Oliver v. New York State Police
Filing
310
ORDER that Defendant McKee's motion to seal (Dkt. No. 260 ) is DENIED without prejudice and, if Defendant McKee has not submitted a supplemental affidavit in support of this motion by March 19, 2020, the Clerk shall file on the public docket t he unredacted versions of Defendant McKee's Exhibits C, D, E, F, G, H, I, K, M, O, P, Q, replacing the placeholders at Dkt. Nos. 259-4, -5, -6, -7, -8, -9, -10, -12, -14, -16, -17, -18. Defendants' motions to seal (Dkt. No. 257 , 305 ) are GRANTED with respect to the proposed redactions to Plaintiff's Exhibits 10, 11, 13, 16, 24, 29, 41, 42, 46, 47, 49, 50, 51, 55, 56, 58, 61, 64, and 65, and Dkt. Nos. 293 -4, 293 -5, 293 -6, 293 -7, and 293 -8, and the Clerk shall fil e on the public docket the redacted versions of these documents (see Dkt. No. 305 ); Defendants' motion to seal (Dkt. Nos. 257 , 305 ) are otherwise DENIED without prejudice, with the exception of the Narco Manual in the compact disc Plain tiff submitted to the Court in Dkt. No. 294 , which is stricken from the record. Plaintiff's motion to remove personal identifiers, (Dkt. No. 304 ), is DENIED as moot, and Defendants are directed to email, by March 19, 2020, to the Court 9;s Courtroom Deputy, complete copies of Dkt. No. 256 -2, with pages 961, 963, 1196 replaced and Dkt. No. 256 -3, with pages 234, 240, 299, 1497, 1503 replaced. Defendants' motion to strike (Dkt. No. 307 ) Plaintiff's affirmation is D ENIED. With respect to the items for which sealing has been denied, Defendants may submit a supplemental affidavit and letter brief in support of their motions to seal no later than March 19, 2020, to which the Plaintiff may respond by March 26, 202 0. On March 20, 2020, the Clerk of Court shall publicly file those items for which sealing has been denied unless covered by Defendants' timely submissions. Signed by Judge Brenda K. Sannes on 3/13/2020. (Copy served on plaintiff via regular and certified mail)(rjb, ) (Main Document 310 replaced on 3/13/2020) (rjb, ).
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
JEAN OLIVER,
Plaintiff,
v.
NEW YORK STATE POLICE; JOSEPH D’AMICO, in his
individual and official capacity; FRANCIS
CHRISTENSEN, in his individual and official capacity;
MICHAEL CERRETTO, in his individual and official
capacity; WAYNE OLSON, in his individual and official
capacity; STEVEN NIGRELLI, in his individual and
official capacity; MARTIN MCKEE, in his individual and
official capacity; TIMOTHY OWENS, in his individual
and official capacity; PAUL KELLY, in his individual and
official capacity; TIMOTHY BOUR, in his individual and
official capacity; GARY KOPACZ, in his individual and
official capacity,
Defendants.
Appearances:
Plaintiff pro se:
Jean Oliver
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060
For Defendants New York State Police,
D’Amico, Christensen, Cerretto, Olson,
Nigrelli, Owens, Kelly, Bour, and Kopacz:
Daniel J. Moore
Joshua D. Steele
Harris Beach PLLC
99 Garnsey Road
Pittsford, NY 14535
For Defendant McKee:
Lisa F. Joslin
Daniel A. Jacobs
Gleason, Dunn, Walsh & O’Shea
40 Beaver Street
Albany, NY 12207
1:15-CV-00444 (BKS/DJS)
Hon. Brenda K. Sannes, United States District Judge:
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Jean Oliver brings this employment discrimination action against Defendant
New York State Police (“NYSP”), and ten NYSP employees, including the Superintendent of the
NYSP and several of her former supervisors. (Dkt. No. 37). Presently before the Court are:
Defendants’ motions to seal certain documents filed in connection with the pending summary
judgment motions, (Dkt. Nos. 257, 260, 305), and Plaintiff’s response, (Dkt. No. 306); Plaintiff’s
letter motion seeking removal of personal identifiers, (Dkt. No. 304); and a motion by all
Defendants, except Defendant Martin McKee, to strike portions of Plaintiff’s affirmation in
opposition to their motion to seal, (Dkt. No. 307), and Plaintiff’s response, (Dkt. No. 309). For
the reasons that follow, Defendants’ motions to seal are granted in part and denied in part,
Plaintiff’s motion is denied as moot, and Defendants’ motion to strike is denied.
