Carroll v. The State of New York et al
Filing
64
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER granting 48 Motion for Summary Judgment: The Court hereby ORDERS that the Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED; and the Court further ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in Defen dants' favor and close this case; and the Court furtherORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall serve of copy of this Memorandum-Decision and Order on the parties in accordance with the Local Rules. Signed by U.S. District Judge Mae A. D'Agostino on 2/22/2018. (ban)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
____________________________________________
TRACY CARROLL,
Plaintiff,
vs.
1:14-CV-00479
(MAD/ATB)
THE STATE OF NEW YORK and the NYS
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES,
Defendants.
____________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
OF COUNSEL:
OFFICE OF DENNIS F. IRWIN
428 Sandy Creek Road
Albany, New York 12205
Attorney for Plaintiff
DENNIS F. IRWIN, ESQ.
OFFICE OF THE NEW YORK
STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL
The Capitol
Albany, New York 12224
Attorneys for Defendants
ADRIENNE J. KERWIN, AAG
Mae A. D'Agostino, U.S. District Judge:
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 25, 2014, Plaintiff commenced this action alleging that Defendants violated her
rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, specifically 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). See
Dkt. No. 1. On August 22, 2014, Plaintiff amended her complaint. See Dkt. No. 11.
On November 11, 2014, the Court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss, finding that
Plaintiff failed to allege any acts of discrimination within the 300-day statutory time period. See
Dkt. No. 19 at 7-8. The Court also permitted Plaintiff one final opportunity to amended her
complaint.
Currently before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was employed by the New York State Department of Corrections and
Community Supervision ("DOCCS") from November 2006 until April 2013. See Dkt. No. 48-1
at ¶ 1. In November 2006, Plaintiff began her employment with DOCCS at Mount McGregor
Correctional Facility ("Mt. McGregor C.F."). See id. at ¶ 2. Plaintiff worked at Mt. McGregor
C.F. until December 2010. See id. at ¶ 3. At Mt. McGregor C.F., Plaintiff worked as a
transitional services coordinator and veterans coordinator. See id. at ¶ 4.
Mt. McGregor C.F. had a medium security portion and a minimum security portion:
Plaintiff maintained offices in both locations. See id. at ¶ 5. During her time at Mt. McGregor
C.F., Plaintiff's direct supervisor was senior correction counselor Jean Huff. See id. at ¶ 6.
Plaintiff claims that, while employed at Mt. McGregor C.F., she faced harassment and
discrimination directed at her by, among others, Sergeant John Michaels, Captain Murphy,
Corrections Officer Kleinfeld, and Lieutenant Sheridan. See id. at ¶ 7.
In December of 2010, Plaintiff lost her job at Mt. McGregor C.F. as a result of a reduction
in staff. See id. at ¶ 8. In January 2011, Plaintiff began work at Great Meadow Correctional
Facility ("Great Meadow C.F."). See Dkt. No. 48-1 at ¶ 9. At Great Meadow C.F., Plaintiff was
employed as a correction counselor and her direct supervisor was, at first, Robert Boissey, and
thereafter Cheryl Goodman. See id. at ¶¶ 10-11. Plaintiff's next-ranking supervisor was Karen
LaPolt, who was deputy superintendent of programs. See id. at ¶ 12. While employed at Great
Meadow C.F., Plaintiff claims that she faced harassment and/or discrimination directed at her by,
among others, Corrections Officers Scuderi, LaPointe, and possibly Dougherty, "Tony," and
Kemp. See id. at ¶ 13.
2
At Great Meadow C.F., Plaintiff's regular schedule was Monday through Friday, 8:00 a.m.
through 4:00 p.m. See id. at ¶ 14. Plaintiff did not work on Friday, April 13, 2012. See id. at ¶
15. On Monday, April 16, 2012, Plaintiff worked for seven hours and thirty minutes, having used
thirty minutes of vacation time on that day. See id. at ¶¶ 15-16. Plaintiff worked a full day on
Tuesday, April 17, 2012 but was compensated using time allowed to her under the Family and
Medical Leave Act for Wednesday, April 18, 2012. See id. at ¶¶ 17-18. The last day upon which
Plaintiff reported to work at Great Meadow C.F. was April 17, 2012. See id. at ¶ 19.
