Allen et al v. King et al
Filing
47
MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDER - That Spencerport's 20 motion to dismiss is GRANTED and that the Clerk terminate Spencerport as a defendant in this action. That State defendants' 25 motion to dismiss is DENIED. That plaintiffs' 2 motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED. That the parties contact Magistrate Judge Christian F. Hummel to schedule further proceedings in this case. Signed by Judge Gary L. Sharpe on 9/15/2015. (jel, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
________________________________
ROBERT ALLEN et al.,
Plaintiffs,
1:14-cv-1231
(GLS/CFH)
v.
ELIZABETH R. BERLIN et al.,
Defendants.
________________________________
APPEARANCES:
OF COUNSEL:
FOR THE PLAINTIFFS:
New York State United Teachers
800 Troy-Schenectady Road
Latham, NY 12110-2455
Office of Richard E. Casagrande
800 Troy-Schenectady Road
Latham, NY 12110-2455
FOR THE DEFENDANTS:
Elizabeth R. Berlin, New York State
Education Department
HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN
New York State Attorney General
The Capitol
Albany, NY 12224
Board of Education of the
Spencerport Central School District
Harris, Beach Law Firm
99 Garnsey Road
Pittsford, NY 14534
CHRISTINA M. FRENCH, ESQ.
JENNIFER N. COFFEY, ESQ.
JAMES D. BILIK, ESQ.
TIFFINAY M. RUTNIK
Assistant Attorney General
DANIEL J. MOORE, ESQ.
KYLE W. STURGESS, ESQ.
Board of Education of the Taconic
Hills Central School District
Girvin, Ferlazzo Law Firm
20 Corporate Woods Boulevard
Albany, NY 12211-2350
PATRICK J. FITZGERALD, III,
ESQ.
Gary L. Sharpe
District Judge
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. Introduction
Plaintiffs Robert Allen, Matthew Fuller, Carol Lennon, Claudia
Montecalvo, and Emilija Thevanesan commenced this action against
defendants Elizabeth R. Berlin, Acting Commissioner of the New York
State Education Department,1 the New York State Education Department
(NYSED) (collectively, “State defendants”), the Board of Education of the
Spencerport Central School District, and the Board of Education of the
Taconic Hills Central School District, asserting claims pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 based upon violations of their First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights to free speech. (See generally Compl., Dkt. No. 1.)
Pending are plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, (Dkt. No. 2),
1
Although plaintiffs originally named John B. King, Jr., Commissioner of the New York
State Education Department, as a defendant, he was substituted with Berlin, Acting
Commissioner of NYSED, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). (Dkt. No. 37.)
2
Spencerport’s motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim
or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, (Dkt. No. 20), and State
defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, (Dkt. No. 25). For
the reasons that follow, Spencerport’s motion to dismiss is granted, State
defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied, and plaintiffs’ motion for a
preliminary injunction is denied.
II. Background2
Plaintiffs in this action are all employed as teachers: Fuller is a
science teacher in the Taconic Hills Central School District, and Allen,
Lennon, Montecalvo, and Thevanesan work as English teachers in the
2
Unless otherwise noted, the facts are drawn from plaintiffs’ complaint and presented
in the light most favorable to them. Additionally, the court has considered certain documents
outside of the pleadings, to the extent that they are incorporated by reference in, and integral
to, the complaint—specifically, the exam scoring manuals for administrators and teachers,
including the confidentiality agreements within them, and the scoring leader handbooks
provided in conjunction with the 2014 Common Core examinations. (Compl. ¶¶ 21-23, 25, 39,
41-45; Dkt. No. 2, Attachs. 1, 2, 4, 7, 8.) See Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147,
153-54 (2d Cir. 2002) (explaining that the court, on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), may consider documents referred to and relied upon in drafting the complaint,
without converting the motion to one for summary judgment). While the court has considered
these documents in connection with the parties’ Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, the court
declines to convert Spencerport’s motion into a motion for summary judgment, as
plaintiffs—the non-moving parties—have had no opportunity to conduct discovery. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(d); JTH Tax, Inc. v. Gouneh, 721 F. Supp. 2d 132, 137 (N.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[A]s we
are in the preliminary throes of litigation, such that the parties have not yet engaged in any
discovery, the court is unwilling to address [the defendants’] arguments as they relate to
summary judgment.”). In any event, as discussed below, the court finds that Spencerport is
entitled to dismissal of all claims against it pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Accordingly, the court
has not considered the additional materials submitted by Spencerport in support of its motion
to dismiss, beyond those indicated above.
