Burch v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER: the Court hereby ORDERS that Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings is DENIED. The Court further ORDERS that Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED. The Court further ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in favor of Defendant and close this case. Signed by Senior Judge Frederick J. Scullin, Jr. on 11/20/2015. (nmk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_______________________________________________
SARA LINDSEY BURCH,
Plaintiff,
v.

1:13-CV-155
(FJS)

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
_______________________________________________
APPEARANCES

OF COUNSEL

OFFICE OF STEPHEN J. MASTAITIS, JR.
1412 Route 9P
Saratoga Springs, New York 12866
Attorneys for Plaintiff

STEPHEN J. MASTAITIS, JR., ESQ.

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Office of Regional General Counsel
Region II
26 Federal Plaza Room 3904
New York, New York 10278
Attorneys for Defendant

KATRINA M. LEDERER, ESQ.

SCULLIN, Senior Judge
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Sara Lindsey Burch brought this action pursuant to the Social Security Act (the
"Act"), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the
"Commissioner"), denying her application for Child's Insurance Benefits based on disability and
Supplemental Security Income ("SSI"). See Dkt. No. 1.
Pending before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings. See

Dkt. Nos. 11, 12.

II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was born on June 3, 1993. Plaintiff completed 11th grade and, as of April 23, 2012,
was expected to receive an Individualized Education Plan ("IEP") diploma. Plaintiff is able to
communicate in English but has no work history. Generally, Plaintiff's alleged disability consists of
borderline intellectual function, obesity, high blood pressure, thyroid impairment, and respiratory
impairments. Her alleged disability onset date is June 3, 1993.
On April 18, 2011, Plaintiff applied for Child's Insurance Benefits. Subsequently, on June 1,
2011, she applied for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI"). The Social Security Administration
initially denied both applications on September 16, 2011, after which Plaintiff timely requested a
hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). ALJ Robert Wright held a hearing in Albany,
New York, on March 9, 2012. Attorney John Bernhard represented Plaintiff, who appeared and
testified. See Dkt. No. 9-1, Administrative Record ("AR") at 13.1 Esperanza Distefano, an impartial
vocation expert ("VE"), also testified, see id., as did Plaintiff's father.
The ALJ considered the case de novo and issued a written decision denying Plaintiff's
application on April 23, 2012. See id. at 13-22. In his decision, the ALJ stated that he had carefully
considered the entire record and made the following findings:
(1) Born on June 3, 1993, Plaintiff had not attained age 22 as of June
3, 1993, the alleged onset date, and was 18 years old within 2 days of
the application date, see id. at 15 (citing 20 CFR 404.102,
416.120(c)(4) and 404.350(a)(5)).
1

References to the page numbers in the Administrative Record are to the Bate-stamp
number appearing in the upper right corner of each page.
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(2) Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity ("SGA")
since June 3, 1993, the alleged onset date, see id. (citing 20 CFR
404.1571 et seq., and 416.971 et seq.).
(3) Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: borderline
intellectual function, obesity and respiratory impairments, see id.
(citing 20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).
(4) Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the
listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, see id.
at 17 (citing 20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d),
416.925 and 416.926).
(5) Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform a
full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: (a) limited to unskilled work that requires only
a fourth-grade reading level, (b) in a clean air environment, meaning
air such as might be found in an office or shopping mall, without
fumes or respiratory irritants, and (c) with no contact with the public,
see id. at 19.
(6) Plaintiff had no past relevant work, see id. at 21 (citing 20 CFR
404.1565 and 416.965).
(7) Plaintiff was born on June 3, 1993, and was 0 years old, which is
defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the alleged disability
onset date and was 18 years old within 2 days of her SSI application
date, see id. (citing 20 CFR 404.1563 and 416.963).
(8) Plaintiff had an 11th grade education, was expected to receive an
IEP diploma at the end of 2012, and was able to communicate in
English, see id. (citing 20 CFR 404.1564 and 416.964).
(9) Transferability of job skills was not an issue because Plaintiff did
not have past relevant work, see id. (citing 20 CFR 404.1568 and
416.968).
(10) Considering Plaintiff's age, education, work experience and RFC,
there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national
economy that Plaintiff could perform, see id. (citing 20 CFR
404.1569, 404.1569(a), 416.969, and 416.969(a)).

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(11) Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined in the Social
Security Act, from June 3, 1993, through the date of the ALJ's
decision, April 23, 2012, see id. at 22 (citing 20 CFR 404.350(a)(5),
404.1520(g) and 416.920(g)).
On December 15, 2012, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review, rendering
the ALJ's decision the Commissioner's final decision. See id. at 4-6.
Plaintiff commenced this action on February 11, 2013, see Dkt. No. 1, and filed a supporting
brief on July 11, 2013, see Dkt. No. 11. Defendant filed a responsive brief on August 15, 2013. See
Dkt. No. 12.

