Donohue et al v. Madison et al

Filing 142

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER: The Court hereby ORDERS that Defendants' # 114 motion for summary judgment is DENIED as to Plaintiffs' First Amendment targeting claim and GRANTED as to Plaintiffs' First Amendment retaliation claim. Th e Court further ORDERS that, based on Plaintiffs' statement that they have decided not to pursue their Due Process, Contract Clause and state-law claims, these claims are DISMISSED. The Court further ORDERS that Plaintiffs' # 120 motion for partial summary judgment is DENIED. The Court further ORDERS that Defendant Madison's # 114 and Defendant Milstein's # 116 motions for summary judgment based on qualified immunity are GRANTED. Plaintiffs' claims against Defenda nts Madison and Milstein are DISMISSED insofar as Plaintiffs assert those claims against them in their individual capacities. The Court further ORDERS that Plaintiffs' # 97 joint motion for class certification is referred to Magistrate Judge Hummel for proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition of said motion. Signed by Senior Judge Frederick J. Scullin, Jr. on 4/14/2017. (nmk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_______________________________________________
DANNY DONOHUE, as President of the
Civil Service Employees Association, Inc.,
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO; CIVIL
SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION,
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO;
WILLIAM COLEMAN, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated; WILLIAM
MILLER, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated; JOHN METZGIER, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated; and JACK
WIEDEMAN, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.

1:13-CV-918
(FJS/CFH)

THOMAS J. MADISON, JR., individually and in his
official capacity as Executive Director of the New York
State Thruway Authority and the New York State Canal
Corporation; CARLOS MILAN, in his official capacity as
Director of Employee Relations and Employee Safety,
New York State Thruway Authority and New York
State Canal Corporation; BRIAN U. STRATTON, in his
official capacity as Director of the New York State Canal
Corporation; HOWARD P. MILSTEIN, individually and
in his official capacity as Chairman of New York State
Thruway/Canal Corporation Board of Directors; E. VIRGIL
CONWAY, in his official capacity as Board Member of the
New York State Thruway/Canal Corporation Board of
Directors; NEW YORK STATE THRUWAY AUTHORITY;
NEW YORK STATE CANAL CORPORATION; DONNA J.
LUH, in her official capacity as Vice-Chairman of New York
State Thruway/Canal Corporation Board of Directors;
RICHARD N. SIMBERG, in his official capacity as Board
Member of the New York State Thruway/Canal Corporation
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Board of Directors; BRANDON R. SALL, in his official
capacity as Board Member of the New York State Thruway/
Canal Corporation Board of Directors; J. DONALD
RICE, JR., in his official capacity as board Member of
the New York State Thruway/Canal Corporation Board of
Directors; and JOSE HOLGUIN-VERAS, in his official
capacity as Board Member of the New York State
Thruway/Canal Corporation Board of Directors,
Defendants.
___________________________________________________________
DANNY DONOHUE, as President of the
Civil Service Employees Association, Inc.,
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO; CIVIL
SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION,
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO;
JOHN DELLIO, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated; MICHAEL BOULERIS,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated; MAUREEN ALONZO, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated; and MARCOS
DIAMANTATOS, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.

1:13-CV-920
(FJS/CFH)

THOMAS J. MADISON, JR., individually and in his
official capacity as Executive Director of the New York
State Thruway Authority and the New York State Canal
Corporation; CARLOS MILAN, in his official capacity as
Director of Employee Relations and Employee Safety,
New York State Thruway Authority and New York
State Canal Corporation; HOWARD P. MILSTEIN,
individually and in his official capacity as Chairman of New
York State Thruway/Canal Corporation Board of Directors;
E. VIRGIL CONWAY, in his official capacity as Board
Member of the New York State Thruway/Canal Corporation
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Board of Directors; NEW YORK STATE THRUWAY
AUTHORITY; JOSE HOLGUIN-VERAS, in his official
capacity as Board Member of the New York State Thruway/
Canal Corporation Board of Directors; DONNA J. LUH,
in her official capacity as Vice-Chairman New York State
Thruway/Canal Corporation Board of Directors; J. DONALD
RICE, JR., in his official capacity as Board Member of New
York State Thruway/Canal Corporation Board of Directors;
BRANDON R. SALL, in his official capacity as Board
Member of New York State Thruway/Canal Corporation
Board of Directors; and RICHARD N. SIMBERG, in his
official capacity as Board Member of New York State
Thruway/Canal Corporation Board of Directors,
Defendants.
_______________________________________________________
NEW YORK STATE THRUWAY EMPLOYEES
LOCAL 72; JOSEPH E. COLOMBO; GEORGE E.
SAVOIE; and DAVID M. MAZZEO, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly-situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.