3
Spencerport Central School District. (Compl. ¶¶ 5-9.) Each year, NYSED
administers the New York State Testing Program, which consists of
English and math exams for students in grades three through eight, and
science exams for students in grades four and eight. (Id. ¶¶ 14-15.) Fuller
scored the 2014 eighth grade New York State science exam, (id. ¶¶ 116,
119), while Allen, Lennon, Montecalvo, and Thevanesan participated in
scoring the English exam that year, (id. ¶¶ 58, 80-81, 95, 105).
Beginning in 2013, the state exams were drafted pursuant to a new
set of standards referred to as the Common Core Learning Standards.
(Id. ¶ 17.) Coinciding with the implementation of the Common Core
standards, in 2013, and again in 2014, all employees who scored the state
Common Core exams were required by NYSED to sign Exam Scoring
Confidentiality Agreements. (Id. ¶¶ 18-19.) As part of the confidentiality
agreement, the individual grading the exam agrees “not to disclose any
secure test materials, including test questions and answers, other than
while participating in the scoring activity.” (Id. ¶ 41; Dkt. No. 2, Attach. 7 at
2.) The confidentiality agreement defines “secure test materials” as
“includ[ing], but . . . not limited to, all test books, answer sheets, scoring
guides, and any other information, whether printed or electronic (CD),
4
relating to the scoring of the . . . Grades 3-8 Common Core English
Language Arts and Mathematics Tests,” and also includes “any notes [the
scorers] take during [their] participation in the scoring of secure test
materials and confidential student information.” (Compl. ¶ 42; Dkt. No. 2,
Attach. 7 at 2.) Exam scorers must agree to “not use or discuss the
content of secure test materials, including test questions and answers, in
any classroom or other activities.” (Compl. ¶ 43; Dkt. No. 2, Attach. 7 at 2.)
Violating the confidentiality agreement potentially subjects exam scorers to
“disciplinary actions in accordance with Sections 3020 and 3020-a of
Education Law and/or to action against their certification,” and the
agreement notes “that § 225 of the Education Law makes fraud in exams a
misdemeanor.” (Dkt. No. 2, Attach. 7 at 2; Compl. ¶ 44.) Plaintiffs allege
that scorers of the grade eight science exam are required to sign an
equivalent confidentiality agreement. (Compl. ¶¶ 49-50.)
Plaintiffs each signed a confidentiality agreement in connection with
their scoring of the 2014 Common Core exams. (Compl. ¶¶ 65, 85, 94,
108, 117, 122.) As a result of signing these agreements, plaintiffs allege
that they are prevented from fully discussing their opinions and concerns
regarding the Common Core exams, and problems inherent in them,
5
including the length and difficulty of the exams and the propriety of the
amount of time given to complete the exams, the lack of clarity with which
exam questions were written, and the disparity between the material tested
on the exams and the Common Core standards. (Id. ¶¶ 67, 88, 96, 113,
121.) Plaintiffs further allege that they had openly discussed similar issues
in connection with past years’ exams, and that they currently wish to speak
about the same or similar issues in regard to the 2014 Common Core
exams, but have not done so, out of fear that they would be disciplined
pursuant to the confidentiality agreements. (Id. ¶¶ 68, 70-74, 87-91, 97,
99-100, 110-14, 122-25, 127.)
Consequently, plaintiffs allege that the requirement that those scoring
the state exams must sign confidentiality agreements “prohibit[s] teachers
from speaking about the content of New York State exams in any forum,”
and that school districts such as Spencerport and Taconic Hills, because
they “distribute[ ] and use[ ]” the confidentiality agreements, “chill the
exercise of plaintiffs’ free speech rights.” (Id. ¶¶ 132-33.) Plaintiffs thus
claim that these agreements violate the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment. (Id. ¶ 135.) They request relief in the form of a declaration
that the agreements are “an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech,” and
6
“a preliminary and permanent injunction against the enforcement and
implementation” of the agreements, specifically “the imposition of
discipline” against plaintiffs. (Id. at 24.)