III. DISCUSSION
A.

Standard of review
Absent legal error, a court will uphold the Commissioner's final determination if there is

substantial evidence in the record to support it. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Supreme Court has
defined substantial evidence to mean "'more than a mere scintilla'" of evidence and "'such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quotation omitted).
To be eligible for SSI, a claimant must show that she suffers from a disability within the
meaning of the Act. The Act defines "disability" as an inability "to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected
to result in death or which has or can be expected to last for a period of not less than twelve
months." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). To determine if a claimant has sustained a disability within
the meaning of the Act, the ALJ follows a five-step process:

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(1) The ALJ first determines whether the claimant is engaged in SGA.
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(b), 416.972. If so, the claimant is not
disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b).
(2) If the claimant is not engaged in SGA, the ALJ determines if the
claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments. See
20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). If not, the claimant is not disabled. See id.
(3) If the claimant has a severe impairment, the ALJ determines if the
impairment meets or equals an impairment found in the appendix to
the regulations (the "Listings"). If so, the claimant is disabled. See 20
C.F.R. § 416.920(d).
(4) If the impairment does not meet the requirements of the Listings,
the ALJ determines if the claimant can do her past relevant work. See
20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e), (f). If so, she is not disabled. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.920(f).
(5) If the claimant cannot perform her past relevant work, the ALJ
determines if she can perform other work, in light of her RFC, age,
education, and experience. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(f), (g). If so, she
is not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(g). A claimant is only
entitled to receive disability benefits if she cannot perform any
alternative gainful activity. See id.
For this test, the burden of proof is on the claimant for the first four steps and on the
Commissioner for the fifth step, if the analysis proceeds that far. See Balsamo v. Chater, 142 F.3d
75, 80 (2d Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted).

B.

Plaintiff's obesity
When analyzing a claimant's obesity, an ALJ should rely on SSR 02-1p, which explains the

process for assessing a claimant's obesity at steps two through five of the sequential evaluation
process. See SSR 02-1p, 2002 WL 31026506 (Sept. 12, 2002). At step two, the ALJ should find
obesity severe, alone or in combination with other medically determinable impairments if "it

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significantly limits an individual's physical or mental abilities to do basic work activities." Id. at
¶ 6. At step three, SSR 02-1p provides that "obesity may increase the severity of coexisting or
related impairments to the extent that the combination of impairments meets the requirements of a
listing. This is especially true of . . . respiratory . . . impairments." Id. at ¶ 7. At steps four and five,
the ALJ "will consider any functional limitations resulting from the obesity in the RFC assessment."
Id. at ¶ 9. However, the ALJ "will not make assumptions about the severity or functional effects of
obesity combined with other impairments . . . . [but] will evaluate each case based on the
information in the case record." Id. at ¶ 7.
SSR 02-1p notwithstanding, an ALJ is not required to single out a claimant's obesity for
discussion in all cases. See Yablonski v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:03-CV-414, 2008 WL
2157129, *6 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2008) (citing Cruz v. Barnhart, 2006 WL 1228581, at *9 (S.D.N.Y.
May 8, 2006) (citing Guadalupe v. Barnhart, 2005 WL 2033380, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2005))),
report and recommendation adopted, 2008 WL 2157128 (N.D.N.Y. May 20, 2008). Furthermore,
"[t]hose circuits which have recently commented on this complaint
[that the ALJ did not explicitly consider the claimant's obesity] have
held that an ALJ's failure to explicitly address a claimant's obesity
does not warrant remand . . . . When an ALJ's decision adopts the
physical limitations suggested by reviewing doctors after examining
the Plaintiff, the claimant's obesity is understood to have been
factored into their decisions."
Yablonski, 2008 WL 2157129, at *6 (quoting Guadalupe v. Barnhart, 2005 WL 2033380, at *6
(citing Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552-53 (3d Cir. 2005) & Skarbek v. Barnhart, 390
F.3d 500, 504 (7th Cir. 2004))) (other citation omitted); see also Martin v. Astrue, No. 5:05-CV-72,
2008 WL 4186339, *3-*4 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2008), aff'd, 337 F. App'x 87 (2d Cir. 2009).
In this case, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's obesity was a severe impairment. See AR at 15.
Specifically, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff "had been diagnosed with, and treated for asthma, which

