Lynch v. Claus et al

Filing 37

SUMMARY ORDER - That the letter motion of the County, County of Schenectady District Attorney, and Schenectady County Public Defender's Office requesting dismissal of Lynch's filing (Dkt. No. 27) is DENIED. That Lynch's application re garding the dismissal of the County of Schenectady District Attorney and Schenectady County Public Defender's Office (Dkt. No. 25) is DENIED. That the Clerk is directed to amend the docket to reflect that the Doe defendants have been identified as "Police officer Shepler" and "Police officer I.D. #5142," and that, upon receipt from Lynch of the documents required for service of process, the Clerk be directed to issue summonses and forward them, together with copies of L ynch's complaint, a General Order No. 25 packet, which sets forth this District's civil case management plan requirements, a copy of the Uniform Pretrial Scheduling Order previously issued in this case, to the United States Marshal for serv ice upon Police officer Shelpler and Police officer I.D. #5142. That the Clerk is directed to terminate Schenectady Police Dept., City of Schenectady, County of Schenectady District Attorney, Schenectady County Public Defender's Office, and Sch enectady County. That the only claim accepted for filing is one of excessive force against P.O. James Claus, Police officer Shelpler, and Police officer I.D. #5142. That the motion to dismiss of County of Schenectady District Attorney, Schenectady County Public Defender's Officer, and Schenectady County (Dkt. No. 33) is DENIED as moot. Signed by Chief Judge Gary L. Sharpe on 1/28/2014. (jel, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
________________________________
MARK LYNCH,
Plaintiff,

1:13-cv-830
(GLS/CFH)

v.
P.O. JAMES CLAUS et al.,
Defendants.
________________________________
SUMMARY ORDER
Plaintiff pro se Mark Lynch commenced this action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants police officer James Claus, the
Schenectady Police Dept. (SPD), the City of Schenectady, the County of
Schenectady, the County of Schenectady District Attorney (DA), the
Schenectady County Public Defender’s Officer (PDO), and two John Doe
police officers. (Compl. at 1-2, 5, Dkt. No. 1.) In his complaint, Lynch
alleges claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, prosecutorial
misconduct, ineffective assistance of counsel, and excessive force. (Id. at
3, 6-16; Dkt. No. 3 at 2-3.) The claim of excessive force is alleged only as
against the police officers, and, arguably, on a Monell1 theory of municipal

1

See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

liability as against SPD, the City, and the County.2 (Compl. at 3, 6, 7-9,
15.) Pending before the court are three applications, one filed by Lynch,
(Dkt. No. 25), and two filed by the County, DA, and PDO, (Dkt. Nos. 27,
33), which are discussed below.
Lynch filed a motion seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis
along with his pleading, (Dkt. No. 2), and, upon review of that application,
Magistrate Judge Christian F. Hummel recommended that all but Lynch’s
claim of excessive force against the police officers be dismissed, and,
before dismissing the City and County, Lynch be afforded additional time to
allege facts that would support a Monell claim against them, (Dkt. No. 3 at
4-7). Judge Hummel also specifically recommended the dismissal of SPD
on the excessive force claim. (Id. at 5.) Judge Hummel’s ReportRecommendation and Order (R&R), containing the aforementioned
recommendations, was adopted in its entirety by the court after the

2

Here, liability could only be imposed upon the municipality that
employs or had an agency relationship with the individual police officers
allegedly responsible for the conduct in question if those officers were
acting pursuant to an official policy or custom. See Monell, 436 U.S. at
694. It appears that the officers named herein are employees of the City,
(Compl. ¶ 3), but, for reasons explained below, both the City and County
are dismissed, and the question of who employed the police officers
named herein is of no moment.
2

