Carroll v. The State of New York et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER granting 12 Motion to Dismiss: The Court hereby ORDERS that the Defendants motion to dismiss Plaintiff's amended complaint is GRANTED; and the Court further ORDERS that Plaintiff shall file her proposed second am ended complaint within fourteen (14) days from the date of this Memorandum-Decision and Order; and the Court further ORDERS that, if Plaintiff fails to file a proposed second amended complaint within fourteen (14) days from the date of this Memorandum-Decision and Order, the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in Defendants' favor and close this case, without further order of the Court. Signed by U.S. District Judge Mae A. D'Agostino on 11/14/14. (ban)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
____________________________________________
TRACY CARROLL,
Plaintiff,
vs.
1:14-CV-00479
(MAD/ATB)
THE STATE OF NEW YORK and the NYS
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES,
Defendants.
____________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
OF COUNSEL:
OFFICE OF DENNIS F. IRWIN
428 Sandy Creek Road
Albany, New York 12205
Attorney for Plaintiff
DENNIS F. IRWIN, ESQ.
OFFICE OF THE NEW YORK
STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL
The Capitol
Albany, New York 12224
Attorneys for Defendants
RACHEL M. KISH, AAG
Mae A. D'Agostino, U.S. District Judge:
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 25, 2014, Plaintiff commenced this action alleging that Defendants violated her
rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, specifically 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). See
Dkt. No. 1. On August 22, 2014, Plaintiff amended her complaint. See Dkt. No. 11.
Currently before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Dkt. No. 12-1. On
September 23, 2014, Plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to Defendants motion to
dismiss. See Dkt. No. 15.
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff at all times relevant herein was employed by Defendant the State of New York,
and by Defendant New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision
("DOCCS"). See Dkt. No. 11 at ¶ 6. During her employment with Defendants, Plaintiff's position
was as a Transitional Service Coordinator or Veteran's Coordinator. See id. at ¶ 8.
According to Plaintiff's amended complaint, between February 1, 2010 and April 18,
2012, while employed first at Mt. McGregor Correctional Facility for a ten-month period, and
then at Great Meadow Correctional Facility, she was subjected to "acts of commission or
omission, [and Defendants] acted towards [her], both directly and indirectly, in ways which were
hostile, abusive, discriminatory, threatening, offensive, abusive and harassing, retaliatory, and
sexually inappropriate." See id. at ¶¶ 13, 14. Plaintiff first contends that during her employment
at Mt. McGregor Correctional Facility, between February 1, 2010, and December 2010, falsities
were spread by and amongst the correctional officers regarding her preference in men because she
was the mother of a biracial son. See id. at ¶¶ 13, 13(a). Plaintiff further alleges in her amended
complaint that false rumors were spread by Defendants' employees that Plaintiff was engaging in
inappropriate relations with inmates, "including inappropriate touching and providing contraband
to inmates." See id. at ¶ 13(b). In March of 2010, Plaintiff filed a grievance with the
Superintendent of the Correctional Facility regarding inappropriate conduct of Sgt. Michaels. See
id. at ¶ 13(d). In her grievance, Plaintiff alleged that Sgt. Michaels stated the following: "I gave
you a play. You fucked up and you better not fuck up again!" See id. During that same month,
Plaintiff alleged that another employee made unwanted comments to Plaintiff that she felt "had a
sexual innuendo." See id. at ¶ 13(f). Furthermore, during her employment at Mt. McGregor
Correctional facility through December 2010, Plaintiff experienced threatening behavior from
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Defendants' employees which allegedly prevented her from properly fulfilling her employment
duties and otherwise "creat[ed] a hostile workplace for her." See id. at ¶ 13(o).
In December of 2010, against her wishes, Plaintiff transferred from Mt. McGregor
Correctional Facility to Great Meadow Correctional Facility, where she continued to experience
discriminatory behavior from Defendants' employees between January 3, 2011, and April 18,
2012. See id. at ¶¶ 13(p), 13(q), 14. In March of 2011, Plaintiff was allegedly falsely accused of
engaging in a sexual relationship with an inmate. See id. at ¶ 14(a). Additionally, Plaintiff
alleged that during her employment at Great Meadow, specifically in and around August 25,
2011, Defendants' employees continuously exposed her to "excessive use of profanity" and
taunting. See id. at ¶¶ 14(b)–14(d). Plaintiff further alleges that in late 2011, her ability to carry
out her duties as a counselor were further hindered as both the correctional officers and others
assigned to work with Plaintiff refused to speak with her, and if they did speak to her, it was only
to harass or jeer at her. See id. at ¶¶ 14(e), 14(f). On February 3, 2012, Plaintiff received a
threatening letter in the mail which she immediately reported to the local police. See id. at ¶
14(h). Three days later, on February 6, 2012, Plaintiff reported an incident to the Great Meadow's
administration after she discovered that her office had been "ransacked, including items being
missing, her desk put in disarray and all the drawers had been ransacked," which frightened her
immensely. See id. at ¶ 14(i). Plaintiff contends that throughout her employment with
Defendants at Great Meadow, she continuously experienced a "hostile, discriminatory, retaliatory,
and sexually inappropriate work environment" stemming from the conduct of the Defendants'
employees. See id. at ¶ 14(t). The February 6, 2012 incident is the last occurrence of
discrimination that Plaintiff explicitly references in her amended complaint. See id. at ¶14(i).
