Coppola v. The Town of Plattekill et al
Filing
138
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDERED, that the Ulster Defendants Motion (Dkt. No. 121), the Town Defendants Motion (Dkt. No. 122), and the Access Defendants Motion (Dkt. No. 123) are GRANTED; and it is further ORDERED, that Plaintiffs cross-motion for par tial summary judgment (Dkt. No. 127) is DENIED in its entirety; and it is further ORDERED, that Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 71) is DISMISSED; and it is further ORDERED, that the Clerk close this action. Signed by Senior Judge Lawrence E. Kahn on November 24, 2020. (sas)
Case 1:17-cv-01032-LEK-ATB Document 138 Filed 11/24/20 Page 1 of 29
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
EUGINIA COPPOLA
Plaintiff,
v.
1:17-CV-1032 (LEK/ATB)
PAUL VAN BLARCUM, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Euginia Coppola brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against: Paul Van
Blarcum; John Maguire; John Raftery; Brian Benjamin; Joseph Ryan; Access: Supports for
Living, Inc. (“Access”); Amy Anderson-Winchell; Matthew Maher; and Colleen Maher
(collectively, “Defendants”).1 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution when they confined her against her
will and searched her home on November 19, 2016. See Dkt. No. 71 (“Second Amended
Complaint” or “SAC”) ¶ 1.
The Ulster Defendants, the Town Defendants, and the Access Defendants have each
moved for summary judgment. See Dkt. Nos. 121–23. In addition to opposing those motions,
Plaintiff has cross-moved for summary judgment. See Dkt. No. 127.
For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants each set of defendants’ motion, denies
1
Van Blarcum and Maguire are collectively referred to as the “Ulster Defendants” in this
Memorandum-Decision and Order. Raftery, Benjamin, and Ryan are collectively referred to as the
“Town Defendants.” Access, Anderson-Winchell, Matthew Maher, and Colleen Maher are
collectively referred to as the “Access Defendants”.
Case 1:17-cv-01032-LEK-ATB Document 138 Filed 11/24/20 Page 2 of 29
Plaintiff’s cross-motion, and dismisses this action.
II.
BACKGROUND
A. Factual History
The following facts are undisputed, except where otherwise noted.
1. The Parties
Plaintiff Euginia Coppola is a daycare operator. See Dkt. No. 121-20 (“Ulster
Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts” or “Ulster Defendants’ SMF”) ¶ 2; Dkt. No. 127-2
(“Plaintiff’s Response to Ulster Defendants’ SMF”) ¶ 2.
Defendant Paul Van Blarcum2 was the sheriff of Ulster County from January 1, 2007 to
December 31, 2018. See Ulster Defendants’ SMF ¶ 180; Pl.’s Response to Ulster Defendants’
SMF ¶ 180. Van Blarcum is sued only in his individual capacity. See Dkt. No. 72.
Defendant John Maguire is a deputy in the Ulster County Sheriff’s Office (“UCSO”).
See Dkt. No. 121-19 (“Maguire Affidavit”) ¶ 2.
Defendant John Raftery3 is an officer with the Town of Plattekill Police Department
(“TPPD”). See Dkt. No. 121-13 (“Raftery Deposition”) at 7.
Defendant Brian Benjamin is a TPPD officer. See Dkt. No. 121-16 (“Benjamin
2
The Second Amended Complaint refers to this defendant both as “Paul Van Blarcum,”
SAC ¶ 147, and as “Paul VanBlarcum,” id. at ¶ 12. The Ulster Defendants refer to this defendant
as “VanBuren,” “VanBlarcum,” and “Van Blarcum.” See Dkt. No. 121-21 (“Ulster Defendants’
Memorandum of Law”) at 2, 7, 21. The Court has already advised Plaintiff’s counsel to exercise
diligence in its references to defendants. See March 2018 Order at 2 n.1. The Court will refer to
this defendant as “Van Blarcum” as that is how he is referenced in the case caption. See Docket.
3
The Second Amended Complaint refers to this defendant as “John Rafferty”. SAC ¶ 14.
The Town Defendants’ Motion refers to this defendant as “John Raftery”. Town Defs.’ Mot. at 11.
The Court will refer to him as “Raftery”.
2
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Deposition”) at 6.
Defendant Joseph Ryan is chief of TPPD. See Dkt. No. 121-17 (“Ryan Deposition”) at
7.
