Cooper v. State of New York

Filing 23

DECISION AND ORDER granting # 19 Defendant's Motion to Plaintiff's amended complaint. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is dismissed in its entirety. Signed by Chief Judge Glenn T. Suddaby on 10/9/15. (lmw)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
______________________________________
WINIFRED COOPER,
Plaintiff,

1:14-CV-0717
(GTS/CFH)

v.
NEW YORK STATE DEP’T OF LABOR,
Defendant.
______________________________________
APPEARANCES:

OF COUNSEL:

SUSSMAN & WATKINS
Counsel for Plaintiff
1 Railroad Ave.
P.O. Box 1005
Goshen, New York 10924

CHRISTOPHER D. WATKINS, ESQ.
MICHAEL H. SUSSMAN, ESQ.

HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN
Attorney General of the State of New York
Counsel for Defendant
The Capitol
Albany, New York 12224

JUSTIN L. ENGEL, ESQ.
Assistant Attorney General

GLENN T. SUDDABY, Chief United States District Judge
DECISION and ORDER
Currently before the Court, in this employment civil rights action filed by Winifred
Cooper (“Plaintiff”) against the New York State Department of Labor (“Defendant”), is
Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (Dkt. No. 19.) For the reasons
set forth below, Defendant’s motion is granted.

I.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND

A.

Plaintiff’s Complaint

Generally, liberally construed, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint alleges as follows. (Dkt.
No. 14.) Plaintiff, who is African-American, commenced employment with New York State in
1978. (Id., ¶ 11.) In October 2007, she was recruited by Defendant to serve as the Director of
Equal Opportunity Development (“DEOD”). (Id., ¶ 14.) In this position, Plaintiff represented
New York State on the National Association of State Workforce Agencies’ (“NASWA”) Equal
Opportunity Committee. (Id., ¶ 16.) Defendant receives most of its funding from the federal
government, and part of Plaintiff’s mandate as Director of DEOD was “to ensure that the agency
complied with federal Equal Opportunity rules and regulations.” (Id., ¶ 15.)
During her entire tenure as an employee with New York State, Plaintiff received positive
performance evaluations and was never the subject of disciplinary action. (Id., ¶ 12.) She was
widely recognized as one of the state’s most highly respected and knowledgeable advocates for
equal opportunity within the workplace. (Id., ¶ 13.) In early 2012, based on her performance as
Director of DEOD, Plaintiff received a performance-based Merit Award. (Id., ¶ 17.)
In December 2012, Plaintiff learned that the Governor’s Office of Employee Relations
(“GOER”) was planning to substantially alter the means by which internal equal employment
opportunity (“EEO”) complaints were to be handled by state agencies, including the NYSDOL.
(Id., ¶ 18.) Plaintiff reviewed the proposed changes and determined that, in part, they materially
conflicted with federal regulations. (Id., ¶ 19.) Plaintiff’s overriding and express concern was
that GOER’s proposed changes would subject the EEO complaint response process to political
pressure and thereby enable discrimination not to be redressed based on political calculations.
(Id.) Plaintiff organized a meeting on December 14, 2012, where she shared her concerns with

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the NYSDOL’s Executive Deputy Commissioner, Mario Musolino, and the DOL’s Director of
Employee Relations, DOL counsel, and the DEOD’s secretary. (Id., ¶ 20.) Plaintiff volunteered
to be on the GOER committee responsible for reviewing the procedures; however, she was not
selected for the committee, apparently because she had raised concerns about GOER’s
compliance with federal regulations. (Id., ¶ 21.)
In late February 2013, GOER’s new EEO procedures became effective. (Id., ¶ 22.) Once
again, Plaintiff contacted her supervisor, Mr. Musolino, and requested another meeting be held
regarding GOER’s procedures and their continued conflict with federal law. (Id., ¶ 23.) Another
meeting was held on March 15, 2013, during which Plaintiff made a presentation outlining the
conflicts between GOER’s new procedures and the federal EEO regulations. (Id., ¶ 25.) In
response, Mr. Musolino directed agency counsel to address Plaintiff’s concerns with “bridging
language” that would be submitted to GOER for approval. (Id., ¶ 26.) Mr. Musolino also
advised Plaintiff that NYSDOL’s former senior counsel, Ann Hohenstein, who had been
appointed as Director for this new initiative by GOER, had referred to Plaintiff as a “pain in her
butt” for raising concerns about the new procedures. (Id., ¶ 27.)
On March 19, 2013, NYSDOL counsel sent Plaintiff a draft of the proposed revised
complaint handling procedures, which addressed her concerns, prior to sending the draft to Mr.
Musolino and the Governor’s Deputy for Civil Rights, Alphonso David. (Id., ¶ 28.) Plaintiff
agreed with the changes and signed off on the revised language. (Id., ¶ 29.)
On April 10, 2013, Mr. Musolino advised Plaintiff that her services were no longer
needed by the NYSDOL and that her employment was ending that day. (Id., ¶ 30.) Mr.
Musolino further directed Plaintiff to file her retirement papers the next day. (Id.) When