On February 7, 2013, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC"). See id. at ¶ 21. On January 24, 2014, Plaintiff was issued a right-to-sue
letter. See id.
III. DISCUSSION
A.
Summary Judgment Standard
A court may grant a motion for summary judgment only if it determines that there is no
genuine issue of material fact to be tried and that the facts as to which there is no such issue
warrant judgment for the movant as a matter of law. See Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctrs. Corp., 43
F.3d 29, 36 (2d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). When analyzing a summary judgment motion, the
court "cannot try issues of fact; it can only determine whether there are issues to be tried." Id. at
36-37 (quotation and other citation omitted). Moreover, it is well-settled that a party opposing a
motion for summary judgment may not simply rely on the assertions in its pleading. See Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e)).
In assessing the record to determine whether any such issues of material fact exist, the
court is required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party. See Chambers, 43 F.3d at 36 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
3
242, 255 (1986)) (other citations omitted). Where the non-movant either does not respond to the
motion or fails to dispute the movant's statement of material facts, the court must be satisfied that
the citations to evidence in the record support the movant's assertions. See Giannullo v. City of
New York, 322 F.3d 139, 143 n.5 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that not verifying in the record the
assertions in the motion for summary judgment "would derogate the truth-finding functions of the
judicial process by substituting convenience for facts").
B.
Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
As noted in Defendants' reply, Plaintiff's opposition to Defendants' motion for summary
judgment mostly just regurgitates prior filings, including Plaintiff's second amended complaint,
and is largely non-responsive to the arguments Defendants raised. In her opposition, Plaintiff
refers to the testimony of non-party witnesses Jean Huff, Belle Denise Perkins, and Virginia
Donohue, as exhibits I, II, and III, respectively. See Dkt. No. 58-10 at ¶¶ 9-11. Plaintiff has filed
nine fragments of deposition transcripts in conjunction with her affidavit in opposition. See Dkt.
Nos. 58-1–58-9. Yet each is simply identified as "Transcript" and Plaintiff failed to attach to
these filings the witness' oaths. Moreover, the last two filings labeled "Transcript" do not have
any identifying information that would aid in determining which witness is providing the
testimony. See Dkt. Nos. 58-8 & 58-9. Moreover, Plaintiff provides no citation to any specific
page(s) of these transcripts in her response.
C.
Discrimination and Retaliation
In her response to Defendants' motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff contends that she
is "claiming that the many acts of discrimination and retaliation against me are part of the creation
of the hostile work environment and sexual harassment against me, not that they stand alone as
separate cause of action claims." Dkt. No. 58 at ¶ 13; see also Dkt. No. 59 at 8 ("Furthermore,
4
even if Plaintiff's claims of 'discrimination' and 'retaliation' do not stand alone as viable claims,
they do stand to show and be part of the hostile work environment and sexually inappropriate
conduct that were wrongfully created and acted out against the Plaintiff"). Since Plaintiff does
not oppose Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to her claims of retaliation and
discrimination, the Court grants summary judgment as to those claims.
D.
Hostile Work Environment
1. Timeliness
Prior to bringing a Title VII claim in a New York federal court, the aggrieved individual
must file a complaint with the EEOC within 300 days of the events or occurrences giving rise to
the claim of discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 104–05 (2002); Zerilli-Edelglass v. New York City Transit Authority, 333
F.3d 74, 80 (2d Cir. 2003). Consequently, those claims that fall outside of this 300-day time
period are deemed time-barred and must be dismissed. See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 109.
Furthermore, "discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they are
related to acts alleged in timely filed charges." Id. at 113. However, in a Title VII action alleging
a hostile work environment, where at least one of the alleged acts of discrimination falls within
the statutory period, the court may apply the continuing violation doctrine, wherein the court will
find that those discrete claims that would ordinarily be time-barred are sufficiently related to an
overall unlawful employment practice or policy and thus will be considered. See Patterson v.
