Brunswick Central School District v. Gill Montague Regional School District

Filing 19

MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDERED, that Plaintiffs Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3); and it is further ORDERED, that Defendants Motion (Dkt. No. 11) for summary judgment is DENIED as moot; and it is further ORDERED, that Plaintiffs Motion (Dkt. No. 16) for summary judgment is DENIED as moot. Signed by Senior Judge Lawrence E. Kahn on August 12, 2014. (sas)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
BRUNSWICK CENTRAL SCHOOL
DISTRICT,
Plaintiff,
-against-

1:13-CV-0445 (LEK/RFT)

GILL MONTAGUE REGIONAL SCHOOL
DISTRICT,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDER
I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Brunswick Central School District (“Plaintiff,” or “BCSD”) brings this action

seeking tuition reimbursement from Defendant Gill Montague Regional School District
(“Defendant,” or “GMRSD”) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1400 et. seq. (“IDEA”). Dkt. No. 1 (“Complaint”). Both parties have filed Motions for summary
judgment and oppositions. Dkt. Nos. 11 (“Defendant Motion”); 13 (“Plaintiff Response”); 15
(“Plaintiff Motion”); 16 (“Defendant Response”). Because the Court finds that it lacks subjectmatter jurisdiction, this case is dismissed.
II.

BACKGROUND
A. The IDEA
Congress enacted the IDEA “to promote the education of handicapped children.” Walczak

v. Florida Union Free School Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Bd. of Educ. v.
Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 179 (1982)). “Toward that end, Congress provides federal funds to those
states that develop plans to assure ‘all children with disabilities the right to a free appropriate public

education [“FAPE”].’” Walczak, 142 F.3d at 122 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1)); see also A.M. ex
rel. Y.N. v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 964 F. Supp. 2d 270, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“The
[IDEA] requires any state receiving federal funds to provide disabled children with a FAPE.”). The
IDEA does not dictate how each state administers its education to disabled students, but merely
provides that “[e]ach State that receives funds under this chapter shall . . . ensure that any State
rules, regulations and policies relating to this chapter conform to the purposes of this chapter.” 20
U.S.C. § 1407.
The IDEA also “ensure[s] that children with disabilities and their parents are guaranteed
procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of a [FAPE].” 20 U.S.C. § 1415. The IDEA’s
procedural safeguards serve two primary functions. First, “[i]f a parent believes that the [school
district] has breached its obligations under the IDEA ‘by failing to provide their disabled child a
FAPE, the parent may unilaterally place their child in a private school at their own financial risk and
seek tuition reimbursement.’” Scott ex rel. C.S. v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., No. 12 CIV
3558, 2014 WL 1225529, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2014) (quoting Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v.
Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 9-10, 16 (1993)). Second, a parent may also challenge the adequacy of their
child’s Individualized Education Plan (“IEP”). See Antonaccio v. Bd. of Educ. of Arlington Cent.
Sch. Dist., 281 F. Supp. 2d 710, 713 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
The IDEA requires parents or disabled children seeking tuition reimbursement or
challenging an IEP to bring their claims through a state administrative process. See 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415. Only after the administrative process has been fully exhausted may they appeal an
unfavorable, administrative decision in state or federal district court. See 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(i)(2)(A); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4404(3); see also Antonaccio, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 713.

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B. Factual History1
Plaintiff is a New York state school district located in Rensselaer County. Dkt. No. 11-2
(“Def. Statement of Material Facts”) ¶ 1. Defendant is a Massachusetts school district located in
Franklin County, which includes the Village of Turner Falls (“Turner Falls”). Id. ¶ 2; Dkt. No. 15-5
(“Pl. Statement of Material Facts”) ¶ 2. In May 2010, a child in Turner Falls was taken into foster
care by the Massachusetts Department of Children & Families (“DCF”) and placed in a foster home
in Rensselaer County. Def. SMF ¶¶ 3-4. From May 2010 through June 2012, the child was enrolled
in a special education program in Plaintiff’s school district, which caused Plaintiff to incur tuition
expenses in the amount of $67,719.76. Pl. SMF ¶¶ 3, 8.
On June 26, 2012, the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education
(“DOE”) issued a letter to Defendant concerning the tuition expenses incurred by Plaintiff. Dkt. No.
14 (“Pl. Response to Def. SMF”) at 3. DOE’s letter indicated that, pursuant to Massachusetts
regulation 603 C.M.R. 28.10(4),2 Defendant was fiscally responsible for the child’s tuition expenses
because the child’s sole surviving parent resided in Turner Falls at the time the child was enrolled in