1:14-CV-1043
(FJS/CFH)

NEW YORK STATE THRUWAY AUTHORITY;
HOWARD P. MILSTEIN, individually and in his official
capacity as Chairman of the New York State Thruway
Authority; THOMAS J. MADISON, JR., individually and
in his official capacity as Executive Director of the New
York State Thruway Authority; THOMAS RYAN, in his
official capacity; E. VIRGIL CONWAY, in his official
capacity as Board Member of the New York State Thruway
Authority; JOHN F. BARR, in his official capacity as Director
of Administrative Services of the New York State Thruway
Authority; JOHN M. BRYAN, in official capacity as Chief
Financial Officer and Treasurer of the New York State
Thruway Authority; DONNA J. LUH, in her official capacity
as Vice-Chair of the New York State Thruway/Canal
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Corporation Board of Directors; J. DONALD RICE, JR., in
his official capacity as Board Member of the New York State
Thruway Authority; BRANDON R. SALL, in his official
capacity as Board Member of the New York State Thruway
Authority; RICHARD N. SIMBERG, in his official capacity
as Board Member of the New York State Thruway Authority;
and JOSE HOLGUIN-VERAS, in his official capacity as
Board Member of the New York State Thruway Authority,
Defendants.
_________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES

OF COUNSEL

CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION, INC.
143 Washington Avenue
P.O. Box 7125, Capitol Station
Albany, New York 12224
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

AARON E. KAPLAN, ESQ.
JENNIFER C. ZEGARELLI, ESQ.

LIVINGSTON ADLER PULDA
MEIKLEJOHN & KELLY
557 Prospect Avenue
Hartford, Connecticut 06105
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

GREGG D. ADLER, ESQ.
NICOLE M. ROTHBERG, ESQ.

DREYER, BOYAJIAN LLP
75 Columbia Street
Albany, New York 12210
Attorneys for Defendant Madison

BENJAMIN W. HILL, ESQ.
WILLIAM J. DRYER, ESQ.

WHITEMAN, OSTERMAN &
HANNA
One Commerce Plaza
Suite 1900
Albany, New York 12260
Attorneys for all Defendants
except Defendants Madison
and Bryan

BETH A. BOURASSA, ESQ.
CHRISTOPHER W. MEYER, ESQ.
MONICA R. SKANES, ESQ.
NORMA G. MEACHAM, ESQ.

-4-

E. STEWART JONES HACKLER
MURPHY, LLP
28 Second Street
Troy, New York 12180
Attorneys for Defendant Bryan

E. STEWART JONES, JR., ESQ.
THOMAS J. HIGGS, ESQ.

SCULLIN, Senior Judge

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
These consolidated actions involve constitutional challenges to an April 3, 2013
reduction in force ("RIF"), whereby the New York State Thruway Authority and New York State
Canal Corporation (collectively "Defendants") eliminated approximately 198 employees
represented by New York State Thruway Employees Local 72 and the Civil Service Employees
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (collectively "Plaintiffs"). Pending before
the Court are Defendants' joint motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, see Dkt. No. 114; 1 Defendant Madison's motion for summary
judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure based on qualified immunity,
see Dkt. No. 116; and Plaintiffs' joint motion for partial summary judgment against Defendants
New York State Thruway Authority, New York State Canal Corporation, and all individual
Defendants in their official capacities only based on their First Amendment targeting theory in

1

Defendants also moved for summary judgment with regard to Plaintiffs' claims against
Defendant Milstein in his individual capacity based on the doctrine of qualified immunity. See
Dkt. No. 114.
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the first count of their complaint under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Dkt.
No 120. 2

II. BACKGROUND
Defendant New York State Thruway Authority is a statutorily created public corporation,
see N.Y. Pub. Auth. L. § 352, with the "power to finance, construct, reconstruct, improve,
develop, maintain [and] operate" the New York State Thruway, see N.Y. Pub. Auth. L. at § 353.
Defendant New York State Canal Corporation is a subsidiary corporation of Defendant New
York State Thruway Authority. See N.Y. Pub. Auth. L. § 1005-b.
In the decade preceding the RIF at issue in this case, Defendants faced significant
financial pressure that increased their debt burden from $1.3 billion to $3.2 billion. See Dkt. No
114-78 at 3. The continuing need for reconstructing the aging thruway and canal system,
declining traffic and toll revenues due to the 2008 recession and high fuel prices, and spiraling
health insurance costs for employees worsened Defendants' financial situation. See id. In
response, Defendants implemented several cost-saving measures, including withholding a series
of salary increases for managerial/confidential ("M/C") employees who are not affiliated with the
Plaintiff unions. See id. at 4-5. Defendants estimate that these steps saved approximately $6.4
million. See id. at 4.
Despite the savings recognized through these cost-saving measures, Defendants
determined that they needed to reduce labor costs further. See id. Salaries and benefits made up
approximately 95% of Defendants' operating budget. See id. Defendants thus sought