County of Oneida, N.Y., 375 F.3d 206, 220 (2d Cir. 2004) ("To bring a claim within the
continuing violation exception, a plaintiff must at the very least allege that one act of
discrimination in the furtherance of the ongoing policy occurred within the limitations period")
(citing Cornwell v. Robinson, 23 F.3d 694, 703–04 (2d Cir. 1994)); see also Lambert v. Genesee
5
Hospital, 10 F.3d 46, 53 (2d Cir. 1993). Where the continuing violation doctrine applies, the
court is permitted to consider "'the entire time period of hostile work environment . . . for the
purposes of determining liability.'" Patterson, 375 F.3d at 220 (quoting National R.R. Passenger
Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 117 (2002)). Where the claim that is brought is one alleging a
hostile work environment resulting from sexual harassment, in order for the doctrine of
continuing violation to apply, it must be shown that "while a harassing incident need not be
overtly sex-based, there must be reason to believe that the act was motivated by the plaintiff's sex
in order for the incident to contribute to a sexually hostile work environment." Sanderson v. New
York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 560 Fed. Appx. 88, 92 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing Alfano v. Costello,
294 F.3d 365, 378 (2d Cir. 2002)).
Courts in the Second Circuit generally disfavor the continuing violation doctrine and have
declined to extend its applicability absent compelling circumstances. See Cotz v. Matroeni, 476
F. Supp. 2d 332, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) ("Courts in the Second Circuit view continuing violation
arguments with disfavor, and the doctrine's applicability outside of the Title VII or discrimination
context is uncertain"); Trinidad v. New York City Dep't of Corr., 423 F. Supp. 2d 151, 165 n.11
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("As a general matter, the continuing violation doctrine is heavily disfavored in
the Second Circuit and courts have been loath to apply it absent a showing of compelling
circumstances"). "Such compelling circumstances include 'unlawful conduct tak[ing] place over a
period of time, making it difficult to pinpoint the exact day the violation occurred; where there is
an express, openly espoused policy that is alleged to be discriminatory; or where there is a pattern
of covert conduct such that the plaintiff only belatedly recognizes its unlawfulness.'" Clemmons
v. Holder, No. 13-cv-7229, 2015 WL 4894184, *5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2015) (quoting Koehl v.
Greene, No. 06–cv–0478, 2007 WL 2846905, *7-*9 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2007)) (other citation
6
omitted); see also Yip v. Bd. Of Tr. of SUNY, No. 03–CV–0959, 2004 WL 2202594, *4
(W.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2004).
In the present matter, Plaintiff was employed by DOCCS until April 2013, but she last
reported to her place of employment on April 17, 2012. See Dkt. No. 48-1 at ¶¶ 1, 19. Plaintiff
filed her complaint with the EEOC on February 7, 2013. As such, the 300-day statutory period
for actionable claims allows for claims based on incidents having occurred between April 13,
2012 and February 7, 2013. Since Plaintiff left DOCCS' employment, however, the actionable
period in this case is from April 13, 2012 through April 18, 2012. As set forth in Defendants'
motion, Plaintiff only reported to work at Great Meadow C.F. on April 16 and 17, 2012. See
id. at ¶¶ 16-17.
First, the Court finds the continuing violation doctrine is inapplicable to Plaintiff's hostile
work environment claim relating to her time at Mt. McGregor C.F. Courts have consistently held
that when alleged discriminatory act are committed by different coworkers, in different
departments, during different time periods, the doctrine is inapplicable. See Little v. NBC, 210 F.
Supp. 2d 330, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Hill v. Taconic Developmental Disabilities Servs. Office, 181
F. Supp. 2d 303, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). While at Mt. McGregor C.F., Plaintiff alleges that she
encountered difficulties with Sergeant John Michaels, Captain Murphy, C.O. Kleinfeld, and
Lieutenant Sheridan. See Dkt. No. 48-1 at ¶ 7. Plaintiff did not work with any of these
individuals at Great Meadow C.F., the two facilities are not located on the same property, and
Plaintiff had different supervisors at each facility. See id. at ¶¶ 11-13. As such, Plaintiff's claims
relating to her time at Mt. McGregor C.F. are untimely.
As to the allegations relating to Plaintiff's time at Great Meadow C.F., the Court finds that
Plaintiff has failed to set forth any compelling circumstances to otherwise merit the application of
7
the continuing violation doctrine, and the Court declines to do so. At her deposition, Plaintiff
testified that she first consulted with an attorney about her workplace issues in 2009 or 2010. See
Dkt. No. 48-4 at 86, 180. She again consulted with one or more attorneys almost immediately
upon leaving DOCCS employment in April or May 2012. See id. at 182. Plaintiff presents no
compelling reason why the Court should apply the continuing violation doctrine to the present
matter.
