Chompupong et al v. City of Schenectady et al

Filing 91

ORDER granting 89 MOTION for Reconsideration re 87 Order on Motion for Summary Judgment: The Court hereby ORDERS that Defendant's motion for reconsideration (Dkt. No. 87) is GRANTED; and the Court further ORDERS that Plaintiffs' F ourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment, and state law claims against the City of Schenectady are DISMISSED; and the Court further ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in Defendant's favor and close this case; and the Court further ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court serve a copy of this Order on all parties in accordance with the Local Rules. Signed by U.S. District Judge Mae A. D'Agostino on 5/4/21. (ban) (Main Document 91 replaced on 5/4/2021) (ban, ).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
____________________________________________
VIROJ CHOMPUPONG and MALINEE
CHOMPUPONG,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

1:17-CV-929
(MAD/CFH)

CITY OF SCHENECTADY, JACKSON
DEMOLITION SERVICE, INC.,
SCHENECTADY METROPLEX DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY,
Defendants.
____________________________________________
APPEARANCES:

OF COUNSEL:

ARCHER & GREINER P.C.
1211 Avenue of the Americas
Suite 2750
New York, New York 10036
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

ANTHONY D. DOUGHERTY, ESQ.

TARTER KRINSKY & DROGIN LLP
1350 Broadway
New York, New York 10018
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

LINDA S. ROTH, ESQ.

MURPHY BURNS LLP
407 Albany Shaker Road
Loudonville, New York 12211
Attorneys for Defendant City of Schenectady

JAMES J. BURNS, ESQ.

Mae A. D'Agostino, U.S. District Judge:
ORDER
Plaintiffs commenced this action on August 22, 2017, asserting numerous claims against
the City of Schenectady (the "City"), Jackson Demolition Service, Inc., the Schenectady
Metroplex Development Authority, and unnamed John Does and XYZ Corps. See Dkt. No. 1.
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Following multiple motions to dismiss, only Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment,
and state law claims against the City survived. See Dkt. No. 58. The City them moved for
summary judgment on Plaintiffs' remaining claims. See Dkt. No. 79. On December 18, 2020, the
Court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment in part. See Dkt. No. 87. The Court
found that questions of material fact remained as to Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment, Fifth
Amendment, and state law claims, but that Plaintiffs had failed to establish Monell liability. See
id. Presently before the Court is Defendant's motion for reconsideration. The Court presumes the
parties' familiarity with the facts and refers the parties to its December 18, 2020 MemorandumDecision and Order for a more detailed recitation of the facts. See Dkt. No. 87. For the following
reasons, Defendant's motion is granted.
A court may justifiably reconsider its previous ruling if: (1) there is an intervening change
in the controlling law; (2) new evidence not previously available comes to light; or (3) it becomes
necessary to remedy a clear error of law or to prevent manifest injustice. See Delaney v. Selsky,
899 F. Supp. 923, 925 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing Doe v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 709
F.2d 782, 789 (2d Cir. 1983)). The standard for granting a motion for reconsideration is strict.
Shrader v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995). A motion for
reconsideration "should not be granted where the moving party seeks solely to relitigate an issue
already decided." Id. Thus, a motion for reconsideration is not to be used for "presenting the case
under new theories, securing a rehearing on the merits, or otherwise taking a 'second bite at the
apple.'" Sequa Corp. v. GBJ Corp., 156 F.3d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1998).
Defendant does not suggest that there has been an intervening change in the controlling
law, nor have they presented new evidence which was not previously available. Rather,
Defendant seeks reconsideration of the Court's Order arguing that it is necessary to remedy a clear

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error of law. See Dkt. No. 89-2 at 4. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs must establish Monell
liability because the only claims remaining are against the City. See id. Defendant contends that
the Court must dismiss Plaintiffs' Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims because it found that
Plaintiffs failed to plead and prove a Monell claim against the City. See Dkt. No. 89-2. Finally,
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' state law claims must be dismissed as well. See id. Plaintiffs, in
opposition to the motion to reconsider, argue that the City can be liable for its own illegal acts.
See Dkt. No. 90 at 6. Plaintiffs argue that because the acts were done by government officials
with sufficient authority to direct the demolition, the conduct was done "under the color of law"
and that Section 1983 claims may be brought directly against the municipality. See id. (citing
Burtnieks v. City of N.Y., 716 F.2d 982, 986 (2d Cir. 1983); City of St. Louis v. Paprotnik, 485
U.S. 112, 123 (1988)).
Citing Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011), Plaintiffs argue that a Section 1983
claim can be brought directly against a municipality to hold the municipality responsible for "their
own illegal acts." See Dkt. No. 90 at 5-6. While it is true that Connick held that "under [Section]
1983, local governments are responsible only for 'their own illegal acts,'" that is not the end of the
analysis. See Connick, 563 U.S. at 60 (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479
(1986)). Immediately following the language that Plaintiffs quote is the following requirement:
Plaintiffs who seek to impose liability on local governments under §
1983 must prove that "action pursuant to official municipal policy"
caused their injury. Official municipal policy includes the decisions
of a government's lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials,
and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the
force of law. These are "action[s] for which the municipality is
actually responsible."
Id. at 60-61 (internal quotations omitted). While a Section 1983 action may be brought against a
municipality based on a single decision, the decision must be made by officials "'whose acts or