II.
MOTIONS TO SEAL
A.
Legal Standard
“The notion that the public should have access to the proceedings and documents of
courts is integral to our system of government.” United States v. Erie County, 763 F.3d 235,
238–39 (2d Cir. 2014). “Indeed, the common law right of public access to judicial documents is
said to predate even the Constitution itself.” Id. at 239. The First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution “also protects the public’s right to have access to judicial documents.” Id. A party
seeking to seal documents submitted to a court bears the burden of showing that sealing is
proper. See DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 121 F.3d 818, 826 (2d Cir. 1997).
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1.
Common Law Right of Access
The Second Circuit has articulated a three-step process for determining whether
documents should be sealed in light of the common law right of access. “Before any such
common law right can attach . . . a court must first conclude that the documents at issue are
indeed ‘judicial documents.’” Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir.
2006). To constitute a judicial document, “the item filed must be relevant to the performance of
the judicial function and useful in the judicial process.” United States v. Amodeo (Amodeo I), 44
F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1995).
Second, after determining that the documents are judicial documents and that the
“common law presumption of access attaches,” the court must “determine the weight of that
presumption.” Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 119. According to the Second Circuit,
the weight to be given the presumption of access must be governed
by the role of the material at issue in the exercise of Article III
judicial power and the resultant value of such information to those
monitoring the federal courts. Generally, the information will fall
somewhere on a continuum from matters that directly affect an
adjudication to matters that come within a court’s purview solely to
insure their irrelevance.
United States v. Amodeo (Amodeo II), 71 F.3d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1995). When a document
plays a role in a court’s adjudication of litigants’ substantive rights—a function that is “at the
heart of Article III”—the presumption is strong, but “[a]s one moves along the continuum, the
weight of the presumption declines.” Id. When “documents are usually filed with the court and
are generally available, the weight of the presumption is stronger than where filing with the court
is unusual or is generally under seal.” Id. at 1050.
Third, the court must balance any “competing considerations” against the weight of the
presumption of access. Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 120. “Such countervailing factors include but are
not limited to ‘the danger of impairing law enforcement or judicial efficiency’ and ‘the privacy
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interests of those resisting disclosure.’” Id. (quoting Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1050); accord
Bernstein v. Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, 814 F.3d 132, 143 (2d Cir. 2016).
When weighing privacy interests, courts should consider “the degree to which the subject matter
is traditionally considered private rather than public.” Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1051. Courts should
also assess the “nature and degree of injury,” paying heed to “the sensitivity of the information
and the subject” but also to “how the person seeking access intends to use the information.” Id. at
1051 (explaining that “[c]ommercial competitors seeking an advantage over rivals need not be
indulged in the name of monitoring the courts”).
2.
First Amendment Right of Access
The First Amendment right of access stems from the qualified right of the public and the
press “to attend judicial proceedings and to access certain judicial documents.” Lugosch, 435
F.3d at 120 (quoting Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 91 (2d Cir. 2004)). Once
a court concludes that there is a qualified First Amendment right of access to the judicial
documents at issue, it may only seal the documents “if specific, on the record findings are made
demonstrating the closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve
that interest.” Id. (quoting In re N.Y. Times Co., 828 F.2d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 1987)). “Broad and
general findings by the trial court . . . are not sufficient to justify closure.” Id. (quoting In re N.Y.
Times Co., 828 F.2d at 116). Examples of “higher values” may include law enforcement
interests, the privacy of innocent third parties, Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1050, and the attorneyclient privilege, Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 125.
B.