deadline for filing objections to the R&R lapsed and none were filed. (Dkt.
No. 4.)
More than thirty days afterward, the City, Claus, and SPD filed an
answer, (Dkt. No. 13), and, by letter motion, the County, DA, and PDO
requested that they be dismissed in light of Lynch’s failure to amend his
complaint within the time allotted by the court to do so, (Dkt. No. 16). Soon
thereafter, Lynch sought a temporary stay, which was granted, and his time
to file an amended complaint was again extended, this time to November
1, 2013. (Dkt. Nos. 18, 19.) The order granting Lynch’s request was twice
returned to the court as undeliverable, (Dkt. Nos. 22, 23), but, ultimately,
as reflected in a November 7, 2013 docket entry, he telephoned the court
to advise it of his then-current address, and he was notified of the court’s
order at that time. On November 18, 2013, Lynch filed a document that
both objects to the adopted R&R—or, arguably seeks reconsideration of
this court’s adoption of it—and proposes some amendments to his
complaint. (Dkt. No. 25.) That filing is pending, and its disposition is
discussed below. In response to Lynch’s filing, and also pending before
the court, the County, DA, and PDO by letter motion request that the court
dismiss the application as “clearly untimely.” (Dkt. No. 27.) While the court
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agrees that Lynch’s application is late, in an abundance of caution, it
denies the letter motion, and considers Lynch’s filing as outlined below.
Finally, the same defendants have moved to dismiss. (Dkt. No. 33.) That
motion is denied as moot.3
In a nutshell, Lynch’s objection to the dismissal of DA and PDO, (Dkt.
No. 25), is without merit, and his complaint is amended to reflect the
identities of the Doe defendants. Before addressing those issues,
however, it is necessary to clarify the status of this action. In particular, it
will benefit the parties and their counsel to understand who remains as
parties and what claim(s) are still pending following the court’s order
adopting the R&R.
Lynch’s claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, prosecutorial
misconduct, and ineffective assistance of counsel were dismissed on the
authority of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). (Dkt. No. 4
at 2.) Lynch was not given leave to amend his complaint regarding these
claims, (id.), and, in light of Lynch’s admission that his conviction “still
stands,” (Dkt. No. 25 at 1), amendment would be futile. Because these
3

Because the claims against the County, DA, and PDO are all
dismissed as outlined below, their motion to dismiss, (Dkt. No. 33), is
moot, and no response from Lynch is warranted.
4

were the only claims that pertained to DA and PDO, those parties were
previously dismissed by the court’s adoption of the R&R. (Dkt. No. 4 at 2.)
Lynch’s excessive force claim remained only as against Claus, and the
Doe defendants. (Dkt. No. 3 at 4-5, 7.) The City and County were
conditionally dismissed subject to Lynch alleging a plausible Monell claim
against them within thirty days, (id. at 5-6, 7; Dkt. No. 4 at 2), and SPD was
specifically dismissed outright as “an administrative arm of the City,” (Dkt.
No. 3 at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Turning to Lynch’s late objection to the dismissal of DA and PDO,
(Dkt. No. 25), nothing contained in his filing alters the conclusion that Heck
bars the claims asserted against them and that no amendment can save
those causes of action. As such, the court declines to reconsider its
adoption of the R&R. With respect to the proposed amendments alleged
by Lynch, the court accepts for filing his identification of the Doe
defendants as “Police officer Shepler” and “Police officer I.D. # 5142,” (Dkt.
No. 25 at 2), which should be sufficient identification for purposes of
service. The court also recognizes that Lynch does not allege a Monell

5

claim against either the City or County,4 and those parties are, accordingly,
dismissed. Finally, Lynch’s statement that “The Federal Court should
issue a Writ of habeas Corpus” to “right the wrong that has been done” to
him is disregarded. (Id. at 4.) Habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is
available only to those “in custody” within the meaning of § 2254(a), and
there is no indication whatsoever that Lynch is in custody within the
meaning of the statute.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that the letter motion of the County, County of
Schenectady District Attorney, and Schenectady County Public Defender’s
Office requesting dismissal of Lynch’s filing (Dkt. No. 27) is DENIED; and it
is further
ORDERED that Lynch’s application regarding the dismissal of the
County of Schenectady District Attorney and Schenectady County Public
Defender’s Office (Dkt. No. 25) is DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk is directed to amend the docket to reflect

4

Indeed, Lynch asserts that he is “completely sure that there is a
custom and-or policy that Police officers[] not beat the people that they
arrest.” (Dkt. No. 25 at 5 (emphasis added).)
6

that the Doe defendants have been identified as “Police officer Shepler”
and “Police officer I.D. # 5142,” and that, upon receipt from Lynch of the
documents required for service of process, the Clerk be directed to issue
summonses and forward them, together with copies of Lynch’s complaint,
a General Order No. 25 packet, which sets forth this District’s civil case
management plan requirements, and a copy of the Uniform Pretrial
Scheduling Order previously issued in this case, to the United States
Marshal for service upon Police officer Shepler and Police officer I.D. #
5142; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk is directed to terminate Schenectady Police
Dept., City of Schenectady, County of Schenectady District Attorney,
Schenectady County Public Defender’s Office, and Schenectady County;
and it is further
ORDERED that the only claim accepted for filing is one of excessive
force as against P.O. James Claus, Police officer Shepler, and Police
officer I.D. # 5142; and it is further
ORDERED that the motion to dismiss of County of Schenectady
District Attorney, Schenectady County Public Defender's Office, and
Schenectady County (Dkt. No. 33) is DENIED as moot; and it is further
7

ORDERED that the Clerk provide a copy of this Summary Order to
the parties.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
January 28, 2014
Albany, New York

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