III. Standards of Review
A.
Motion to Dismiss
The standard of review under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is well settled
and will not be repeated here. For a full discussion of the standard, the
court refers the parties to its prior decision in Ellis v. Cohen & Slamowitz,
LLP, 701 F. Supp. 2d 215, 218 (N.D.N.Y. 2010), abrogated on other
grounds by Altman v. J.C. Christensen & Assocs., Inc., 786 F.3d 191 (2d
Cir. 2015).
B.
Preliminary Injunction
“[P]reliminary injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy and should
not be routinely granted.” Patton v. Dole, 806 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1986).
In most cases, to warrant the issuance of a
preliminary injunction, a movant must show (a)
irreparable harm and (b) either (1) a likelihood of
success on the merits of the claim or (2) sufficiently
serious questions going to the merits, and a balance
of hardships tipping decidedly in favor of the moving
party.
Phelan v. Hersh, No. 9:10-CV-0011, 2010 WL 277064, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Jan.
7
20, 2010) (citing D.D. ex rel. V.D. v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 465 F.3d 503,
510 (2d Cir. 2006)).
IV. Discussion
A.
Motions to Dismiss
In support of its motion to dismiss, Spencerport argues that plaintiffs
have failed to allege a policy or practice that would subject the school
district to liability under § 1983, and that plaintiffs’ claims are not yet ripe
for adjudication because they have not alleged an actual or imminent
injury. (Dkt. No. 20, Attach. 3 at 4-14.) State defendants have also moved
for dismissal, arguing that Fuller’s claims should be dismissed because he
was not required by NYSED to sign a confidentiality agreement in
connection with his scoring of the 2014 grade eight science exam, (Dkt.
No. 25, Attach. 1 at 4-5), and, additionally, that the remaining plaintiffs’
claims are subject to dismissal for lack of standing and failure to state a
claim, (id. at 5-11).3 The court will address each of these motions
separately below.
1.
Spencerport
3
While it has submitted an opposition to plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction,
(Dkt. No. 31), Taconic Hills has neither filed a motion to dismiss the claims against it, nor
requested to join in the motions of either Spencerport or State defendants.
8
As noted above, Spencerport has moved for dismissal, arguing
primarily that plaintiffs have failed to allege any policy or custom on the part
of the district that caused a violation of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. (Dkt.
No. 20, Attach. 3 at 4-9.) In response, plaintiffs argue that Spencerport is
not immune from § 1983 liability. (Dkt. No. 43, Attach. 1 at 24-33.) The
court agrees with Spencerport.
A municipality may be liable for the constitutional violations of its
employees provided that any such violations occurred pursuant to an
official policy or custom. See Mayo v. Cnty. of Albany, No. 07-cv-823,
2009 WL 935804, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2009); see also Monell v. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978). A successful claim of
municipal liability under section 1983, therefore, requires the plaintiff “‘to
plead and prove three elements: (1) an official policy or custom that (2)
causes the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) a denial of a constitutional right.’”
Zherka v. City of N.Y., 459 F. App’x 10, 12 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Wray v.
City of N.Y., 490 F.3d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 2007)). As pertinent here, this
framework for establishing municipal liability has been extended to apply to
school districts. See Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist.,
365 F.3d 107, 128 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Municipalities and other local
9
government bodies, including school districts, are considered ‘persons’
within the meaning of § 1983. . . . The District can therefore only be held
liable if its ‘policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury.’” (quoting Monell, 436
U.S. at 694)).
Here, plaintiffs allege only that the utilization and implementation of
the confidentiality agreements in connection with the administration of the
state exams was a decision made by NYSED, and there are no allegations
that Spencerport had a policy or custom of utilizing such agreements, or
disciplining those teachers who violated them. The allegations in the
complaint make clear that it was NYSED that was responsible for the
testing program and required those who scored the Common Core exams
to sign the agreements. (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 14, 18.) Additionally, the
agreements were distributed as part of the exam manuals and scorer’s
handbooks created by NYSED, and the agreements themselves contained
the heading “THE STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT.” (Id. ¶¶ 21-22;
Dkt. No. 2, Attach. 7 at 2.)