Application
The documents requested to be sealed in this case were submitted by the parties in
support of and in opposition to Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. “[I]t is well-settled
that ‘documents submitted to a court for its consideration in a summary judgment motion are—as
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a matter of law—judicial documents to which a strong presumption of access attaches, under
both the common law and the First Amendment.’” Brown v. Maxwell, 929 F.3d 41, 47 (2d Cir.
2019) (quoting Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 121). As they are summary judgment submissions “used to
determine litigants’ substantive legal rights” they are subject to the “highest” presumption of
access, and “should, absent exceptional circumstances, be subject to public scrutiny.” Lugosch,
435 F.3d at 121, 123, 124 (quoting Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 893 (2d Cir. 1982)).
1.
Defendant McKee’s Motion to Seal
Defendant McKee seeks to seal 12 exhibits submitted in connection with his motion for
summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 260). Exhibits C, D, E, F, G, and H (Dkt. Nos. 259-4, 259-5, 2596, 259-7, 259-8, 259-9) contain excerpts of the transcripts from the depositions of Plaintiff,
Defendant McKee, and Defendant Timothy Owen. Exhibit I (Dkt. No. 259-10) contains excerpts
from Plaintiff’s responses to interrogatories. Exhibit K (Dkt. No. 259-12) contains the May 28,
2014 Investigative Report by the NYSP Internal Affairs Bureau (“IAB”) regarding Plaintiff’s
complaints against Defendant McKee, Defendant Timothy Bour, and Charles Torres. Exhibits M
and O (Dkt. Nos. 259-14, 259-16) contain Plaintiff’s answers to the disciplinary charges filed
against her, Exhibit P (Dkt. No. 259-17) contains excerpts from Plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing,
Exhibit Q (Dkt. No. 259-18) contains the Findings and Recommendations of the State Police
Hearing Board on the charges against Plaintiff. Defendant McKee asserts that these exhibits
contain information that is “inextricably intertwined with specific references to employmentrelated complaints and accusations made against current State Police officers and other nonparties” and asserts that such information is protected by New York Civil Rights Law § 50-a.
(Dkt. No. 290, at 3). As discussed below, however, Defendant McKee has failed to provide a
specific basis for the wholesale sealing of the documents and has failed to show that his requests
are narrowly tailored.
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Section 50-a provides “[a]ll personnel records used to evaluate performance toward
continued employment or promotion, under the control of any police agency or department of the
state . . . shall be considered confidential and not subject to inspection or review without the
express written consent of such police officer . . . except as may be mandated by lawful court
order.” N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 50-a(1). The Court of Appeals of New York has held that
“[d]ocuments pertaining to misconduct or rules violations . . . are the very sort of record which,
the legislative history [of § 50-a] reveals, was intended to be kept confidential.” Daily Gazette
Co. v. City of Schenectady, 93 N.Y.2d 145, 159 (1999) (quoting Prisoners’ Legal Servs. of New
York v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 73 N.Y.2d 26, 31 (1988)) (emphasis omitted).
However, “New York state law does not govern discoverability and confidentiality in federal
civil rights actions.” King v. Conde, 121 F.R.D. 180, 187 (E.D.N.Y. 1988). While“[s]tate rules
may illustrate important privacy interests, and a strong policy of comity between state and
federal sovereignties impels federal courts to recognize state privileges where this can be
accomplished at no substantial cost to federal substantive and procedural policy,” “[s]imple
direct application of the state rule would be undesirable and improper [and] would often frustrate
the important federal interests in broad discovery and truth-seeking and the interest in
vindicating important federal substantive policy such as that embodied in section 1983.”
Coleman v. Cty. of Suffolk, 174 F. Supp. 3d 747, 757 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting King, 121 F.R.D.
at 187), aff’d, 685 F. App’x 69 (2d Cir. 2017). “The police must make a substantial threshold
showing that there are specific harms likely to accrue from disclosure of specific materials,” and
“through competent declarations, show[] the court what interests [of law enforcement or privacy]
would be harmed, how disclosure . . . would cause the harm, [and] how much harm there would
be.” Id. at 758 (quoting King, 121 F.R.D. at 189) (emphasis omitted). The declaration or affidavit
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submitted must (1) be under oath and penalty of perjury; (2) from a responsible official within
the agency who has personal knowledge of the principal matters to be attested to; and (3) upon
personal review of the documents.” Dorsett v. Cty. of Nassau, 762 F. Supp. 2d 500, 532
(E.D.N.Y. 2011).