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Plaintiff advised Ms. Musolino that she had no plans to retire, and requested an explanation for
her termination after 35 years of exemplary service, Mr. Musolino advised that the DEOD would
be going in a different direction and it wanted new leadership. (Id., ¶ 31.)
Neither Mr. Musolino, nor anyone else at NYSDOL, had advised Plaintiff that there was
any perceived deficiency with her performance or leadership, or that there was any desire to
move DEOD in a “new direction.” (Id., ¶ 32.) Rather, Plaintiff believes that her termination was
the result of pressure from GOER to the NYSDOL to terminate her in retaliation for Plaintiff’s
opposition to GOER’s proposed EEO complaint-handling procedures. (Id., ¶ 32A.)
Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff alleges she was fired in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., and the New York State Human Rights
Law (“NYSHRL”), New York Executive Law § 296. (Id., ¶¶ 33-36.)
B.

Parties’ Briefing on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
1.

Defendant’s Memorandum of Law-in-Chief

Generally, Defendant makes three arguments in support of its motion to dismiss
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. (Dkt. No. 19, Attach. 1 [Def.’s Mem. of Law].) First,
Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts plausibly suggesting that she engaged in
protected activity under either the participation or opposition clause of Title VII. (Id. at 6-10.)
Specifically, with respect to the participation clause, Defendant argues that Plaintiff did not
participate in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under Title VII. (Id. at 6-7.) Rather,
Defendant argues that she alleges only that she “expressed concerns” about proposed changes to
the manner in which NYSDOL handled EEO complaints and that those concerns were addressed
when NYSDOL drafted new language to include in the procedures. (Id. at 7.) With regard to the

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opposition clause, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not alleged facts plausibly suggesting that
she engaged in a protected activity. (Id. at 7-10.) According to Defendant, a management
employee does not engage in protected activity under Title VII when he/she disagrees with, or
opposes, the actions of her employer in the course of her normal job performance. (Id. at 7.)
Moreover, Defendant argues that employees whose job involves handling discrimination
complaints “need to first clearly establish that they were engaged in protected activities other
than the general work involved in their employment” before they can claim retaliation. (Id. at 8.)
As a result, Defendant argues that Plaintiff was merely performing her job responsibilities when
she expressed her concerns and was not taking any action to oppose illegal discrimination by her
employer. (Id. at 9-10.)
Second, Defendant argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t
of Nashville, 555 U.S. 271 (2009), is distinguishable from the present case. (Id. at 10-13.)
Specifically, Defendant argues that in Crawford the Court held that Title VII’s anti-retaliation
protection “extends to an employee who speaks out about discrimination not on her own
initiative, but in answering questions during an employer’s internal investigation.” Crawford,
555 U.S. at 273. Defendant argues that this case is distinguishable because Plaintiff does not
contend that she reported unlawful discrimination in response to an inquiry from her employer,
nor has she even identified any unlawful discrimination by her employer at all. (Id. at 11.)
Rather, Plaintiff merely claims that she opposed procedural changes to complaint-handling that
she believed conflicted with unspecified federal regulations that could potentially cause future
discrimination complaints not to be redressed. (Id.) Finally, Defendant argues that Crawford
did not overrule well-established case precedent that prohibits employees from claiming that

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they were engaged in a protected activity when they were merely performing their job duties.
(Id. at 12.)
2.

Plaintiff’s Opposition Memorandum of Law

Generally, in response to Defendant’s motion to dismiss, Plaintiff concedes that she has
not alleged facts plausibly suggesting a violation of the participation clause of Title VII. (Dkt.
No. 20, at 5 [Pl.’s Opp’n Mem. of Law].) Rather, Plaintiff argues that she engaged in protected
opposition when she opposed the proposed procedures that conflicted with federal regulations
implementing Title VII,. (Id. at 8-12.) More specifically, Plaintiff argues that Crawford adopted
an expansive interpretation of the opposition clause of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision and
the mere fact that her job included ensuring Defendant complied with Title VII and its
implementing regulations does not immunize Defendant from liability for discriminating against
her because she opposed its failure to comply with those regulations. (Id.)
3.