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has been complicated by her obesity." See id. at 16. In his RFC determination, the ALJ concluded
that Plaintiff was limited to work in a clean air environment without fumes or respiratory irritants.
See id. at 19. Furthermore, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff's obesity by itself, or in combination
with its effects on Plaintiff's respiratory impairment, was not sufficient to meet any impairment
listed in the Social Security regulations. See id. at 17. The ALJ also noted that, even considering
Plaintiff's obesity, Plaintiff's respiratory problems were not sufficient to satisfy a respiratory
impairment as there was no evidence of sufficient abnormal test findings, hospitalization, or urgent
care intervention. See id. at 17.
In addition, Plaintiff's medical records do not establish any work-related limitations
associated with her obesity. Consultative examiner Dr. Paolano noted that Plaintiff had reported
that she did not believe she had any physical limitations. See AR at 207. Dr. Paolano's physical
examination notes did not indicate any significant physical limitations. See id. at 208. Although Dr.
Meyer and special education teacher Jenni Palerno opined that Plaintiff had limited mobility due to
obesity and asthma, Plaintiff's own testimony supports a finding that her obesity did not limit her
mobility. See id. at 86, 103; see also Dkt. No. 9-2 at 280-84. Plaintiff testified that her asthma did
not bother her often and that she only had issues with asthma when she walked far distances or ran.
See Dkt. No. 9-2 at 283. Plaintiff further testified that she was able to perform a multitude of daily
activities including laundry, washing dishes, caring for a pet dog and pet cat, preparing meals,
dressing herself, riding a school bus, and attending gym class. See id. at 280-82.
For all these reason, the Court finds that the ALJ properly assessed Plaintiff's obesity as SSR
02-1p requires. The ALJ expressly addressed Plaintiff's obesity and found it severe. See AR at 15.
In determining Plaintiff's RFC, the ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff "had been diagnosed with, and
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treated for asthma, which has been complicated by her obesity"; and, despite the fact that Dr.
Paolano found no physical limitations or evidence of wheezing, the ALJ limited Plaintiff to working
in a clean air environment without fumes or respiratory irritants. See id. at 19, 207-08. Given the
ALJ's discussion of Plaintiff's obesity throughout his decision and the evidence in the record on
which he relied, the Court concludes that there is substantial evidence in the record to support the
ALJ's conclusions regarding Plaintiff's obesity and its effects on her ability to engage in SGA at all
exertional levels within the limitations that he set.

C.

The ALJ's RFC determination
Residual functional capacity ("RFC") is "'what an individual can still do despite . . . her

limitations. Ordinarily, RFC is the individual's maximum remaining ability to do sustained work
activities in an ordinary work setting on a regular and continuing basis . . . .'" Melville v. Apfel, 198
F.3d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *2); see also SSR 96-8p, 1996
WL 374184, *2 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996). "'A "regular and continuing basis" means 8 hours a day, for 5
days a week, or an equivalent work schedule.'" Balles v. Astrue, No. 3:11-CV-1386, 2013 WL
252970, *2 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2013) (quoting Melville v. Apfel, 198 F.3d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 1999)
(quoting SSR 96-8p, Policy Interpretation Ruling Titles II and XVI: Assessing Residual Functional
Capacity in Initial Claims ("SSR 96-8p"), 1996 WL 374184, *2 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996))).
In rendering an RFC determination, the ALJ must consider objective medical facts,
diagnoses and medical opinions based on such facts, as well as a plaintiff's subjective symptoms.
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945; Ferraris v. Heckler, 728 F.2d 582, 585 (2d Cir. 1984);
Martone v. Apfel, 70 F. Supp. 2d 145, 150 (N.D.N.Y. 1999). "A determination that a person can
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work is predicated on a finding of residual functional capacity (RFC), which must be established by
demonstrating substantial evidence [of] each of the criteria of the physical requirements in the
regulations." LaPorta v. Bowen, 737 F. Supp. 180, 181 (N.D.N.Y. 1990) (citing Benko v.
Schweiker, 551 F. Supp. 698, 705 (D.N.H. 1982)).
In this case, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform a full range of work at all
exertional levels with the following nonexertional limitations: unskilled work that requires only a
fourth-grade reading level; work in a clean air environment such as air that may be found in an
office or shopping mall without fumes or respiratory irritants; and no contact with the public. See
AR at 19.2 Basic work activities are "abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs," including,
for example, "walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying or handling[.]"
20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b); SSR 85-28, 1985 WL 56856, *3 (1985).
In support of his RFC determination, the ALJ noted that he afforded "great weight" to the
opinions of consultative examining psychologist Seth Rigberg, Ph.D.; consultative non-examining
review physician Jennifer Meyer, M.D.; speech and language pathologist Dawn Grasso-Megyeri,
M.S., CCC-SLP; and consultative examining physician Albert Paolano, M.D. See AR at 20-21.
The ALJ also afforded "greater consideration" to the opinion of certified school psychologist Bonnie
Wieder. See id. at 21.
The ALJ's mental limitations in his RFC findings are consistent with Dr. Rigberg's and Dr.
Meyer's examination notes and opinions. Dr. Rigberg examined Plaintiff in July 2011. See id. at
172. Dr. Rigberg noted, upon administration of a standardized achievement measure, that Plaintiff
2