Defendant McKee asserts disclosure would implicate “the privacy interests of non-party
witnesses in their employment and disciplinary records,” but has not provided specific examples
or identified whose privacy interests he seeks to protect. Nor has Defendant McKee specified
which parts of the above exhibits implicate New York Civil Rights Law § 50-a, submitted an
affidavit from an official with personal knowledge of the matter, or attempted to narrowly tailor
his sealing request. See E.E.O.C. v. Kelley Drye & Warren LLP, No. 10 Civ. 655, 2012 WL
691545, at *3, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28724, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2012) (“[B]road
allegations of harm unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning fail to satisfy
the test [for sealing judicial documents].” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly,
Defendant McKee’s motion to seal is denied without prejudice.
2.
Defendants NYSP, D’Amico, Christensen, Cerretto, Olson, Nigrelli,
Owens, Kelly, Bour, and Kopacz’s Motion to Seal
Defendants seek wholesale sealing of their Exhibit 26 (Dkt. No. 256-2, at 1230),
Plaintiff’s Exhibits 23, 30, 31, and 36 (Dkt. Nos. 289-24, 289-31, 289-32, 290-3), as well as the
video of an undercover operation and “Narco Manual” contained on the compact disc Plaintiff
submitted (Dkt. No. 294). In addition, Defendants have proposed redactions to Plaintiff’s
Exhibits 10, 11, 13, 16, 24, 29, 35, 41, 42, 43, 46, 47, 49, 50, 51, 55, 56, 58, 61, 64, and 65, (Dkt.
Nos. 289-11, 289-12, 289-14, 289-17, 289-25, 289-30, 294, 290-8, 290-9, 290-10, 294,1 290-14,
1
Docket Number 294 is a compact disc with numerous documents, a video, and an audio recording.
7
290-14, 290-16, 290-17, 290-18, 290-22, 290-32, 290-24, 290-27, 293-3), as well as Docket
Numbers 293-4, 293-5, 293-6, 293-7, and 293-8. Defendants contend that these exhibits should
be sealed as they contain: (1) identifying information related to third-party privacy interests; (2)
confidential information used to evaluate an officer’s performance as defined in New York Civil
Rights Law § 50-a, or (3) highly sensitive information regarding undercover investigations and
confidential informants. (Dkt. No. 305-1, at 5). Plaintiff objects to the sealing of Exhibits 23, 30,
31, 35, 36, and 43, and the video of an undercover operation.
a.
Proposed Redactions
As the proposed redactions to Plaintiff’s Exhibits 10, 11, 13, 16, 24, 29, 41, 42, 46, 47,
49, 50, 51, 55, 56, 58, 61, 64, and 65, (Dkt. Nos. 289-11, 289-12, 289-14, 289-17, 289-25, 28930, 294, 290-8, 290-9, 290-10, 290-14, 290-14, 290-16, 290-17, 290-18, 290-22, 290-32, 290-24,
290-27, 293-3), and Docket Numbers 293-4, 293-5, 293-6, 293-7, and 293-8, are narrowly
tailored to protect third-parties whose privacy interests are implicated and the identities of
confidential informants or targets of investigations, Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 124, Defendants’
request to file the redacted versions is granted. Accordingly, the Court turns to the exhibits
Defendants maintain should be sealed in their entirety.
b.
Wholesale Sealing
i.
Investigative Reports
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 23 (Dkt. No. 289-24) contains 4 investigative reports from 2010, 2011,
and 2014 with information about narcotics investigations in which Plaintiff and another CNET
investigator were involved. Prior to filing Exhibit 23, Plaintiff redacted suspects’ names and
addresses.2 Defendants maintain this exhibit should nonetheless “be redacted in full because it
2
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 23 (Dkt. No. 289-24) still appears to contain date of birth information that must be redacted in
accordance with Local Rule 8.1(a)(3).