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Ordinarily in a motion for summary judgment, a court must resolve all ambiguities and
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000); Nora Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Grp. of Am., Inc., 164 F.3d
736, 742 (2d Cir. 1998). Where both parties have moved for summary judgment, it may thus be
necessary to distinguish their factual assertions accordingly. See id. However, in this case, the facts
are not in dispute, and therefore the Court has consolidated the parties’ factual statements for
purposes of this section.
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This regulation states, in relevant part, that “[t]he school district where the parent(s) . . .
resides shall have financial responsibility and the school district where the student resides shall have
programmatic responsibility when a student is in . . . a foster home . . . that is located outside of
Massachusetts . . . . [W]hen a student is served in an in-district program, the school district where
the student lives shall provide such services and may bill and shall receive payment for the special
education costs . . . from the school district where the parent(s) or legal guardian resides.” 603
C.M.R. 28.10(4)(a).
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Plaintiff’s school. Id. Additionally, on July 10, 2012, Walter Solzak (“Solzak”), Director of Special
Education and Student Services for Defendant, sent a letter to the child’s mother indicating “[w]e
have been assigned responsibility for your son.” Id. at 4.
After Plaintiff’s repeated, unsuccessful attempts to obtain reimbursement from Defendant,
see e.g., Dkt. No. 13-2 at 50, 52-53, 78, 86, Plaintiff commenced this action. See Compl. at 1.
Plaintiff asserts that the Court may exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over this case because it
“arises under” under the IDEA and “its regulations thereunder.” Id. at 1-2.
III.

LEGAL STANDARD
Federal district courts are “courts of limited jurisdiction,” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah

Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005), and have subject matter jurisdiction only over cases in which
there is a federal question, or in which there is complete diversity of citizenship between the parties.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. “Determining the existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a
threshold inquiry and a claim is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction . . . when
the district court lacks statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.” Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d
157, 168 (2d Cir. 2008). Even in the absence of a challenge from any party, the Court is still
obligated to determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction. See Da Silva v. Kinsho Int’l
Corp., 229 F.3d 358, 361 (2d Cir. 2000); see also U.S. v Robinson, 357 F. Supp. 2d. 523 (N.D.N.Y.
2005) (Kahn, J.) (“A court may sua sponte inquire into the subject matter jurisdiction and satisfy
itself that such jurisdiction exists.”). Finally, “[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3).

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IV.

DISCUSSION
Federal-question jurisdiction is properly invoked when there is “a colorable claim ‘arising

under’ the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513
(2006) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1331). “A case arises under federal law within the meaning of § 1331
. . . if a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that
the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal
law.” Empire Healthchoice Assur. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 690 (2006); see also Franchise Tax
Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983).
A. Private Right of Action
1. Express Private Right of Action
As described supra, the IDEA explicitly provides for an administrative process through
which disabled children and their parents may file grievances concerning the child’s education. See
20 U.S.C. § 1415(b). In addition, the IDEA permits children or their parents to appeal an
unfavorable administrative decision in state or federal court. See id. at § 1415(i)(2). Thus, it is well
established that the IDEA affords disabled children and their parents an express private right of
action to bring suit in federal court after exhausting the administrative process. See Beth V. by
Yvonne V. v. Carroll, 87 F.3d 80, 88 (3d Cir. 1995) (reversing district court’s finding that disabled
children and their parents did not have a private right of action under the IDEA); John T. v. Iowa
Dep’t of Educ., 258 F.3d 860, 862 (8th Cir. 2001) (discussing appeal of an administrative law
judge’s decision in a claim brought by parents challenging their child’s IEP); Gadsby v. Grasmick,
109 F.3d 940, 948 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting parent’s right to seek tuition reimbursement following an
unfavorable administrative decision); Todd D. v. Andrews, 933 F.2d 1576, 1579 (11th Cir. 1991)

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(recognizing parent’s right to challenge administrative decision on child’s IEP in district court);
David D. v. Dartmouth Sch. Comm., 775 F.2d 411, 418-20 (1st Cir. 1985) (same).
Furthermore, school districts have also been permitted to appeal an unfavorable,
administrative decision in federal court. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2) (“[A]ny party aggrieved by the
findings and decision made under this subsection . . . shall have the right to bring a civil action with
respect to the complaint . . . in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the
United States. . . .”). However, in all such cases the dispute was initiated by parents at the
administrative level. See, e.g., St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd. v. State of La.,142 F.3d 776, 785 (5th
Cir. 1998) (permitting a local school board to bring an action in federal court seeking
reimbursement from the state DOE following an administrative determination of the school’s
liability in an action commenced by the student’s parents); S.C. ex rel. C.C. v. Deptford Tp. Bd. of
Educ., 213 F. Supp. 2d 452, 456-59 (D. N.J. 2002) (addressing school district’s third-party
complaint against NJ DOE in action initiated by parents); Todd D., 933 F.2d at 1582-83 (allowing
cross claim by local educational authority against education department following administrative
claim by parents); Bd. of Educ. of Oak Park & River Forest High Sch. Dist. No. 200 v. IL State Bd.
of Educ., 10 F. Supp. 2d 971, 979-81 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (same).
The question presented in this case, however, is whether a school district, in the absence of
an administrative grievance filed by a parent or disabled child, may nonetheless bring a tuitionrelated claim in federal court. This precise issue appears to be of first impression, but courts who
have addressed similar issues have found that only parties “aggrieved” by an underlying
administrative decision are granted a private right of action under the IDEA. See Asbury Park Bd.
of Educ. v. Hope Acad. Charter Sch., 278 F. Supp. 2d 417, 421-23 (D. N.J. 2003) (finding where a

