Donohue et al v. Madison et al

Filing 198

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER: The Court hereby ORDERS that Plaintiffs' original and corrected amended joint motions for class certification, see Dkt. Nos. 161 , 165 , are DENIED; and the Court further ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shal l terminate Plaintiffs Danny Donohue, CSEA, and Teamsters as Plaintiffs in this action; and the Court further ORDERS that this matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Hummel for all further pretrial matters. Signed by Senior Judge Frederick J. Scullin, Jr on February 16, 2022. (rep)

Case 1:13-cv-00918-FJS-CFH Document 198 Filed 02/16/22 Page 1 of 13

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
DANNY DONOHUE, as President of the
Civil Service Employees Association, Inc.,
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO; CIVIL
SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION,
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO;
WILLIAM COLEMAN, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated; WILLIAM
MILLER, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated; JOHN METZGIER,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated; and JACK WIEDEMAN, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
THOMAS J. MADISON, JR., in his official capacity
as Executive Director of the New York State Thruway
Authority and the New York State Canal Corporation;
CARLOS MILLAN, in his official capacity as Director
of Employee Relations and Employee Safety, New York
State Thruway Authority and New York State Canal
Corporation; BRIAN U. STRATTON, in his official capacity
as Director of the New York State Canal Corporation;
HOWARD P. MILSTEIN, in his official capacity as Chairman
of New York State Thruway/Canal Corporation Board of
Directors; E. VIRGIL CONWAY, in his official capacity as
Board Member of the New York State Thruway/Canal
Corporation Board of Directors; NEW YORK STATE
THRUWAY AUTHORITY; NEW YORK STATE CANAL
CORPORATION; DONNA J. LUH, in her official capacity
as Vice-Chairman of New York State Thruway/Canal
Corporation Board of Directors; RICHARD N. SIMBERG,
in his official capacity as Board Member of the New York State
Thruway/Canal Corporation Board of Directors; BRANDON
R. SALL, in his official capacity as Board Member of the New
York State Thruway/Canal Corporation Board of Directors; J.
DONALD RICE, JR., in his official capacity as Board Member of
the New York State Thruway/Canal Corporation Board of
Directors; and JOSE HOLGUIN-VERAS, in his official capacity

1:13-CV-918
(FJS/CFH)
(Lead Case)

Case 1:13-cv-00918-FJS-CFH Document 198 Filed 02/16/22 Page 2 of 13

as Board Member of the New York State Thruway/Canal
Corporation Board of Directors,
Defendants.

DANNY DONOHUE, as President of the
Civil Service Employees Association, Inc.,
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO; CIVIL
SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION,
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO;
JOHN DELLIO, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated; MICHAEL
BOULERIS, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated; MAUREEN
ALONZO, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated; and MARCOS
DIAMANTATOS, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.

1:13-CV-920
(FJS/CFH)

THOMAS J. MADISON, JR., individually and in his
official capacity as Executive Director of the New York
State Thruway Authority and the New York State Canal
Corporation; CARLOS MILLAN, in his official capacity as
Director of Employee Relations and Employee Safety, New
York State Thruway Authority and New York State Canal
Corporation; HOWARD P. MILSTEIN, individually and in his
official capacity as Chairman of New York State Thruway/Canal
Corporation Board of Directors; E. VIRGIL CONWAY, in his
official capacity as Board Member of the New York State
Thruway/Canal Corporation Board of Directors; NEW YORK
STATE THRUWAY AUTHORITY; DONNA J. LUH, in her
official capacity as Vice-Chairman of New York State Thruway/
Canal Corporation Board of Directors; RICHARD N. SIMBERG,
in his official capacity as Board Member of the New York State
Thruway/Canal Corporation Board of Directors; BRANDON R.
SALL, in his official capacity as Board Member of the New York
State Thruway/Canal Corporation Board of Directors; J. DONALD
RICE, JR., in his official capacity as Board Member of the New York
State Thruway/Canal Corporation Board of Directors; and JOSE
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HOLGUIN-VERAS, in his official capacity as Board Member of
the New York State Thruway/Canal Corporation Board of Directors,
Defendants.
NEW YORK STATE THRUWAY
EMPLOYEES LOCAL 72; JOSEPH
E. COLOMBO; GEORGE E. SAVOIE;
and DAVID M. MAZZEO, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.

