Siddiqua v. New York State Department of Health
Filing
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DECISION AND ORDER: that Defendant's motion to dismiss Dkt. No. 10 is Granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of the Defendant and close this case.Signed by Judge Glenn T. Suddaby on 07/23/2015. (hmr)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
________________________________________
JESMAIN SIDDIQUA,
Plaintiff,
1:14-CV-0372
(GTS/RFT)
v.
NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
Defendant.
________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
OF COUNSEL:
SMITH HOKE, PLLC
Counsel for Plaintiff
7 Southwoods Blvd., Suite 103
Albany, NY 12211
JOHN J. HOKE, ESQ.
HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN
Attorney General for the State of New York
Counsel for Defendant
The Capitol Albany, New York 12224-0341
JUSTIN J. ENGEL, ESQ.
Assistant Attorney General
GLENN T. SUDDABY, United States District Judge
DECISION and ORDER
Currently pending before the Court, in this employment civil rights action filed by
Jesmain Siddiqua ("Plaintiff") against the New York State Department of Health (“Defendant”),
is Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (Dkt. No. 10.) For the reasons set
forth below, Defendant's motion is granted.
I.
RELEVANT BACKGROUND
A.
Plaintiff's Claims
Generally, liberally construed, Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that, between approximately
May 20, 2011, and April 5, 2012, Defendant disciplined Plaintiff, an Information Technology
Specialist, and improperly terminated her employment, for taking a trip to Bangladesh to care for
her sick mother between April 4, 2011, and May 20, 2011, after Plaintiff had requested and
obtained prior permission to take such leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act
(“FMLA”). (See generally Dkt. No. 1 [Plf.’s Compl.].) In addition, the Complaint alleges that
Plaintiff grieved the discipline and termination under her union, the Public Employees
Federation, but that, on April 5, 2012, an arbitrator “inexplicably held that Plaintiff’s termination
did not violate the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the Public Employees Federation
and the New York State Department of Health.” (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 19.) Based on these factual
allegations, Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts two claims against Defendant: (1) a claim that the
“Defendants interfered, restrained and denied Plaintiff her rights under 29 U.S.C. § 2611,1 more
specifically, interfering with her right to utilize FMLA qualified leave and terminating her as a
result of the use of said leave”; and (2) a claim that the “Defendant retaliated against the Plaintiff
for her exercise of her rights provided for under the FMLA.” (Id.) Familiarity with these claims
and factual allegations supporting them in Plaintiff’s Complaint is assumed in this Decision and
Order, which is intended primarily for the review of the parties. (Id.)
1
While Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges a violation under 29 U.S.C. § 2611, the Court
notes that the alleged violation appears to arise under 29 U.S.C. § 2612.
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B.
Parties’ Briefing on Defendant's Motion
Generally, in support of its motion to dismiss, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s FMLA
claims are barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel for the following four
reasons: (1) the Court may consider the arbitration decision in question on a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim because (a) the decision is a matter of public record, and (b) in any
event, the decision was incorporated by reference into Plaintiff’s Complaint; (2) arbitration
awards have a preclusive effect in subsequent litigation, even if not judicially confirmed; (3)
Plaintiff actively pursued her FMLA claims in arbitration and through an unsuccessful petition to
vacate the arbitration award in New York State Supreme Court, and is therefore precluded from
re-litigating them in federal court under the doctrine of res judicata and, in the alternative, under
the doctrine of collateral estoppel; and (4) the Supreme Court case that barred arbitration of
statutory discrimination claims has been abrogated by subsequent Supreme Court cases and no
longer applies. (Dkt. No. 10, Attach. 1 [Def.'s Memo. of Law].)
Generally, in response, Plaintiff argues asserts two arguments: (1) the arbitration award
has no preclusive effect because (a) under the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the arbitrator
did not have the power to rule on statutory claims such as Plaintiff’s FMLA claims, and (b) in
any event, Plaintiff did not rely on the FMLA during the arbitration proceeding; and (2) even if
the arbitrator had the power to decide Plaintiff’s FMLA claims, he cannot be said to have
decided those claims, because he did not conduct a proper FMLA analysis. (Dkt. No. 13.)
Generally, in reply, Defendant asserts three arguments: (1) Plaintiff’s argument that the
arbitrator did not have the power to rule on her FMLA claims does not address Defendants’
reliance on the doctrine of collateral estoppel, which focuses on issues that were necessarily
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decided, not claims that were or could have been presented; (2) because Plaintiff’s argument in
arbitration was that Defendant lacked just cause to terminate her because she was exercising her
FMLA rights during her absence from work, the primary issue addressed at the arbitration was
whether Plaintiff’s termination violated the FMLA; and (3) moreover, Plaintiff’s argument that
the arbitrator did not conduct the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis is flawed because
there was no need to conduct such an analysis given that the arbitrator found that Plaintiff never
established a prima facie case of interference or retaliation under the FMLA due to the lack of
adequate notice of her intent to take FMLA leave (which finding precludes both her interference
and retaliation claims). (Dkt. No. 16.)
