Talukder v. County of Rensselaer et al
Filing
44
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER granting 17 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim: ORDERS that Defendant Rensselaer's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint is GRANTED; and the Court further ORDERS that Plaintiff's claims ag ainst Defendant Rensselaer are DISMISSED with prejudice; and the Court furtherORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall terminate Defendant Rensselaer from this action; and the Court further ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision and Order on the parties in accordance with the Local Rules. Signed by U.S. District Judge Mae A. D'Agostino on 6/5/13. (ban, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
____________________________________________
MICHAEL K. TALUKER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
1:12-cv-1765
(MAD/CFH)
COUNTY OF RENSSELAER,
CITY OF TROY, CITY OF TROY
POLICE DEPARTMENT,
POLICE OFFICER CHARLES D.
CASTLE, POLICE OFFICER
BUTTOFUCCO, POLICE
OFFICER McNULL, SERGEANT
G.E. ANDERSON, and POLICE
OFFICER JOHN DOE,
Defendants.
____________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
OF COUNSEL:
MICHAEL K. TALUKDER
Auburn Correctional Facility
P.O. Box 618
Auburn, New York 13024
Plaintiff pro se
CARTER, CONBOY, CASE, BLACKMORE,
MALONEY & LAIRD, P.C.
20 Corporate Woods Boulevard
Albany, New York 12211
Attorneys for Defendant Rensselaer
JAMES A. RESILA, ESQ.
Mae A. D'Agostino, U.S. District Judge:
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff commenced this action on November 30, 2012, seeking damages for alleged
violations of his constitutional rights.
Currently before the Court is Defendant County of Rensselaer's ("Rensselaer") motion to
dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See
Dkt. No. 17 at 2. Defendant Rensselaer asserts that (1) Plaintiff failed to state a claim for which
relief can be granted; (2) Plaintiff failed to state a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the
municipality; (3) Plaintiff failed to state a claim for false imprisonment; (4) Plaintiff failed to state
a claim regarding the violation of his due process rights; (5) Plaintiff failed to state a claim for
malicious abuse of process; (6) Plaintiff failed to state a claim against Defendant Rensselear for
New York State constitutional violations upon which relief can be granted; and (7) the district
attorney's actions are protected by absolute immunity. See id. at 2-10.
II. BACKGROUND
On September 15, 2011, Defendant police officer John Doe ("Doe") stopped Plaintiff as
Plaintiff walked down Old 6th Avenue in Troy, New York, because he looked suspicious. See
Dkt. 1 at 1-2. Plaintiff gave Defendant Doe his identifying information, and Defendant Doe
searched Plaintiff. See id. at 2. Defendant Doe found nothing, and told Plaintiff that he was "free
to go, but [he] better get home & fast because if [he] was out when [the officer] came back around
[he] wasn't going to make it home." See id. Two of Plaintiff's friends drove up to Plaintiff after
seeing his interaction with Defendant Doe. See id. Plaintiff told his friends he needed to get
home, and he was about to get in the car when two police cruisers pulled up with their lights on,
blocking the car. See id. One of Plaintiff's friends ran from the scene, while the other instructed
Plaintiff to enter the car, and drove away. See id.
When Plaintiff and his friend were pulled over, the police told them they had been pulled
over because they had left the scene of a crime. See id. Plaintiff and his friend were brought to
2
the City of Troy Police Department, where they were told that the police found 1,500 milligrams
of cocaine under the driver's seat of the car; Plaintiff and his friend explained that they had no
knowledge of cocaine being in the vehicle. See id. Plaintiff and his friend were charged with
Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Third Degree, Criminal Possession of a
Controlled Substance in the Fifth Degree, and Loitering in the First Degree. See id. at 2-3.
Plaintiff had a preliminary hearing on September 20, 2011, at which Defendant police
officers Buttofucco and Charles D. Castle ("Castle") gave inconsistent testimony regarding the
location and quantity of drugs that were found in the vehicle. See id. at 3. Plaintiff was remanded
to the Rensselaer County Jail pending grand jury action. Plaintiff testified at his grand jury on
November 4, 2011. See id. Assistant District Attorney Elizabeth Kennedy advised Plaintiff to
plead guilty, but he refused. See id. Plaintiff was released from jail on November 5, 2011,
pursuant to C.P.L. § 190.80, because the prosecution had failed to indict Plaintiff within forty-five
days after a preliminary hearing. See id. On November 25, 2011, all charges against Plaintiff
were dismissed pursuant to C.P.L. § 160.50. See id.
On November 30, 2012, Plaintiff commenced this action. See id. at 1. Plaintiff alleges
that police officers under Defendant City of Troy's ("Troy") and Defendant Rensselaer's oversight
illegally searched and unlawfully detained him without cause or due process. See id. at 3-4.