1:14-CV-1043
(FJS/CFH)

NEW YORK STATE THRUWAY AUTHORITY;
HOWARD P. MILSTEIN, individually and in his
official capacity as Chairman of the New York State
Thruway Authority; THOMAS J. MADISON, JR.,
individually and in his official capacity as Executive
Director of the New York State Thruway Authority;
THOMAS RYAN, in his official capacity; E. VIRGIL
CONWAY, in his official capacity as Board Member
of the New York State Thruway Authority; JOHN F.
BARR, in his official capacity as Director of Administrative
Services of the New York State Thruway Authority;
JOHN M. BRYAN, in his official capacity as Chief
Financial Officer and Treasurer of the New York State
Thruway Authority; DONNA J. LUH, in her official
capacity as Vice-Chair of the New York State Thruway
Authority Board of Directors; J. DONALD RICE, JR.,
in his official capacity as Board Member of the New
York State Thruway Authority; BRANDON R. SALL,
in his official capacity as Board Member of the New York
State Thruway Authority; RICHARD N. SIMBERG, in
his official capacity as Board Member of the New York
State Thruway Authority; and JOSE HOLGUIN-VERAS,
in his official capacity as Board Member of the New York
State Thruway Authority,
Defendants.

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Case 1:13-cv-00918-FJS-CFH Document 198 Filed 02/16/22 Page 4 of 13

APPEARANCES

OF COUNSEL

CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION, INC.
143 Washington Avenue
P.O. Box 7125, Capitol Station
Albany, New York 12224
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Danny
Donohue, Civil Service Employees
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME,
AFL-CIO, William Coleman, William
Miller, John Metzgier, Jack Wiedeman,
John Dellio, Michael Bouleris, Maureen
Alonzo, and Marcos Diamantatos

AARON E. KAPLAN, ESQ.
JENNIFER C. ZEGARELLI, ESQ.

LIVINGSTON ADLER PULDA
MEIKLEJOHN & KELLY
557 Prospect Avenue
Hartford, Connecticut 06205
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Danny
Donohue, Civil Service Employees
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME,
AFL-CIO, William Coleman, William
Miller, John Metzgier, Jack Wiedeman,
New York State Thruway Employees
Local 72, Joseph E. Colombo, George E.
Savoie, and David M. Mazzeo

NICOLE M. ROTHGEB, ESQ.
GREGG D. ADLER, ESQ.

WHITEMAN, OSTERMAN &
HANNA LLP
One Commerce Plaza
Suite 1900
Albany, New York 12260
Attorneys for Defendants Carlos
Millan, Brian U. Stratton, E. Virgil
Conway, Richard N. Simberg, New
York State Thruway Authority, New
York State Canal Corporation, Donna
J. Luh, Brandon R. Sall, J. Donald Rice,
Jr., Jose Holguin-Veras, Howard P.
Milstein, Thomas J. Madison, Jr., Thomas
Ryan, and John F. Barr

BETH A. BOURASSA, ESQ.
CHRISTOPHER W. MEYER, ESQ.
MONICA R. LENAHAN, ESQ.
NORMA G. MEACHAM, ESQ.
ALAN JAY GOLDBERG, ESQ.
WILLIAM S. NOLAN, ESQ.

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Case 1:13-cv-00918-FJS-CFH Document 198 Filed 02/16/22 Page 5 of 13

CAPEZZA HILL, LLP
30 South Pearl Street
Suite P-110
Albany, New York 12207
Attorneys for Defendant Thomas J.
Madison, Jr.

