Disability Rights New York v. North Colonie Board of Education et al

Filing 105

MEMORANDUM, DECISION and ORDER: that Plaintiff's 96 motion for attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988 is Granted in part and Denied in part; that plaintiff is awarded attorneys' fees in the amount of $85,853.75 and costs in the amount of $778.78, for a total award of $86,632.53; and that the Clerk of the Court is directed to entry judgment accordingly. Signed by Judge David N. Hurd on 05/08/2017. (hmr)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------DISABILITY RIGHTS NEW YORK,
Plaintiff,
-v-

1:14-CV-0744
(DNH/DJS)

NORTH COLONIE BOARD OF EDUCATION;
NORTH COLONIE CENTRAL SCHOOLS; and
MR. D. JOSEPH CORR, in his official capacity as
Superintendent of North Colonie Central Schools,
Defendants.
-------------------------------APPEARANCES:

OF COUNSEL:

DISABILITY RIGHTS NEW YORK
Attorneys for Plaintiff
725 Broadway, Suite 450
Albany, NY 12207

JULIE MICHAELS KEEGAN, ESQ.
JENNIFER J. MONTHIE, ESQ.
CLIFF ZUCKER, ESQ.

YOUNG/SOMMER LLC
Attorneys for Defendants
Executive Woods
Five Palisades Drive
Albany, NY 12205

JOSEPH F. CASTIGLIONE, ESQ.
JESSICA R. VIGARS, ESQ.

DAVID N. HURD
United States District Judge
MEMORANDUM, DECISION and ORDER
I.

INTRODUCTION.
Plaintiff Disability Rights New York (“Disability Rights”), the designated protection and

advocacy system for individuals with disabilities in New York State, brought this action against
Defendants North Colonie Board of Education, North Colonie Central Schools and Mr. D. Joseph
Corr, the superintendent of North Colonie Central Schools (collectively, the “Defendants”).

On March 21, 2016, partial summary judgment for Disability Rights was granted.
Plaintiff now moves for attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. In its motion,
plaintiff seeks an award of attorneys’ fees in the amount of $209,532.75 and $778.78 for litigation
expenses and costs. Defendants have filed a response and the motion is fully briefed. For the
following reasons, plaintiff’s motion is granted in part.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND.
Disability Rights is the New York Protection and Advocacy system designated by the

Governor of the State of New York to provide protection and advocacy services to individuals
with mental illness and disabilities pursuant to New York Executive Law § 558. On June 19,
2014, plaintiff filed suit against the defendants seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The
complaint alleged that defendants improperly denied plaintiff access to Blue Creek Elementary
School (“Blue Creek”). Plaintiff wished to access Blue Creek to investigate reports of abuse and
neglect in the school’s ACS classroom and that such investigation was authorized by the
Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act, 42 U.S.C. § 10801-10827 (the
“PAIMI Act”), (ii) the Developmental Disabilities and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 15041 et seq.
(the “DD Act”) and (iii) the Protection and Advocacy for Individual Rights Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794e,
et seq. (the “PAIR Act”, and together with the PAIMI Act and DD Act, the “P&A Statutes”). On
June 20, 2014, plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order was granted providing plaintiff
with immediate access to the Blue Creek school.
After discovery, both parties filed motions for summary judgment pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56. On March 21, 2016, defendant’s motion for summary judgment in
its entirety was denied and Disability Right’s summary judgment motion was granted in part. It
was found that Blue Creek was a facility or service provider pursuant to the provisions of the P&A
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Statutes; that the complaints received by Disability Rights properly alleged abuse and neglect
as defined by the P&A Statutes; that the particular students at Blue Creek constituted disabled
individuals under the P&A Statutes; that the defendants’ initial failure to provide physical access
to Blue Creek and the records of certain students constituted a violation of the P&A Statutes.
As a result, the defendants were enjoined from disputing that Blue Creek is a facility or service
provider for the purposes of the P&A Statutes to the extent Disability Rights seeks to assert the
rights granted to it pursuant to federal law or that the students receiving special education
pursuant to a particular designation constituted disabled individuals pursuant to the P&A
Statutes.
On April 5, 2016, plaintiff submitted the pending motion for attorneys’ fees, seeking
$209,532.75 based upon: (i) 52.6 hours of work completed by attorney Cliff Zucker (“Zucker”)
at an hourly rate of $345.00, (ii) 79.1 hours of work completed by attorney Jennifer Monthie
(“Monthie”) at an hourly rate of $300.00, (iii) 489.8 hours of work completed by attorney Julie
Keegan (“Keegan”) at an hourly rate of $300.00, (iv) 29.6 hours of work completed by attorney
Chris Turner (“Turner”) at an hourly rate of $275.00, (v) 20.6 hours of work completed by attorney
Stefen Short (“Short”) at an hourly rate of $170.00, (vi) 14.0 hours of work completed by attorney
Prianka Nair (“Nair”) at an hourly rate of $150.00 and (vii) 14.10 hours of work completed by
attorney Shain Neumeier (“Neumeier”) at an hourly rate of $175.00.
III.