The Court notes that, in her submissions, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred in finding
that she could perform the full range of sustained light work activity. See Dkt. No. 11 at 8. This
is an inaccurate statement of the ALJ's findings with respect to Plaintiff's RFC. See AR at 19.
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had a word reading score of 70, the equivalent of a 3.8 grade level. See id. at 173. Dr. Rigberg
opined that Plaintiff was able to follow and understand simple directions and instructions, could
perform some simple tasks independently, would need supervision to perform some tasks, and was
able to maintain attention and concentration for tasks. See id. at 174.
Consultative non-examining review physician Jennifer Meyer further opined that Plaintiff's
learning disability was a medically determinable severe impairment. See id. at 200. Dr. Meyer
noted that Plaintiff's teacher reported that Plaintiff was in a life-skills education program that was at
a third to fifth grade level and that Plaintiff's WRAT-IV demonstrated a third grade reading level.
See id. at 202.
In further support of the ALJ's mental RFC findings, speech pathologist Dawn GrassoMegyeri observed that Plaintiff had mild articulation delay and receptive vocabulary delay but noted
that Plaintiff's prognosis was fair. See id. at 21, 170. Similarly, certified school psychologist
Bonnie Wieder found Plaintiff's range of functioning to be low average to below average and
reported a Full Scale I.Q. score of 70. See id. at 228. Based on the opinions of Dr. Rigberg, Dr.
Meyer, Therapist Grasso, and Psychologist Wieder, the ALJ limited Plaintiff to "unskilled work that
requires only a fourth grade reading level." See id. at 19.
Furthermore, although the ALJ found Plaintiff capable of performing a full range of work at
all exertional levels, he limited this work by including several non-exertional limitations. See id. In
support of his findings, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff had told the state agency consultative examining
physician, Albert Paolano, M.D., that she did not believe that she had any physical limitations. See
id. at 20. The ALJ also gave great weight to the opinion of Dr. Paolano, who examined Plaintiff on
September 7, 2011. See id. at 207. Dr. Paolano observed that Plaintiff rose from the seated position
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with no difficulty and ambulated with a normal gait. See id. Dr. Paolano also noted that Plaintiff
had full and clear breathing sounds with no wheezing. See id. His assessment of Plaintiff's
extremities showed no signs of muscle atrophy or swelling, and her deep tendon reflexes and
straight leg raises were all normal and symmetric. See id. Dr. Paolano further noted that Plaintiff
had normal range of motion in all extremities. See id. Dr. Paolano's overall conclusion was that
Plaintiff had no significant physical limitations. See id. Based on Dr. Paolano's examination notes
and assessment, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could perform a full range of work. See id. at 19.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that, in rendering his RFC determination, the ALJ
properly considered objective medical facts, diagnoses and medical opinions based on such facts,
and Plaintiff's subjective symptoms, including pain and descriptions of other limitations. See 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945; Martone, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 150. Furthermore, the ALJ supported his
RFC determination with a narrative discussion, describing specifically how the opinions of Dr.
Rigberg, Dr. Meyer, Dr. Paolano, Ms. Grasso-Megyeri, and Ms. Wieder affected his RFC
determination. See AR at 13-21; Trail v. Astrue, No. 5:09-CV-01120, 2010 WL 3825629, *6
(N.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2010) (citing S.S.R. 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *7 (S.S.A.)) (finding that
"'[t]he RFC assessment must also include a narrative discussion, describing how the evidence
supports each conclusion, citing specific medical facts . . . and nonmedical evidence . . . .'").
For all these reasons, the Court finds that there is substantial evidence in the record to
support the ALJ's RFC determination.

D.