II.
GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARDS
It has long been understood that a defendant may base a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted on either or both of two grounds: (1) a challenge
to the "sufficiency of the pleading" under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); or (2) a challenge to the legal
cognizability of the claim. Jackson v. Onondaga County, 549 F. Supp.2d 204, 211, nn. 15-16
(N.D.N.Y. 2008) (McAvoy, J., adopting Report-Recommendation on de novo review).
Because such motions are often based on the first ground, a few words on that ground are
appropriate. Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a pleading
contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) [emphasis added]. In the Court’s view, this tension between permitting a
“short and plain statement” and requiring that the statement “show[]” an entitlement to relief is
often at the heart of misunderstandings that occur regarding the pleading standard established by
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
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On the one hand, the Supreme Court has long characterized the “short and plain”
pleading standard under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) as "simplified" and "liberal." Jackson, 549 F.
Supp.2d at 212, n.20 (citing Supreme Court case). On the other hand, the Supreme Court has
held that, by requiring the above-described "showing," the pleading standard under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(a)(2) requires that the pleading contain a statement that "give[s] the defendant fair notice of
what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Jackson, 549 F. Supp.2d at
212, n.17 (citing Supreme Court cases) (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court has explained that such fair notice has the important purpose of
“enabl[ing] the adverse party to answer and prepare for trial” and “facilitat[ing] a proper decision
on the merits” by the court. Jackson, 549 F. Supp.2d at 212, n.18 (citing Supreme Court cases);
Rusyniak v. Gensini, 629 F. Supp.2d 203, 213 & n.32 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (Suddaby, J.) (citing
Second Circuit cases). For this reason, as one commentator has correctly observed, the “liberal”
notice pleading standard "has its limits." 2 Moore’s Federal Practice § 12.34[1][b] at 12-61 (3d
ed. 2003). For example, numerous Supreme Court and Second Circuit decisions exist holding
that a pleading has failed to meet the “liberal” notice pleading standard. Rusyniak, 629 F.
Supp.2d at 213, n.22 (citing Supreme Court and Second Circuit cases); see also Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-52 (2009).
Most notably, in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Supreme Court reversed an
appellate decision holding that a complaint had stated an actionable antitrust claim under 15
U.S.C. § 1. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007). In doing so, the Court
"retire[d]" the famous statement by the Court in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957),
that "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond
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doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him
to relief." Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1968-69. Rather than turning on the conceivability of an
actionable claim, the Court clarified, the "fair notice" standard turns on the plausibility of an
actionable claim. Id. at 1965-74. The Court explained that, while this does not mean that a
pleading need "set out in detail the facts upon which [the claim is based]," it does mean that the
pleading must contain at least "some factual allegation[s]." Id. at 1965. More specifically, the
"[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level [to a
plausible level]," assuming (of course) that all the allegations in the complaint are true. Id.
As for the nature of what is “plausible,” the Supreme Court explained that “[a] claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). “[D]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for
relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense. . . . [W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to
infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged–but it has not
show[n]–that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950 [internal quotation marks
and citations omitted]. However, while the plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully,” id., it “does not impose a probability
requirement.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
Because of this requirement of factual allegations plausibly suggesting an entitlement to
relief, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint
is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
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supported by merely conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
Similarly, a pleading that only “tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement”
will not suffice. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (internal citations and alterations omitted). Rule 8
“demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id.
Finally, a few words are appropriate regarding what documents are considered on a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Generally, when contemplating a dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) or Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), the following matters outside the four corners of the complaint
may be considered without triggering the standard governing a motion for summary judgment:
(1) documents attached as an exhibit to the complaint or answer, (2) documents incorporated by
reference in the complaint (and provided by the parties), (3) documents that, although not
incorporated by reference, are “integral” to the complaint, or (4) any matter of which the court
can take judicial notice for the factual background of the case. LeBarron v. Warren Cnty.
Sheriff’s Office, 13-CV-1572, 2015 WL 2248749, at *8, n.6 (N.D.N.Y. May 13, 2015)
(collecting authorities.2
2
See also Faconti v. Potter, 242 F. App'x 775 (2d Cir.2007), aff’g, Faconti v.
Henderson, 01-CV-2600, Memorandum & Order, at 7-8 (E.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 29, 2006)
(dismissing claims based on res judicata pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12[c] because, “[h]ere, the
court relies on the pleadings, documents incorporated by reference, and matters of which the
court takes judicial notice”) [emphasis added]; Stringer v. Liinve, 92 F. App'x 818 (2d Cir.2004),
aff’g, 02-CV-0997, Decision and Order, at *4-5 (N.D.N.Y. filed May 30, 2003) (McAvoy, J.)