As the Second Circuit has held, “there must have been conscious
decision making by the [school district]’s policymakers before the [school
district] can be held to have made a conscious choice,” such that it would
10
be subject to liability. Vives v. City of N.Y., 524 F.3d 346, 353 (2d Cir.
2008); see Whitesel v. Sengenberger, 222 F.3d 861, 872 (10th Cir. 2000)
(emphasizing “that the [municipal entity] cannot be liable for merely
implementing a policy created by the state [entity]”); Kelly v. Ulster Cnty.,
NY, No. 1:12-CV-1344, 2013 WL 3863929, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. July 24, 2013)
(“To satisfy the first prong of the test [for municipal liability] on a motion to
dismiss, the plaintiff must allege the existence of . . . a formal policy, which
the municipality has officially endorsed.”). Plaintiffs point to no such
allegations here regarding a conscious choice made by Spencerport to
utilize the confidentiality agreements. Plaintiffs simply argue that school
districts are the only entities that could implement a particular form of
discipline referenced in the confidentiality agreements, and that this
somehow subjects Spencerport to liability under Monell. (Dkt. No. 43,
Attach. 1 at 27-28.) However, while plaintiffs may have adequately
pleaded the violation of a constitutional right, they have not pleaded that an
official policy or custom of the school district caused such violation. See
Roe v. City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 36-37 (2d Cir. 2008) (emphasizing
that “a plaintiff must demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the
municipality was the moving force behind the alleged injury” (internal
11
quotation marks and citation omitted)). Accordingly, Spencerport’s motion
to dismiss is granted.
2.
State defendants
State defendants argue that dismissal of all claims against them is
merited here because: 1) Fuller was not, in fact, required by NYSED to
sign a confidentiality agreement in connection with his scoring the 2014
grade eight science exam, (Dkt. No. 25, Attach. 1 at 4-5); and 2) the
remaining plaintiffs lack standing or have otherwise failed to state a claim,
(id. at 5-11). State defendants’ motion is denied.
First, with respect to Fuller, unlike the remaining plaintiffs, the court
has not been provided with the form agreement allegedly signed by
graders of the eighth grade science exam—according to State defendants,
that is because scorers of that exam were not in fact required to sign any
confidentiality agreement. (Dkt. No. 25, Attach. 1 at 4-5.) In other words,
State defendants simply deny Fuller’s allegations that he did sign an
agreement similar to the one used for the English and math exams and
signed by the other plaintiffs, and that the “threat of disciplinary action” in
the science exam agreement prevented him from openly discussing his
concerns with the exam. (Compl. ¶¶ 49-50, 55, 117-18, 122, 125, 127.)
12
While defendants may ultimately be able, after discovery, to substantiate
their contention that no confidentiality agreement was in fact used in
connection with the grade eight science exam, at this juncture, Fuller’s
allegations are entitled to the presumption of truth, and all reasonable
inferences are to be drawn in his favor. See ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar
Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007). Therefore, Fuller’s claims
against State defendants may not be dismissed on the basis of State
defendants’ denials alone.
State defendants next argue that the remaining plaintiffs lack
standing because the alleged chilling effect on their speech is too
speculative, and their claim is thus not yet ripe for review. (Dkt. No. 25,
Attach. 1 at 5-7.) The court disagrees.
To establish constitutional standing under Article III, “a plaintiff must
have suffered an ‘injury in fact’ that is ‘distinct and palpable’; the injury
must be fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury must be
likely redressable by a favorable decision.” Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG,
443 F.3d 253, 263 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). Similarly, the ripeness doctrine dictates that
a court should not entertain a case in which the dispute has not yet
13
“matured to a point that warrants decision.” Tri-State Video Corp. v. Town
of Stephentown, No. 97-CV-965, 1998 WL 72331, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 13,
1998) (citing Auerbach v. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 1998));
see N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. Grandeau, 528 F.3d 122, 130 n.8 (2d Cir.