BENJAMIN W. HILL, ESQ.

DREYER BOYAJIAN LLP
75 Columbia Street
Albany, New York 12210
Attorneys for Defendant Thomas J.
Madison, Jr.

WILLIAM J. DREYER, ESQ.

E. STEWART JONES HACKER
MURPHY, LLP
28 Second Street
Troy, New York 12180
Attorneys for Defendant John M. Bryan

E. STEWART JONES, JR., ESQ.
THOMAS J. HIGGS, ESQ.

SCULLIN, Senior Judge
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs are union-represented employees who contend that their employers,
Defendants New York State Thruway Authority ("Defendant Thruway") and New York State
Canal Corporation ("Defendant Canal Corporation," and collectively referred to with Defendant
Thruway as "Defendants"), terminated or otherwise adversely impacted their positions as part of
a reduction in force ("RIF") that targeted employees for their association with those unions. See
generally Dkt. No. 1, Class Compl., at ¶¶ 5-37, 48-54. 1 In addition to the individual employees,
Plaintiffs include the two collective bargaining units to which those employees belong – Civil
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO ("CSEA") and New

1

These three actions are consolidated for pre-trial matters. All citations to docket numbers
refer to the docket in the Lead Case, 13-CV-918, unless otherwise noted. Such notation, where
appropriate, is included in a parenthetical following the citation.
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York State Thruway Employees Local 72 ("Teamsters"). See generally id.; Dkt. No. 1 (13-CV920); Dkt. No. 2 (14-CV-1043). After many years of litigation, the only remaining causes of
action in these cases are Plaintiffs' First Amendment targeting claims. 2 See Dkt. Nos. 142, 159,
180, 194.
Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs' corrected, renewed, and amended joint motion for
class certification. 3 See Dkt. No. 165. The Court has already considered the parties' initial
submissions in support of and in opposition to certifying three classes of Plaintiffs, i.e., the
"Teamsters Local 72 Class," the "CSEA [Thruway] Authority Class," and the "CSEA Canal
Corporation Class." See Dkt. No. 165-2, Pls' Memorandum in Support of Corrected Mot., at
10-11. Each of those proposed classes included individuals who (a) worked for either
Defendant Thruway or Defendant Canal Corporation; (b) were members of either Teamsters or
CSEA unions; (c) were "adversely affected" by the RIF; and (d) were in one of the following
subclasses of Plaintiffs:
(1) those whose employment was terminated (hereinafter referred
to as "Direct Plaintiffs"); or
(2) those who were bumped, demoted or transferred to different
positions or work locations, or who were forced into
retirement (hereinafter referred to as "Indirect Plaintiffs").
See id.

2

Because the only remaining claims are First Amendment targeting claims, and unions and
union-representatives cannot bring such claims, the Court directs the Clerk of the Court to
terminate Plaintiffs CSEA, Teamsters, and Danny Donohue – as President of CSEA – from this
action.
3

Plaintiffs' initial renewed and amended joint motion for class certification, see Dkt. No. 161, is
also pending before the Court. However, because the corrected motion in Dkt. No. 165 appears
to replace the initial renewed and amended motion, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's motion in
Dkt. No. 161 as moot.
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After reviewing the parties' submissions, the Court requested additional information
regarding the following eight issues: (1) quantifying the number of Direct Plaintiffs; (2)
quantifying the number of Indirect Plaintiffs; (3) whether current class counsel could adequately
represent both Direct and Indirect Plaintiffs; (4) recommendations for potential class counsel for
Direct and Indirect Plaintiffs; (5) recommendations for class representatives for Direct and
Indirect Plaintiffs; (6) proposed definitions for Direct and Indirect Plaintiffs' subclasses; (7)
further explanation as to how Indirect Plaintiffs would demonstrate that Defendants collectively
targeted them based on their union membership; and (8) how the common issues among
Indirect Plaintiffs predominate over individualized issues. See Dkt. No. 191 at 5-6. The parties
have filed supplemental memoranda answering these questions. See Dkt. Nos. 195, 197. The
Court must now determine whether Plaintiffs have satisfied Rule 23's requirements to warrant
class certification. See Dkt. No. 165.