Defendant Access: Support for Living, Inc. is “a multi-service agency . . . serving
people with mental illness, chemical dependency and intellectual/developmental disabilities.”
See Dkt. No. 123-12 (“Access Defendants’ SMF”) ¶ 70. Pursuant to a contract with Ulster
County, Access provides “mobile mental health services,” meaning the performance of “clinical
assessment[s] and intervention service[s] for people in crisis or extreme need.” Dkt. No. 123-8
(“Anderson-Winchell Deposition”) at 12–13.
Defendant Amy Anderson-Winchell is Access’ President. See id. at 15.
Defendant Matthew Maher is a clinician for Mobile Mental Health (“MMH”), an agency
of Access. See Dkt. No. 123-7 (“Matthew Maher Deposition”) at 9; Dkt. No. 123-1 (“Attorney
Gasparini Affidavit”) ¶ 49.
Defendant Colleen Maher is an MMH clinician. See Dkt. No. 123-6 (“Colleen Maher
Deposition”) at 6.
2. Plaintiff’s Property
Plaintiff owns 25 acres of property in Highland, New York. See Dkt. No. 127-3
(“Plaintiff’s Affidavit”) at 3. The property is surrounded by stone walls measuring
approximately four-to-five feet tall and four feet wide. Id. Plaintiff provided daycare services
from her home on the property. See Access Defendants’ SMF ¶ 3; Dkt. No. 127-15 (“Plaintiff’s
Response to Access Defendants’ SMF”) ¶ 3. Upstairs in a portable lockbox, Plaintiff kept a
revolver for which she had a valid permit. See Access Defs.’ SMF ¶ 2; Pl.’s Resp. to Access
3
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Defs.’ SMF ¶ 2; Ulster Defs.’ SMF ¶ 136. Plaintiff placed a food cart at the foot of the stairs to
prevent the children under her care from going upstairs and potentially accessing the firearm.
See Access Defs.’ SMF ¶ 4; Pl.’s Response to Access Defs.’ SMF ¶ 4. The Ulster Defendants
assert that Plaintiff told Maguire she used the firearm outside for target practice while the
daycare children were also outside, but Plaintiff denies this fact. Compare Ulster Defs.’ SMF ¶
134 with Pl.’s Resp. to Ulster Defendants’ SMF ¶ 134.
3. Plaintiff’s Interactions with Law Enforcement
In 2015, Plaintiff began to suspect that unknown individuals were removing multi-ton
landscaping boulders from her property, as well as rocks from the stone walls. See Access
Defs.’ SMF ¶ 5; Pl.’s Response to Access Defs.’ SMF 5. Plaintiff believed that the individuals
were stealing in order to intimidate her into leaving so that they could take her land. See Access
Defs.’ SMF ¶ 9; Pl.’s Response to Access Defs.’ SMF ¶ 9; Dkt. No. 123-5 (“Plaintiff’s
Deposition”) at 104.
On April 27, 2016, Plaintiff reported the alleged thefts to TPPD. See Dkt. No. 121-4
(“TPPD Records”) at 7; See Ulster Defs.’ SMF ¶ 4; Pl.’s Response to Ulster Defendants’ SMF
¶ 4. In September 2016, Plaintiff’s mother told her that she “was getting a little obsessive”
about the apparently vanishing stones. Pl.’s Dep. at 107. Plaintiff contacted TPPD again on
October 25, 2016. See TPPD Records at 9. On October 26, 2016, TPPD responded to Plaintiff’s
home, and Plaintiff showed the responding officer the areas from which she believed stones
were being removed. Id. TPPD followed up with another visit to Plaintiff’s property on October
28, 2016. Id. Later that day, TPPD assisted UCSO in responding to Plaintiff’s complaint that
four males were removing rocks from the stone walls, but no evidence was found to support
4
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Plaintiff’s assertion. Id. at 11. During this visit, a non-defendant UCSO deputy gave Plaintiff
the phone number for MMH. See Access Defs.’ SMF ¶ 13; Pl.’s Response to Access Defs.’
SMF ¶ 13. On November 5, 2016, TPPD performed a welfare check on Plaintiff and found her
sitting in her backyard in the dark. See TPPD Records at 12–13. Plaintiff told TPPD “that there
were people watching her house and when she[’]s not around[,] they are removing stones from
her walls that line her property.” Id. at 13. TPPD told Plaintiff “that there is no sign of any
disturbed rocks on her stonewall” and noted that it would follow up with Plaintiff’s mental
health case worker “due to her declining condition.” Id. Then, on November 16, 2016, Ryan
called TPPD patrol regarding Plaintiff’s well-being, stating that “she may want to hurt herself.”