Further, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Troy violated Plaintiff's right to due process by sending
the case to the grand jury even though the relevant police officers' testimony were inconsistent at
trial. See id. at 4.
Plaintiff claims that Defendants Castle, McNull, and Buttofucco illegally searched him,
causing Plaintiff to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment by being wrongfully accused
and unlawfully detained. See id. Plaintiff argues that each officer did so under the color of law in
3
the State of New York, County of Rensselaer, and City of Troy. See id. Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant Sergeant G.E. Anderson ("Anderson") allowed officers under his supervision to
illegally search him, resulting in Plaintiff being subjected to cruel and unusual punishment. See
id. at 4-5. Lastly, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant John Doe ("Doe") made indirect threats to and
illegally searched Plaintiff, causing Plaintiff to be wrongfully accused and unlawfully detained.
See id. at 5.
Plaintiff requests that Defendant Rensselaer be ordered to institute requirements for
training and enforcing policies against abuses of power. See id. at 5. Plaintiff requests that
Defendant Troy be ordered to monitor its law enforcement, and that Defendant City of Troy
Police Department be ordered to institute police training, oversight, and repercussions to ensure
citizens' rights are upheld. See id. Plaintiff further requests that Defendants Castle, Buttofucco,
McNull, Anderson, and Doe be reprimanded or terminated as police officers. See id. at 5-6.
Plaintiff seeks $1,000,000.00 in punitive damages from each of the eight defendants. See id.
Lastly, Plaintiff requests that Defendant Rensselaer be ordered to create a $10,000,000.00 fund to
assist citizens who have been "Illegally Stopped, Searched, Frisked, & Detained in direct
violation of their Constitutional Rights." See id. at 6.
III. DISCUSSION
A.
Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of the party's
claim for relief. See Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 111-12 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). In
considering the legal sufficiency, a court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the pleading
4
and draw all reasonable inferences in the pleader's favor. See ASTI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar
Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). This presumption of truth,
however, does not extend to legal conclusions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(citation omitted).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a party need only plead "a short and plain statement of the
claim," see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), with sufficient factual "heft to 'sho[w] that the pleader is
entitled to relief[,]'" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) (quotation omitted).
Under this standard, the pleading's [f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right of relief
above the speculative level." Id. at 555 (citation omitted). "Where a complaint pleads facts that
are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility
and plausibility of "entitlement to relief."'" Id. (quoting [Twombly, 550 U.S.] at 557, 127 S. Ct.
1955). Ultimately, "when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of
entitlement to relief," Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558, or where a plaintiff has "not nudged [its] claims
across the line from conceivable to plausible, the [ ] complaint must be dismissed[,]" id. at 570.
Despite this recent tightening of the standard for pleading a claim, complaints by pro se
parties continue to be accorded more deference than those filed by attorneys. See Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation omitted). As such, Twombly and Iqbal
notwithstanding, this Court must continue to "'construe [a complaint] broadly, and interpret [it] to
raise the strongest arguments that [it] suggests.'" Weixel v. Bd. of Educ., 287 F.3d 138, 146 (2d
Cir. 2002) (quotation omittes).
When a pro se complaint fails to state a cause of action, the court generally "should not
dismiss without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint
gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated." Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112
5
(2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation and citations omitted). Of course, an opportunity to amend is
not required where "[t]he problem with [the plaintiff's] cause of action is substantive" such that
"better pleading will not cure it." Id. (citation omitted).
B.
Municipal liability
In order to succeed in recovering from a municipality under section 1983, the plaintiff
"must first prove the existence of a municipal policy or custom" that was the cause of his injuries.
Vippolis v. Vill. of Haverstraw, 768 F.2d 40, 44 (2d Cir. 1985) (citation omitted). "Second, the
plaintiff must establish a causal connection – an 'affirmative link' – between the policy and the
deprivation of his constitutional rights." Id. (citations omitted).
To satisfy the first prong of the test on a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must allege the
existence of either (1) a formal policy, which the municipality has officially endorsed, see Monell
v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); (2) actions taken or decisions
made by government officials responsible for establishing municipal policies which caused the
alleged violation of the plaintiff's civil rights, see Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469,
483-84 (1986); (3) a practice so persistent and widespread that it constitutes a "custom or usage"
and implies the constructive knowledge of policy-making officials, see Monell, 436 U.S. at
690-91; or (4) the failure of official policy-makers to train or supervise subordinates properly to
such an extent that it "amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of those with whom the
[municipal employees] will come into contact," City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388
(1989) (footnote omitted).
