Stanford v. NYS Office of Children and Family Services et al
Filing
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ORDER denying 3 Motion to Appoint Counsel; adopting Report and Recommendations re 6 Report and Recommendations: The Court hereby ORDERS that Magistrate Judge Hummel's October 24, 2017 Order and Report- Recommendation is ADOPTED in its ent irety; and the Court further ORDERS that Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED; and the Court further ORDERS that Plaintiff's motion for Appointment of Counsel (Dkt. No. 3) is denied; and the Court further ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in Defendants' favor and close this case; and the Court further ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall serve a copy of this Order on all parties in accordance with the Local Rules. Signed by U.S. District Judge Mae A. D'Agostino on 6/19/2018. (Copy served via regular and certified mail)(ban)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
____________________________________________
CLARENCE STANFORD, JR.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
1:17-CV-1000
(MAD/CFH)
N.Y.S. OFFICE OF CHILDREN AND
FAMILY SERVICES; JOHN ROCKEFELLOW,
Tour 3 Supervisor; NURSE GAGNON;
NURSE ROOT; GARY PATTMAN,
Director of Brookwood,
Defendant.
____________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
OF COUNSEL:
CLARENCE STANFORD, JR.
835 Emmett Street, 2nd Floor
Schenectady, New York 12307
Plaintiff pro se
Mae A. D'Agostino, U.S. District Judge:
ORDER
Plaintiff, Clarence Stanford, Jr., commenced this action pro se on September 8, 2017,
against Defendants N.Y.S. Office of Children And Family Services ("OCFS"), John Rockefellow,
Nurse Gagnon, Nurse Root, and Gary Pattman. See Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiff asserts claims pursuant
to Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and New
York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL") alleging disability discrimination, failure to
accommodate, and retaliation. See Dkt. No. 1.
On October 29, 2016, Plaintiff claims he was denied reasonable accommodation to receive
assistance from nursing staff and to "check blood glucose levels and to self-administer medication
and food" to treat his diabetic symptoms. See Dkt. No. 1 at 2, 17–18. Plaintiff received
emergency treatment from Greenport Rescue at 6:20pm. Plaintiff was subsequently placed on
administrative leave with pay on November 3, 2016.
On October 24, 2017, Magistrate Judge Christian F. Hummel issued a ReportRecommendation and Order granting Plaintiff's motion for in forma pauperis relief,
recommending that Plaintiff's complaint be dismissed in its entirety with prejudice, and further
recommending that Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel be denied. See Dkt. No. 6.
A court may grant a motion to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP") if the party is "unable to
pay" the standard fee for commencing an action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). When a plaintiff seeks
to proceed IFP, "the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the
action or appeal (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). While, "the court has the duty to show liberality towards pro se litigants,
. . . there is a responsibility on the court to determine that a claim has some arguable basis in law
before permitting a plaintiff to proceed with an action in forma pauperis." Moreman v. Douglas,
848 F. Supp. 332, 333–34 (N.D.N.Y. 1994) (internal citations omitted); see, e.g., Thomas v.
Scully, 943 F.2d 259, 260 (2d Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (holding that a district court has the power
to dismiss a complaint sua sponte if the complaint is frivolous).
When a party files specific objections to a magistrate judge's report-recommendation, the
district court makes a "de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed
findings or recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). However,
when a party files "[g]eneral or conclusory objections or objections which merely recite the same
arguments [that he presented] to the magistrate judge," the court reviews those recommendations
for clear error. O'Diah v. Mawhir, No. 9:08-CV-322, 2011 WL 933846, *1 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 16,
2011) (citations and footnote omitted). After the appropriate review, "the court may accept,
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reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate
judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
Plaintiff's objection contains only conclusory statements and fails to address the reasoning
and legal issues set forth in Magistrate judge Hummel's Report-Recommendation and Order.
Thus, the Court will review Plaintiff's objection for clear error.
The Eleventh Amendment provides a state with sovereign immunity from suit. See
Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 253–54 (2011) (citation
omitted). "[A]bsent waiver or valid abrogation, federal courts may not entertain a private person's
suit against a State." Id. (citation omitted). Generally, New York and its agencies enjoy
sovereign immunity from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment. See Woods v.
Rondout Valley Central Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 466 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that
the Eleventh Amendment extends beyond the states themselves to state agents and state
instrumentalities) (citation omitted).
In 1908, the Supreme Court decided Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), which
established an exception to the Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity protection afforded to
the states. "In determining whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young avoids an Eleventh
Amendment bar to suit, a court need only conduct a 'straightforward inquiry into whether [the]
complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as
prospective.'" Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Com'n. of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (quoting
Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 296, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 138 L. Ed.2d 438
(1997) (O'Connor, J., joined by Scalia and Thomas, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment)).