Id. at 15. TPPD patrol officers found Plaintiff sitting outside dressed in camouflage, and she
stated that she was waiting for the people she suspected were stealing her rocks. Id. TPPD noted
that Plaintiff “did not seem to be a danger [to herself] or others at this time, and there were no
children, or anyone else in the residence[.]” Id.
4. The November 19, 2016 Incident
On November 19, 2016, a non-defendant UCSO deputy called Plaintiff to follow up on
her ongoing complaints. See Ulster Defs.’ SMF ¶ 71; Pl.’s Response to Ulster Defendants’
SMF ¶ 71. The deputy reminded Plaintiff that he had given her the contact information for
MMH because he believed the complaints were related to “a mental issue.” See Ulster Defs.’
SMF ¶ 73; Pl.’s Response to Ulster Defendants’ SMF ¶ 73.
UCSO then dispatched Maguire to Plaintiff’s property. See Dkt. No. 122-9 (“Town
Defendants’ SMF”) ¶ 17; Ulster Defs.’ SMF ¶ 74. Maguire, who had never been to Plaintiff’s
property before, was sent there to check on a “possibl[y] delusional individual who believes
5
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[someone] is stealing her rock wall.” See Ulster Defs.’ SMF ¶ 78; Dkt. No. 121-3 (“UCSO
Records”) at 4. Upon Maguire’s arrival at approximately 5 p.m., Plaintiff told him that her
“walls [were] being ripped down each night.” See Town Defs.’ SMF ¶ 18 (citing Pl.’s Dep. at
118); Access Defs.’ SMF ¶ 19. Plaintiff showed Maguire the area where she believed the thefts
were occurring. See Ulster Defs.’ SMF ¶ 119. Maguire asserts that Plaintiff became agitated
when she realized he did not believe her. See Dkt. No. 121-12 (“Maguire Deposition”) at
30–31. According to Maguire, Plaintiff informed him that she had a gun. See Maguire Aff. ¶ 9.
In Maguire’s version of events, he called a supervisor, who confirmed the existence of
Plaintiff’s firearm permit and instructed Maguire to seize the weapon for safekeeping. See id.
TPPD officers Raftery and Benjamin then arrived on the scene, having received a call
from a UCSO dispatcher to assist with its response. See Town Defs.’ SMF ¶¶ 12–13, 20; Pl.’s
Dep. at 118–19. Raftery and Benjamin assert that Maguire informed them that he was
considering “removing Plaintiff for a mental health evaluation with the assistance of MMH.”
See Town Defs.’ SMF ¶¶ 27–28. According to Colleen Maher, a UCSO deputy called Access
and requested its help with the unfolding situation. See Colleen Maher Depo. at 14.
Mental Hygiene Law (“MHL”) § 9.41 states in relevant part that “[a]ny . . . police
officer . . . may take into custody any person who appears to be mentally ill and is conducting
himself or herself in a manner which is likely to result in serious harm to the person or others.”
MHL § 9.41. That statute also permits law enforcement to “remove” such an individual to a
hospital. Id. Another MHL provision, § 9.45, gives this same “removal” authority to directors
of community services upon a report from “a licensed psychologist,” a “certified social worker
currently responsible for providing treatment services to the person,” or a police officer, among
6
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others. MHL § 9.45.
A UCSO deputy contacted Access to request assistance with a female subject who had
repeatedly reported thefts from her property. See Access Defendants’ SMF ¶ 34. After Matthew
and Colleen Maher arrived at approximately 5:30 p.m., Maguire told Plaintiff that the Mahers
were mental health workers who wanted to talk to her. See Access Defs.’ SMF ¶¶ 20, 53. In
response, Plaintiff because “extremely upset” and screamed at Maguire. See Ulster Defs.’ SMF
¶¶ 140, 143. Plaintiff then demanded that everyone—Maguire, Raftery, Benjamin, and Matthew
and Colleen Maher—leave her property because they were not taking her theft report seriously.
See id. ¶ 144. According to Maguire, Plaintiff refused to tell him where she stored her firearm.