LEGAL STANDARD.
A. Legal Standard for Awarding Fees.
Pursuant to § 1988, in any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee as
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part of the costs. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). Section 1988 represents a limited exception to the
“American Rule,” under which each party to an action underwrites its own litigation expenses,
including attorney’s fees regardless of the outcome. See Neroni v. Coccoma, 2014 WL 3866307,
at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2014) (Sharpe, D.J.). “Determining whether an award of attorney's fees
is appropriate requires a two-step inquiry. First, the party must be a ‘prevailing party’ in order to
recover. If [it] is, then the requested fee must also be reasonable.” Pino v. Locascio, 101 F.3d
235, 237 (2d Cir.1996) (citations omitted). The purpose of allowing attorneys' fees in a civil rights
action “is to ensure effective access to the judicial process for persons with civil rights
grievances.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983). “[A]ccordingly, a prevailing
plaintiff should ordinarily recover an attorney fee unless special circumstances would render such
an award unjust.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
IV.

DISCUSSION.
(i) An Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs is Available to Disability Rights.
Defendants asserts that an award of attorneys’ fees is not available to Disability Rights

as neither their motion for summary judgment nor the Memorandum, Decision and Order
granting plaintiff relief expressly rested on a Section 1983 claim. Disability Rights argues that
its Section 1983 claims were properly pled and judgment was granted in their favor.
Section 1983 provides “a private right of action against any person who, acting under
the color of state law, causes another person to be subjected to the deprivation of a right,
privilege, or immunity secured by the relief for persons who, under color of state law, have been
deprived of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the U.S. Constitution or laws of the
United States.” Stone v. White, 2016 WL 1298725, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. March 31, 2016) (Kahn,
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D.J.). Numerous courts, including those in the Second Circuit, have considered a protection and
advocacy system’s claim to enforce its authority under the P&A Statutes through a Section 1983
action. See Protection & Advocacy For Persons With Disabilities v. Armstrong, 266 F. Supp. 2d
303, 312 (D. Conn. 2003); Michigan Protection & Advocacy Service, Inc. v. Flint Community
Schools, 146 F. Supp. 3d 897, 905 (E.D. Michigan 2015) (“[P]laintiff filed suit to enforce its right
under the Protection and Advocacy Acts via 42 U.S.C. § 1983"); Advocacy Center v. Stadler, 128
F. Supp. 2d 358 (M.D. La. 1999). “Section 1983 provides a cause of action for violations of
federal statutes, unless Congress has ‘foreclosed’ such an enforcement action, or where the
federal statute ‘does not create enforceable rights, privileges or immunities within the meaning
of § 1983.’” Armstong, 266 F. Supp. 2d at 312 (quoting Stadler, 128 F. Supp. 2d at 366).
Plaintiff’s amended complaint cites Section 1983 in each of its claims for relief.
Disability Rights instituted this action on its own behalf alleging that the defendants systemically
denied plaintiff its right to access Blue Creek, an enforceable right guaranteed to it by the P&A
Statutes. Further, none of the P&A Statutes contain an express statement or comprehensive
remedial scheme foreclosing the ability to bring a Section 1983 action. See 42 U.S.C. § 15041
et seq. (the DD Act); 45 C.F.R. Part 1385 and Part 1386, Subpart B (DD Act regulations); 42
U.S.C. § 10801, et seq. (PAIMI); 42 C.F.R. Part 51 (PAIMI regulations); 42 U.S.C. § 794e
(PAIR); 34 C.F.R. Part 381 (PAIR regulations).
The March 21, 2016 decision determined that the actions of the defendants violated
the rights granted to Disability Rights by the P&A Statutes. Therefore, plaintiff properly alleged
and demonstrated that defendants, acting under the color of state law, deprived plaintiff of rights

