Rizvi v. The Town of Wawarsing et al

Filing 66

MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDER - That Rizvi's 54 cross motion to amend is DENIED. That the Town's 47 motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and Rizvi's 1 complaint is DISMISSED. Signed by Chief Judge Gary L. Sharpe on 4/23/2015. (jel, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
________________________________
SHAHIDA RIZVI, individually
and doing business as Colonial
Motel,
1:12-cv-1396
(GLS/RFT)

Plaintiff,
v.
THE TOWN OF WAWARSING,

Defendant.
________________________________
APPEARANCES:
OF COUNSEL:
FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
Office of Mark D. Stern
P.O. Box 1028
Goshen, NY 10924

MARK D. STERN, ESQ.

FOR THE DEFENDANT:
Carter, Conboy Law Firm
20 Corporate Woods Boulevard
Albany, NY 12211

MICHAEL J. MURPHY, ESQ.
WILLIAM C. FIRTH, ESQ.

Gary L. Sharpe
Chief Judge
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. Introduction
Plaintiff Shahida Rizvi, individually and doing business as Colonial
Motel, brought this action against several defendants alleging six causes of

action. (See generally Compl., Dkt. No. 1.) All claims and defendants
were dismissed on motion except for causes of action brought pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the Equal Protection and dormant
Commerce Clauses against defendant the Town of Wawarsing. (Dkt. No.
35 at 15-16.) Pending is the Town’s motion for summary judgment on the
remaining claims, (Dkt. No. 47), and Rizvi’s cross motion to “amend and
reinstate complaint against [former defendants] Scott Carlsen, Dan
Johnson and Terry Houck, individually,” (Dkt. No. 54). For the reasons set
forth below, the Town’s motion is granted, and Rizvi’s cross motion is
denied.
II. Background
A.

Facts1
Rizvi, who is a woman of Pakistani origin and Muslim, owns and

operates the Colonial Motel. (Pl.’s Statement of Material Facts (SMF) ¶¶ 2,
3, 7, Dkt. No. 53, Attach. 1.) The Colonial Motel, which is located in the
Town, has eighteen rooms that are regularly occupied by registered sex

1

Unless otherwise noted, the facts are not disputed. Also, as highlighted by the Town,
(Dkt. No. 64, Attach. 5 at 2-5), Rizvi’s failure to comply with Local Rule 7.1(a)(3) by admitting
or denying each of the paragraphs in the Town’s statement of material facts, (compare Dkt.
No. 47, Attach. 2, with Dkt. No. 53), is not without consequences. The Town’s properly
supported and uncontroverted facts are therefore deemed admitted.

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offenders referred to it by the Ulster County Department of Social Services.
(Def.’s SMF ¶¶ 7-9, Dkt. No. 47, Attach. 2.) In 2011, the Town enacted
Local Law No. 2 of 2011 (hereinafter “Local Law”), which became effective
January 1, 2012. (Id. ¶ 10; Local Law No. 2 of 2011, Dkt. No. 1 at 21-24.)
The Local Law created a new chapter to the Town Code titled “Hotels,
Motels, Boarding Houses and Bed & Breakfasts.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 21.)
Saliently, the Local Law regulates the aforementioned types of
establishments within the Town’s geography by, among other things,
restricting occupancy “by the same guest or customer to no more than
[thirty] consecutive days or [ninety] days in any individual calendar year”
(hereinafter “the 30/90 rule”). (Def.’s SMF ¶ 10); Local Law No. 2 of 2011
§ 71-7(B). In addition to Colonial Motel, three hotels/motels are within the
ambit of the Local Law: Chelsea House, Continental Motel, and Honors
Haven Resort and Spa. (Def.’s SMF ¶ 12.) Prior to the Local Law’s
effective date, each of the affected hotels/motels—four in number—was
notified of the new ordinance. (Id. ¶ 38.)
After the Local Law went into effect, Chief Code Enforcement Officer
Bryant Arms and subordinate officer Barron Berg “visited the Colonial
Motel and all other motels/hotels within the Town . . . to help implement the
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new law and to ensure that [it] was administered properly, including
ensuring that the proprietors maintained a register of guests in the lobby
with the names of the inhabitants.” (Id. ¶¶ 40, 41, 47.) In March 2012, the
Colonial Motel failed an inspection for failure to maintain a guest register
consistent with the Local Law, and violations of the 30/90 day rule. (Dkt.
No. 47, Attach. 14 ¶ 9.) Days later, Arms followed up and found
substantial compliance with the guest register requirements but continuing
violations of the 30/90 day rule. (Id. ¶ 10.) In April and May, appearance
tickets were issued to the Colonial Motel. (Dkt. No. 47, Attach. 3 at 31, 35;
Def.’s SMF ¶¶ 56-58.) On April 30, Arms was instructed by Town
Supervisor Carlsen to issue appearance tickets to the Colonial Motel for
violations of the 30/90 day rule. (Def.’s SMF ¶ 33; Dkt. No. 47, Attach. 11
at 42.) Carlsen also ordered Arms to withdraw an April appearance ticket,
which concerned Colonial Motel’s failure to apply for a license, and,
consistent with Carlsen’s directive, it was withdrawn. (Dkt. No. 47, Attach.
11 at 42-43, 45; Def.’s SMF ¶ 56.) On prior occasions, Arms was
instructed by Town Counsel to issue tickets; such directives were not

