Castle v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 18

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER affirming the decision of the Commissioner and dismissing Pltf's 1 Complaint. Signed by Chief Judge Gary L. Sharpe on 5/29/14. (sfp, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
________________________________
JAMES CASTLE,
Plaintiff,

1:13-cv-543
(GLS)

v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
________________________________
APPEARANCES:
OF COUNSEL:
FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
Law Offices of Steven R. Dolson
126 North Salina Street, Suite 3B
Syracuse, NY 13202
FOR THE DEFENDANT:
HON. RICHARD S. HARTUNIAN
United States Attorney
100 South Clinton Street
Syracuse, NY 13261

MAGGIE W. MCOMBER, ESQ.

SANDRA M. GROSSFELD
Special Assistant U.S. Attorney

Steven P. Conte
Regional Chief Counsel
Social Security Administration
Office of General Counsel, Region II
26 Federal Plaza, Room 3904
New York, NY 10278
Gary L. Sharpe
Chief Judge
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

I. Introduction
Plaintiff James Castle challenges the Commissioner of Social
Security’s denial of Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental
Security Income (SSI), seeking judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
(Compl., Dkt. No. 1.) After reviewing the administrative record and
carefully considering Castle’s arguments, the court affirms the
Commissioner’s decision and dismisses the complaint.
II. Background
On March 30 and April 4, 2011, Castle filed applications for SSI and
DIB, respectively, under the Social Security Act (“the Act”), alleging
disability since August 8, 2009. (Tr.1 at 66-67, 115-24.) After his
applications were denied, (id. at 69-76), Castle requested a hearing before
an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), which was held on April 23, 2012, (id.
at 24-59, 77-78). On May 14, 2012, the ALJ issued an unfavorable
decision denying the requested benefits which became the
Commissioner’s final determination upon the Social Security Administration
Appeals Council’s denial of review. (Id. at 1-4, 8-23.)

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Page references preceded by “Tr.” are to the Administrative Transcript. (Dkt. No. 8.)

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Castle commenced the present action by filing his complaint on May
10, 2013 wherein he sought review of the Commissioner’s determination.
(Compl.) The Commissioner filed an answer and a certified copy of the
administrative transcript. (Dkt. Nos. 7, 8.) Each party, seeking judgment
on the pleadings, filed a brief. (Dkt. Nos.10, 16.)
III. Contentions
Castle contends that the Commissioner’s decision is tainted by legal
error and is not supported by substantial evidence. (Dkt. No. 10 at 2-6.)
Specifically, Castle claims that the ALJ erred in determining that there is
work in the national economy that he is capable of performing. (Id.) The
Commissioner counters that the appropriate legal standards were used by
the ALJ and her decision is also supported by substantial evidence. (Dkt.
No. 16 at 7-12.)
IV. Facts
The court incorporates the factual recitations of the parties and the
ALJ. (Dkt. No. 10 at 1-2, Dkt. No. 16 at 1; Tr. at 11-19.)
V. Standard of Review
The standard for reviewing the Commissioner’s final decision under

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42 U.S.C. § 405(g)2 is well established and will not be repeated here. For
a full discussion of the standard and the five-step process by which the
Commissioner evaluates whether a claimant is disabled under the Act, the
court refers the parties to its previous decision in Christiana v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 1:05-CV-932, 2008 WL 759076, at *1-2 (N.D.N.Y.
Mar. 19, 2008).
VI. Discussion
A.

Other Work
Castle argues that the ALJ’s decision “is not supported by substantial

evidence because the ALJ failed to properly assess [Castle’s] manipulative
limitations in her” residual functional capacity (RFC)3 analysis. (Dkt. No. 10
at 2-6.) Although imprecisely stated, the essence of Castle’s argument is
that his manipulative limitations are more restrictive than the ALJ
concluded at step five when she determined that Castle is able to perform

2

Review under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) is identical. As such, parallel
citations to the regulations governing SSI are omitted.
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A claimant’s RFC “is the most [he] can still do despite [his] limitations.” 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1545(a)(1). In assessing a claimant’s RFC, an ALJ must consider “all of the relevant
medical and other evidence,” including a claimant’s subjective complaints of pain. Id.
§ 404.1545(a)(3). An ALJ’s RFC determination must be supported by substantial evidence in
the record. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). If it is, that determination is conclusive and must be
affirmed upon judicial review. See id.; Perez v. Chater, 77 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1996).

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essentially the full range of sedentary work. (Id.) In other words,
according to Castle, given his limited ability to use his right hand, the ALJ
erred in failing to consult a vocational expert (VE) to determine whether
there is other work in the national economy which he is capable of
performing. (Id. at 4-5.) The Commissioner, on the other hand, argues
that substantial evidence4 supports the ALJ’s determination with respect to
Castle’s ability to use his right hand and that Castle’s nonexertional
limitations have little or no effect on the occupational base of unskilled
sedentary work. (Dkt. No. 16 at 7-12.)
Here, the ALJ determined that Castle retains the RFC to perform
sedentary work,5 except that he can push and pull up to fifteen pounds,
occasionally bend and stoop, and must avoid work that requires climbing,
or heights. (Tr. at 14.) Further, the ALJ concluded that Castle cannot
perform overhead lifting with his right upper extremity and can occasionally

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“Substantial evidence is defined as more than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion.” Alston v.
Sullivan, 904 F.2d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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“Sedentary work” is defined as: “lifting no more than ten pounds at a time and
occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools. . . . Jobs are
sedentary if walking and standing are required occasionally and other sedentary criteria are
met.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a).