In the present matter, Plaintiff offers no more than a bare recitation of the elements of this
claim, without any factual support. In the complaint, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Rensselaer
6
engaged in the following conduct: "The County of Rensselaer overseeing all Law Enforcement
Agencies under it's Jurisdiction did allow Officers under their command to violate Plaintiff's
Constitutional Rights by Unlawfully Detaining the Plaintiff because of an Illegal Search. The
County of Rensselaer also ordered the Detaining of the Plaintiff without Cause nor Due Process."
See Dkt. No. 1 at 3-4. This boilerplate recitation of the elements of a Monell claim is insufficient
to survive a motion to dismiss. See In re Dayton, 786 F. Supp. 2d 809, 823 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(dismissing the plaintiff's Monell claim against the City of Middletown and Orange County that
merely alleged the City and County "'negligently failed to properly administer its agencies[,]
departments[,] personnel[,] and the like in regard to the maintenance, design, supervision and
control over those accused and detained'").
Further, Plaintiff does not allege any conduct on Defendant Rensselaer's part. All of the
named Defendants are employees of Defendant Troy, not Defendant Rensselaer. Although
Plaintiff asks the Court to ensure that Defendant Rensselaer institute policies to train its officers
against abuses of power, Plaintiff fails to allege that there exists such a policy, custom or practice
that let to a violation of his constitutional rights. See Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185,
195 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding "that an 'official policy' cannot ordinarily be inferred from a single
incident of illegality, such as a first false arrest or excessive use of force, absent some additional
circumstances" (citation omitted)).
Finally, although Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Rensselaer "oversee[s] all Law
Enforcement agencies under its jurisdiction," including the City of Troy Police Department,
Plaintiff fails to state any basis for this presumption. Although the City of Troy is located within
the borders of Defendant Rensselaer, they are separate political entities.
7
Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Defendant Rensselaer's motion to dismiss.1
C.
False Imprisonment Claim
In order to state a claim for false imprisonment under § 1983, a plaintiff "must
demonstrate that defendant intended to confine him, he was conscious of the confinement, he did
not consent to the confinement, and the confinement was not otherwise privileged." Shain v.
Ellison, 273 F.3d 56, 67 (2d Cir. 2001).
In the present matter, Plaintiff offers no more than a bare recitation of the elements of this
claim, without any factual support. Plaintiff was arrested by City of Troy police officers, not the
County Sheriff's Department, and was subsequently charged with drug related offenses. See Dkt.
No. 1 at 2-3. Plaintiff was then detained in the County jail pursuant to section 500-a(b) of the
New York Correction Law. Plaintiff does not claim any independent violations of his rights
during his incarceration.
Pursuant to New York Correction Law § 500-a(b), "each county jail shall be used . . . for
the detention of persons charged with a crime, and committed for trial or examination." It is well
settled that such a confinement is privileged and will not give rise to an action for false
imprisonment/detainment. See Kearney v. Westchester County Dept. of Corr., 2012 WL
6621457, *1 (2d Cir. Dec. 20, 2012) (citations omitted). Since Plaintiff concedes that he was
detained pursuant to a court order pending "Grand Jury Action," his confinement was privileged
and, therefore, he has failed to allege a plausible claim for false imprisonment/detention.
Although the Court's determination that Plaintiff failed to state a plausible claim of
municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is dispositive because Plaintiff did not name any
individual employed by Defendant Rensselaer as a Defendant in this matter, the Court will still
address the merits of Plaintiff's substantive claims as they relate to Defendant Rensselaer.
1
8
Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Defendant Rensselaer's motion to dismiss as to
Plaintiff's false imprisonment/detention claim.
D.
Due Process Claim
In his complaint, Plaintiff does not state whether he is attempting to assert a procedural or
substantive due process claim. Under either analysis, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim.
In order to prevail on a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983, "the plaintiff must show (1) that he possessed a protected liberty or property
interest; and (2) that he was deprived of that interest without due process." Rehman v. State Univ.
of N.Y. at Stony Brook, 596 F. Supp. 2d 643, 656 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing McMenemy v. City of
Rochester, 241 F.3d 279, 285-86 (2d Cir. 2001)). "Property rights arise from '"an independent
source such as state law," [with] federal constitutional law determin[ing] whether that interest
rises to the level of a "legitimate claim of entitlement" protected by the Due Process Clause.'"
Pichen v. City of Auburn, N.Y., 728 F. Supp. 2d 192, 198 (N.D.N.Y. 2010) (quotation and other
citation omitted).