Defendant’s Reply Memorandum of Law

Generally, in reply to Plaintiff’s opposition, Defendant asserts the following arguments.
(Dkt. No. 21 [Def.’s Mem. of Law].) First, Defendant argues that, even if the so-called
“manager rule” does not apply to this case, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be dismissed
because she does not allege facts plausibly suggesting that she opposed any employment practice
made unlawful by Title VII. (Id. at 1-2.) Specifically, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed
to identify any employee, or group of employees, that was being discriminated against and that
she subsequently reported. (Id.) Rather, as discussed above, Plaintiff opposed procedural
changes, which she believed conflicted with federal regulations that potentially could cause
future discrimination complaints not to be redressed. (Id.)

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Second, Defendant re-iterates its argument regarding the “manager rule,” and that an
employee does not engage in protected activity under Title VII’s opposition clause when
engaging in conduct that is part of her job responsibilities. (Id. at 2-3.) According to Defendant,
to hold otherwise would result in nearly all of the normal job activities conducted by certain
categories of employees being deemed protected activity. (Id.)
II.

GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARD
It has long been understood that a defendant may base a motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted on either or both of two grounds: (1) a challenge
to the “sufficiency of the pleading” under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); or (2) a challenge to the legal
cognizability of the claim. Jackson v. Onondaga Cty., 549 F. Supp. 2d 204, 211, nn.15-16
(N.D.N.Y. 2008) (McAvoy, J., adopting Report-Recommendation on de novo review).
Because such motions are often based on the first ground, a few words on that ground are
appropriate. Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a pleading
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). In the Court’s view, this tension between permitting a
“short and plain statement” and requiring that the statement “show[]” an entitlement to relief is
often at the heart of misunderstandings that occur regarding the pleading standard established by
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
On the one hand, the Supreme Court has long characterized the “short and plain”
pleading standard under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) as “simplified” and “liberal.” Jackson, 549 F.
Supp. 2d at 212, n.20 (citing Supreme Court case). On the other hand, the Supreme Court has
held that, by requiring the above-described “showing,” the pleading standard under Fed. R. Civ.

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P. 8(a)(2) requires that the pleading contain a statement that “give[s] the defendant fair notice of
what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Jackson, 549 F. Supp. 2d at
212, n.17 (citing Supreme Court cases) (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court has explained that such fair notice has the important purpose of
“enabl[ing] the adverse party to answer and prepare for trial” and “facilitat[ing] a proper decision
on the merits” by the court. Jackson, 549 F. Supp. 2d at 212, n.18 (citing Supreme Court cases);
Rusyniak v. Gensini, 629 F. Supp. 2d 203, 213 & n.32 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (Suddaby, J.) (citing
Second Circuit cases). For this reason, as one commentator has correctly observed, the “liberal”
notice pleading standard “has its limits.” 2 Moore’s Federal Practice § 12.34(1)(b) at 12-61 (3d
ed. 2003). For example, numerous Supreme Court and Second Circuit decisions exist holding
that a pleading has failed to meet the “liberal” notice pleading standard. Rusyniak, 629 F. Supp.
2d at 213, n.22 (citing Supreme Court and Second Circuit cases); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 677-83, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-52 (2009).
Most notably, in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Supreme Court reversed an
appellate decision holding that a complaint had stated an actionable antitrust claim under 15
U.S.C. § 1. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007). In doing so,
the Court “retire[d]” the famous statement by the Court in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46,
78 S. Ct. 99 (1957), that “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless
it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561, 127 S. Ct. at 1968-69. Rather than
turning on the conceivability of an actionable claim, the Court clarified, the “fair notice”
standard turns on the plausibility of an actionable claim. Id. at 556-70, 127 S. Ct. at 1965-74.