2008) (“Standing and ripeness are closely related doctrines that overlap
most notably in the shared requirement that the [plaintiff’s] injury be
imminent rather than conjectural or hypothetical.” (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted)). In the First Amendment context, “[a] plaintiff must
allege something more than an abstract, subjective fear that his rights are
chilled in order to establish a case or controversy[,] . . . [b]ut a real and
imminent fear of such chilling is enough.” Nat’l Org. for Marriage, Inc. v.
Walsh, 714 F.3d 682, 689 (2d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Furthermore, in
prior restraint cases such as this one, courts apply a “somewhat relaxed”
standard for assessing standing and ripeness. See id.
Here, in order to ultimately prevail, it will be plaintiffs’ burden to
substantiate their claims with more than just a subjective allegation that
their speech was chilled. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972)
(noting that allegations of a “subjective ‘chill’ [of First Amendment rights]
are not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective
14
harm or a threat of specific future harm”). However, at this juncture,
plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. See
Hispanic Leadership Fund, Inc. v. Walsh, No. 1:12-cv-1337, 2013 WL
5423855, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2013) (explaining that, for purposes of
standing, “‘[a]t the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury
resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice, for on a motion to
dismiss [the court may] presum[e] that general allegations embrace those
specific facts that are necessary to support the claim’” (quoting Lujan, 504
U.S. at 561)). Plaintiffs have expressly alleged that they were required to
sign NYSED’s confidentiality agreements, which clearly threaten specific
disciplinary action if they are violated, and that this threat of a specific
future harm chilled their speech. (Compl. ¶¶ 18, 44, 68, 70-74, 87-91, 97,
99-100, 110-14, 122-25, 127.) The court is satisfied that this fulfills
plaintiffs’ requirement of pleading “a claim of specific present objective
harm or a threat of specific future harm.” Laird, 408 U.S. at 13-14. In
other words, plaintiffs have adequately alleged “an injury in fact; that is, . . .
some ‘threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal
action.’” Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 392 (1988)
(quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)).
15
While State defendants cite cases in which the plaintiffs continued
engaging in speech despite their subjective allegations of a chill, and thus
no chilling effect was found, that is not the case here. (Dkt. No. 25, Attach.
1 at 7.) Contrary to State defendants’ contention that plaintiffs “fail to
allege how the ELA confidentiality clause changed or will change their
behavior,” (id.), the complaint expressly alleges that plaintiffs engaged in
this type of speech in the past, and that they currently wish to engage in it
again, but are prohibited from doing so because of the confidentiality
agreements and the threat of discipline. (Compl. ¶¶ 68, 70-74, 87-91, 97,
99-100, 110-14, 122-25, 127.) State defendants’ remaining argument, that
the value of plaintiffs’ desired speech is outweighed by the value of
efficiency in administering the state exams, (Dkt. No. 25, Attach. 1 at 7-11),
is best resolved on a fuller record, and not at the motion to dismiss stage,
as the exact contours of plaintiffs’ desired speech, and the values served
by limiting such speech, will be further borne out in discovery. Accordingly,
State defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied.
B.
Preliminary Injunction
In support of their request for “a preliminary injunction against the
enforcement and implementation of the terms of the . . . [c]onfidentiality
16
[a]greement[s],” (Dkt. No. 2 at 3), plaintiffs argue that they have
established both irreparable harm and a likelihood of success on the
merits. (Dkt. No. 2, Attach. 12 at 14-19.) In opposition, State defendants
and Taconic Hills contend that plaintiffs have not adequately demonstrated
entitlement to a preliminary injunction.4 (Dkt. No. 30 at 4-9; Dkt. No. 31 at
3-4.) In short, plaintiffs have not met their burden of demonstrating their
entitlement to a preliminary injunction, and, therefore, their motion is
denied.
Even assuming plaintiffs were to satisfy the irreparable harm prong,
the court cannot say, at this juncture, that plaintiffs have satisfied their
burden of demonstrating a likelihood of success on the merits. With
respect to the merits of plaintiffs’ claims, regulations on the speech of
government employees are evaluated pursuant to the balancing test
announced in Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School
4
Although Spencerport has submitted an attorney affirmation in response to plaintiffs’
request for a preliminary injunction, Spencerport indicates that it “takes no position with
respect to . . . [p]laintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction enjoining the use or enforcement
of the [c]onfidentiality [a]greements,” because of its view, more fully discussed in its dismissal
motion papers, that Spencerport “plays no active role in the requirement and administration of
the [c]onfidentiality [a]greements, but rather simply acts as a pass-through vehicle for the
execution of a State mandate.” (Dkt. No. 32 ¶ 6.) In any event, because Spencerport is
dismissed as a defendant in this action, the request for a preliminary injunction against it is
denied as moot.
