol at 6 (dkt. No. 167). For instance, Glickman argues that
while she “definitely recommended to the store manager about terminations, promotions and
demotions[],” and that sometimes her recommendations were accepted by store management, DSOF at
¶64, “if a significant management decision had to be made, such as whether an employee should be
hired or fired, [she] needed approval from her store manager.” Pl. Mol at 6 (dkt. No. 167).
However, even where a manager’s discretion is limited by upper management, the manager may
still be considered an exempt employee. See Donovan v. Burger King Corp., 675 F.2d 516, 521-22 (2d
10

Cir. 1982) (assistant managers were considered exempt employees under the FLSA even where their
exercise of discretion was “circumscribed by prior instruction . . . .”); Thomas v. Speedway
SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 507 (6th Cir. 2007) (stating that an employee’s relative freedom
from supervision “does not demand complete freedom from supervision, such that she is answerable to
no one, as this would disqualify all but the chief executive officer from satisfying this factor of the
primary duty inquiry.”); Yesmin v. Rite Aid of New York, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127655, at *18
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2012)(“The fact that plaintiff was also supervised by the store manager, who was
the highest ranked employee in the store, does not diminish [the plaintiff’s] management of the other
employees and the operation of the store.”). Thus, even assuming that Plaintiff did not have final
authority in matters such as hiring, this fact carries no weight because “[a]n employee’s suggestions
and recommendations may still be deemed to have ‘particular weight’ even if a higher level manager’s
recommendation has more importance and even if the employee does not have authority to make the
ultimate decision as to the employee’s change in status.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.105. Plaintiff’s
responsibility here is consistent with being a bona fide executive because, for example, her
recommendations regarding employees’ changes of status were given particular weight by her
superiors. See DSOF at ¶¶46-54; 29 C.F.R. § 541.100. In addition, Glickman was charged with the
authority to discipline associates, including termination when appropriate and Glickman testified that
on one occasion she did terminate an associate for attendance problems. DSOF at ¶¶53-54. Simply
because Glickman did not have final supervisory authority as to specific management duties, this “does
not take [her] out of realm of being a manager in the organization.” Scott v. SSP Am., Inc., 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 32819, at *44 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2011); see also 29 C.F.R. § 541.105. Given the
uncontested record in this case, a reasonable fact finder could only conclude that Glickman was
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relatively free from direct supervision in the performance of the array of her managerial duties.
d.

Glickman’s Wages Were Greater Than Wages Earned by Subordinates

The final factor to consider when determining an employee’s primary duty is “the relationship
between the employee’s salary and the wages paid to other employees for the kind of nonexempt work
performed by the employee.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.700(a). Plaintiff contends that if her salary is reduced
to an hourly wage by dividing it by her weekly hours, she was not paid substantially more than her
subordinates. See Pl. Mol at 6 (dkt. No. 167). However, and in contravention to Plaintiff’s assertions,
courts have rejected engaging in “mathematical gymnastics” by dividing a manager’s weekly salary by
the number of hours worked each week to determine an hourly wage, and instead compare “the
manager’s weekly salary with the highest possible non-exempt weekly wage . . . .” Moore v. Tractor
Supply Co., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1278-79 (S.D. Fla. 2004). Plaintiff’s weekly salary is greater than
the highest non-exempt weekly wage of her subordinates.
Moreover, even accepting Plaintiff’s hypothetical hourly pay rate, there is a disparity in
Plaintiff’s compensation compared to her subordinates. Between February and March 2006, Plaintiff
earned $985.57 weekly.3 Assuming Plaintiff worked 55 hours per week, the hourly rate would be
approximately $17.92 per hour. According to Defendant’s uncontested Statement of Material Facts, the
mid-range hourly rates for sales associates and department supervisors where Plaintiff worked were
$12.64 and $16.97, respectively. DSOF at ¶101. Thus, Plaintiff was paid more than the employees she
supervised. Furthermore, Glickman was entitled to stock options and a monetary bonus based upon
the financial success of her store and her own individual performance, both of which were not available

3
This calculation is based on Glickman’s annual salary of $51,250.00 in 2006 after she was promoted
to MASM. DSOF at ¶99.

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to non-exempt employees. DSOF at ¶97. Based on these calculations as well as the stock options and
possible bonus, a reasonable fact finder could only conclude that Plaintiff’s wages were greater than
those earned by her subordinates.
e.

Conclusion - Primary Duty

Based on the above factors, a reasonable fact finder could only conclude that Plaintiff’s primary
duty was management. See Luksza v. TJX Cos., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10813, at *13-14
(D. Nev. Jan. 28, 2014) (finding the plaintiffs’ primary duty was management where their own
description of their job activities indicated the plaintiffs’ responsibilities consisted of directing
the work of employees, handling employee concerns, disciplining employees, planning their
work, and providing for their safety and security). Thus, Plaintiff was properly classified as a bona
fide executive exempt from the overtime compensation requirements of the FLSA and NYLL.
V.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant Home Depot’s motion for summary judgment [Dkt.

# 139] is GRANTED, and Plaintiff Sheryl Glickman’s claims are DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: June 3, 2014

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