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On February 7, 2013, Plaintiff filed a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC"), which referenced the discriminatory acts that were allegedly committed
between February 1, 2010, and April 18, 2012. See Dkt. No. 15 at 3. Plaintiff was then issued a
right-to-sue letter by the EEOC on January 24, 2014, upon which she commenced this action on
April 25, 2014. See Dkt. No. 11 at 10; see Dkt. No. 1.
III. DISCUSSION
A.
Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of the party's claim for relief. See Patane v.
Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 111–12 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). In considering the legal
sufficiency, a court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the pleading and draw all
reasonable inferences in the pleader's favor. See ATSI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493
F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). This presumption of truth, however, does not
extend to legal conclusions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted).
Although a court's review of a motion to dismiss is generally limited to the facts presented in the
pleading, the court may consider documents that are "integral" to that pleading, even if they are
neither physically attached to, nor incorporated by reference into, the pleading. See Mangiafico v.
Blumenthal, 471 F.3d 391, 398 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d
147, 152-53 (2d Cir. 2002)).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a party need only plead "a short and plain statement of the
claim," see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), with sufficient factual "heft to 'sho[w] that the pleader is
entitled to relief[,]'" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) (quotation omitted).
Under this standard, the pleading's "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right of relief
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above the speculative level," id. at 555 (citation omitted), and present claims that are "plausible
on [their] face," id. at 570. "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,'
but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). "Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a
defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of "entitlement
to relief."'" Id. (quoting [Twombly, 550 U.S.] at 557, 127 S. Ct. 1955). Ultimately, "when the
allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief,"
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558, or where a plaintiff has "not nudged [its] claims across the line from
conceivable to plausible, the[ ] complaint must be dismissed[,]" id. at 570.
Prior to bringing a Title VII claim in a New York federal court, the aggrieved individual
must file a complaint with the within 300 days of the events or occurrences giving rise to the
claim of discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan,
536 U.S. 101, 104–05 (2002); Zerilli-Edelglass v. New York City Transit Authority, 333 F.3d 74,
80 (2d Cir. 2003). Consequently, those claims that fall outside of this 300-day time period are
deemed time-barred and must be dismissed. See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 109. Furthermore,
"discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they are related to acts
alleged in timely filed charges." Id. at 113. However, in a Title VII action alleging a hostile work
environment, where at least one of the alleged acts of discrimination falls within the statutory
period, the court may apply the continuing violation doctrine, wherein the court will find that
those discrete claims that would ordinarily be time-barred are sufficiently related to an overall
unlawful employment practice or policy and thus will be considered. See Patterson v. County of
Oneida, N.Y., 375 F.3d 206, 220 (2d Cir. 2004) ("To bring a claim within the continuing violation
exception, a plaintiff must at the very least allege that one act of discrimination in the furtherance
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of the ongoing policy occurred within the limitations period") (citing Cornwell v. Robinson, 23
F.3d 694, 703–04 (2d Cir, 1994)); see also Lambert v. Genesee Hospital, 10 F.3d 46, 53 (2d Cir.
1993). In such a circumstance where the continuing violation doctrine applies, the court will then
be permitted to consider "'the entire time period of hostile work environment . . . for the purposes
of determining liability.'" Patterson, 375 F.3d at 220 (quoting National R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 117). Where the claim that is brought is one alleging a hostile work
environment resulting from sexual harassment, in order for the doctrine of continuing violation to
apply, it must be shown that "while a harassing incident need not be overtly sex-based, there must
be reason to believe that the act was motivated by the plaintiff's sex in order for the incident to
contribute to a sexually hostile work environment." Sanderson v. New York State Elec. & Gas
Corp., 560 Fed. Appx. 88, 92 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 378 (2d Cir.
2002)).
B.
Application
In the present case, Plaintiff claims that the alleged acts of discrimination and sexual
harassment by Defendants continued until April 18, 2012. See Dkt. No. 11 at ¶ 14. The pertinent
300-day period in this case ended when Plaintiff filed her complaint with EEOC, which was no
earlier than February 7, 2013. See Dkt. No. 15 at 3. Thus, the 300-day statutory period for
actionable claims of discrimination would have had to occur between approximately April 13,
2012, and February 7, 2013, a time period that both parties have agreed to. See id.; see also Dkt.