2

Plaintiffs also filed a joint motion for class certification under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. See Dkt. No. 97. The Court will address that motion separately.
-6-

concessions from unionized workers when the collective bargaining agreements ("CBAs") with
Plaintiffs expired on June 30, 2012. See id. at 5. In conjunction with the start of negotiating a
new CBA, Defendants announced that they were planning an RIF for April, 2013 to achieve
savings if negotiations were unsuccessful. See id. Defendants' strategy was to leverage the
layoffs to encourage the unions to agree to a new CBA that would require unionized employees
to pay a portion of their health insurance costs. See Dkt. No. 120-8 at 5-6.
Plaintiffs and Defendants could not agree on a new CBA, and thus Defendants executed
the RIF as planned. See id. at 7. "The Thruway Authority identified positions targeted for layoff
under the RIF plan by allocating costs amongst each of the bargaining units in proportion to the
savings that the [Defendants were] looking to achieve in the unionized workforce." See Dkt. No.
129 at ¶ 146. Originally the RIF was supposed to save approximately $20 million annually;
however, Defendants calculated that the RIF resulted in only $9 million in savings for 2013. See
Dkt. No. 114-78 at 5. If Defendants had achieved their most important objective in bargaining -namely, getting all employees to pay a percentage of their health insurance costs -- the savings
would have been approximately $6.69 million. See Dkt. No. 120-8 at 7.
Following the RIF, Plaintiff Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000,
AFSCME, AFL-CIO filed two actions against Defendant Authorities and a number of executives
and board members in their individual and official capacities on August 2, 2013. Almost a year
later, Plaintiff New York State Thruway Employees Local 72 filed an action against Defendant
Thruway Authority and a number of the same individuals in their individual and official

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capacities on June 17, 2014. The Court consolidated these three actions on October 2, 2014. 3
See Dkt. No 45.
In these consolidated cases, Plaintiffs assert causes of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and New York law. First, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants coerced Plaintiff CSEA into
giving up its rights to negotiate a CBA by threatening layoffs and that Defendants intentionally
directed their demands for concessions and threats of termination to union-represented
employees only. Therefore, according to Plaintiffs, Defendants' action in terminating unionrepresented employees violated those employees' right to associate with their union in violation
of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution by retaliating against Plaintiffs for
engaging in union activity and by targeting Plaintiffs for layoffs because of their union
affiliation.
Second, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause by illegally targeting Plaintiffs for layoffs based on their status as unionrepresented employees. Further, they contend that Defendants' actions were arbitrary, irrational,
and deprived Plaintiffs of their rights to substantive due process.
Third, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants acted under color of state law to impair the
contractual rights of Plaintiff CSEA, which violated the Contract Clause of the United States
Constitution. 4

3

The parties have stipulated to the dismissal of all claims against the individual Defendants in
their individual capacities with the exception of the claims against Defendants Madison and
Milstein.
4

Plaintiffs' complaint in New York State Thruway Emps. Local 72 v. New York State Thruway
Auth., No. 1:14-CV-1043 (FJS/CFH), did not raise a Contracts Clause claim.
-8-

Finally, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated Article I, § 17 of the New York State
Constitution by depriving employees of their right to organize.
Plaintiffs have indicated that, "[t]o streamline these cases, and because the First
Amendment and Equal Protection claims will provide the plaintiffs and the class with full relief,
plaintiffs have decided not to further pursue the Due Process, the Contract Clause or the New
York State Law claims." See Dkt. No. 132-6 at 8 n.1. In light of this statement, the Court
dismisses these claims. Therefore, Plaintiffs' remaining claims are those they assert under the
First Amendment and under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. 5
Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause claim and their First
Amendment targeting claim raise identical issues, i.e., whether Defendants unconstitutionally
singled out Plaintiffs for inclusion in the RIF because of their status as union-represented
employees. To resolve these claims, the Court must answer two questions: (1) Are Plaintiffs
members of a protected class? and (2) Can Defendants justify their actions under the applicable
level of judicial scrutiny?

III. DISCUSSION
A.

Standard of review
A court must grant summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). In other words, an entry of summary judgment is appropriate "against a party

5

The Court finds that these two causes of action are duplicative; and, therefore, it will analyze
these claims together.
-9-

who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that
party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). "[I]n ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the district
court is not to weigh the evidence but is instead required to view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
that party, and to eschew credibility assessments[.]" Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 854 (2d Cir.
1996) (citations omitted).