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granted to it by the laws of the United States, i.e. the P&A Statutes. As a result, attorneys’ fees
and litigation costs are available to plaintiff pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
(ii) Disability Rights was a Prevailing Party.
Defendants further assert that Disability Rights did not succeed on any significant
issues beyond the relief awarded in the June 20, 2014 temporary restraining order and therefore,
any attorneys’ fees should be limited to litigation efforts up to June 2014 only.
A party is considered a prevailing party for purposes of awarding attorney's fees under
§ 1988 if the party “succeed[ed] on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the
benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.” Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 109 (1992); see also
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). “To qualify for attorney's fees, there must be
a ‘judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties.’” Kirk v. N.Y. State Dep't
of Educ., 644 F.3d 134, 137 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W.
Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001)). “In short, a plaintiff prevails when
actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties
by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff.” Farrar, 506
U.S. at 111-12; see also Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782,
792–93 (1989) (The “[t]ouchstone of the prevailing party inquiry must be the material alteration
of the legal relationship of the parties.”). Section 1988 “has been interpreted to create a strong
preference in favor of the prevailing party's right to fee shifting,” and therefore, a prevailing party
“‘should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an
award unjust.’” Wilder v. Bernstein, 965 F.2d 1196, 1201–02 (2d Cir.1992).

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After the granting of the temporary restraining order in June 2014, defendants
continued to argue that Disability Rights did not have the statutory power to investigate
complaints of abuse and neglect of disabled individuals at Blue Creek through multiple
arguments and continuously argued that the P&A Statutes were not applicable to schools such
as Blue Creek. The March 21, 2016 Memorandum, Decision & Order clearly found that Disability
Rights is authorized to exercise its statutory monitoring and investigative authority at Blue Creek
and other service providers in the Northern District. Further, the defendants were permanently
prohibited from disputing that they are a service provider or facility pursuant to the P&A Statutes.
As a result, the legal relationship between the parties materially changed and Disability Rights
succeeded on the significant issues in this litigation, above and beyond the relief granted to them
in the June 20, 2014 temporary restraining order. Accordingly, plaintiff must be considered a
prevailing party for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and may recover attorneys’ fees and costs
for the entirety of this action.
(iIi) Special Circumstances.
In their response, defendants argue that an award of attorneys’ fees would be unjust
as there was no financial disincentive for Disability Rights in deciding whether to pursue litigation.
Further, defendants argue such an award would be unjust because they are a taxpayer funded
school district.
Generally, plaintiffs are entitled to Section 1988 fees “unless special circumstances
would render such an award unjust.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 164 (1985), see also
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983).