No. 12-1 at 6. Although Plaintiff alleges that she experienced the discriminatory acts as alleged
in paragraph 14 subsections b, g, j, k, l, n, o, t, u, v, in her amended complaint between April 13,
2012 and April 18, 2012, these allegations are too conclusory and fail to explicitly identify which
acts of alleged discrimination occurred during that five-day time period. See Dkt. No. 15 at 3–4.
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Throughout Plaintiff's amended complaint, she explicitly references the dates upon which she
experienced alleged discriminatory acts, all occurring between March 2010, and February 6,
2012. See Dkt. No. 11 at ¶¶ 13(d), 14(i). Although Plaintiff contends that she experienced acts of
discrimination from the Defendants until April 18, 2012, February 6, 2012, is the last is the latest
date Plaintiff references in her amended complaint. See id. at ¶ 14(i).
Although Plaintiff indicated in her amended complaint and in her memorandum of law in
opposition to Defendants' motion to dismiss that Defendants' employees continued to violate her
rights under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), until April 18, 2012, she fails to explicitly reference any
acts of discrimination in her amended complaint that occurred after February 6, 2012. See id. at
¶¶ 14, 14(i). Thus, Plaintiff's argument that the continuing violation doctrine should be applied
by the Court fails, as she does not provide the Court with any specifics acts of discrimination that
occurred within the statutory 300-day time period. In order for the Court to apply the continuing
violation doctrine, Plaintiff would have had to show that at least one of the alleged discriminatory
acts occurred within the 300-day statutory period. See Sanderson, 560 Fed. Appx. at 90 ("With
respect to a claim that the plaintiff suffered a hostile work environment . . . the claim is timely 'so
long as one act contributing to the claim occurred within the statutory period.' . . . then 'the entire
time period of the hostile environment may be considered by the court for . . . determining
liability'") (quoting Patterson, 375 F.3d, at 220). Thus, Plaintiff's failure to make reference to any
discriminatory act occurring on or after April 13, 2012, in her amended complaint renders the
doctrine of continuing violation inapplicable.
Plaintiff again alleges in her affidavit in opposition to Defendants' motion to dismiss, that
between February 6, 2012, and April 18, 2012, Defendants continuously failed to investigate the
incident that she alleged in paragraph 14i of her amended complaint. See Dkt. No. 15 at ¶ 11.
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Again, however, this conclusory allegation in which Plaintiff fails to identify any specific conduct
that occurred within the 300-day time period is insufficient to plausibly suggest that her claims
are timely. See Russo v. New York Presbyterian Hosp., 972 F. Supp. 2d 429, 444-45 (E.D.N.Y.
2013) (citations omitted); see also Meadors v. Ulster County, 984 F. Supp. 2d 83, 91 (N.D.N.Y.
2013) ("Plaintiffs' attempts to salvage these untimely claims under the continuing violation
doctrine fail because Plaintiffs have offered nothing more than the conclusory statement that
Defendants have maintained 'systematic motivations and methods [of discrimination], including
the conscious denial of receiving complaints and knowing refusal to take action'"); Deras v.
Metropolitan Transp. Auth., No. 11–CV–5912, 2013 WL 1193000, *7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2013)
(finding that the plaintiff's conclusory allegations were insufficient to trigger the continuing
violation doctrine); Askew v. New York, No. 09–CV–553, 2013 WL 450165, *7 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 6,
2013) (holding that the plaintiff's arguments and conclusory allegations were insufficient to
"warrant application of the continuing violation doctrine").
Although Plaintiff has not requested leave to replead in response to Defendants' motion,
the Court will permit Plaintiff one final opportunity to file an amended pleading. If Plaintiff fails
to file her proposed second amended complaint within fourteen (14) days of the date of this
Memorandum-Decision and Order, this matter will be closed and judgment entered in Defendants'
favor, without further order of this Court.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court hereby
ORDERS that the Defendants motion to dismiss Plaintiff's amended complaint is
GRANTED; and the Court further
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ORDERS that Plaintiff shall file her proposed second amended complaint within
fourteen (14) days from the date of this Memorandum-Decision and Order; and the Court further
ORDERS that, if Plaintiff fails to file a proposed second amended complaint within
fourteen (14) days from the date of this Memorandum-Decision and Order, the Clerk of the Court
shall enter judgment in Defendants' favor and close this case, without further order of the Court;
and the Court further
ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall serve of copy of this Memorandum-Decision
and Order on the parties in accordance with the Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 14, 2014
Albany, New York
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