II. DISCUSSION
Whether Plaintiffs have satisfied Rule 23's requirements for class certification
A "district court may certify a class only after determining that each Rule 23
requirement is met." Lisnitzer v. Zucker, 983 F.3d 578, 588 (2d Cir. 2020) (citing Shahriar v.
Smith & Wollensky Rest. Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 234, 251 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing In re IPO Secs.
Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 41-42 (2d Cir. 2006))); see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338,
351 (2011). "Rule 23(a) requires that '(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impractical; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4)
the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.'" Doxey v.

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Cmty. Bank, N.A., No. 8:19-CV-919 (MAD/CFH), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169735, *9
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2021) (D'Agostino, J.) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)).
If the Court finds that Plaintiffs satisfy Rule 23(a), then it must determine whether
Plaintiffs have met the requirements set forth in Rule 23(b). See Zhang v. Ichiban Grp., No.
1:17-CV-148 (MAD/TWD), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136308, *17-*18 (N.D.N.Y. May 21,
2021) (D'Agostino, J.). Plaintiffs argued in their initial memorandum that the proposed classes
satisfied the requirements set forth in Rule 23(b)(2) and (b)(3). See Dkt. No. 165-2 at 21-22.
"According to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a class may be certified under Rule
23(b)(2) in a single circumstance: when 'the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act
on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding
declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.'" Berni v. Barilla S.P.A., 964
F.3d 141, 146 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2)). "Put another way, a class may
not be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) if any class member's injury is not remediable by the
injunctive or declaratory relief sought." Id. With respect to subsection (b)(3), "[a] district court
may certify a class under Rule 23(b)(3) only if 'the questions of law or fact common to class
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.'" Zhang, 2021
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136308, at *18 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)). The Court addresses each
element in turn.
A. Numerosity
With respect to Rule 23(a)'s first element, "a proposed class that exceeds forty members
is considered presumptively numerous for purposes of this requirement." A.T. v. Harder, 298 F.
Supp. 3d 391, 406 (N.D.N.Y. 2018) (Hurd, J.) (citing Pa. Pub. Sch. Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Morgan
Stanley & Co., Inc., 772 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2014) ("Numerosity is presumed for classes
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larger than forty members.")). Notably, however, "[i]t is not the total size of the class that
matters, but the size of each proposed subclass that drives the numerosity inquiry." Carollo v.
United Capital Corp., 528 F. Supp. 3d 37, 53 (N.D.N.Y. 2021) (Hurd, J.) (citation omitted). In
response to the Court's most recent inquiry, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants' RIF adversely
impacted 322 people. See Dkt. No. 195 at 8. According to Plaintiff, Defendants terminated 217
Teamsters and CSEA union members as part of the RIF; those members are the "Direct
Plaintiffs." See id. Specifically, those Direct Plaintiffs include 143 Teamsters members, 35
CSEA Thruway members, and 39 CSEA Canal Corporation members. See id. at 8-9. With
respect to the "Indirect Plaintiffs," Plaintiffs identify 105 union members who suffered adverse
employment actions "as a result of the exercise of bumping or seniority rights." See id. at 9. Of
those individuals, 65 were Teamsters members, 22 were CSEA Thruway members, and 18 were
CSEA Canal Corporation members. See id. 4
Plaintiffs appear to concede that they encompass six subclasses – one for each union and
then further divided into Direct and Indirect Plaintiffs in that specific union – because they
identified named Plaintiffs to represent each of those six subclasses. See Dkt. No. 195 at 11-12.
If the Court were to divide Plaintiffs into those six subclasses based on the numbers listed in
response to the Court's inquiry, neither the CSEA Thruway nor the CSEA Canal Corporation
units would reach the 40-member minimum that Rule 23 requires with respect to either their
Direct or their Indirect Plaintiffs. For this reason, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not