B.

Targeting theory of liability
As briefly outlined above, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants violated their "First and

Fourteenth Amendment rights by singling out union-represented employees in making the layoff
determinations associated with the RIF based solely on the fact that such employees were unionrepresented." See Dkt. No. 120-8 at 12 (citing State Emp. Bargaining Agent Coal. v. Rowland,
718 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2013) ("Rowland")). According to Plaintiffs, in Rowland, the Second
Circuit "definitively determined whether, and under what circumstances a public entity's
employment decisions violate the right to associate in unions." See id. at 13. Plaintiffs assert
that "conditioning public employment on union membership is subject to strict scrutiny and can
only be done if the government has a vital interest in doing so." See id. (citing Rowland, 718
F.3d at 132-33). Therefore, Plaintiffs argue that "the law of this Circuit is set -- a public
employer like [Defendants] may not take adverse action against its employees based upon a
protected First Amendment association absent a compelling state interest that is implemented in
the least restrictive manner." See id. at 14 (citing Rowland, 718 F.3d at 133-35).

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Defendants, on the other hand, assert that the Second Circuit decided Rowland on
"stipulated facts, in which defendants admitted to the 'targeted' termination of about 2,800
Connecticut state workers specifically because of 'their union membership.'" See Dkt. No. 11478 at 13-14 (quoting Rowland, 718 F.3d at 129). Defendants contend that, "[f]or Rowland to
apply, Plaintiffs must first establish that [Defendants] intentionally and exclusively terminated,
or eliminated the positions of, union members . . . and that non-union members who were not
'targeted' were indistinguishable, except for union membership." See id. at 14 (citing Rowland,
718 F.3d at 135).
As is clear from the preceding discussion, the parties' principal dispute is whether
Rowland provides the appropriate framework to decide this case.

1. Rowland's applicability to this case
Rowland involved a labor dispute between the State Employees Bargaining Agent
Coalition ("SEBAC") and Connecticut. See State Emps. Bargaining Agent Coal. v. Rowland,
718 F.3d 126, 129-30 (2d Cir. 2013). SEBAC is a coalition of thirteen state public employee
unions representing approximately 40,000 state employees. See id. at 129. In November 2002,
the defendants met with SEBAC and sought concessions under the plaintiffs' Collective
Bargaining Agreement ("CBA"). See id. at 130. "Defendants advised plaintiffs that unless they
agreed to these concessions, defendants would fire approximately 3000 unionized state
employees." Id. According to the stipulated facts, "defendants 'intentionally directed their
demands for health care and pension concessions (and their corresponding threats of termination
if the concessions were not granted) solely to state union employees.'" Id. (quotation omitted).

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SEBAC refused to agree to all of the proposed concessions but offered alternative
concessions, which was its right under Connecticut Law. See id. (citing Conn. Gen. Stat. § 5–
272(c)). "In December 2002, defendants ordered the firing of approximately 2800 unionized
state employees." Id. Importantly,
[n]o non-union workers were fired. While the fired employees were told that they
were being laid off due to economic necessity caused by the state's fiscal year
2003 budget deficit, the firings in fact "had minimal effect" on the state's fiscal
year 2003 expenses, and "were ordered as a means of trying to compel the
plaintiff unions to agree to the concessions demanded." . . . Defendants advised
plaintiffs that the 2003 firings would be rescinded if plaintiffs agreed to the
proposed concessions.
Id. (internal quotation and footnote omitted).
SEBAC sued the governor and other state officials for, among other things, violation of the
plaintiffs' right to free association by targeting them for layoffs based solely on their union
membership. See id. at 131. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment on liability. See
id. Furthermore, "the parties submitted a Joint Rule 56 Statement, and stipulated that the facts
therein would govern the cross-motions for summary judgment." Id. The plaintiffs appealed
after the district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. See id.
The Second Circuit began its analysis by recognizing that "[t]he right to free association
is 'a right closely allied to freedom of speech and a right which, like free speech, lies at the
foundation of a free society.'" Id. at 132 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485-86, 81 S.
Ct. 247, 5 L. Ed. 2d 231 (1960)) (other citation omitted). "Included in this right to free
association is the right of employees to associate in unions." Id. (citing Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. 516, 534, 65 S. Ct. 315, 89 L. Ed. 430 (1945)). The Second Circuit noted that it had
previously stated that it could not "'be questioned that the First Amendment's protection of