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The Court explained that, while this does not mean that a pleading need “set out in detail the
facts upon which [the claim is based],” it does mean the pleading must contain at least “some
factual allegation[s].” Id. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1965, n.3. More specifically, the “[f]actual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level [to a plausible
level],” assuming (of course) that all the allegations in the complaint are true. Id. at 554, 127 S.
Ct. at1965.1
As for the nature of what is “plausible,” the Supreme Court explained that “[a] claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). “[D]etermining whether a complaint states a
plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw
on its judicial experience and common sense. . . . [W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit
the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged–but it
has not show[n]–that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S. Ct. at 1950
[internal quotation marks and citations omitted]. However, while the plausibility standard “asks

1

It should be emphasized that Fed. R. Civ. P. 8’s plausibility standard, explained in
Twombly, was in no way retracted or diminished by the Supreme Court’s decision (two weeks
later) in Erickson v. Pardus, in which the Court stated, “Specific facts are not necessary” to
successfully state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93,
127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (emphasis added). That statement was merely an abbreviation of
the often-repeated point of law–first offered in Conley and repeated in Twombly–that a pleading
need not “set out in detail the facts upon which [the claim is based]” in order to successfully
state a claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1965, n.3 (citing Conley, 355 U.S. at 47)
(emphasis added). That statement did not mean that all pleadings may achieve the requirement
of “fair notice” without ever alleging any facts whatsoever. Clearly, there must still be enough
facts set out (however set out, whether in detail or in a generalized fashion) to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level to a plausible level. See Rusyniak, 629 F. Supp. 2d at 214 &
n.35 (explaining holding in Erickson).
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for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully,” id., it “does not impose
a probability requirement.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. at 1965.
Because of this requirement of factual allegations plausibly suggesting an entitlement to
relief, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint
is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by merely conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at
1949. Similarly, a pleading that only “tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual
enhancement” will not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (internal citations and
alterations omitted). Rule 8 “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfullyharmed-me accusation.” Id., at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
III.

ANALYSIS
The parties’ motion papers present the issue of whether Plaintiff has alleged facts

plausibly suggesting that she engaged in protected activity under Title VII and the NYSHRL.2
After carefully considering the matter, the Court answers this question in the negative for the
reasons stated in Defendant’s memorandum of law and reply memorandum of law. (Dkt. No. 19,
Attach. 1, at 7-10 [Def.’s Mem. of Law]; Dkt. No. 21, at 1-4 [Def.’s Mem. of Law].) To those
reasons, the Court adds the following analysis.
“Section 704(a) of Title VII prohibits retaliation against two kinds of protected activity:

2

The same standard applies to retaliation claims under both Title VII and
NYSHRL. See Summa v. Hofstra Univ., 708 F.3d 115, 125 (2d Cir. 2013) (stating that “[t]he
burden-shifting framework laid out in McDonnell Douglas, governs retaliation claims under both
Title VII and the NYSHRL”); Hyek v. Field Support Servs., Inc., 461 F. App’x 59, 60 (2d Cir.
2012) (stating that “[c]laims brought under the NYSHRL ‘are analyzed identically’ and ‘the
outcome of an employment discrimination claim made pursuant to the NYSHRL is the same as it
it is under . . . Title VII’”) (quoting Smith v. Xerox Corp., 196 F.3d 358, 363 n.1 [2d Cir. 1999]).
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‘participation’ in investigations into discrimination and ‘opposition’ to conduct prohibited by the
statute.” Irons v. Bedford-Stuyvesant Cmty. Legal Servs., 13-CV-4467, 2015 WL 5692860, at
*18 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2015). Under the opposition clause, “a plaintiff engages in a protected
activity when he or she opposes an employment practice made unlawful under the provisions of
Title VII.” Kauffman v. Maxim Healthcare Servs., Inc., 04-CV-2869, 2006 WL 1983196, at *5
(E.D.N.Y. July 13, 2006). “The practice complained of need not necessarily be illegal under
Title VII; a cause of action is stated so long as plaintiff possessed a ‘good faith, reasonable belief
that the underlying challenged actions of the employer violated the law.’” Kunzler v. Canon,
USA, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 574, 579 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting Manoharan v. Columbia Univ.
Coll. of Physicians & Surgeons, 842 F.2d 590, 593 [2d Cir. 1988]).
The Second Circuit recently clarified to what extent an employee’s complaints of
discrimination are protected activities under the opposition clause when that employee’s job
responsibilities involve preventing and investigating discrimination within the company by
which he or she is employed. In Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2015), the
Second Circuit explained that,
[t]o the extent an employee is required as part of her job duties to
report or investigate other employees’ complaints of
discrimination, such reporting or investigating by itself is not a
protected activity under § 704(a)’s opposition clause, because
merely to convey others’ complaints of discrimination is not to
oppose practices made unlawful by Title VII. But if an
employee–even one whose job responsibilities involve
investigating complaints of discrimination–actively “support[s]”
other employees in asserting their Title VII rights or personally
“complain[s]” or is “critical” about the “discriminatory
employment practices” of her employer, that employee has
engaged in a protected activity under §704(a)’s opposition clause.
Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 318 (citing Sumner v. U.S. Postal, 899 F.2d 203, 209 [2d Cir. 1990]).
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Although Plaintiff in the present case alleges facts plausibly suggesting that she
“personally complained” of, and was “critical” about, the proposed changes to complainthandling procedures within state agencies, the Court finds that this conduct did not rise to the
level of opposing a protected activity under Title VII. Specifically, Plaintiff has not alleged
facts plausibly suggesting that she reasonably believed the DOL and GOER were engaging in
unlawful discrimination through the new complaint-handling procedures. Rather, Plaintiff
alleges merely that she advised these entities, as part of her job duties, that the changes were in
conflict with federal regulations regarding nondiscrimination. Conspicuously absent from
Plaintiff’s otherwise detailed Amended Complaint is any factual allegation plausibly suggesting
that the handling of internal complaints pursuant to the new procedure actually caused any
individual to be discriminated against under Title VII. Indeed, after being informed of the
potential conflicts, her supervisors concededly took action to incorporate “bridging language”
into the proposed procedures that addressed Plaintiff’s concerns within approximately a month
(apparently before any complaints were improperly handled such that an individual was
discriminated against).3

