Barnes v. Crist et al

Filing 24

DECISION and ORDER re 19 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(3) is GRANTED; and Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED. Signed by Judge Glenn T. Suddaby on 3/28/2014. (lah)[copy of Decision and Order sent to plaintiff pro se by certified return receipt and regular mai]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
____________________________________________
RONNIE BARNES,
Plaintiff,
v.

1:13-CV-0505
(GTS/RFT)

ERIC CRIST, Police Officer for Albany Police Dep’t;
and DETECTIVE COLEMAN; Police Officer for
Albany Police Dep’t,
Defendants.
____________________________________________
APPEARANCES:

OF COUNSEL:

RONNIE BARNES, 12-A-2479
Plaintiff, Pro Se
Coxsackie Correctional Facility
Box 999
Coxsackie, NY 12051
CITY OF ALBANY CORPORATION COUNSEL
Counsel for Defendants
City Hall, 24 Eagle Street
Albany, NY 12207

ERIC P. SUGAR, ESQ.
JOHN JOSEPH REILLY, ESQ.

GLENN T. SUDDABY, United States District Judge
DECISION and ORDER
Currently before the Court, in this pro se civil rights action filed by Ronnie Barnes
(“Plaintiff”) asserting claims of false arrest, unreasonable search and seizure, and excessive force
against the two above-captioned county police officers (“Defendants”), is Defendants’ motion
for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). (Dkt. No. 19.) Plaintiff has not
filed an opposition to Defendants’ motion, and the deadline by which to do so expired
approximately seven-and-a-half months ago. (See generally Docket Sheet.) After carefully

considering the matter, the Court grants Defendants’ motion for each of the three reasons stated
in their memorandum of law: (1) Plaintiff’s guilty plea to the crime of Burglary in the Second
Degree bars his claims of false arrest and unreasonable search and seizure under Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1984); (2) even liberally construed, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to
allege facts plausibly suggesting a claim of excessive force (or failure to intervene), based on the
twist of an arm and tightening of a pair of handcuffs; and (3) in the alternative, based on
Plaintiff’s own factual allegations, Defendants are protected from liability as a matter of law by
the doctrine of qualified immunity. (Dkt. No. 19, Attach. 9.) To those reasons, the Court would
add only two points.
First, in this District, the failure to oppose a motion lightens the movant’s burden such
that, in order to succeed, the movant need show only that the motion possesses facial merit.1
Here, the Court finds that, at the very least, Defendants’ motion possesses facial merit, for the
reasons stated therein. The Court notes that Plaintiff was sufficiently advised of his need to
respond to Defendants’ motion through each of the following two documents: (1) the courtesy
copy of Local Rule 7.1(b)(3) of the Local Rules of Practice for this Court that was on file at
Coxsackie Correctional Facility when Defendants served Plaintiff with their motion; and (2) the
Notice of Consequences of Failing to Respond provided to Plaintiff by Defendants with their
motion papers (Dkt. No. 19, Attach. 26).

1

See N.D.N.Y. L.R. 7.1(b)(3) (“Where a properly filed motion is unopposed and
the Court determines that the moving party has met its burden to demonstrate entitlement to the
relief requested therein, the non-moving party's failure to file or serve any papers as required by
this Rule shall be deemed as consent to the granting . . . of the motion . . . , unless good cause be
shown.”); Zuk v. Onondaga Cnty., 09-CV-0272, 2011 WL 4344043, at *4 & nn.1-3 (N.D.N.Y.
Sept. 14, 2011) (Suddaby, J.) (reciting point of law and citing cases).
2

Second, generally, before a district court dismisses a pro se complaint, the plaintiff will
be allowed to amend that complaint. See Gomez v. USAA Fed. Savings Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 796
(2d Cir.1999). However, an opportunity to amend is not required where the defects in the
plaintiff's claims are substantive rather than merely formal, such that any amendment would be
futile. As the Second Circuit has explained, “[w]here it appears that granting leave to amend is
unlikely to be productive, . . . it is not an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend.” Ruffolo v.
Oppenheimer & Co., 987 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir.1993), accord, Brown v. Peters, 95-CV-1641,
1997 WL 599355, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1997) (Pooler, J.) (“[T]he court need not grant leave
to amend where it appears that amendment would prove to be unproductive or futile.”).2 This
rule applies even to pro se plaintiffs. See, e.g., Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 103 (2d
Cir.2000); Brown, 1997 WL 599355, at *1.
Here, the Court finds that the defects in Plaintiff’s Complaint are substantive rather than
merely formal, such that any amendment would be futile. For these reasons, Plaintiff will not be
given leave to amend his Complaint before it is dismissed.
ACCORDINGLY, it is
ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(3) (Dkt. No. 19) is GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is DISMISSED.

2

See also Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (holding that denial of leave
to amend was not an abuse of discretion where the amendment would be futile); Cuoco v.
Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir.2000) (“The problem with Cuoco's causes of action is
substantive; better pleading will not cure it. Repleading would thus be futile.”); Cortec Indus.,
Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir.1991) (“Of course, where a plaintiff is unable
to allege any fact sufficient to support its claim, a complaint should be dismissed with
prejudice.”).
3

The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendants and close this case.
The Court hereby certifies, for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (3), that any appeal taken
from this Decision and Order would not be taken in good faith.
Dated: March 28, 2014
Syracuse, New York

4