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edicts may fairly be said to represent official policy.'" Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 480 (quoting Monell
v. Dep't of Soc. Serv. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)).
Plaintiffs' response disregards the fact that the Court previously found Plaintiff failed to
establish that the decision to demolish the Nicholaus Building was made by a policymaking
official and that there was no evidence that the decision was part of government policy. See Dkt.
No. 87 at 15-16. Without such a showing, Plaintiffs cannot bring a Section 1983 action directly
against the City.
The cases upon which Plaintiffs rely do not help their argument. In Burtneiks, the Second
Circuit found that the conduct complained of was committed under the color of state law because
the acts were done by city employees who exercised "final authority over significant matters
involving the exercise of discretion." Burtnieks, 716 F.2d at 986 (quoting Rookard v. Health and
Hosp. Corp., 710 F.2d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 1983)). In St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123
(1988), the Supreme Court clarified its decision in Pembaur. Pursuant to Pembaur, in
determining whether a decision made on a single occasion is sufficient to establish an
unconstitutional municipal policy, the Supreme Court noted the following:
First, a majority of the Court agreed that municipalities may be held
liable under § 1983 only for acts for which the municipality itself is
actually responsible, "that is, acts which the municipality has
officially sanctioned or ordered." Second, only those municipal
officials who have "final policymaking authority" may by their
actions subject the government to § 1983 liability. Third, whether a
particular official has "final policymaking authority" is a question
of state law. Fourth, the challenged action must have been taken
pursuant to a policy adopted by the official or officials responsible
under state law for making policy in that area of the city's business.
Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 123. Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that "municipal liability under §
1983 attaches where – and only where – a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made

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from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final
policy with respect to the subject matter in question." Id. at 483.
As previously mentioned, the Court considered whether the decision to demolish the
Nicholaus Building was made by a policymaking official and whether the decision was made as
part of a government policy. See Dkt. No. 87 at 15-16. On the motion for summary judgment,
Plaintiffs did not present any evidence to meet the requirements under Pembaur. In their
response to the present motion, Plaintiffs do not present additional evidence or argument which
would lead the Court to alter its conclusion. Therefore, for the reasons discussed in the Court's
previous order, Monell liability does not attach and Plaintiffs have not established that their
Section 1983 claims may be brought directly against the City. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Fourth and
Fifth Amendment claims against the City must be dismissed.
In its December 12, 2020 Memorandum-Decision and Order, the Court denied Defendant's
motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' state law claims, finding that questions of fact
remain. See Dkt. No. 87 at 16-17. However, in light of the Court's decision on the present
motion, the only remaining claims are Plaintiffs' state law claims. Thus, the Court will consider
whether it should continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law
claims.
Federal courts may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over "claims that are so related to
claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or
controversy." 28. U.S.C. § 1367. "Disputes form part of the 'same case or controversy' ... 'when
they "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact."'" Romero v. Bestcare, Inc., No. 15-CV7397, 2018 WL 1702001, *8 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2018) (citations omitted). "Such supplemental
jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties." Id.

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"A district court's decision whether to exercise ... jurisdiction after dismissing every claim over
which it had original jurisdiction is purely discretionary." Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc.,
556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009). The Court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a
claim if
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the
claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over
which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district
court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other
compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Finally, a court should weigh "the values of judicial economy, convenience,
fairness, and comity" in deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law
claims. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988).
Here, all of the claims over which the Court has original jurisdiction have been dismissed
and this matter now involves only state law. Thus, the Court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' state law claims and dismisses them without prejudice.
After carefully reviewing the entire record in this matter, the parties' submissions and the
applicable law, and for the above-stated reasons, the Court hereby
ORDERS that Defendant's motion for reconsideration (Dkt. No. 89) is GRANTED; and
the Court further
ORDERS that Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment, and state law claims
against the City of Schenectady are DISMISSED; and the Court further
ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in Defendant's favor and close
this case; and the Court further
ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court serve a copy of this Order on all parties in
accordance with the Local Rules.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 4, 2021
Albany, New York

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