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school district is “not aggrieved by the outcome of underlying administrative proceedings in a
dispute over a particular child, the IDEA . . . does not afford it an express private right of action”);
Cnty. of Westchester v. State of New York, 286 F.3d 150, 152-53 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding no private
right of action for counties suing state for alleged failure to satisfy IDEA requirements); Andrews v.
Ledbetter, 880 F.2d 1287, 1288-91 (11th Cir. 1989) (finding local education agencies cannot sue
education department to provide IDEA services absent underlying challenge by handicapped child,
parent, or guardian); Piedmont Behavioral Health Ctr., LLC v. Stewart, 413 F. Supp. 2d 746, 754
(S.D. W.Va. 2006) (“Sections 1412 and 1415 [of the IDEA] ensure that procedural safeguards exist
for children with disabilities and their parents, not for entities with a vested financial interest in
IDEA proceedings.”); Va. Office of Prot. and Advocacy v. Va. Dep’t of Educ., 262 F. Supp. 2d 648,
661 n. 5 (E.D. Va. 2003).
Here, Plaintiff is not appealing an administrative decision from a grievance filed by a parent
or disabled child. See generally Compl. Thus, Plaintiff’s claim does not fall within the scope of the
IDEA’s private right of action. See Asbury Park Bd. of Educ., 278 F. Supp. 2d at 421-23.
Accordingly, Plaintiff does not have an express private right of action under the IDEA to bring its
claim in federal court.
2. Implied Private Right of Action
“‘[U]nless congressional intent can be inferred from the language of the statute, the statutory
structure, or some other source, the essential predicate for implication of a private remedy simply
does not exist.’” Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 179 (1988) (quoting Nw. Airlines, Inc. v.
Transp. Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 94 (1981)). “The plain language of §§ 1412 and 1415
unambiguously provide[s] disabled children and parents of disabled children administrative

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remedies to address IDEA-related disputes. A review of the IDEA, however, reveals no such intent
to provide [other] entities seeking reimbursement for the costs of educating disabled children access
to these procedural safeguards.” Piedmont, 413 F. Supp. 2d at 753. Moreover, “Section 1415(a) of
the IDEA, entitled ‘establishment of procedures,’ provides that procedures shall be established and
maintained ‘in accordance with this section to ensure that children with disabilities and their
parents are guaranteed procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of [a FAPE].’”
Lawrence Twp. Bd. of Educ. v. New Jersey, 417 F.3d 368, 371 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(a) (emphasis in original). “Similarly, section 1412(a)(6), which is entitled ‘procedural
safeguards,’ provides that “[c]hildren with disabilities and their parents are afforded the procedural
safeguards required by section [1415].” Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(6)(A)). “This language
strongly suggests that Congress intended to provide a private right of action only to disabled
children and their parents.” Id. Therefore, the Court finds that Congress did not intend to provide a
private right of action for a school district seeking tuition reimbursement from another school
district in the absence of an underlying administrative decision. See St. Tammany Parish Sch.
Bd.,142 F.3d at 785. Accordingly, no implied private right of action exists for Plaintiff’s claim, and
subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be asserted on that basis.
B. Substantial Question of Federal Law
In the absence of a private right of action, a “case might still ‘arise under’ the laws of the
United States if a well-pleaded complaint establishe[s] that [the plaintiff’s] right to relief under state
law requires resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” City of Chicago v. Int’l College of
Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 164 (1997). The mere fact that a suit “takes its origin in the laws of the
United States,” however, does not necessarily make it “one arising under the Constitution or laws of