The Second Circuit has “established a

two-step test for courts to apply when considering whether special circumstances make it
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appropriate to deny attorneys' fees.” Raishevich v. Foster, 247 F.3d 337, 344 (2d Cir. 2001).
Under that test, courts “must make an initial determination whether 'the plaintiff's claim was so
strong on the merits and so likely to result in a substantial judgment that counsel in similar cases
could be easily and readily, retained.’” Id. (quoting Kerry v. Quinn, 692 F.2d 875, 878 (2d Cir.
1982)). If the plaintiff's case satisfies this requirement, a court “may use its discretion to deny
fees if, in light of all of the circumstances and the size of recovery, an award of such fees might
work an injustice.” Id. That second, discretionary decision “will turn on the usual factors such as
the award of punitive damages, the amount of compensatory damages, the degree and
measurability of harm to the plaintiff, and the public interest in the particular claim.” Kerry, 692
F.2d at 878. One of the factors entitled to consideration is “the presence or absence of any bad
faith or obdurate conduct on the part of either party.” Zarcone v. Perry, 581 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2d
Cir. 1978).
Nothing in the submissions, nor the conduct of Disability Rights or their attorneys,
evidences bad faith sufficient to constitute the type of “special circumstances” the Second Circuit
has found to justify the denial of attorney's fees to a prevailing party. Even though Disability
Rights is publicly funded, it was required to devote significant resources to this action after the
defendant’s improperly denied plaintiff its ability to investigate complaints of abuse and neglect
at Blue Creek in violation of the P&A Statutes. As a result, no special circumstances warrant a
finding prohibiting plaintiff from recovery of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1988.

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(iv) Reasonable Fee Rate.
Having found that attorneys’ fees and cost are available to Disability Rights and it was
a prevailing party pursuant to Section 1988, the inquiry turns to the reasonableness of the
amounts sought by plaintiff’s counsel. The fee application is supported by several documents
including contemporaneous time records and documents outlining the qualifications of the
attorneys involved in this action. First, defendants object to the proposed hourly rates for the
seven plaintiff attorneys who worked on this case.
In this circuit, fee awards are governed by the Second Circuit's instructive decision in
Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass'n v. Cnty. of Albany, 522 F.3d 182, 183–84 (2d
Cir. 2008). Under the protocol announced in Arbor Hill, a court must first consider whether the
rates at which compensation is sought are those that a “reasonable, paying client would be
willing to pay” before multiplying that figure by the number of hours expended. Arbor Hill, 522
F.3d at 190–91; see also Lewis v. City of Albany Police Dep't, 2008 WL 2103565, at *1 (N.D.N.Y.
May 20, 2008) (“Attorney's fees are awarded by determining a presumptively reasonable fee,
reached by multiplying a reasonable hourly rate by the number of reasonably expended hours.”).
Determination of the rate at which a reasonable client would be willing to compensate for the
services rendered is informed by several factors of varying degrees of relevance,
including, but not limited to, the complexity and difficulty of the case, the available
expertise and capacity of the client's other counsel (if any), the resources required
to prosecute the case effectively ... the timing demands of the case, [and] whether
an attorney might have an interest (independent of that of his client) in achieving
the ends of the litigation ....
Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 184. Arbor Hill also reinforced the appropriateness of considering the
so-called “Johnson factors” when establishing a reasonable rate, including
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(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and the difficulty of the questions;
(3) the level of skill required to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion
of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the attorney's
customary hourly rate; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) the time
limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved in
the case and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the
attorneys; (10) the ‘undesirability’ of the case; (11) the nature and length of the
professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.

Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 186 n. 3, 190 (discussing Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d
714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974)). The Second Circuit cautioned that a court should also “bear in
mind that a reasonable, paying client wishes to spend the minimum necessary to litigate the case
effectively.” Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 190.
Furthermore, the Second Circuit “‘forum rule’ generally requires use of ‘the hourly rates
employed in the district in which the reviewing court sits in calculating the presumptively
reasonable fee.’” Bergerson v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Health, 652 F.3d 277, 290 (quoting
Simmons v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 575 F.3d 170, 174 (2d Cir. 2009)). This Court has previously
found that “[t]he prevailing hour rates . . ., which are what a reasonable paying client would be
willing to pay, are $210 per hour for an experienced attorney, $150 per hour for an attorney with
more than four years experience, $120 per hour for an attorney with less than four years
experience, an $80 per hour for paralegals. See Lewis v. City of Albany Police Dep’t, 554 F.
Supp. 2d 297, 298-99 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing Picinich v. United Parcel Serv., 2008 WL 1766746,
at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2008)); see also Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Hopkins, 2008 WL
314541, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2008) (Scullin, D.J.) ; New Paltz Cent. Sch. Dist. v. St. Pierre,
2007 WL 655603, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2007) (Scullin, D.J.). However, since that time, other
courts in the Northern District of New York have awarded fees at higher rates. See Legends are
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Forever, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 2013 WL 6086461, at *3-4 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2013) (Peebles, M.J.)
(awarding attorney’s fees based on an hourly rate of $350 for a partner and $275 for an
associate); Zalewski v. T.P. Builders, Inc., 2012 WL 5880327, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2012)
(Sharpe, D.J.) (awarding attorney’s fees based on an hourly rate of $275 per hour for partners,
$200 per hour for attorneys with more than four years experience and $170 per hour for
attorneys with less than four years experience); Luessenhop v. Clinton Cnty., N.Y., 558 F. Supp.
2d 247, 266 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (Treece, M.J.) (awarding attorney’s fees based on an hourly rate
of $235 per hour).
Although this action primarily concerned differing interpretations of the P&A Statutes,
the legal issues were novel and complex. Further, the level of skill possessed by plaintiff’s
attorneys and their specialization in disability rights law served their client well and were material
to the success of their action. Lastly, the timing of the case was demanding as the case was
originally brought near the end of the 2013-14 school year. Each such factor, as well as all of
the case-specific variables that the Second Circuit have identified as relevant are kept in mind
when considering the experience of each of plaintiff’s attorneys.
Pursuant to the submitted affirmation and resumes, Zucker has over thirty four years
experience after receiving his Juris Doctor in 1982. See Affirmation of Cliff Zucker, Resumes,
Zucker Affirmation, Ex. C. He possesses a specialization in disability rights law and has served
as General Counsel and Legal Director of Disability Rights since 2013. He also has extensive
litigation experience.

An award of $300 per hour for an experienced senior attorney is

appropriate. See Curtis v. City of Kingston, 2016 WL 1223471 at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2016).
Accordingly, Zucker will be compensated at the rate of $300 per hour in this case.

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Monthie has over thirteen years experience after being admitted to the Bar of the State
of New York in 2004. See Affidavit of Jennifer Monthie. She also has a specialization in
disability rights law and has served as a director for Disability Rights since 2013. Keegan was
admitted to the New York State Bar in 1999 and has substantial experience with special
education law and disability rights law. She currently serves as a Supervising Attorney at
Disability Rights. For senior attorneys with more than ten years of experience, the Northern
District has found that an hourly rate within the range of $250 to $350 is appropriate. See Pope
v. County of Albany, 2015 WL 5510944 at *10-11, 16 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2016) (Kahn, D.J.).
Upon review of the affidavits and documents submitted, $250 per hour is the appropriate hourly
rate for attorneys Monthie and Keegan.
The appropriate hourly rate for attorneys Turner, Short, Neumeier and Nair, each a
staff attorney at Disability Rights with less than ten years of experience, is $175.00 per hour.
(v) Reasonable Hours.
The next step requires a determination of the number of hours reasonably expended
by plaintiff’s attorneys. Plaintiffs’ attorneys have submitted documentation evidencing that they
expended almost seven hundred (700) hours representing Disability Rights in this matter.
Defendants contend that such amount of time is excessive and redundant.
In considering the number of reasonably expended hours, the court “should exclude
excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary hours,” and “has discretion simply to deduct a
reasonable percentage of the number of hours claimed as a practical means of trimming fat from
a fee application.” See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434; see also Kirsch v. Fleet St., Ltd., 148 F.3d 149,
173 (2d Cir.1998); Gierlinger v. Gleason, 160 F.3d 858, 876 (2d Cir.1998). The court should also