(dismissing claims based on alternative ground of res judicata pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12[c]
because the plaintiff's complaint referenced the prior state court foreclosure proceeding of which
he was complaining); Mennella v. Office of Court Admin., No. 97-7811, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS
22041 (2d Cir.1988), aff’g, 938 F. Supp. 128, 130-31 (E.D.N.Y.1996) (dismissing claims based
on res judicata pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12[c] because the plaintiff's complaint referenced the
prior state court proceeding of which he was partially complaining); Caldwell v. Gutman, Mintz,
Baker & Sonnenfeldt, P. C., 701 F. Supp. 2d 340, 345, 351-52 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (dismissing
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III.
ANALYSIS
After carefully considering the matter, the Court accepts each of Defendant’s arguments
for dismissal for the reasons stated in its memoranda of law. To those reasons, the Court adds
three points.
First, in her opposition papers, Plaintiff does not take issue with the accuracy of the
arbitration decision adduced by Defendant in its motion to dismiss. (See generally Dkt. No. 13.)
As a result, the Court finds that the arbitration decision, which is referenced in Paragraph 19 of
Plaintiff’s Complaint, may be properly construed as part of the Complaint, for purposes of
Defendant’s motion. See, supra, Part II of this Decision and Order (setting forth the standard on
a motion to dismiss). In the alternative, the Court finds that both the arbitration decision and the
Supreme Court’s decision may be properly considered on Defendant’s motion as both integral to
the Complaint and documents of which the Court may take judicial notice Id.
Second, in finding that the arbitration decision has preclusive effect, the Court relies on,
inter alia, the following facts: (1) the fact that, in the arbitration proceeding, Plaintiff relied
exclusively on her alleged compliance with the FMLA as part of her defense to the charge of
claims based on alternative ground of res judicata pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12[c] because the
plaintiffs' complaint referenced the prior state court proceeding of which they were partially
complaining); Pantoja v. Scott, 96-CV-8593, 2001 WL 1313358, at *2, 5-9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26,
2001) (considering prior decision, “annexed to the Answer,” and determining that decision had
barred plaintiff, based on “principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel[,] from pursuing his
present Fair Housing Act claim against Kiska”); Anderson News, L.L.C. v. Am. Media, Inc., 732
F. Supp. 2d 389, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting that, on a motion to dismiss, the court can take
judicial notice of prior proceedings for the purpose of considering whether collateral estoppel
bars the plaintiff's claims); Candelaria v. Erickson, 01-CV-8594, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45549,
at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2007) (“Here, the Court will take judicial notice of Plaintiff's complaint
filed [in a prior action in this District], . . . the related Stipulation and Order of Discontinuance, .
. . . and the . . . Judgment Dismissing the Action with prejudice . . . , because they are public
documents in an official judicial proceeding.”).
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being absent from work without authorization; (2) the fact that, at the arbitration proceeding,
Plaintiff had the opportunity to introduce documentary evidence, testify on her own behalf,
cross-examine adverse witnesses, and submit post-hearing briefs; and (3) the fact that the 19page arbitration decision, in addition to expressly mentioning the “FMLA” at least 40 times,
specifically and repeatedly found that Plaintiff never gave adequate notice of her intent to take
leave for purposes of the FMLA (which finding precludes certain elements of both a claim for
interference and a claim for retaliation under the FMLA, as explained by Defendant). (Dkt. No.
10, Attach. 3.)3
Third, in addition to relying on the preclusive effect of the arbitration decision, the Court
relies on the preclusive effect of the New York State Supreme Court decision, which, in
considering the “interest of justice” standard that governs a request for an extension of a service
deadline, found that Plaintiff’s challenge to the arbitration award is not meritorious. (Dkt. No.
10, Attach. 4.) More specifically, the state court judge rejected Plaintiff’s argument that the
arbitrator was biased, did not properly credit her evidence or testimony, and was not “wellacquainted with the Family Medical Leave Act.” (Id.)
For all of these reasons, the Court grants Defendant’s motion.
3
Generally, under New York law, the doctrine of collateral estoppel (or issue
preclusion) has two essential elements: (1) “the identical issue necessarily must have been
decided in the prior action and be decisive of the present action”; and (2) “the party to be
precluded from relitigating the issue must have had a full and fair opportunity to contest the prior
determination.” Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 85 (2d Cir. 2007). Generally, under
New York law, the doctrine of res judicata (or claim preclusion) has three elements: “(1) the
previous action involved an adjudication on the merits; (2) the previous action involved the
parties or those in privity with them; and (3) the claims asserted in the subsequent action were, or
could have been, raised in the prior action.” Murtaugh v. New York, 810 F. Supp. 2d 446, 485
(N.D.N.Y. 2011) (Suddaby, J.) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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ACCORDINGLY, it is
ORDERED that Defendant's motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 10) is GRANTED. The Clerk
is directed to enter judgment in favor of the Defendant and close this case.
Dated: July 23, 2015
Syracuse, New York
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