4

Furthermore, as Defendants point out, Plaintiffs have changed the expected number of class
members several times, including from their initial memorandum of law supporting the pending
motion to their supplemental memorandum of law. Compare Dkt. No. 165-2 at 3-4, 13
(alleging that Defendants terminated 200 Direct Plaintiffs and "340 other union member
employees suffered other tangible adverse actions") with Dkt. No. 195 at 8-9 (alleging that the
RIF impacted 322 total employees, with 217 Direct Plaintiffs and 105 Indirect Plaintiffs).
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Case 1:13-cv-00918-FJS-CFH Document 198 Filed 02/16/22 Page 10 of 13

satisfied the numerosity requirement for their subclasses. Plaintiffs nonetheless appear to
attempt to get around this issue by defining three subclasses – one for each union – which
would include both the Direct and Indirect Plaintiffs for that union. See id. at 12-16. However,
as is discussed below, this is improper because lumping together Direct and Indirect Plaintiffs
into one subclass fails to meet Rule 23's commonality and typicality requirements.
B. Commonality
"Commonality asks whether the class members 'have suffered the same injury' which
can be proven by a 'common contention' that is 'of such a nature that it is capable of classwide
resolution.'" Carollo, 528 F. Supp. 3d at 53-54 (quoting Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350, 353). "In
short, commonality is met where the determination of a single issue will resolve that issue as to
'the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.'" Id. at 54 (quoting Dukes, 564 U.S. at
350). Plaintiffs' First Amendment targeting claims are the only remaining claims in this action.
See Dkt. No. 180 at 16 n.13. In those claims, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants threatened that, if
Teamsters and CSEA did not agree to the concessions demanded, they would terminate
Teamsters and CSEA-represented employees; and Defendants followed through on that threat.
See Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 94-120 (13-CV-918); Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 70-96 (13-CV-920); Dkt. No. 2 at
¶¶ 47-69 (14-CV-1043). Plaintiffs generally allege that, although Defendants employed union
and non-union-represented employees, Defendants "intentionally singled out union members for
termination" and "intentionally direct[ed]" the terminations against "union members because of
their union membership." See Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 103-104 (13-CV-918). Additionally, Plaintiffs
allege that Defendants "intended to interfere" with Plaintiffs' "exercise of their rights of freedom
of association and freedom of speech" and that Defendants' conduct violated those rights. See
id. at ¶¶ 110-111. Thus, the single issue that will resolve Plaintiffs' First Amendment claim is
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determining whether Defendants intentionally interfered with Plaintiffs' employment because of
their union membership.
Although Plaintiffs may argue in a broad sense that they "have suffered the same injury"
in that Defendants allegedly violated each of their First Amendment rights, Plaintiffs more
specifically argue that they have suffered directly, in that Defendants terminated them from
their positions, or indirectly, in that they suffered some other adverse consequence, such as
transferring locations, being "bumped," or being "forced into retirement." See Dkt. No. 195 at
12-16. These injuries are not the same. For example, the Court cannot conceive that Plaintiffs
suffered the "same injury" when one class member lost his employment entirely and another
was merely transferred to a new location.
Furthermore, proving whether Defendants "intentionally interfered" with Plaintiffs' First
Amendment rights would require different showings for Direct and Indirect Plaintiffs. As
Defendants point out, to show that they intentionally terminated Direct Plaintiffs would require
showing Defendants' intentional conduct in terminating employees based on their union
membership. See Dkt. No. 197 at 26. However, with respect to Indirect Plaintiffs, Defendants
did not direct or control other employees' seniority or bumping choices, which ultimately
caused Indirect Plaintiffs' harm. See id. For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have
not suffered the "same injury," and addressing this issue would not resolve the claims "in one
stroke." Carollo, 528 F. Supp. 3d at 54. Therefore, the Court holds that Plaintiffs have not
satisfied Rule 23's commonality requirement.
C. Typicality
"'Rule 23(a)(3) is satisfied when each class member's claim arises from the same course
of events, and each class member makes similar arguments to prove the defendant's liability.'"
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A.T., 298 F. Supp. 3d at 408-09 (quoting Stinson, 282 F.R.D. at 370-371 (quotation omitted)).
"'When the same unlawful conduct was directed at or affected both the named plaintiffs and the
prospective class, typicality is usually met.'" Id. at 409 (quotation omitted). "The commonality
and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to merge such that similar considerations inform
the analysis for both prerequisites." Sykes v. Mel Harris & Assocs. LLC, 285 F.R.D. 279, 287
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citations omitted). As discussed with regard to the issue of commonality,
Direct Plaintiffs must show that Defendants intentionally terminated their employment; whereas
Indirect Plaintiffs must show that Defendants' conduct somehow affected the seniority and
bumping choices of other employees, which, in turn, impacted Indirect Plaintiffs. Thus, the
Court finds – for substantially the same reasons as set forth in its commonality analysis – that
Plaintiffs have not shown that Defendants directed the same unlawful conduct at both Direct
and Indirect Plaintiffs. As such, the Court holds that Plaintiffs have not satisfied the typicality
requirement. 5
In sum, for all of the above-stated reasons, the Court denies Plaintiffs' corrected,
renewed, and amended joint motion for class certification. See Dkt. No. 165. 6