To state a substantive due process claim, the plaintiff must show that (1) he had a valid
property interest in a benefit that was entitled to constitutional protection, and (2) that the
defendant's actions were "so outrageously arbitrary as to be gross abuse of governmental
authority." Lisa's Party City, Inc. v. Town of Henrietta, 185 F.3d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation
omitted).
In the present matter, Plaintiff fails to specify a valid property interest that was entitled to
constitutional protection or that Defendant Rensselaer's actions were so outrageously arbitrary as
to be a gross abuse of governmental authority. Further, Plaintiff fails to state any facts to support
9
his allegation that Defendant Rensselaer caused his detainment and, therefore, violated his due
process rights.
Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Defendant Rensselaer's motion to dismiss as to
this claim.
E.
Abuse of process
The torts of malicious prosecution and abuse of process are very similar in nature. See
Cook v. Sheldon, 41 F.3d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 1994). "While malicious prosecution concerns the
improper issuance of process, '[t]he gist of abuse of process is the improper use of process after it
is regularly issued.'" Id. (quotation omitted). Abuse of process is the use of "legal process to
attain some collateral objective . . . ." Bd. of Educ. of Farmingdale Union Free Sch. Dist. v.
Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Ass'n, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 397, 402 (1975) (citations omitted).
Both malicious prosecution and abuse of process are recognized claims under section 1983. See
Cook, 41 F.3d at 80 (citations omitted).
The federal courts look to state law to determine the elements of an abuse of process
claim. See id. (citations omitted). Pursuant to New York Law, an abuse of process claim lies
against a defendant who "(1) employs regularly issued legal process to compel performance or
forbearance of some act (2) with intent to do harm without excuse or justification, and (3) in order
to obtain a collateral objective that is outside the legitimate ends of the process." Id. (citations
omitted). Unlike malicious prosecution, favorable termination of the criminal proceeding is not
an element of an abuse of process claim. See Dallas v. Goldberg, 95 Civ. 9076, 2002 WL
1013291, *12 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2002).
Moreover, the plaintiff must allege that the process that the defendants issued was
10
improperly used after it was issued, not merely that the defendants acted with malice in bringing
the action. See Curiano v. Suozzi, 63 N.Y.2d 113, 117 (1984) (citation omitted). As the Second
Circuit has explained, "it is not sufficient for a plaintiff to allege that the defendant[ ] [was]
seeking to retaliate against him by pursuing his arrest and prosecution. Instead, he must claim
that [the defendant] aimed to achieve a collateral purpose beyond or in addition to [the plaintiff's]
criminal prosecution." Savino, 331 F.3d at 77.
In the present matter, Plaintiff has failed to allege the elements of this cause of action and
simply makes a legal conclusion without asserting any facts plausibly supporting an abuse of
process claim. Further, the complaint fails to allege any facts suggesting an ulterior motive by
Defendant Rensselaer or a collateral objective that Defendant Rensselaer might have sought to
obtain through the use of legal process.
Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Defendant Rensselaer's motion to dismiss as to
this claim.
F.
Leave to amend
When a pro se complaint fails to state a cause of action, the court generally "should not
dismiss without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint
gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated." Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112
(2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation and citations omitted). Of course, an opportunity to amend is
not required where "[t]he problem with [the plaintiff's] cause of action is substantive" such that
"better pleading will not cure it." Id. (citation omitted).
Although a Court should generally grant a plaintiff proceeding pro se at least one
opportunity to amend when dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim, no such
11
opportunity is required when it is clear that such an amendment would be futile, as is the case in
the present matter. In his response to Defendant Rensselaer's motion to dismiss, Plaintiff makes
clear that the only reason he included Defendant Rensselaer in this matter is because "[t]he
County of Rensselaer has municipal liability over the City of Troy[,] who has municipal liability
over the City of Troy Police Department." See Dkt. No. 26 at 3. As discussed, Defendant
Rensselaer and the Defendant Troy are separate municipal entities, not subject to liability for the
other's actions, absent their personal involvement in the alleged unconstitutional conduct.
Plaintiff's complaint and response to Defendant Rensselaer's motion make clear that Defendant
Rensselaer is included as a Defendant merely because it is the county in which Defendant Troy is
located.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the claims against Defendant Rensselaer
should be dismissed with prejudice because any amendment to the complaint as to this Defendant
would be futile.
IV. CONCLUSION
After carefully reviewing the entire record in this matter, the parties' submissions and the
applicable law, and for the above-stated reasons, the Court hereby
ORDERS that Defendant Rensselaer's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint is
GRANTED; and the Court further
ORDERS that Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Rensselaer are DISMISSED with
prejudice; and the Court further
ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall terminate Defendant Rensselaer from this
action; and the Court further
12
ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision
and Order on the parties in accordance with the Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: June 5, 2013
Albany, New York
13
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?