Additionally, as discussed in more detail below, Plaintiff fails to provide the Court with
any evidence of a relationship between the alleged hostile acts that fall without the statute of
limitations and those that fall within it. None of the conduct occurring between April 13 and
April 18, 2012 relate to a specific discriminatory policy or mechanism, or to continued
unremedied wrongs amounting to a discriminatory policy or practice. See Cornwell v. Robinson,
23 F.3d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1994).
Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to
Plaintiff's hostile work environment claim as to the incidents that occurred prior to April 13,
2012. D.
Hostile Work Environment
Title VII makes it "'an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Harris v.
Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1)). "[T]he phrase
'terms, conditions, or privileges of employment' evinces a congressional intent '"to strike at the
entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women"' in employment." Meritor Sav. Bank,
FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (quoting L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435
U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)). In order to demonstrate a hostile work environment based on gender,
8
a plaintiff must establish: "(1) that the harassment was 'sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment,' and (2) that a
specific basis exists for imputing the objectionable conduct to the employer." Alfano v. Costello,
294 F.3d 365, 373 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Perry v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 115 F.3d 143, 149 (2d Cir.
1997)); see also Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 ("Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create
an objectively hostile or abusive work environment—an environment that a reasonable person
would find hostile or abusive — is beyond Title VII's purview"); Pucino v. Verizon Wireless
Commc'ns, Inc., 618 F.3d 112, 117-18 (2d Cir. 2010).
The inquiry has objective and subjective elements: "'the misconduct must be "severe or
pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment," and the victim
must also subjectively perceive that environment to be abusive.'" Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128,
148 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Alfano, 294 F.3d at 374). Factors such as frequency of the
discriminatory conduct, its severity, and whether it humiliates or physically threatens an
employee or unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance are used to determine
whether an environment is sufficiently hostile. Id. (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 23). "As a general
rule, incidents must be more than 'episodic; they must be sufficiently continuous and concerted in
order to be deemed pervasive.'" Alfano, 294 F.3d at 374 (quoting Perry, 115 F.3d at 149).
"Finally, it is 'axiomatic' that in order to establish a sex-based hostile work environment under
Title VII, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the conduct occurred because of her sex." Id. (quoting
Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001)).
"In assessing the 'totality of the circumstances' offered to prove a hostile work
environment, a fact-finder may consider only abusive conduct proven to be 'based on sex.'"
Pucino, 618 F.3d at 117 (quotation and other citation omitted). "This may be proven by
9
'harass[ment] in such sex-specific and derogatory terms . . . [as] to make it clear that the harasser
is motivated by general hostility to the presence of women in the workplace,' . . . or by offering
'some circumstantial or other basis for inferring that incidents sex-neutral on their face were in
fact discriminatory.'" Id. at 117-18 (internal quotations omitted). "A plaintiff may rely on
incidents of sex-based abuse to show that other ostensibly sex-neutral conduct was, in fact,
sex-based." Id. at 118 (citation omitted); see also Howley v. Town of Stratford, 217 F.3d 141, 156
(2d Cir. 2000) (holding that a rational jury could infer that facially-neutral abuse was sex-based
because the perpetrator had previously made several sexually-derogatory statements).
Following the issuance of the Court's November 11, 2014 Memorandum-Decision and
Order, Plaintiff amended her complaint to include incidents that occurred between April 13 and
18, 2012. For example, Plaintiff claims that on April 12 and 13, 2012, she exchanged emails with
her union representative regarding an upcoming grievance meeting that related to a sexual
harassment grievance that she had filed on April 7, 2011. See Dkt. No. 20 at ¶ 14(ff). This upset
Plaintiff because she believed that the meeting "meant to me that DOCS was not taking my sexual
harassment or hostility complaint seriously to protect me." Id.
Moreover, Plaintiff's second amended complaint states that on April 16, 2012, a coworker, Ginger Donahue overheard Corrections Officers Scuderi and LaPointe "plotting 'to get
me.'" Dkt. No. 20 at ¶ 14(w). Her deposition, however, indicates that Ms. Donahue informed
Plaintiff that she overheard the alleged plot much earlier. See Dkt. No. 48-4 at 148-49, 167.
Further, both Ginger Donahue and Plaintiff testified in their depositions that this alleged
"conspiracy" to get Plaintiff in trouble had nothing to do with her gender. Rather, the false
complaint they filed against her related to the fact that they believed that Plaintiff was responsible
for getting them into trouble and had otherwise complained about their excessive use of profanity.