"Under Ex parte Young, the state officer against whom a suit is brought 'must have some
connection with the enforcement of the act' that is in continued violation of the law." In re Dairy
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Mart Convenience Stores, Inc. v. Nickel, 411 F.3d 367, 372-73 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. at 157). "So long as there is such a connection, it is not necessary that the
officer's enforcement duties be noted in the act." In re Dairy Mart, 411 F.3d at 373. Deciding
whether a state official has violated federal law, however, "affects both the initial immunity
inquiry as well as the ultimate decision on the merits." 17A James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's
Federal Practice § 123.40[3][a] (3d ed. 2004); see also In re Dairy Mart, 411 F.3d at 374. At
this stage, a court's job is not to decide the merits of the claim, but "only determine whether [the
plaintiff's] assertion that the [defendant's acts] resulted in a violation of federal law is . . .
substantial and not frivolous[.]" In re Dairy Mart, 411 F.3d at 373.
District courts have supplemental jurisdiction over all state-law claims that are so related
to federal claims over which they exercise original jurisdiction that they form part of the same
case or controversy under Article III of the Constitution. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Application of
supplemental jurisdiction is discretionary, however, and "it requires a balancing of the
considerations of comity, fairness to the litigants, judicial economy, and the avoidance of needless
decisions of state law." Federman v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 597 F.2d 798, 809 (2d Cir.
1979) (citation omitted).
As Magistrate Judge Hummel correctly found, Plaintiff's ADA claim with respect to
Defendant OCFS must be dismissed with prejudice because OCFS is a state agency that is
immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.1 See Dkt. No. 6 at 11. In the instant matter,
Plaintiff is not seeking prospective relief, but is merely seeking money damages for "all time
placed out of work" as well as $2,000,000 "for pain and suffering, mental anguish," and other
Although courts have held that Title II of the ADA abrogated the States' sovereign
immunity, the Second Circuit has determined "the statute unambiguously limits employment
discrimination claims to Title I." Mary Jo C. v. N.Y. State and Local Retirement Sys., 707 F.3d
144, 171–73 (2d Cir. 2013).
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stress induced health complications. Dkt. No. 1 at 10. "The Supreme Court has held that a claim
brought under Title I of the ADA against states for monetary damages is barred by the Eleventh
Amendment." Winokur v. Office of Court Admin., 190 F. Supp. 2d 444, 448 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)
(citing Bd. Of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363, 121 S. Ct. 955, 962 (2001)).
Further, Magistrate Judge Hummel correctly determined that Plaintiff's ADA claim cannot
proceed with respect to Defendants John Rockefellow, Nurse Gagnon, Nurse Root, and Gary
Pattman because the statute does not permit suits against defendants in their individual capacities
"under the retaliation provision of the ADA." Arcuri v. Schoch, No. 15-CV-798 (DNH/TWD),
2015 WL 5652336, *5 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2015) (citing Spiegel v. Schulmann, 604 F.3d 72, 79
(2d Cir. 2010)).
Finally, Magistrate Judge Hummel also correctly recommended that, since the Court has
dismissed all of Plaintiff's federal claims, it will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
his NYSHRL claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
An opportunity to amend is not required where "the problem with [plaintiff's] causes of
action is substantive" such that "better pleading will not cure it." Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d
99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). As the Second Circuit explained, "[w]here it appears
that granting leave to amend is unlikely to be productive . . . it is not an abuse of discretion to
deny leave to amend." Ruffolo v. Oppenheimer & Co., 987 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1993)
(citations omitted). Although courts generally permit a pro se litigant leave to amend at least
once, the Court finds that amendment is inappropriate in this case.
As Magistrate Judge Hummel explained, Plaintiff's claims against OCFS and the
individual defendants cannot proceed because OCFS is immune from suit as a state agency under
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the Eleventh amendment and the ADA does not allow for individual liability. See Dkt. No. 6 at
10–12. There are no possible amendments to the complaint that will change these facts.
Upon a review of the Order and Report-Recommendation, and considering that the parties
have failed to object to any of Magistrate Judge Hummel's thorough and well-reasoned
recommendations, the Court finds no clear error in Magistrate Judge Hummel's recommendations
and hereby affirms and adopts the Order and Report-Recommendation as the opinion of the
Court. Accordingly, the Court hereby
ORDERS that Magistrate Judge Hummel's October 24, 2017 Order and ReportRecommendation is ADOPTED in its entirety; and the Court further
ORDERS that Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED; and the Court further
ORDERS that Plaintiff's motion for Appointment of Counsel (Dkt. No. 3) is denied; and
the Court further
ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in Defendants' favor and close
this case; and the Court further
ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall serve a copy of this Order on all parties in
accordance with the Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: June 19, 2018
Albany, New York
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