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includes classified information regarding CNET criminal, confidential investigations” that “were
explicitly designated confidential.” (Dkt. No. 307-1, ¶ 10). Blanket assertions of confidentiality
are not enough. See Bernstein, 814 F.3d at 144–45 (stating that “conclusory” assertions are
“insufficient to justify deprivation of public access to the record” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Moreover, to the extent Defendants have relied on the protective order’s, (Dkt. No.
92), classification of confidential materials, “the mere existence of a confidentiality order says
nothing about whether complete reliance on the order to avoid disclosure was reasonable.”
Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 126. Accordingly, Defendants have failed to show the asserted
confidentiality interest is sufficiently strong to overcome the presumption of access. Their
motion to seal Plaintiff’s Exhibit 23 (Dkt. No. 289-24) in its entirety is denied.
ii.
Internal Investigation Materials
Defendants’ Exhibit 26 (Dkt. No. 256-2, at 1230), and Plaintiff’s Exhibits 30, 31, 35
(Dkt. Nos. 289-31, 289-32, 305-12, at 41–60) contain the IAB’s “Report of Personnel
Investigation” based on Plaintiff’s complaint that an investigator with whom she worked had
sexually harassed her, memoranda submitted as part of the investigation, the transcripts of IAB’s
interrogations of the subject of the investigation and others, a letter of censure, and an email
regarding Plaintiff. Defendants conclusorily assert that these exhibits must be sealed in their
entirety because “IAB Investigation files are confidential” under § 50-a of the New York State
Civil Rights Law and the subject is not a party to this case and is currently employed with the
NYPS. (Dkt. No. 307-1, ¶ 11). As discussed, to sustain their burden, Defendants must “through
competent declarations, show[] the court what interests [of law enforcement or privacy] would
be harmed, how disclosure . . . would cause the harm, [and] how much harm there would be.”
Coleman, 174 F.3d at 758 (quoting King, 121 F.R.D. at 189). They have not done so here. Nor
have they addressed whether narrowly tailored redactions would be sufficient. Finally,
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Defendants offer no explanation for sealing the email dated May 16, 2014, more than four
months after the investigation ended and which implicates no third-party privacy interests. (Dkt.
No. 289-31, at 22). Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to seal Defendants’ Exhibit 26 (Dkt. No.
256-2, at 1230), and Plaintiff’s Exhibits 30, 31, 35 (Dkt. Nos. 289-31, 289-32, 305-12, at 41–60)
is denied.
iii.
Buy Sheets
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 36 (Dkt. No. 290-3), contains buy sheets documenting narcotics
transactions by undercover investigators in 2013 and 2014. Target names have been redacted
already from Plaintiff’s Exhibit 36. Defendants have offered no explanation for the wholesale
sealing of these documents, even after Plaintiff noted that Defendants had no objection to the
filing of similarly redacted documents. (Dkt. No. 306-1, at 26; see e.g., Dkt. No. 289-12).
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to seal Plaintiff’s Exhibit 36 (Dkt. No. 290-3) is denied.
iv.
Video of Undercover Investigation
The video at issue is listed as part of Plaintiff’s Exhibit 43, (Dkt. No. 290-10) and is
contained on the compact disc Plaintiff submitted. (Dkt. No. 294). Defendants assert that “the
video should be sealed in its entirety inasmuch as it records undercover police operations and the
target of a narcotics investigation.” (Dkt. No. 305, ¶ 12). A more specific showing is required.
“[T]he party asserting the law enforcement privilege bears the burden of showing that the
privilege applies” by demonstrating that the evidence at issue contains “information that the law
enforcement privilege is intended to protect.” In re City of New York, 607 F.3d 923, 944 (2d Cir.