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speech and associational rights extends to labor union activities.'" Id. (quoting Conn. State Fed'n
of Teachers v. Bd. of Educ. Members, 538 F.2d 471, 478 (2d Cir. 1976)) (other citation omitted).
However, the Second Circuit understood that it was breaking new ground in Rowland,
recognizing that it "ha[d] never articulated a standard for determining whether, and under what
circumstances, a public entity's employment decisions violate this right to associate in unions."
Id. Thus, for guidance, the Second Circuit turned to the well-established case law concerning a
person's right to associate with political parties. See id. For instance, the Second Circuit noted
that the Supreme Court had stated in Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois "that government
employers may not 'condition [ ] hiring decisions on political belief and association . . . unless
the government has a vital interest in doing so.'" Id. (quoting 497 U.S. 62, 78, 110 S. Ct. 2729,
111 L. Ed. 2d 52 (1990)) (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 372-73, 96 S. Ct. 2673, 49 L. Ed.
547 (1976) (holding that public employees who alleged they were discharged because they were
not members of the sheriff's political party stated a First Amendment claim)) (other citation
omitted). The Second Circuit discussed the Supreme Court's concern "that the government
would 'wield[] its power to interfere with its employees' freedom to believe and associate,' id. at
133 (quoting Rutan, 497 U.S. at 76, 110 S. Ct. 2729), and noted that 'conditioning public
employment on the provision of support for the favored political party "unquestionably inhibits
protected belief and association[,]"'" id. (quoting [Rutan, 497 U.S.] at 69, 110 S. Ct. 2729
(quoting Elrod, 427 U.S. at 359, 96 S. Ct. 2673)). The Second Circuit also recognized that hiring
based on political party affiliation is "subject to strict scrutiny and must be 'narrowly tailored to
further vital government interests.'" Id. (quoting Rutan, 497 U.S. at 74, 110 S. Ct. 2729) (other
citation omitted).

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Turning to the issue at hand, the Second Circuit reasoned that "[c]onditioning public
employment on union membership, no less than on political association, inhibits protected
association and interferes with government employees' freedom to associate." Id.
Consequently, "[g]iven the well-established principle that union activity is protected by the First
Amendment, and the applicability of the reasoning in the political patronage cases to union
membership, [the Second Circuit held] that Rutan's heightened scrutiny requirement applies to
employment decisions based on union membership." Id. at 134 (footnote omitted). Therefore,
the Second Circuit examined whether the terminations in Rowland were "'narrowly tailored to
further vital government interests.'" Id. at 135 (quoting Rutan, 497 U.S. at 74, 110 S. Ct. 2729)
(footnote omitted).
The defendants in Rowland conceded that they intentionally fired only union members in
2003. See id. at 134-35. The defendants argued "that the State needed to reduce the cost of its
work force, and that since plaintiffs refused the proposed CBA concessions defendants were
forced to lay off union workers to do so." Id. at 135. The Second Circuit found that the firings
were not tailored to reduce the cost of the work force but instead "'had minimal effect on the
State's [fiscal year 2003] expenses.'" Id. (quotation omitted). Furthermore, the defendants
stipulated "that the savings realized from the 2003 firings did not correlate to the concessions
requested from the unions." Id. (citation omitted)
In addition, and more importantly according to the Second Circuit, the defendants did not
show "why the State's fiscal health required firing only union members, rather than implementing
membership-neutral layoffs." Id. The stipulated facts showed that all employees -- whether or
not they belonged to unions -- received the same health care and pension benefits. See id.
Indeed, "[n]othing in the stipulation provide[d] any support for an argument that union members

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cost more, provided fewer services, or were distinguishable from their non-union coworkers in
any way other than their membership itself." Id. Rather than target the most expensive, or least
valuable employees, the layoffs were predicated on union membership alone. See id.
According to the Second Circuit, the defendants' best argument was that the firings were
a means to compel the union to agree to concessions, which would reduce the long-term costs of
state government. See id. at 135-36. The Second Circuit recognized that reducing the long-term
cost of state government was "arguably a vital government interest." Id. at 136. However, the
Second Circuit found that the defendants failed to offer any evidence of narrow tailoring. See id.
In so holding, the Second Circuit recognized a state's ability to bargain hard with state
employees. See id. However, the fatal flaw of the defendants' plan was that they effectively
penalized union members for no other reason than their union membership, rather than
implementing a neutral plan. See id. As the Supreme Court noted in Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S.
347 (1976) "conditioning the retention of public employment on the employee's" association
with a certain group "must further some vital government end by a means that is least restrictive
of freedom of belief and association in achieving that end, and the benefit gained must outweigh
the loss of constitutionally protected rights." Id. at 363 (footnote omitted). According to the
Second Circuit in Rowland, the defendants "made no such showing . . . to justify terminating
only union employees." Rowland, 718 F.3d at 136.
Defendants in this case argue that Rowland is inapplicable because the Second Circuit
decided that case on stipulated facts, including the defendants' admission that they laid off
employees "specifically because of 'their union membership.'" See Dkt. No 128 at 6-7 (quoting
Rowland, 718 F.3d at 129). Thus, Defendants argue that Rowland only applies if Plaintiffs can
establish intentional and exclusive termination of union members. See id. at 7. In that regard,