See Maguire Aff. ¶ 13. Though Plaintiff disputes that she ever spoke to the Matthew and
Colleen Maher, see Pl.’s Response to Ulster Defs.’ SMF ¶ 184, Colleen Maher formed the
opinion that Plaintiff was “paranoid and delusional,” see Dkt. No. 121-15 at 41. At some point,
Maguire heard Matthew Maher yell that he would sign an order under either MHL § 9.41 or §
9.45—Maguire is not sure which. See Maguire Dep. at 90. Maguire explicitly asked Matthew
Maher whether the MHL allowed him to take Plaintiff to the hospital under the circumstances,
and Matthew Maher responded that it did. See Maguire Aff. ¶ 13. Maguire stated in a sworn
statement that he relied on MMH’s assessment that there were sufficient grounds to take
Plaintiff to the hospital and that, without MMH’s presence, he is unsure that he would have
done so. Maguire Aff. ¶ 13.
Maguire informed Plaintiff that he was taking her to the hospital. Plaintiff then pushed
past Maguire, ran into her house, and tried to slam the door shut. See Ulster Defs.’ SMF ¶ 176.
Maguire used his foot to prevent the door from closing and forced his way into the home.
7
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See id. ¶ 177. He grabbed Plaintiff’s arm as she started up the stairs and brought her to the front
door where Raftery and Benjamin stood. See id. ¶ 178. Maguire handcuffed Plaintiff and patted
her down before putting her into his patrol car. See id. ¶¶ 198, 206. Raftery and Maguire then
entered Plaintiff’s home, went to her bedroom, and retrieved her firearm from a dresser drawer.
See Maguire Aff. ¶ 19. Maguire stated that he “didn’t know” whether a warrant was required in
order to lawfully retrieve the weapon and made a “split decision” to retrieve it without one.
See Maguire Dep. at 47, 57. Plaintiff was eventually freed from the handcuffs and transferred to
an ambulance, which transported her to the hospital. See Ulster Defs.’ SMF ¶ 198.
B. Procedural History
Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit on September 3, 2017. Docket. On November 6, 2017,
Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. See Dkt. No. 42 (the “Amended Complaint”). On March
22, 2018, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to amend in part and denied it in part. See Dkt.
No. 68 (the “March 2018 Order”). Plaintiff filed another amended complaint on March 24,
2018. See SAC.
On February 14, 2020, the Ulster Defendants, the Town Defendants, and the Access
Defendants each filed a motion for summary judgment. See Dkt. Nos. 121 (“Ulster Defendants’
Motion”); Ulster Defs.’ Mem. of Law; 122 (“Town Defendants’ Motion”); 122-10 (“Town
Defendants’ Memorandum of Law”); 123 (“Access Defendants’ Motion”); 123-13 (“Access
Defendants’ Memorandum of Law”).
On April 9, 2020, Plaintiff filed an opposition to each summary judgment motion and
cross-moved for partial summary judgment. See Dkt. Nos. 127; 127-12 (“Plaintiff’s Opposition
to Ulster Defendants’ Motion”); 127-14 (“Plaintiff’s Opposition to Town Defendants’
8
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Motion”); 127-16 (“Plaintiff’s Opposition to Access Defendants’ Motion”).
On May 22, 2020, each set of Defendants filed an opposition to Plaintiff’s cross-motion.
See Dkt. Nos. 134 (“Ulster Defendants’ Reply and Opposition”); 133 (“Ulster Defendants’
Counter-Statement of Material Facts”); 135 (“Town Defendants’ Reply and Opposition”); 136
(“Town Defendants’ Counter-Statement of Material Facts”); 137-1 (“Access Defendants’ Reply
and Opposition”).
III.
LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure instructs courts to grant summary
judgment if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law,” and a dispute is “‘genuine’ . . . if the evidence is
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Thus, while “[f]actual disputes that are irrelevant or
unnecessary” will not preclude summary judgment, “summary judgment will not lie if . . . the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.; see
also Taggart v. Time, Inc., 924 F.2d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Only when no reasonable trier of
fact could find in favor of the nonmoving party should summary judgment be granted.”).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of informing the court of the
basis for the motion and identifying those portions of the record that the moving party claims
will demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Similarly, the movant is entitled to summary judgment when the
nonmoving party has failed “to establish the existence of an element essential to [the movant’s]
9
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case, and on which [the movant] will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Id. at 322.
In attempting to repel a motion for summary judgment after the moving party has met its
initial burden, the nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). At the same time, a court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods.,
Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). Hence, “a court’s duty in reviewing a motion for summary
judgment is ‘carefully limited’ to finding genuine disputes of fact, ‘not to deciding them.’”