2010). “Such protected information includes information pertaining to ‘law enforcement
techniques and procedures,’ . . . information that would endanger ‘witness and law enforcement
personnel [or] the privacy of individuals involved in an investigation,’ and information that
would ‘otherwise . . .interfere[ ] with an investigation.’” Id. (quoting In re Dep’t of Investigation
10
of City of New York, 856 F.2d 481, 484 (2d Cir. 1988)). Though “[a]n investigation . . . need not
be ongoing for the law enforcement privilege to apply as the ability of a law enforcement agency
to conduct future investigations may be seriously impaired if certain information is revealed to
the public,” id., Defendants fail to show that disclosure of the video would endanger witnesses or
law enforcement or impair the NYSP’s ability to conduct future investigations. Accordingly,
Defendants’ motion to seal the video is denied.
v.
Narco Manual
Defendants seek to seal “The Narco Manual” in its entirety. (Dkt. No. 305, ¶ 13). This
document is contained on the compact disc Plaintiff submitted to the Court. (Dkt. No. 294).
Plaintiff, however, has not listed it on her Exhibit List, (see generally Dkt. No. 289-2),
accordingly, the Court strikes it from the record.
III.
MOTION TO REMOVE PERSONAL IDENTIFIERS
Plaintiff has moved for an order directing Defendants to redact their exhibits to remove
her Social Security number and date of birth in accordance with Local Rule 8.1(a)(1), (3). (Dkt.
No. 304). Defendants have agreed and resubmitted those documents with appropriate redactions.
(Dkt. No. 305, ¶ 15). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion is denied as moot.
IV.
MOTION TO STRIKE
Defendants move to strike paragraphs 4–74 of Plaintiff’s affirmation in response to their
motion to seal, (Dkt. No. 306-1), on the basis that those paragraphs are “untimely arguments in
opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.” (Dkt. No. 307-2, at 5). Defendants’
motion is denied. The Court finds their argument without merit as much of Plaintiff’s affirmation
directly addresses the propriety of sealing the documents at issue. To the extent Plaintiff has
made further arguments regarding the pending summary judgment motions, such arguments will
be disregarded.
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V.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is
ORDERED that Defendant McKee’s motion to seal (Dkt. No. 260) is DENIED without
prejudice and, if Defendant McKee has not submitted a supplemental affidavit in support of this
motion by March 19, 2020, the Clerk shall file on the public docket the unredacted versions of
Defendant McKee’s Exhibits C, D, E, F, G, H, I, K, M, O, P, Q, replacing the placeholders at
Dkt. Nos. 259-4, -5, -6, -7, -8, -9, -10, -12, -14, -16, -17, -18; and it is further
ORDERED that Defendants’ motions to seal (Dkt. No. 257, 305) are GRANTED with
respect to the proposed redactions to Plaintiff’s Exhibits 10, 11, 13, 16, 24, 29, 41, 42, 46, 47, 49,
50, 51, 55, 56, 58, 61, 64, and 65, and Dkt. Nos. 293-4, 293-5, 293-6, 293-7, and 293-8, and the
Clerk shall file on the public docket the redacted versions of these documents (see Dkt. No. 305);
and it is further
ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to seal (Dkt. Nos. 257, 305) are otherwise
DENIED without prejudice, with the exception of the Narco Manual in the compact disc
Plaintiff submitted to the Court in Dkt. No. 294, which is stricken from the record; and it is
further
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion to remove personal identifiers, (Dkt. No. 304), is
DENIED as moot, and Defendants are directed to email, by March 19, 2020, to the Court’s
Courtroom Deputy, complete copies of Dkt. No. 256-2, with pages 961, 963, 1196 replaced and
Dkt. No. 256-3, with pages 234, 240, 299, 1497, 1503 replaced; and it is further
ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to strike (Dkt. No. 307) Plaintiff’s affirmation is
DENIED; and it is further
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ORDERED that, with respect to the items for which sealing has been denied, Defendants
may submit a supplemental affidavit and letter brief in support of their motions to seal no later
than March 19, 2020, to which the Plaintiff may respond by March 26, 2020; and it is further
ORDERED that, on March 20, 2020, the Clerk of Court shall publicly file those items
for which sealing has been denied unless covered by Defendants’ timely submissions.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 13, 2020
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