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to frequently,6 but not continuously, finger, feel, and handle with his right
hand. (Id.) In making this determination, the ALJ relied on the
examination results and opinions of treating physician Matthew Adamo and
consultative examiner Joseph Prezio. (Id. at 15-17, 239-42, 347-48, 35462.) Further, the ALJ considered Castle’s employment until September
2009—more than one month after his alleged onset date—at which time he
was incarcerated, as well as his performance of work duties while
incarcerated. (Id. at 15, 38, 48.) Additionally, the ALJ noted Castle’s daily
activities, conservative treatment, and his treating physician’s opinion that
surgical intervention was not indicated. (Id. at 17, 158-65, 237, 250-52.)
Castle does not challenge the weight the ALJ gave to the opinion
evidence, or the ALJ’s determination that he can perform occasional to
frequent, but not continuous fingering, feeling, and handling with his right
hand. (See generally Dkt. No. 10 at 3-6.) Instead, Castle argues that,
given that most sedentary work requires good use of both hands, the ALJ
was required to consult a VE before making a determination as to
disability. (Id. at 4-5.)

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“Frequent” is defined under the regulations as occurring from one-third to two-thirds
of the time, while “occasional” refers to activity that occurs up to one-third of the time. SSR
83-10, 1983 WL 31251, at *5-6 (1983).

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In making his ultimate disability determination, the ALJ must consider
whether the claimant can do any other, less demanding work existing in the
national economy. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 404.1560(c); White v.
Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 910 F.2d 64, 65 (2d Cir. 1990). To make
such a determination, an ALJ may rely on the Medical-Vocational
Guidelines, referred to as “the grids,” found in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P,
app. 2, as long as the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and
RFC coincide with the criteria of a rule contained in those Guidelines. See
20 C.F.R. § 404.1569; see also Calabrese v. Astrue, 358 F. App’x 274, 275
n.1 (2d Cir. 2009). However, “if a claimant’s nonexertional impairments
‘significantly limit the range of work permitted by his exertional limitations’
then the grids obviously will not accurately determine disability status
because they fail to take into account claimant’s nonexertional
impairments.” Bapp v. Bowen, 802 F.2d 601, 605 (2d Cir. 1986) (quoting
Blacknall v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 1179, 1181 (9th Cir. 1983)). In that case,
the ALJ should consult with a VE before making a determination as to
disability. See id. However, “the mere existence of a nonexertional
impairment does not automatically require the production of a [VE] nor
preclude reliance on the guidelines.” Id. at 603. Instead, exclusive
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reliance on the grids will only be deemed inappropriate where the
nonexertional impairments “significantly limit the range of work permitted
by his exertional limitations.” Id. at 605 (emphasis added) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
In this case, at step five, the ALJ concluded that Castle’s
nonexertional limitations have little or no effect on the occupational base of
unskilled sedentary work, and, thus, a finding of not disabled is directed by
the grids. (Tr. at 198.) Relying on Social Security Ruling 96-9p, Castle
argues that the ALJ’s determination was in error. (Dkt. No. 10 at 3-5.) The
ruling states that “[a]ny significant manipulative limitation of an individual’s
ability to handle and work with small objects with both hands will result in a
significant erosion of the unskilled sedentary occupational base,” and that
“when the limitation is less significant, . . . it may be useful to consult a
vocational resource.” SSR 96-9p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34,478, 34,482 (July 2,
1996) (emphasis added). Thus, SSR 96-9p does not require that the ALJ
call upon the services of a VE in every case. Id. The ultimate inquiry in a
case such as this one is whether the claimant’s manipulative limitations
significantly limit the range of sedentary work. Id. Therefore, the ALJ
rendered her decision in accordance with applicable law. (Tr. at 18); see
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Bapp, 802 F.2d at 605 (“[A]pplication of the grid guidelines and the
necessity for expert testimony must be determined on a case-by-case
basis.”).
Moreover, the ALJ’s determination that Castle’s manipulative
limitations have little or no effect on the occupational base of sedentary
work is supported by substantial evidence, as the medical evidence of
record indicates a very minor limitation in Castle’s ability to use his right
hand. (Tr. at 18.) Specifically, upon examination in July 2009, Castle
possessed 5/5 strength in his bilateral upper extremities and strong and
equal hand grips. (Id. at 205-06.) In May 2011, Dr. Adamo examined
Castle and found 5/5 muscle strength in his bilateral upper extremities
including his hand grips. (Id. at 237.) Dr. Prezio examined Castle in June
2011 and found that his hand and finger dexterity were intact, but his grip
strength was reduced in his right hand to 4/5. (Id. at 241.) However,
Castle was able to zip, button, and tie, and Dr. Prezio opined that he
suffered only a “very mild restriction” for activities requiring fine
manipulation of his right hand. (Id. at 241-42.) In July 2011, Dr. Adamo
again noted that Castle had 5/5 muscle strength in his upper extremities
including his hand grips. (Id. at 356-57.) Treatment notes from later that
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month indicate that Castle had “equal strength and mobility” in his upper
and lower extremities. (Id. at 287.) On several occasions, Dr. Adamo
opined that Castle was moderately limited in his physical functioning,
including his ability to use his hands. (Id. at 345-48, 361-62.) In sum,
based on the court’s review of the record, substantial evidence supports
the ALJ’s determination—that Castle’s ability to use his right hand
occasionally to frequently, but not continuously, for handling, feeling, and
fingering did not significantly effect the occupational base of unskilled
sedentary work—and, thus, her reliance on the grids was appropriate. See
Bapp, 802 F.2d at 605.
B.

Remaining Findings and Conclusions
After careful review of the record, the court affirms the remainder of

the ALJ’s decision as it is supported by substantial evidence.
VII. Conclusion
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED and
Castle’s complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is DISMISSED; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk close this case and provide a copy of this
Memorandum-Decision and Order to the parties.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
May 29, 2014
Albany, New York

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