Macera v. Vill. Bd. of Ilion, No. 16-CV-668, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169632, at *26 (N.D.N.Y.
Sept. 30, 2019) (Kahn, J.) (quoting Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd.. P’ship, 22 F.3d
1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994)).
IV.
DISCUSSION4
4
As the Court noted in the March 2018 Order, Plaintiff’s third cause of action—for false
imprisonment—is identical to the false arrest portion of Plaintiff’s first cause of action. See March
2018 Order at 5 n.4. The Court accordingly dismisses the Second Amended Complaint’s third
10
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A. The Ulster Defendants
1. Van Blarcum5
Plaintiff has only an unreasonable search and seizure claim remaining against Van
Blarcum. See SAC at 11; see also supra n.4. Van Blarcum argues that he is entitled to summary
judgment because he was not personally involved in the events of November 19, 2016. See
Ulster Defs.’ Mem. of Law at 21–22.6 Plaintiff argues that Van Blarcum is liable because: (1)
cause of action as duplicative. See Hickey v. City of New York, No. 01-CV-6506, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 23941, at *21 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2004) (“Because the torts of false arrest and false
imprisonment are identical, plaintiffs’ Third Cause of Action, for false imprisonment . . . is
dismissed as duplicative.”).
5
In its March 2018 Order, the Court dismissed the Amended Complaint’s fourth cause of
action against Ulster County, see March 2018 Order at 23, and dismissed Plaintiff’s official
capacity claims against Van Blarcum, see id. at 24, 29. The fourth cause of action was based on
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). After the March 2018 Order, Plaintiff filed
the Second Amended Complaint, including the fourth cause of action and listing Van Blarcum as
the only defendant for that claim. See SAC at 23. But “in no event does the Monell analysis of
governmental policy or practice apply to allegations against someone acting in his or her individual
capacity.” Amory v. Katz, No. 15-CV-1535, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175342, at *12 (D. Conn. Dec.
19, 2016) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167–68 (1985)). Therefore, the fourth cause
of action in the Second Amended Complaint is dismissed.
6
Van Blarcum initially appeared to have moved for summary judgment on all claims
against him. See Ulster Defs.’ Mem. of Law at 22 (“As a result, the [SAC] should be dismissed
against Paul VanBlarcum as there is no basis for a supervisory liability claim against him and he
had no actual involvement in the events.”). However, in the Ulster Defendants’ Reply and
Opposition, Van Blarcum argues that “the Fourth Cause of Action against Van Blarcum should be
dismissed and plaintiff’s cross motion for judgment against him denied.” Ulster Defs.’ Reply and
Opp’n at 13. As discussed supra, n.5, the Court dismisses the fourth cause of action against Van
Blarcum, which had been based on Monell. But even assuming Van Blarcum failed to move for
summary judgment on all claims, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) gives the Court the ability
to grant summary judgment on its own, provided the non-moving party has “notice and a
reasonable time to respond.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). Courts have examined “the totality of the
proceedings to determine whether the losing party had sufficient notice of the possibility that
summary judgment could be granted against it.” Smith v. Perkins Bd. of Educ., 708 F.3d 821 (6th
Cir. 2013) (quoting Turcar, LLC v. IRS, 451 Fed. App’x 509, 513 (6th Cir. 2011)). Here, Plaintiff
responded to Van Blarcum’s opening brief, which stated without qualification that “Van Blarcum
11
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he was grossly negligent in supervising Maguire, his subordinate; and (2) he did not try to learn
about or remedy the alleged wrong. See Pl.’s Opp’n to Ulster Defs.’ Mot. at 31–32. The Court
agrees that Van Blarcum was not personally involved in the alleged constitutional violations.
Therefore, the Court grants summary judgment to Van Blarcum on the remaining claim against
him and denies Plaintiff’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment on the personal
involvement issue.
“It is well settled that, in order to establish a defendant’s individual liability in a suit
brought under § 1983, a plaintiff must show, inter alia, the defendant’s personal involvement in
the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d 133, 138 (2d
Cir. 2013). “The personal involvement of a supervisory defendant may be shown by evidence
that: (1) the defendant participated directly in the alleged constitutional violation, (2) the
defendant, after being informed of the violation through a report or appeal, failed to remedy the
wrong, (3) the defendant created a custom or policy under which unconstitutional policies
occurred, or allowed the continuance of such a policy or custom, (4) the defendant was grossly
negligent in supervising subordinates who committed the wrongful acts, or (5) the defendant
exhibited deliberate indifference to the rights of inmates by failing to act on information
indicating that unconstitutional acts were occurring.” Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d
Cir. 1995).