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unusual and regularly occurred. (Def.’s SMF ¶ 48.)2

B.

Procedural History
This action was commenced in the Southern District of New York,

(see generally Compl.), but soon thereafter venue was changed to this
District by stipulation of the parties, (Dkt. No. 14). Defendants, who, at that
time, included Carlsen, Johnson, and Houck, the County of Ulster, and the
Town, all filed pre-answer motions to dismiss the complaint. (Dkt. Nos. 18,
20.) Those motions were granted in part and denied in part, (Dkt. No. 35),
and, following discovery, (Dkt. No. 46), the pending motions were filed,
(Dkt. Nos. 47, 54).
III. Standard of Review
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The following facts are provided merely for context. Prior to the passage of the Local
Law, Carlsen, Johnson, and Houck all sought political office—in the case of Houck, reelection—in the Town. (Def.’s SMF ¶¶ 20, 25-26, 31-32.) In furtherance of their campaign,
Carlsen, Johnson, and Houck published a political flyer that spoke to the presence of
registered sex offenders in the Town. (Id. ¶ 32; Dkt. No. 47, Attach. 3 at 22.) Among other
things, the flyer called for the adoption of “an ordinance to limit the stays [of sex offenders] in
. . . motels/hotels throughout the Town.” (Dkt. No. 47, Attach. 3 at 22.) Houck was a member
of the Town Board of the Town of Wawarsing during the relevant period of time. (Def.’s SMF
¶ 20.) Houck ultimately proposed the Local Law after some discussion amongst members of
the Town Board and Town Attorney William Collier, who reviewed a similar ordinance in the
neighboring Town of Ellenville and drafted the Local Law. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 15, 16, 18, 24.) Although
not a member of the Board when the Local Law was considered and eventually enacted,
Johnson was, as referenced above, in the midst of a political campaign seeking election to the
Board at that time. (Id. ¶¶ 25-26.) Carlsen, who also was not a Town official when the Local
Law was passed, sought election as Town Supervisor, a position to which he was elected; he
assumed office on January 1, 2012. (Id. ¶¶ 31-33.)

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A.

Leave to Amend
Rule 15(a) provides that, where a party seeks to amend her pleading

before trial, “[t]he court should freely give leave when justice so requires.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). However, “‘[w]here a scheduling order has been
entered, the lenient standard under Rule 15(a) . . . must be balanced
against the requirement under Rule 16(b) that the Court’s scheduling order
shall not be modified except upon a showing of good cause.’” Laskowski
v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 5:11-cv-340, 2013 WL 5127039, at *2 n.3
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2013) (quoting Grochowski v. Phoenix Constr., 318
F.3d 80, 86 (2d Cir. 2003)). “To satisfy the good cause standard the party
must show that, despite its having exercised diligence, the applicable
deadline could not have been reasonably met.” Id. at *2 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). Further, “the good cause standard is not
satisfied when the proposed amendment rests on information that the party
knew, or should have known, in advance of the deadline.” Enzymotec Ltd.
v. NBTY, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 2d 527, 536 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
B.