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Defendants note that the targeted layoffs in Rowland were limited to full-fledged union
members. See id. at 5-6. Here, however, the undisputed facts show that some "agency shop fee
payors" also lost their jobs in the April RIF. 6 See id. at 5. Accordingly, Defendants contend that
they did not violate the First Amendment right to association protected in Rowland because the
group they targeted for layoffs in the April RIF included "agency shop fee payors" and union
members.
Defendants' pseudo-semantic argument does not acknowledge that the Rowland court
described the plaintiffs in several different ways, including the generic term "unionized
workforce" and only stated that "[n]o non-union workers were fired," which may or may not
have included agency shop fee payors. Rowland, 718 F.3d at 130. Although it is true that there
is nothing in the Second Circuit's decision that indicates "that any agency shop fee payors were
included in the group of 'unionized state employees' who were fired," see Dkt. No. 128 at 7, there
is equally nothing to indicate that they were not. Furthermore, the defendants in Rowland
appeared to concede that agency shop fee payors were included within the group of unionized
workers who were laid off in a footnote to their petition for a writ of certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court. Those defendants stated that, "[r]egardless of formal union membership,
a union represents all employees in a bargaining unit, and all bargaining unit members are
subject to their respective union's collective bargaining agreement with the State." Rowland v.
State Employees Bargaining Agent Coalition, No. 13-480, 2013 WL 5652564, *3 n.1 (U.S. Oct.

6

The parties dispute how to characterize agency shop fee payors. Defendants claim that
"[a]gency shop fee payors are individuals who occupy positions within a recognized bargaining
unit, but who have affirmatively decided not to join the union." See Dkt. No 120-8 at 5.
Whereas, Plaintiffs claim that "agency fee payors are individuals who occupy positions in the
bargaining unit but who have not signed a union membership card." See Dkt. No. 135 at 5. This
distinction is insignificant because the bargaining units Defendants targeted in their layoffs
undeniably represent all agency shop fee payors.
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11, 2013). Thus, it appears that neither party in Rowland differentiated between the levels of
membership within the union, focusing rather on the singular fact that the individuals were part
of a bargaining unit, represented by a union, as Plaintiffs do here.
More importantly, the inclusion of agency shop fee payors does not change the
application of Rowland to the current factual situation. Rowland was fundamentally concerned
with the use of targeted layoffs to penalize and pressure the bargaining coalition to accept the
defendants' concessions to sign a new CBA. See Rowland, 718 F.3d at 136. In other words, the
targeting theory announced in Rowland is a means to protect union-represented individuals
during the bargaining process. See id. (stating that, "for a state to fire union members -- and
union members alone -- in the hope of ultimately achieving economic concessions is little
different from refusing to hire union members in the first place"). At its heart, Rowland
condemns executing targeted layoffs to further economic bargaining because of the likely
negative effect on a person's freedom to associate with a union; unless, of course, the layoffs are
narrowly tailored to advance a vital interest. See id.
In sum, the Court finds that the frame-work that the Second Circuit announced in
Rowland applies to this case and further finds that the April 2013 RIF impacted a protected class
of employees, i.e., those employees whom the Plaintiff unions represented during collective
bargaining. Therefore, the Court must next consider whether Defendants narrowly tailored the
April RIF to advance a vital governmental interest.

3. Judicial scrutiny
The Second Circuit in Rowland acknowledged that it is possible for the government to
show that a layoff was narrowly tailored to further vital government interests, stating that

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"compel[ling] the unions to agree to concessions, which in turn would reduce the long-term costs
of state government," is "arguably a vital government interest." Id. at 135-36. The Second
Circuit suggested that to succeed, the defendants must show, among other things, that the layoffs
had more than a minimal effect on expenses and that the savings achieved correlated to the
concession requested from the unions. See id. Furthermore, the defendants must prove that the
"State's fiscal health required firing only union members, rather than implementing membershipneutral layoffs." Id. at 135. The Second Circuit further stated:
Unquestionably, layoffs applied generally without discriminating against union
members would also have brought dramatic pressure on SEBAC, by terminating
the employment of workers on whose behalf the unions were negotiating; this is
particularly so in that 75% of such layoffs could be expected to fall on union
members, who made up that proportion of the work force. But such layoffs, in
contrast to the ones here challenged, would not have penalized employees because
of their union membership.
Id. at 136.
Thus, for Defendants to prevail in this case they must show that the layoffs were not meant to
penalize union employees but were instead narrowly tailored to reduce long-term costs of state
government.
In the instant action, Plaintiffs maintain that the "facts in this case are on all fours with
those of the [Rowland] case." See Dkt. No. 120-8 at 14. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that,
like the defendants in Rowland, Defendants here cannot show that the layoffs were sufficiently
tailored to a compelling interest. See id. at 18-19. For support, Plaintiffs argue that the layoffs
had minimal effect on the overall budget; Defendants never considered coming to an agreement
with Plaintiffs to eliminate fewer positions; and Defendants never considered unilaterally
increasing health insurance contributions for the M/C employees. See id. at 19.