In Colon, the Second Circuit granted summary judgment to a supervisor alleged to have
is entitled to summary judgment” and “the [SAC] should be dismissed against Paul VanBlarcum.”
See Ulster Defs.’ Mem. of Law at 21–22. The Court finds this unequivocal language sufficiently
put Plaintiff on notice such that the Court can consider whether Van Blarcum is entitled to
summary judgment on all claims against him.
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been grossly negligent in “training and supervising the corrections officers under his
management.” Id. The Second Circuit noted that the plaintiff had failed to set forth facts
supporting a claim that the supervisor-defendant either knew or should have known of the
relevant events. Id. at 873–74. “In the absence of such facts, there is no basis for a jury finding
of gross negligence (or deliberate indifference), and summary judgment is proper.” Id. at 874.
Here, too, there is no support for a jury finding of gross negligence or deliberate
indifference on the part of Van Blarcum. Plaintiff does not dispute Van Blarcum’s contention
that he did not direct or advise Maguire on how to respond to Plaintiff’s reports. See Pl.’s
Response to Ulster Defendants’ SMF ¶ 80; Ulster Defs.’ SMF ¶ 3. Nor does Plaintiff counter
Van Blarcum’s statement that he did not speak to Maguire before, during, or after Maguire’s
response to Plaintiff’s property on November 19, 2016. See Pl.’s Response to Ulster
Defendants’ SMF ¶ 79 Ulster Defs.’ SMF ¶ 79; Dkt. No. 121-18 (“Van Blarcum Affidavit”) ¶
3.
Instead, Plaintiff focuses on Van Blarcum’s access to information regarding the
November 29, 2016 incident and ability to discipline Maguire for his role in it. See Pl.’s
Response to Ulster Defendants’ SMF ¶ 79; see also Pl.’s Opp’n to Ulster Defs.’ Mot. at 32
(“Sheriff Van Blarcum testified that he could have discovered what happened, and had the
authority to sanction any deputy.”). But Plaintiff “offers no expert opinion that anything that
VanBlarcum or the UCSO did or did not do deviated from a norm of conduct for a sheriff or
agency in similar circumstances.” Ulster Defs.’ Reply and Opp’n to Pl.’s Cross-Mot. at 12.
Where the record “does not evidence any blameworthy conduct”, supervisory liability is
inappropriate. See, e.g., Clintron v. Shauwecker, No. 05-CV-333, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13
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18825, at *16 (D. Vt. Mar. 6, 2008) (granting summary judgment to supervisor-defendant on
claim of grossly negligent supervision).
In countering Van Blarcum’s argument that he is entitled to summary judgment,
Plaintiff cites to an allegation in the Second Amended Complaint that Van Blarcum “permitted
and tolerated the practice of warrantless detention, illegal search, illegal seizure, and
involuntary confinement of individuals and warrantless entry and search of residences of
individuals believed to have made a false report.” See Pl.’s Opp’n to Ulster Defs.’ Mot. at
31–32 (citing SAC ¶ 150). But unsworn allegations in a complaint are insufficient to defeat a
motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Zayas v. Caring Cmty. of Conn., No. 11-CV-442,
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141698, at *17 (D. Conn. Oct. 1, 2012). And conclusory allegations
such as this one are also insufficient to overcome a summary judgment motion. See, e.g.,
Censor v. ASC Techs. of Conn., LLC, 900 F. Supp. 2d 181, 216 (D. Conn. 2012).
Because Plaintiff has failed to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether
Van Blarcum was personally involved in the allegedly unconstitutional search and seizure, Van
Blarcum is entitled to summary judgment. Plaintiff’s cross-motion is denied to the extent it
seeks summary judgment on Van Blarcum’s personal involvement.
2. Maguire
Plaintiff also has only an unreasonable search and seizure claim remaining against
Maguire. See SAC at 11; see also supra n.4. Maguire argues that he is entitled to qualified
immunity. See Ulster Defs.’ Mem. of Law at 23. The Court agrees.
“When facing a defense of qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage, ‘a court
should ask whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,
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the conduct that may be proved at trial is conduct that, at the time it occurred, violated a clearly
established constitutional or statutory right.’” Ruhlmann v. Ulster County Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
234 F. Supp. 2d 140, 174 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (quoting Mozzochi v. Borden, 959 F.2d 1174, 1178
(2d Cir. 1992)). “To be clearly established, a right must be sufficiently clear that every
reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Reichle v.
Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012). “[W]here plaintiff has a clearly established constitutional
or statutory right, the only remaining inquiry is whether the defendant’s conduct is objectively
reasonable.” Ruhlmann, 234 F. Supp. 2d at 174 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,
639 (1987)). “Though mistaken judgments reasonably arrived at are protected, qualified
immunity does not protect an official against redress for performance that was plainly
incompetent.” Rodriguez v. City of New York, 72 F.3d 1051, 1065 (2d Cir. 1995). Probable
cause is required for an MHL confinement, see, e.g., Roache v. v. McCulloch, No. 17-CV-574,
2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155442, at *14 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2019), but for qualified immunity
to attach, only “arguable probable cause” must be found, see Escalera v. Lunn, 361 F.3d 737,
743 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Arguable probable cause exists if either (a) it was objectively reasonable
for the officer to believe that probable cause existed, or (b) officers of reasonable competence
could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met.”).
As discussed in the March 2018 Order, Plaintiff asserts a cause of action for
unreasonable search and seizure, see SAC at 11, but “does not clearly state the legal theories
underlying” this claim, see March 2018 Order at 5. Just as in the March 2018 Order, the Court
will analyze this cause of action as both an allegedly false arrest of Plaintiff and an allegedly
unreasonable search of her home to locate the firearm. See id. at 5–21.
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a. Plaintiff’s Confinement
The right Plaintiff alleges Maguire violated—the right to be free from false arrest—is
clearly established. See Robinson v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 921 (2d Cir. 1987). The relevant
inquiry, then, is whether Maguire’s conduct was “objectively reasonable”; if so, he is entitled to
qualified immunity. See Ruhlmann, 234 F. Supp. 2d at 174.
Maguire asserts—and Plaintiff does not dispute—that he relied heavily on Matthew
Maher’s opinion in deciding to invoke MHL § 9.41. See Maguire Aff. ¶ 13. In fact, Maguire
swore that he might not have arrested Plaintiff and had her taken to the hospital were it not for
the advice of MMH. See id. The Court finds that Maguire’s reliance on the on-scene mental
health professionals was “objectively reasonable,” entitling him to qualified immunity.
This case is analogous to Cruz v. City of New Rochelle, No. 13-CV-7432, 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 63832 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2017). In Cruz, the court granted summary judgment to
individual defendants on the basis of qualified immunity. See id. at *56. There, an officerdefendant called a hospital representative to request authorization under MHL § 9.45 to take the
plaintiff to the hospital. See id. at *22. The representative instructed the officer-defendant to
bring the plaintiff in. See id. at *23. The court concluded that, “[b]ased on the totality of the
circumstances . . . including in particular the instruction given to [the officer-defendant] by the
hospital representative, after she consulted with the physician on duty, to bring Cruz to the
hospital, it would not have been objectively unreasonable for an officer to conclude that he or
she could and should enter Cruz’s apartment in order to do so.” Id. at *58.
Under Second Circuit precedent, certain types of evidence can justify a defendantofficer’s reliance on the opinion of an on-site mental health professional. See Myers v.
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Patterson, 819 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir. 2016). In Myers, the Second Circuit reversed and
remanded the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to a defendant-officer because the
record did not yet support a finding that the defendant-officer acted reasonably in seizing the
plaintiff for psychiatric evaluation. See id. at 636. The Second Circuit instructed the district
court that “reasonableness could be based on either of two sets of circumstances, or any
combination of them[.]” Id. at 634. First, reasonableness could be found based on information
possessed by the defendant-officer suggesting there was a “substantial risk of serious physical
harm.” Id. Second, reasonableness could be supported by an on-site caseworker’s
“communication of her professional judgment that [the arrestee] should be seized for
psychiatric evaluation.” Id. In other words, the officer “is protected by qualified immunity” if a
mental health professional “somehow communicated to him a message that [the officer] could
have reasonably understood as” an expression of the professional’s opinion that the subject
should be seized for psychiatric evaluation. Id.
Here, while the undisputed record does not indicate that there was a “substantial risk of
serious physical harm,”7 it does present the other indicator of reasonableness endorsed by the
Second Circuit. Maguire relied upon on-site mental health professionals who indicated that the
situation justified the use of the MHL’s procedures. See Maguire Aff. ¶ 13.