Summary Judgment
The standard of review pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 is well
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established and will not be repeated here. For a full discussion of the
standard, the court refers the parties to its decision in Wagner v. Swarts,
827 F. Supp. 2d 85, 92 (N.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d sub nom. Wagner v.
Sprague, 489 F. App’x 500 (2d Cir. 2012).
IV. Discussion
A.

Cross Motion For Leave to Amend the Complaint
Before reaching the Town’s motion for summary judgment, the court

addresses Rizvi’s cross motion to amend. Notably, Rizvi argues that she
should be granted leave to amend her complaint under the lenient
standard of Rule 15 to include requests for injunctive relief and punitive
damages, “clarif[y] the constitutional claims . . . by adding an additional
claim for conspiracy to violate . . . civil rights,” and “reinstate a claim
against the individual capacity defendants.” (Dkt. No. 56 at 17.) According
to Rizvi, through discovery, she has unearthed facts that support her
proposed amendments. (Id.) For reasons explained herein, Rizvi’s cross
motion is denied.
Here, no argument in support of good cause has been made, let
alone demonstrated to the court’s satisfaction. As explained above, the
liberal standard of Rule 15 does not govern where, as here, a scheduling
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order is entered pursuant to Rule 16. See supra Part III.A; (Dkt. No. 42.)
A scheduling order “may be modified only for good cause and with the
judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). Rizvi fails to appreciate that her
cross motion is not measured against Rule 15, and the court will not
speculate as to what arguments she may have made had she accurately
identified the standard of review.3 Her failure to offer any explanation of
good cause justifies denial of her motion, which seeks to make substantial
amendments. In any event, the facts and circumstances of the case
suggest that good cause cannot be shown.
As Rizvi notes, (Dkt. No. 56 at 17-18), the court’s January 15, 2013
Memorandum-Decision and Order, which ruled on defendants’ pre-answer
motions, expressly provided that dismissal of the claims against the
individual defendants was “without prejudice to Rizvi’s right to seek
permission to amend her Complaint if she c[ould], in good faith, allege
sufficient facts to cure [certain] deficiencies,” (Dkt. No. 35 at 8 n.6).

3

Although not referenced in her memorandum of law, Rizvi has filed an attorney
affidavit asserting that “[l]eave to amend and to reinstate could not be made until the
depositions were completed and the facts gathered,” and then, by footnote, contending that
she has not yet had the opportunity to depose nonparty witness Berg. (Dkt. No. 55 ¶ 10, at 5
n.1.) While these allegations could potentially go to whether good cause has been shown, for
the reasons explained below, the court is not persuaded that leave to amend should be
granted at this belated time.

8

However, following the issuance of that decision, a scheduling order was
entered setting the amendment deadline as May 1, 2013 and the discovery
deadline as January 4, 2014. (Dkt. No. 42 at 1.) Rizvi did not seek leave
to amend or request an extension of the deadline to do so prior to May 1,
2013; however, some six months after the amendment deadline passed,
she did successfully seek an extension of the discovery period, which
pushed out the discovery deadline to April 1, 2014. (Dkt. Nos. 45, 46.) It
was not until July 7, 2014, following the Town’s filing of the pending
summary judgment motion, that Rizvi sought to amend her complaint.
(Dkt. Nos. 47, 54.) While Rizvi describes the amendment as not altering
the theory of the case, (Dkt. No. 56 at 18), she now seeks to make
substantive changes to her complaint by alleging entirely new causes of
action for, among other things, conspiracy to violate civil rights and
violations of the Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the United States
and New York Constitutions, (Dkt. No. 58 ¶¶ 122-40). The court also notes
that Rizvi’s proposed amended pleading is not compliant with the Local
Rules, which require that “[t]he motion must set forth specifically the
proposed insertions and deletions of language and identify the
amendments in the proposed pleading, either through the submission of a
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redline/strikeout version of the pleading sought to be amended or through
other equivalent means.” N.D.N.Y. L.R. 7.1(a)(4); (Dkt. No. 58.) For all of
these reasons, Rizvi’s cross motion is denied.
B.