17
District 205, 391 U.S. 563 (1968).5 See Lewis v. Cowen, 165 F.3d 154,
161-62 (2d Cir. 1999). The Pickering test requires a court to “arrive at a
balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State,
as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it
performs through its employees.” Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. “Where a
restraint [on speech] is accomplished through a generally applicable
statute or regulation, as opposed to a particularized disciplinary action, [the
court] must also make sure that the regulation’s sweep is reasonably
necessary to protect the efficiency of the public service.” Latino Officers
Ass’n v. Safir, 170 F.3d 167, 171-72 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
In support of their motion, plaintiffs contend that they are likely to
succeed on the merits of their underlying claims because “[t]he
5
The First Amendment protects a public employee’s speech only when it is “made as a
citizen on matters of public concern rather than as an employee on matters of personal
interest.” Garcia v. Hartford Police Dep’t, 706 F.3d 120, 129-30 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). “Speech by a public employee is on a matter of public
concern if it relates ‘to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community.’”
Johnson v. Ganim, 342 F.3d 105, 112 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138,
146 (1983)). “Whether an employee’s speech addresses a matter of public concern must be
determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole
record.” Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48. In addition, a public employee’s speech is only
protected to the extent that it is made as a citizen, as opposed to as an employee “pursuant to
[one’s] official duties.” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
18
[c]onfidentiality [a]greements are overreaching and unconstitutional, since
they chill all speech concerning the State examinations, no matter what the
subject matter.” (Dkt. No. 2, Attach. 12 at 16-18.) However, defendants
argue that plaintiffs’ assertion appears belied by the plain language of the
agreements themselves, which prohibit the disclosure of “secure test
materials”—specifically defined in the agreements as “all test books,
answer sheets, scoring guides, and any other information” regarding the
Common Core tests, (Dkt. No. 2, Attach. 7 at 2)—and do not prohibit “all
speech concerning the State examinations, no matter . . . the subject
matter,” (Dkt. No. 2, Attach. 12 at 16). (Dkt. No. 30 at 5-6.) Therefore, at
this juncture, the court finds this generic argument by plaintiffs regarding
their likelihood of success on the merits to be unpersuasive.
The remainder of plaintiffs’ argument as to success on the merits
consists of their assertions that the Pickering balancing test would be
resolved in their favor and dictate a finding that defendants’ use of the
confidentiality agreements is unconstitutional. (Dkt. No. 2, Attach. 12 at
18-19.) Plaintiffs maintain that some of the “information [they] wish to
disclose does fall within the category of secure test materials,” and that,
because this speech is chilled, they are likely to succeed in demonstrating
19
that the use of the confidentiality agreements is unconstitutional. (Dkt. No.
39, Attach. 4 at 16-20.) However, in the course of their argument, plaintiffs
have failed to cite to any factual support, and, “[i]n the absence of a record
to support plaintiffs’ contention in this regard,” the court is “unable to
conclude that the procedure is not justified as a ‘reasonable restriction[ ] on
employee activities that in other contexts might be protected by the First
Amendment,’ or as ‘reasonably necessary to protect the efficiency of the
public service’ provided by” NYSED. Safir, 170 F.3d at 172-73 (quoting
Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980); United States v.
Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 474 (1995)). Plaintiffs are, of
course, free to seek a permanent injunction on a more complete record.
V. Conclusion
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that Spencerport’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 20) is
GRANTED and that the Clerk terminate Spencerport as a defendant in this
action; and it is further
ORDERED that State defendants’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 25) is
DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction (Dkt. No.
20
2) is DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED that the parties contact Magistrate Judge Christian F.
Hummel to schedule further proceedings in this case; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk provide a copy of this MemorandumDecision and Order to the parties.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
September 15, 2015
Albany, New York
21
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