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consider “whether, at the time the work was performed, a reasonable attorney would have
engaged in similar time expenditures.” Grant v. Martinez, 973 F.2d 96, 99 (2d Cir.1992) (citing
Wooldridge v. Marlene Indus. Corp., 898 F.2d 1169, 1177 (6th Cir. 1990)). Courts can use
significant discretion in making the determination of reasonableness of time spent based on the
scope and complexity of a case. See N.Y. Ass’n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 711 F.2d
1136, 1146-47 (2d Cir. 1983).
The documents and research submitted in connection with the plaintiffs’ request were
novel and complex issues of law. Further, defendants did challenge Disability Right’s ability to
act under the P&A Statutes on multiple grounds, necessitating significant supporting
documentation concerning both parties’ motions for summary judgment. Additionally, regulations
associated with the P&A Statutes were modified in July 2015, which prompted the Court to
request additional briefing.
However, review of the contemporaneous time records submitted by Disability Rights
does evidence that the number of staff attorneys involved and the hours spent on many tasks
were unnecessary and excessive. The three senior attorneys staffed to this action billed more
than fifty (50) hours each to this case.1 There was also a significant amount of time devoted to
internal meetings and communications.
Additionally, the submissions evidence that plaintiff’s attorneys spent almost fifty (50)
hours drafting and revising its initial pleadings and request for a temporary restraining order. It
was recently found that the sixty (60) hours to draft pleadings and an order to show cause was

1
One senior attorney (Keegan) allegedly spent almost 500 hours, the equivalent of 62 days or 2
plus months full time at 8 hour days, on this one case.

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excessive and reduce such hours by one half. See Curtis, 2016 WL 1223471 at *6. Further,
attorneys for Disability Rights spent approximately one hundred (100) hours drafting and revising
its motion for summary judgment, approximately fifty (50) hours on its response to defendants’
motion for summary judgment and approximately thirty (30) hours on its reply papers. While
such submissions were well reasoned and successful, the hours devoted to their preparation
were excessive especially in light of plaintiff’s attorneys specialization in disability rights law and
familiarity with the P&A Statutes. Therefore, a reduction is appropriate.
Based upon the submissions, Disability Rights spent approximately fifty six (56) hours
on its motion for attorneys’ fees. Courts in the Northern District have found that more than fifty
(50) hours to prepare a motion for attorneys’ fees is unreasonable. See Luessenhop v. Clinton
County, N.Y., 558 F. Supp. 2d 247, 270 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (Treece, M.J.); see also Murray v. Mills,
354 F. Supp. 2d 231, 241 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (even in a complex case a fee application should only
tax thirty (30) hours).
For the foregoing reasons, after review of the contemporaneous time records, the
submissions of the parties and the case law within the Second Circuit, the alleged total hours
expended by plaintiff’s attorneys will be reduced by one half.

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(vi) Fee Calculation.
Accordingly, the reasonable attorneys’ fees can be calculated as follows:
Attorney

Alleged Hours

Rate

Total

Cliff Zucker
Jennifer Monthie
Julie Keegan
Chris Turner
Stefan Short
Prianka Nair
Shain Neumeier

52.6
79.1
489.8
29.6
20.6
14.0
14.10

$300.00
$250.00
$250.00
$175.00
$175.00
$175.00
$175.00

$ 15,780.00
$ 19,775.00
$122,450.00
$ 5,180.00
$ 3,605.00
$ 2,450.00
$ 2,467.50

50% Reduction
Award

$ 171,707.50
$ 85,853.75
$ 85,853.75

Total

699.8

(v) Costs.
In addition to attorneys’ fees, Disability Rights also requests an award of costs in the
amount of $778.78. These costs reflect the $400 filing fee as well as photocopying of student
records and mileage and tolls for oral arguments.

See Zucker Affirmation, Ex. E.

“Unless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs - other
than attorney’s fees - should be allowed to the prevailing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54. As such,
Disability Rights is entitled to recover such costs.
IV.

CONCLUSION.
Based upon the foregoing, and considering the relevant factors governing awards of

attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988, Disability Rights is entitled to recover
attorneys’ fees in the amount of $85,853.75 and costs in the amount of $778.78.
Therefore, it is ORDERED that

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(1) Plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part;
(2) plaintiff is awarded attorneys’ fees in the amount of $85,853.75 and costs in the
amount of $778.78, for a total award of $86,632.53; and
(3) The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 8, 2017
Utica, New York

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