The Town’s Motion For Summary Judgment
The Town argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on Rizvi’s

remaining two claims. (Dkt. No. 47, Attach. 15 at 2-14.) With respect to
the dormant Commerce Clause claim, the Town contends that no record
evidence can support Rizvi’s showing of the requisite “disparate burden” to
support her claim, or, alternatively, that the Local Law’s burden on
interstate commerce is not clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits. (Id. at 2-6.) As for the equal protection claim, the Town asserts
that the facially-neutral Local Law was not selectively enforced nor resulted
in intentionally discriminatory disparate treatment. (Id. at 7-14.)
In opposition, Rizvi summarily, and without citation to record
evidence, claims that sworn statements “show[] that the burden imposed
upon interstate and intrastate commerce by [the Local] Law . . . is clearly
excessive in relation to any putative local benefits to be gained.” (Dkt. No.
56 at 11-12.) By so arguing, Rizvi has glossed over the threshold issue of
whether she can demonstrate a disparate burden, instead skipping directly
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to the balancing test. As for her equal protection claim, Rizvi contends
that, despite violations at Honors Haven Resort and Spa and the
Continental Motel, neither was cited while she was singled out and cited for
violations of the Local Law. (Id. at 13-14.) She also asserts, without
pointing to any record support, that she was “singled out on the basis of
her advancing age, her sex, her national origin, and religion by the Town,
all in violation of her fundamental rights.” (Id. at 16.) Although it appears
that both parties misapprehend, to a greater or lesser degree, the
parameters of the Equal Protection Clause as they apply here, the court
agrees with the Town that it is entitled to summary judgment on both of the
remaining claims.
1.

Dormant Commerce Clause

In terms of the dormant Commerce Clause, “[a] regulation that
evinces discriminatory purpose against interstate commerce, or
unambiguously discriminates in its effect . . . almost always is invalid per
se.” Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393, 431 (2d
Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). On the other
hand, the legislation may run afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause if,
despite facial neutrality, “it imposes a burden on interstate commerce
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incommensurate with the local benefits secured.” Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v.
Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 2001). Where, as here, the plaintiff
seeks to establish the latter infirmity,4 (Dkt. No. 56 at 11-12), the so-called
Pike balancing test guides the analysis. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,
397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
“For a state statute to run afoul of the Pike standard, the statute, at a
minimum, must impose a burden on interstate commerce that is
qualitatively or quantitatively different from that imposed on intrastate
commerce.” Sorrell, 272 F.3d at 109 (citations omitted). The Second
Circuit recognizes three circumstances in which a facially-neutral
regulation imposes an incidental burden on interstate commerce: “(1) when
the regulation has a disparate impact on any non-local commercial entity;
(2) when the statute regulates commercial activity that takes place wholly
beyond the state’s borders; and (3) when the challenged statute imposes a
regulatory requirement inconsistent with those of other states.” Town of
Southold v. Town of E. Hampton, 477 F.3d 38, 50 (2d Cir. 2007). Where
“no such unequal burden [is] shown, a reviewing court need not proceed

4

The court previously dismissed Rizvi’s claim to the extent that it was premised upon
overt discrimination against interstate commerce. (Dkt. No. 35 at 14 n.11.)