3

The cases cited by Plaintiff in support of her argument are distinguishable from
the current case. In Adams v. Northstar Location Servs., LLC, 09-CV-1063, 2010 WL 3911415
(W.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2010), the court held that plaintiff adequately pleaded protected activity for
purposes of her retaliation claim under the opposition clause when she advocated for certain
minority employees by persuading management it would be inappropriate to fire them. Adams,
2010 WL 3911415, at *4. Similarly, in Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561 (6th Cir.
2000), an affirmative action official at a university was found to have engaged in protected
activity by advocating on behalf of female and minority hires. Johnson, 215 F.3d at 576-77.
Finally, in Littlejohn, Plaintiff complained about what she believed was unlawful discrimination
when her supervisors showed preferential treatment to white employees during a merger, “while
at the same time terminating, demoting, or unfavorably reassigning African-American and
Latino/a . . . employees.” Littlejohn 795 F.3d at 304.
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It is worth noting that, in Littlejohn, the Second Circuit indicated that merely alerting
one’s supervisors to Title VII’s mandates is not protected activity. More specifically, the Second
Circuit held that plaintiff had opposed an unlawful practice under Title VII because she “was not
simply conveying others’ complaints of discrimination to [her supervisors] or alerting them to
Title VII’s mandates; she was complaining about what she believed was unlawful discrimination
in the personnel decision-making process during the ACS/DJJ merger.” Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at
319 (emphasis added). As discussed above, Plaintiff has alleged only that she was alerting her
supervisors to federal regulation mandates in the course of performing her job so as to bring the
proposed procedures into compliance. This, in and of itself, is insufficient to plausibly suggest
that Plaintiff was opposing a protected activity under Title VII. See Correa v. Mana Prods., Inc.,
550 F. Supp. 2d 319, 330 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that “[i]n order for employees in human
resources positions to claim retaliation they need to first clearly establish that they were engaged
in protected activities other than the general work involved in their employment”).
Finally, it is also worth noting that the Court is unpersuaded that Plaintiff was
discriminated against based on her race. The Amended Complaint is devoid of any factual
allegation plausibly suggesting an inference of discriminatory intent. (See generally Dkt. No.
14.) Plaintiff has not alleged that she was treated unfairly on the basis of her race as compared to
other similarly situated employees or that her supervisors possessed a discriminatory animus.
Although Plaintiff was informed that Ms. Hohenstein had referred to her as a “pain in her butt”
for raising concerns about the new procedures, this remark does not carry an undertone of racial
animus or discriminatory intent. See Perry v. Sony Music, 462 F. Supp. 2d 518, 520 (S.D.N.Y.
2006) (holding that plaintiff failed to state a discrimination claim where, “[o]ther than

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[plaintiff’s] conclusory assertion [that he was discriminated against because he is black],
[plaintiff] provides no further detail manifesting any form of racial animus, discriminatory
words, prior incidents or other indications that his race played a role in [defendant’s] decision to
dismiss him”).
For each of the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim
under Title VII and the NYSHRL upon which relief can be granted.
ACCORDINGLY, it is
ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Dkt.
No. 19) is GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 14) is DISMISSED in its
entirety with prejudice; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in favor of Defendant and
close this case.
Dated: October 9, 2015
Syracuse, New York
_________________________________
Hon. Glenn T. Suddaby
Chief, U.S. District Judge

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