10
Additionally, Plaintiff claims that on April 16, 2012, she was informed that she was
required to submit to an interrogation the following day at 10:00 a.m. at the Inspector General's
Office in Albany. See Dkt. No. 20 at ¶ 14(cc). Plaintiff claims that the written notice was sent to
her supervisor, Karen LaPort, at the end of March, but she was not notified until April 16, 2012.
She claims that she was verbally told that the investigation was about the fact that her office had
been "ransacked," but the interrogation instead related to false allegations leveled against her for
having a romantic relationship with an inmate and possessing inappropriate drawings from that
inmate hanging in her office. See id. at ¶¶ 14(x), (cc). When Plaintiff returned to Great Meadow
C.F. later that day, she complained to Karen LaPort that she was being set up, to which LaPort
responded "'Tracy, I don't think they're trying to get you.'" Id. at ¶ 14(y). According to Plaintiff,
this dismissive attitude clearly demonstrates that LaPort was not taking her complaints about
harassment, hostility, and sexual matters seriously. See id. Moreover, Plaintiff contends that,
after her meeting with Karen LaPort, when she returned to her office, C.O. LaPointe "and his coworkers" repeatedly called her names including "nigger lover," "whore," and "cunt." See id. at ¶
14(z).
During her deposition, Plaintiff briefly discussed a grievance that she filed in March of
2011, relating to allegations about her having a sexual relationship with an inmate. See Dkt. No.
48-4 at 126-129. Plaintiff claims that she had to continually press her union representative to get
a hearing on this grievance, which she claims took "almost a year[.]" Id. at 129.
What is lacking in all of these allegations is any evidence demonstrating that the alleged
hostile work environment was caused because of her sex. Other than general and conclusory
statements made during her deposition, nothing in the record supports Plaintiff's claim. While the
Court does not doubt that Plaintiff perceived her time at Great Meadow C.F. as a hostile work
11
environment, the perceived hostility was not because of her sex. Even at her deposition, Plaintiff
acknowledged that her problems at Great Meadow C.F. began at a meeting the day after she had
met with an inmate who was serving as her assistant at her office. See Dkt. No. 48-4 at 117. At
this meeting, Plaintiff was told that she was no longer permitted to meet with the inmate and
Plaintiff claims that she challenged this order and expressed her concerns about this limitation.
See id. at 118. Plaintiff believes that it was her challenging this order from the security staff that
started her problems. See id. at 118-20. Indeed, even Ginger Donahue testified that Plaintiff told
her that she believed that she was being harassed because of an unspecified complaint she made
against them at some point in the past, which she believed to be related to the officers' use of
profanity. See Dkt. No. 58-8 at 7; Dkt. No. 58-9 at 17. Additionally, Ms. Donahue testified that
many of the correction officers demonstrate hostility towards the civilian workers and specifically
mentioned this hostility as it pertains to the mental health workers. See Dkt. No. 58-9 at 16-17.
As to the profanity, Plaintiff testified that it was not directed at her on a daily or even
weekly basis, and referred to it as "sporadic." Dkt. No. 48-4 at 140. Further, Plaintiff
acknowledged that profanity was regularly used in the prison, but not necessarily directed at her.
See id. at 138-39, 145. This sporadic use of profanity, which was only directed at Plaintiff on
several occasions during her years at Great Meadow C.F., is insufficient to support her hostile
work environment claim.
In conclusion, even if the Court found that the continuing violation doctrine applied to
Plaintiff's hostile work environment claim relating to her time at Great Meadow C.F., the
undisputed evidence clearly establishes that the alleged hostility was not motivated by
considerations made improper by Title VII. Further, the undisputed evidence identifies only
12
sporadic hostility that is otherwise insufficient to support her claim. Accordingly, Defendants'
motion for summary judgment is granted.
IV. CONCLUSION
After carefully reviewing the entire record in this matter, the parties' submissions and the
applicable law, and for the above-stated reasons, the Court hereby
ORDERS that the Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED; and the
Court further
ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in Defendants' favor and close
this case; and the Court further
ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall serve of copy of this Memorandum-Decision
and Order on the parties in accordance with the Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 22, 2018
Albany, New York
13
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?