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further.” Sorrell, 272 F.3d at 109.
Here, the Town has met its summary judgment burden by “point[ing]
to an absence of proof on plaintiff’s part,” which triggers the plaintiff’s
obligation to “designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial.” Smalls v. Conn. Dep’t of Corr., No. 3:10CV962(DFM), 2012 WL
774952, at *2 (D. Conn. Mar. 8, 2012) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted); accord Parker v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 260 F.3d
100, 111 (2d Cir. 2001). In response to the Town’s motion, Rizvi has failed
to identify any evidence supportive of any one of the three avenues for
proving an incidental burden on interstate commerce,5 let alone a disparate
burden that is “clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”
Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. Rizvi primarily focuses her efforts on attacking the
Town’s proffer of putative local benefits, namely community safety and
welfare. (Dkt. No. 56 at 11-13.) Her argument puts the cart before the
horse and overlooks the threshold showing she must make: that the
regulation imposes a burden on interstate commerce. For all of these

5

It is worth noting that Rizvi uses nearly five pages of her memorandum of law reciting,
by bullet point, what she asserts are disputed issues of fact that preclude summary judgment.
(Dkt. No. 56 at 5-9.) In the list of purported factual issues that follows, Rizvi fails to hone in on
the issue that is central to the dormant Commerce Clause claim: whether she can show a
“disparate burden” under any of the circumstances articulated by the Second Circuit.

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reasons, summary judgment is appropriate on Rizvi’s dormant Commerce
Clause claim.
2.

Equal Protection

For reasons that are not clear, the parties argue Rizvi’s equal
protection claims under the two distinct theories of selective enforcement
and class-of-one. Quite frankly, the court is at a loss. On the one hand,
Rizvi argues—in response to arguments for summary judgment as to a
selective enforcement theory—that she was targeted solely because the
Colonial Motel houses sex offenders. (Dkt. No. 56 at 13-14.) The
evidence and theory advanced by Rizvi would appear to support a
selective enforcement claim that is not dependent on protected class
membership. On the other hand, Rizvi claims—in opposition to the Town’s
motion on a class-of-one theory—that the Local Law “burdens her
fundamental personal rights” and that she “has been singled out on the
basis of her advancing age, her sex, her national origin, and religion.” (Id.
at 15-16.)
Rizvi defends the selective enforcement theory by pointing only to:
(1) deposition testimony of Arms that it was common knowledge that sex
offenders stayed at the Colonial Motel for extended periods of time and
14

that such information was part of the reason why the Local Law was
drafted; and (2) evidence to suggest that Houck said that the Local Law
came into being after it was discovered that sex offenders were staying in
hotels/motels in the Town and that he was not aware of sex offenders
staying anywhere other than the Colonial Motel. (Id. at 14; Dkt. No. 59,
Attach. 7 at 17; Dkt. No. 59, Attach. 8 at 30; Dkt. No. 59, Attach. 9.)
Apparently, Rizvi’s sole contention is that the Local Law was selectively
enforced as to the Colonial Motel because she housed sex offenders,
which, according to her, constitutes treatment with “‘impermissible
animus.’” (Dkt. No. 56 at 14 (quoting Harris v. Buffardi, No. 1:08-cv-1322,
2011 WL 3794235, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2011)).) Rizvi contends that a
class-of-one theory is viable because she was targeted based on age, sex,
national origin, and religion. (Dkt. No. 56 at 16.)
Despite the distinction drawn by the parties between “selective
enforcement” and “class-of-one,” Rizvi appears to assert a garden variety
selective enforcement claim—based upon her membership in a protected
class—and a class-of-one selective enforcement claim—based upon the
Colonial Motel’s affiliation with sex offenders. No matter the theory, Rizvi’s
equal protection claim, as a factual matter, relies on the notion that she
15

