Disability Rights New York v. Wise et al

Filing 53

SUMMARY ORDER - That DRNY's 52 letter motion seeking permission to file a reply is DENIED. That DRNY's 50 motion for attorney fees and costs is GRANTED and $76,761.87 in fees and costs is imposed as against defendants. Signed by Senior Judge Gary L. Sharpe on 6/22/2018. (jel, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
________________________________
DISABILITY RIGHTS
NEW YORK,
Plaintiff,

1:15-cv-32
(GLS/CFH)

v.
JEFF WISE, in his official capacity
as Executive Director of the New
York State Justice Center for the
Protection of People with Special
Needs, et al.,
Defendants.
________________________________
SUMMARY ORDER
Pending is plaintiff Disability Rights New York’s (DRNY) motion for an
award of attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) and
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). (Dkt. No. 50.) DRNY requests an award of
$90,237.50, (id., Attach. 1 at 1), but defendants argue that, “after
appropriate reductions, the fee award . . . should be in the range of
$29,870.80,” (Dkt. No. 51 at 13).1 For the following reasons, the proper
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DRNY subsequently filed a letter motion requesting permission to file a reply brief.
(Dkt. No. 52.) Indeed, the Local Rules require a party to seek such permission from the court
before filing reply papers on a non-dispositive motion. See N.D.N.Y. L.R. 7.1(b)(2). However,
inherent within this requirement is the understanding that the party seeking to file reply papers
will provide the court with a reason why they are necessary. Because DRNY provides no such
reason for granting its request and because the court perceives none, the letter motion is

award is $76,761.87.
In any action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court has discretion
to award the prevailing party reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the
costs. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). Section 1988’s fee-shifting provision
represents a limited exception to the so-called “American Rule,” under
which each party bears its own litigation expenses, including attorneys’
fees, regardless of the outcome of the action. See Neroni v. Coccoma, No.
3:13–cv–1340, 2014 WL 3866307, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2014).
To determine a reasonable attorneys’ fee, courts use the lodestar
method: the product of a reasonable hourly rate and the hours reasonably
spent on the case. See Millea v. Metro-North R.R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 166
(2d Cir. 2011); Miller v. City of Ithaca, 3:10-cv-597, 2017 WL 61947, at *2
(N.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2017). Generally, the district court relies on the
prevailing hourly rate from the district in which it sits in calculating the
lodestar. See Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n v. Cty. of
Albany & Albany Cty. Bd. of Elections, 522 F.3d 182, 191 (2d Cir. 2008).
In determining what a reasonable client would be willing to pay, the court
considers several factors, including:
denied.

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(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the
questions; (3) the level of skill required to perform the legal
service properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney
due to acceptance of the case; (5) the attorney’s customary hourly
rate; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) the time
limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the
amount involved in the case and the results obtained; (9) the
experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the
“undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature and length of the
professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar
cases.
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Northern Lights, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 2d 328, 333
(N.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 186 n.3).
Additionally, a district court may use a percentage reduction of the
requested fees “as a practical means of trimming fat from a fee
application.” McDonald ex rel. Prendergast v. Pension Plan of the
NYSA-ILA Pension Tr. Fund, 450 F.3d 91, 96 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). The court also considers “whether,
at the time the work was performed, a reasonable attorney would have
engaged in similar time expenditures.” Grant v. Martinez, 973 F.2d 96, 99
(2d Cir. 1992). Ultimately, district courts have substantial deference and
may use estimates based on their overall sense of a suit. See Fox v. Vice,
563 U.S. 826, 838 (2011) (“The essential goal in shifting fees . . . is to do

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rough justice, not to achieve auditing perfection.”).
Because defendants do not dispute the reasonableness of DRNY’s
proffered hourly rates, (see generally Dkt. No. 51), and the court is satisfied
that these rates are reasonable given the experience and ability of counsel,
(Dkt. No. 50, Attach. 1 at 5-6), and are within range of the prevailing inDistrict rates, (id. at 6-7), the only remaining issue is whether the hours
spent on this litigation were reasonable.
In sum, defendants contend that an 85% reduction to DRNY’s
proffered hours is in order given (1) excessive hours spent by numerous
attorneys on a limited number of filings, which involved similar legal issues
and little factual dispute; (2) vague, unrelated, or non-compensable billing
entries; and (3) DRNY’s “limited success.” (Dkt. No. 51 at 1, 3-8, 10-13.)
After carefully reviewing DRNY’s time entries, (Dkt. No. 50, Attach.
3), the court agrees with defendants that the time expenditures are
unreasonable due to their excessiveness and vagueness. (Compare Dkt.
No. 50, Attach. 3 with Dkt. No. 51 at 3-8, 10-11.) However, defendants’
requested reduction is also unreasonable. Instead, the court has identified
approximately seventy-four hours that are unreasonable because they
either involved purely legal issues premised on undisputed facts, (see, e.g.,
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Dkt. No. 31, Attach. 3), in an area of the law that DRNY’s counsel
specialized in, (Dkt. No. 50, Attach. 4), or were block billed, (see, e.g., id.,
Attach. 3 at 8 (billing seven hours for “[r]eview[ing] changes to DD
regulations. Draft[ing] notes. Draft[ing] electronic correspondence to
DRNY CZ and AS. Draft[ing] letter to Judge Sharpe of the Northern District
of New York requesting permission to submit supplemental legal brief on
new DD regulations.”)). As such, a fifteen percent reduction to the lodestar
appropriately trims this fat. See McDonald ex rel. Prendergast, 450 F.3d at
96. After a reduction of $13,475.63 to the lodestar, defendants are
awarded fees of $76,361.87 and costs of $400.2
Defendants’ theory that DRNY is entitled to a further reduction
because the court did not adopt the exact language of its proposed
injunction is specious at best. (Dkt. No. 51 at 12-13.) It is unreasonable to
argue that DRNY achieved “limited success” in this litigation. (Id. at 13.)
On the contrary, DRNY achieved overwhelming success throughout this
litigation, which culminated in the attainment of its desired result at the

2

Defendants do not contest DRNY’s request for the cost of its filing fee. (Dkt. No. 51 at 13.)

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dispositive motion stage.3 (Dkt. Nos. 24, 42, 48.) Accordingly, no further
reduction is necessary.
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that DRNY’S letter motion seeking permission to file a
reply (Dkt. No. 52) is DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED that DRNY’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs (Dkt.
No. 50) is GRANTED and $76,761.87 in fees and costs is imposed as
against defendants; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk provide a copy of this Summary Order to
the parties.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
June 22, 2018
Albany, New York

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Defendants’ interpretation of the outcome of this action is troubling. They are advised to rethink
their position if they wish to comply with the court’s injunction and avoid unnecessary, future litigation
costs.

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