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the United States.” Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 507 (1900). Rather, a substantial
question of federal law exists where “the right of the [plaintiffs] to recover under their complaint
will be sustained if the Constitution and laws of the United States are given one construction and
will be defeated if they are given another.” Va. Office of Prot. & Advocacy, 262 F. Supp. 2d at
656-57.
Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not raise a substantial question of federal law. In fact, the
IDEA is only mentioned once throughout the entirety of the parties’ submissions—in conclusory
fashion as the basis for jurisdiction. See Compl. at 1-2. Bare allegations that a case “arises under”
the IDEA do not automatically establish federal question jurisdiction. See Bay Shore Union Free
Sch. Dist. v. Kain, 485 F.3d 730, 736 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Nor does the IDEA’s explicit authorization of
a cause of action to be brought by ‘any party aggrieved by the findings and decision’ of the state
educational agency ipso facto raise a federal question that would confer jurisdiction in this case on a
federal court.”) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A)).
Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s liability is established by: (1) a letter from the MA DOE
stating that, under Massachusetts regulations, Defendant is fiscally responsible for the student, and
(2) Solzak’s letter in which Plaintiff claims responsibility for the child. See Dkt. No. 15-6 at 2.
However, Plaintiff does not assert that the MA regulation fails to comport with the IDEA or
otherwise implicates federal law. See id. Moreover, Plaintiff neither argues that Defendant violated
the IDEA, nor challenges a provision of the IDEA itself. cf. Va. Office of Prot. & Advocacy, 262 F.
Supp. 2d at 657 (finding federal-question jurisdiction where the plaintiff specifically challenged the
procedural protections in the IDEA).

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Ultimately, the only connection between this case and the IDEA is that the IDEA serves as
the source of funding for the tuition expenses at issue; Plaintiff’s claim otherwise has no relation to
the IDEA. Therefore, although Plaintiff states its claim “arises under” the IDEA, it is purely a
monetary dispute involving only the application of state law; Plaintiff’s entitlement to relief does
not “necessarily depend[] on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” Gully v. First
Nat’l Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109, 112 (1936); see also Lawrence Twp. Bd. of Educ., 417 F.3d
at 371 (“A budgetary dispute between [educational] agencies is simply not among the private
actions contemplated by the IDEA, and is traditionally the type of dispute left to state and local
authorities.”).
Furthermore, Defendant has not raised a federal question in any of its pleadings. In
Defendant’s Motion for summary judgment, it argues exclusively that under MA and NY state law,
it is not liable for reimbursement. Def. Mot. at 2-5. Defendant first argues that “under the Interstate
Compact on the Placement of Children, statutorily in effect in both the State of New York and the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, [Defendant] has no obligation to reimburse [Plaintiff].” Id. at 35. However, Defendant’s reliance on the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children is
entirely misplaced, as it explicitly provides that it “does not include . . . any institution primarily
educational in character.” N.Y.S.S.L. § 374-a, Art. II(d). Thus, this statute is irrelevant, and, in any
event, does not raise a question of federal law.
Defendant’s second argument is that under Massachusetts regulation, 603 C.M.R.
§ 28.10(4)(b), it is only liable to reimburse a second school district within MA, but not any school
district outside of the state. See id. at 5. Defendant’s arguments only call for interpretation of state
law and do not raise any question or application of the IDEA. See Standage Ventures v. Arizona,

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499 F.2d 248, 250 (9th Cir. 1974) (deeming no federal question to exist where “the real substance of
the controversy . . . turns entirely upon disputed questions of law and fact relating to compliance
with state law, and not at all upon the meaning or effect of the federal statute itself”). Thus, no
federal question is presented in this case.3
Therefore, because the Court finds that diversity jurisdiction is lacking and no federal
question is presented, the case must be dismissed. See Bay Shore, 485 F.3d at 736 (“We hold that a
federal court may not exercise jurisdiction over a civil action brought under [the IDEA] if the claims
asserted turn exclusively on matters of state law and diversity of citizenship is absent.”)
V.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is hereby:
ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is DISMISSED for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3); and it is further
ORDERED, that Defendant’s Motion (Dkt. No. 11) for summary judgment is DENIED as
moot; and it is further
ORDERED, that Plaintiffs’ Motion (Dkt. No. 16) for summary judgment is DENIED as
moot; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court close this case; and it is further

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The Court also finds sua sponte that diversity jurisdiction is lacking in this case. Diversity
jurisdiction requires that (1) all adverse parties be citizens of different states and (2) the amount in
controversy exceed $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); Herrick Co. v. SCS Commc’ns, Inc., 251
F.3d 315, 322 (2d Cir. 2000); Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373-74 (1978);
St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Universal Builders Supply, 409 F.3d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 2005).
Here, it is undisputed that the parties are citizens of different states; Plaintiff is a citizen of New
York, and Defendant is a citizen of Massachusetts. See Def. SMF ¶¶ 1-2; Pl. SMF ¶¶ 1-2.
However, the amount in controversy is $67,719.76, which is below the statutory threshold. Pl. SMF
¶ 8; 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Therefore, diversity jurisdiction does not exist over this action.
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ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision and
Order on all parties in accordance with the Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:

August 12, 2014
Albany, NY

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