Plaintiff's credibility
When assessing a claimant's credibility, the ALJ must consider both her medical records and
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her reported symptoms. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. A claimant's statements about her condition, on
their own, are not enough to establish disability. See id.; SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, *1 (July 2,
1996). A claimant's complaint of pain and limitation is, however, "'entitled to great weight where . .
. it is supported by objective medical evidence.'" Futia v. Astrue, No. 1:06-CV-0961, 2009 WL
425657, *6 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2009) (quoting Simmons v. U.S.R.R. Retirement Bd., 982 F.2d 49, 56
(2d Cir. 1992)).
If the medical evidence does not support a claimant's testimony, the ALJ employs a two-step
process to evaluate the claimant's reported symptoms. See SSR 96-7p, at *2. First, the ALJ
determines if the claimant has medically determinable impairments that could produce the alleged
symptoms. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a); SSR 96-7p, at *2. Second, if impairments do exist, the
ALJ evaluates the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the symptoms to determine the
extent to which the symptoms limit the claimant's ability to work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c);
SSR 96-7p, at *2. In so doing, the ALJ considers (1) claimant's daily activities, (2) the location,
duration, frequency, and intensity of the claimant's pain or other symptoms; (3) precipitating and
aggravating factors; (4) type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication the claimant
takes or has taken to relieve her pain or other symptoms; (5) other treatment the claimant receives or
has received to relieve her pain or other symptoms; (6) any measures the claimant takes or has taken
to relieve her pain or other symptoms; and (7) any other factors concerning the claimant's limitations
and restrictions due to her pain or other symptoms. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3)(i)-(vii); SSR 967p, at *3.
Finally, "'[a]n [ALJ] may properly reject [a claimant's subjective complaints] after weighing
the objective medical evidence in the record, the claimant's demeanor, and other indicia of
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credibility, but must set forth his . . . reasons "with sufficient specificity to enable [the court] to
decide whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence."'" Lewis v. Apfel, 62 F.
Supp. 2d 648, 651 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (quoting Gallardo v. Apfel, No. 96 CIV 9435, 1999 WL
185253, *5 (S.D.N.Y. March 25, 1999)).
In this case, the ALJ correctly applied the two-step process. The ALJ found that Plaintiff
had the medically determinable severe impairments of borderline intellectual function, obesity, and
respiratory impairments. See AR at 15-16. He also determined that these impairments could
reasonably be expected to cause some of the limitations about which Plaintiff complained. See id. at
20. However, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff's statements about the intensity, persistence and
limiting effects of her symptoms were not credible to the extent that they were not consistent with
his RFC assessment. See id.
The ALJ explained that, with regard to Plaintiff's intellectual limitations, he found her
testimony to be credible and consistent with the medical evidence. See id. However, he did not find
her assessment of the effect of these limitations on her ability to maintain employment consistent
with the vocational evidence and Social Security rules. See id.
Specifically, he found Plaintiff's contention that she was unable to work to be inconsistent
with the vocational expert's testimony. See id. at 20. The ALJ noted, in this regard, that he did not
think that Plaintiff was intentionally misrepresenting her situation. See id. However, he found that
she underestimated her potential to perform work that existed in significant numbers in the national
economy, despite her impairments. See id.
There is substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ's conclusion with regard to
Plaintiff's credibility. As the ALJ noted, Plaintiff testified at the hearing that she was in the 12th
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grade, in special education classes and was attending a BOCES program. See id. at 20. She also
testified that, on a given day, she got up around six or seven, dressed herself, ate breakfast, and went
to her BOCES classes. See id. In addition, she stated that she did some cooking at home, enjoyed
playing video games, did dishes, and did her own laundry. See id. She also stated that she went to
the grocery store with someone else and cared for a pet dog and a pet cat. See id.
Finally, with regard to Plaintiff's asthma, the ALJ noted that she had testified that her asthma
affected her when there was a lot of pollen in the air and that she had not used her inhaler for
approximately two months prior to the hearing. See id.
The ALJ also noted that, with regard to the opinion evidence, he had given great weight to
the opinion of consultative examining psychologist Seth Rigberg, PhD as articulated in his July 26,
2011 examination report, significant weight to the opinion of consultative non-examining review
physician Jennifer Meyer, M.D., as articulated in her June 17, 2011 opinion, and had given great
weight to the opinion of speech and language pathologist Dawn Grasso-Megyeri, M.S., CCC-SLP,
as articulated in her July 26, 2011 speech and language report. See id. at 20-21.
For all these reasons, the Court concludes that there is substantial evidence in the record to
support the ALJ's conclusion regarding Plaintiff's credibility.

IV. CONCLUSION
After reviewing the entire record in this matter, the parties' submissions, and the applicable
law, and for the above-stated reasons, the Court hereby
ORDERS that Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings is DENIED; and the Court
further
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ORDERS that Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED; and the
Court further
ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in favor of Defendant and close
this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 20, 2015
Syracuse, New York

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