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In addition, Plaintiffs contend that notably lacking from Defendants' arguments is any
explanation of why a neutral layoff would not have furthered their goal to pressure the unions to
agree to concessions. In Rowland, for instance, the Second Circuit stated that general layoffs
would have also brought pressure on the defendants -- because 75% of the layoffs would be
expected to fall on union members. See Rowland, 718 F.3d at 136. Here, an even higher
percentage of the total workforce constituted unionized workers. See Dkt. No. 135 at 3 n.1
(unionized workers constitute 92% of all employees and M/C employees constitute 8%). Thus,
Plaintiffs argue that a neutral layoff scheme would have likely brought dramatic pressure on
Plaintiffs to agree to concessions and would have been "unquestionably" constitutional. See,
e.g., Rowland, 718 F.3d at 136.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs contend that the savings that Defendants hoped to achieve from
the RIF were far greater than what they were willing to accept through bargaining. See Dkt. No.
120-8 at 19-20. This fact similarly played a role in Rowland. See Rowland, 718 F.3d at 135
(stating, "the savings realized from the 2003 firings did not correlate to the concessions requested
from the unions"). In other words, the savings realized by the layoffs ($9 million) was less than
what they hoped to achieve from layoffs ($20 million) but more than what they would have been
willing to give up had the employees agreed to the health insurance concessions ($6.69 million).
That being said, the facts in Rowland that led the Second Circuit to reject the defendants'
arguments vary in some important respects from those in the present case. In Rowland, both
parties stipulated that the layoffs were exclusively targeted to penalize unionized employees and
had minimal effect on the state budget. See id. at 136 (stating that "defendants have offered no
evidence of narrow tailoring"). In contrast, Defendants here offer several reasons why the RIF
was narrowly tailored. First, the RIF did not include an entire sub-group of unionized

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employees, namely, part-time toll collectors ("PTTCs"). See Dkt. No. 114-78 at 16; see also
Dkt. No. 140, Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts, at ¶¶ 182-83. Defendants did not
include this group because PTTCs earned lower wages and were eligible for fewer benefits than
full-time toll collectors. See Dkt. No. 140 at ¶ 187. Thus, unlike in Rowland where the
defendants fired union members indiscriminately, Defendants here chose to save the jobs of the
least expensive. 7 See Rowland, 718 F.3d at 135.
Moreover, unlike in Rowland where the defendants could not show "why the State's fiscal
health required firing only union members, rather than implementing membership-neutral
layoffs," id., Defendants here limited the scope of the RIF to unionized members because they
had already "obtained about $6.4 million in savings" from the M/C employees. See Dkt. No.
114-78 at 18.
Thus, the Court finds that there are genuine disputes of material facts regarding several
material issues, including the following: (1) whether the state fiscal crisis required these layoffs;
(2) whether neutral layoffs would have achieved similar savings; and (3) whether Defendants'
financial needs were narrowly tailored to the savings anticipated in the RIF. In sum, the
uniquely factual nature of Plaintiffs' claims and the significant material disputes regarding
whether Defendants narrowly tailored the RIF to achieve a compelling interest preclude the
granting of summary judgement in this case in favor of either party.

7

Plaintiffs argue that excluding PTTCs is irrelevant to determine Defendants' motivation for the
layoffs. See Dkt. No 132-6 at 21. Plaintiffs, however, miss the point of why excluding PTTCs is
a critical factor; it has nothing to do with Defendants' motivation but, instead, shows that
Defendants tailored the RIF to the most expensive employees.
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C.