was treated differently than other businesses within the scope of the Local
Law with respect to enforcement thereof. (Compl. ¶ 41 (“Plaintiff . . . has
been singled out on the basis of her sex, age, national origin, and
religion.”).)
The Equal Protection Clause prohibits “selective adverse treatment
of individuals compared with other similarly situated individuals if ‘such
selective treatment was based on impermissible considerations such as
race, religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights,
or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person.’” Bizzarro v. Miranda,
394 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting LeClair v. Saunders, 627 F.2d 606,
609-10 (2d Cir. 1980)). In addition to the foregoing garden variety selective
enforcement claim, a plaintiff may assert “a ‘class of one’ selective
treatment claim without asserting membership in a protected class,” but, to
be successful, the plaintiff “must demonstrate, inter alia, that the
defendant[] intentionally treated h[er] differently from others similarly
situated without any rational basis.” Price v. City of N.Y., 264 F. App’x 66,
68 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Giordano v. City of N.Y., 274 F.3d 740, 751 (2d
Cir. 2001)). Selective enforcement may be proven by “both direct and
circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent.” Chabad Lubavitch of
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Litchfield Cnty., Inc. v. Litchfield Historic Dist. Comm’n, 768 F.3d 183, 199
(2d Cir. 2014).
Here, the Town is entitled to summary judgment. The record is
devoid of any proof that the Local Law was selectively enforced, which is
fatal to Rizvi’s claim. When deposed in March 2014, Arms testified that,
upon inspection of its guest register the week prior to his deposition, the
Continental Motel was found to be in violation of the 30/90 day rule. (Dkt.
No. 59, Attach. 7 at 1, 25.) While the temporal proximity to Rizvi’s
action—filed in July 2012 and based upon selective enforcement in April
and May 2012, (see generally Compl. ¶¶ 23, 30)—is obviously remote from
the violation identified by Arms two years later, in March 2014, Arms also
testified that he was directed by then-Town Supervisor Lenny Distel to
issue a ticket, which Arms intended to do in due course, (Dkt. No. 59,
Attach. 7 at 23, 25-286). Aside from this single incident,7 which cannot
6

An Arms affidavit submitted in reply, which the court accepts, see Bayway Refining
Co. v. Oxygenated Mktg. & Trading A.G., 215 F.3d 219, 227 (2d Cir. 2000) (explaining that a
court may accept evidence submitted with a reply where there is no surprise to the nonmoving
party, the nonmoving party does not seek to file a sur-reply to respond to the evidence, and
the nonmoving party makes no claim that it has contrary evidence), in essence reiterates what
Arms said during his deposition. (Compare Dkt. No. 59, Attach. 7 at 23, 25-28, with Dkt. No.
64, Attach. 3 ¶¶ 5-6.)
7

In fairness to Rizvi, Arms also testified about a violation of a different provision of the
Local Law—which required affected business to obtain and retain identification for each
guest—at Honors Haven Resort and Spa. (Dkt. No. 59, Attach. 7 at 22-23.) While Arms was

17

support a claim of selective enforcement at the time the Local Law was
enforced against the Colonial Motel, the record is devoid of any evidence
that a business covered by the Local Law was in violation of the 30/90 day
rule. Moreover, it is beyond dispute that each business affected by the
Local Law was provided notice of the new law’s requirements before the
effective date and was inspected to assure compliance. (Def.’s SMF
¶¶ 38, 39, 47.) In a nutshell, Rizvi has failed to “demonstrate that laws
were not applied to h[er] as they were applied to similarly situated
individuals and that the difference was intentional and unreasonable.”
Deegan v. City of Ithaca, 444 F.3d 135, 146 (2d Cir. 2006). Therefore,
whether pursued under a protected-class membership theory or on classof-one grounds, Rizvi’s selective enforcement equal protection claim fails.
V. Conclusion
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that Rizvi’s cross motion to amend (Dkt. No. 54) is

eventually directed to issue a ticket to Honors Haven Resort and Spa for the violation, as of
July 2014 he had not done so because of a backlog of work and shortage of enforcement
officers. (Dkt. No. 64, Attach. 3 ¶¶ 6, 11.) Honors Haven Resort and Spa’s violation of the
identification requirement is not germane to Rizvi’s selective enforcement claim, however,
because that portion of the Local Law was not enforced against the Colonial Motel and
“differential treatment[ is] a prerequisite to selective enforcement.” Church of Am. Knights of
the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197, 210 (2d Cir. 2004).

18

DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED that the Town’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No.
47) is GRANTED and Rizvi’s complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is DISMISSED; and it
is further
ORDERED that the Clerk close this case; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk provide a copy of this MemorandumDecision and Order to the parties.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
April 23, 2015
Albany, New York

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