5

As the Court has found that Plaintiffs have failed to meet Rule 23's requirements for
numerosity, commonality, and typicality, it need not consider the fourth element – whether the
proposed class representatives are adequate – or whether Plaintiffs have satisfied Rule 23(b)(2)
or (b)(3).
6

Thus, going forward, only eleven Plaintiffs remain in this action, eight of whom are Direct
Plaintiffs and three of whom are Indirect Plaintiffs. The Direct Plaintiffs in Case No. 13-CV918 include William Miller, John Metzgier, and Jack Wiedman. The Direct Plaintiffs in Case
No. 13-CV-920 include John Dellio, Michael Bouleris, Maureen Alonzo, and Marco
Diamantatos. The only Direct Plaintiff in Case No. 14-CV-1043 is Joseph Colombo.
Additionally, William Coleman is the only Indirect Plaintiff in Case No. 13-CV-918. There are
no Indirect Plaintiffs in Case No. 13-CV-920. George Savoie and David Mazeo are the Indirect
Plaintiffs in Case No. 14-CV-1043.
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III. CONCLUSION
After carefully considering the entire file in this matter, the parties' submissions, and the
applicable law, and for the above-stated reasons, the Court hereby
ORDERS that Plaintiffs' original and corrected amended joint motions for class
certification, see Dkt. Nos. 161, 165, are DENIED; and the Court further
ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall terminate Plaintiffs Danny Donohue, CSEA,
and Teamsters as Plaintiffs in this action; and the Court further
ORDERS that this matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Hummel for all further pretrial
matters. 7
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 16, 2022
Syracuse, New York

7

The Court notes that there are various issues that the parties must address before setting a trial
date, including but not limited to the following: (1) whether the parties would like to keep these
three actions consolidated for trial, hold three separate trials, or separate the trials into one for
Direct Plaintiffs and one for Indirect Plaintiffs; (2) whether the parties intend to bifurcate trial(s)
on the issue of liability, and, if so, what the parties' next steps would be if Defendants are found
liable to some or all Plaintiffs; and (3) whether there are any conflicts of interest in counsel
representing both Direct and Indirect Plaintiffs when those subcategories appear to have
different interests and injuries.
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