First Amendment retaliation
In Rowland, which involved substantially analogous factual and legal allegations, the

court declined to consider whether the defendants might be liable under a First Amendment
retaliation theory after determining that they targeted the plaintiffs for layoffs based on union
membership. The Second Circuit did so because the resolution of those ancillary issues became
unnecessary to provide the plaintiffs full relief after deciding in their favor under the targeting
theory. See id. at 136 n.13.
In so holding, the court in Rowland also expressed doubts that the plaintiffs would
succeed under their First Amendment retaliation theory, stating that
Plaintiffs also allege that their termination was in retaliation for their speech on
matters of public concern, proscribed by Pickering v. Board of Education, 391
U.S. 563, 88 S. Ct. 1731, 20 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1968). We believe that the case is
better conceptualized under Rutan. We have noted that "for the Pickering line of
cases to apply, there must be an expression of views." Morin v. Tormey, 626 F.3d
40, 43 (2d Cir. 2010). Plaintiffs have not identified any expression of views by
the laid-off workers, but instead allege that defendants retaliated against them
because they refused defendants' proposed concessions. Similar to the plaintiff in
Morin, plaintiffs here "did not initiate the expression of any views, nor did [they]
volunteer comments on any issues, whether of public or private citizen concern.
[They] just said, 'No.'" Id. at 44. "In short, the issue in this case is whether
[plaintiffs] could be retaliated against based on" their union "affiliation (or nonaffiliation), not whether [they] could be retaliated against based on any protected
speech," and the case is therefore "plainly governed by the Elrod/Branti/Rutan
trilogy."
Rowland, 718 F.3d at 136 n.13 (internal citation omitted).
The same is true in this case. Plaintiffs do not allege that they expressed any views; thus, the
primary issue in this case, as it was in Rowland, is whether Defendants targeted layoffs against
Plaintiffs because of their union affiliation. Therefore, the Elrod/Branti/Rutan/Rowland quartet
governs this case; and, accordingly, the Court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment
as to Plaintiffs' First Amendment retaliation claim.

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D.

Qualified immunity
"The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil

damages ‘unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or
constitutional right, and (2) that the right was "clearly established" at the time of the challenged
conduct.'" Wood v. Moss, 134 S. Ct. 2056, 2066-67 (2014) (quoting Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 563
U.S. [731, 735], 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080, 179 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (2011)). In that regard, "for a right to
be 'clearly established,' the 'contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable
official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.'" McGowan v. United States,
825 F.3d 118, 124 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S. Ct.
3034, 97 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1987)). To determine whether a right is clearly established, the Court
considers "Supreme Court and Second Circuit precedent as it existed at the time of the
challenged conduct." Id. (citing Garcia v. Does, 779 F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir. 2014)). Furthermore,
"the need for 'clearly established' law is satisfied if the law on the subject was defined at the time
with reasonable clarity or clearly foreshadowed in rulings of the Supreme Court or the Second
Circuit, so that the defendant should have understood that her conduct was unlawful." Lynch v.
Ackley, 811 F.3d 569, 578-79 (2d Cir. 2016) (citations and footnote omitted).
At the time the alleged violation occurred, i.e., April 2013, Second Circuit and Supreme
Court case law did not clearly establish that targeting a layoff at union represented individuals
violated those individuals' constitutional rights. As the Second Circuit stated in Rowland, it had
"never articulated a standard for determining whether, and under what circumstances, a public
entity's employment decisions violate this right to associate in unions." Rowland, 718 F.3d at
132. Furthermore, as Rowland court pointed out, although "it c[ould not] 'be questioned that the

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First Amendment's protection of speech and associational rights extends to labor union
activities,'" id. (quotation and citation omitted); the contours of the right as it related to a public
entity's employment decision did not clearly foreshadow Rowland's result. Therefore, the Court
finds that, as a matter of law, Defendants Madison and Milstein are entitled to qualified
immunity with regard to Plaintiffs' claims against them in their individual capacities.

IV. CONCLUSION
Having reviewed the entire file in this matter, the parties' submissions, and the applicable
law, and for the above-stated reasons, the Court hereby
ORDERS that Defendants' motion for summary judgment, see Dkt. No. 114, is DENIED
as to Plaintiffs' First Amendment targeting claim and GRANTED as to Plaintiffs' First
Amendment retaliation claim; and the Court further
ORDERS that, based on Plaintiffs' statement that they have decided not to pursue their
Due Process, Contract Clause and state-law claims, see Dkt. No. 132-6 at 8 n.1, these claims are
DISMISSED; and the Court further
ORDERS that Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, see Dkt. No. 120, is
DENIED; and the Court further
ORDERS that Defendant Madison's and Defendant Milstein's motions for summary
judgment based on qualified immunity, see Dkt. Nos. 114, 116, are GRANTED; and Plaintiffs'
claims against Defendants Madison and Milstein are DISMISSED insofar as Plaintiffs assert
those claims against them in their individual capacities; and the Court further

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ORDERS that Plaintiffs' joint motion for class certification, see Dkt. No. 97, is referred
to Magistrate Judge Hummel for proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the
disposition of said motion.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 14, 2017
Syracuse, New York

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