Plaintiff emphasizes that Matthew Maher could not invoke MHL § 9.41 because that
7
TPPD concluded just three days earlier that Plaintiff “did not seem to be a danger [to
herself] or others at this time.” See TPPD Records at 15. Maguire was apparently “very concerned
due to the presence of a weapon on the property,” Maguire Aff. ¶ 11, but there is no indication that
Plaintiff threatened to use the weapon or otherwise harm herself or others. And as the Second
Circuit wrote in Myers, “[a] person may be annoyed, uncooperative, and irrational without
presenting a danger to herself or of violence to others.” Myers, 819 F.3d at 634.
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statute can only be utilized by law enforcement. See Pl.’s Opp’n to the Ulster Defs.’ Mot. at 33
(“[Maguire] had made several arrests based upon MHL 9.41, and knew that it was a police
decision.”). But even though Matthew Maher had no power under MHL§ 9.41, Maguire could
still rely on his input. See Myers, 819 F.3d at 634–35 (“Even if, in actuality, [the caseworker]
did not possess the authority . . . to make the judgment, [the defendant-officer] would
nonetheless be shielded by qualified immunity if a reasonable officer in the circumstances
would have relied on [the caseworker’s] directive and seeming knowledge.”).
Because Maguire reasonably relied upon MMH’s opinion that Plaintiff should have
been seized for psychiatric evaluation, qualified immunity protects him.
b. Search of Plaintiff’s Home
The Court also concludes that Maguire is protected by qualified immunity for reentering Plaintiff’s home to seize her firearm. First, the right Plaintiff claims Maguire
violated—the right to be free from weapons searches at a home-operated daycare—is not
“clearly established.” Second, the right to be free from home searches is also undefined in the
mental health context, and therefore “officers of reasonable competence could disagree,”
Escalera, 361 F.3d at 743, on whether the re-entry was legal. Third, as with the decision to
confine Plaintiff, Maguire relied on the advice of another.
The Court begins its analysis of whether Maguire is immune for his warrantless search
of Plaintiff’s home by examining the “contours” of the right Plaintiff alleges was violated to see
if they are “sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing
violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). “To determine whether
the relevant law was clearly established, we consider the specificity with which a right is
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defined, the existence of Supreme Court or Court of Appeals case law on the subject, and the
understanding of a reasonable officer in light of preexisting law.” Terebesi v. Torreso, 764 F.3d
217, 231 (2d Cir. 2014). “Although there need not be ‘a case directly on point,’ it must
nonetheless be clear that ‘existing precedent [has] placed the . . . constitutional question beyond
debate.’” McEvoy v. Matthews, No. 16-CV-922, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133487, at *8 (D.
Conn. Aug. 21, 2017) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015)).
One federal court of appeals observed that, as of a challenged 2011 search, “no decision
of this court or the Supreme Court had addressed, even generally, whether a warrant was
required for the search of a home out of which a state-regulated day care was operated.” Hall v.
Sweet, 666 Fed. App’x 469, 480 (6th Cir. 2016). The parties do not identify, and the Court has
not uncovered, any decision since then addressing this scenario—an officer conducting a
warrantless search of a home out of which a daycare was run. “Given this lack of certainty in
Fourth Amendment’s applicability to the circumstances,” see id., a reasonable officer in
Maguire’s position could not be fully aware of whether his conduct violated the law.
The fact that this lawsuit arises in the context of an MHL confinement further confuses
the analysis. This is because “the law concerning probable cause in the mental health context is
not clearly established[.]” Housley v. Holquist, 879 F. Supp. 2d 472, 482 (D. Md. 2011)
(finding an officer who conducted a warrantless entry was entitled to qualified immunity for a
mental health seizure). An officer can be immune even where a search or seizure is
“technically unlawful,” as long as he acts reasonably. See id.
The Court finally turns to Maguire’s reliance upon his supervisor’s instructions. The
Second Circuit has held that a subordinate officer is entitled to qualified immunity when he
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relies on a supervisor’s “apparently valid” order. See Varrone v. Bilotti, 123 F.3d 75, 82 (2d
Cir. 1997); see also Goode v. Winkler, No. 97-CV-8999, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18132, at *18
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 1999) (granting summary judgment on an excessive force claim to a
defendant-officer who relied on a superior’s orders in using a distraction device to apprehend
suspects). Maguire asserts that he contacted his supervisor, UCSO Lieutenant Budd, to seek
advice “with respect to [Plaintiff’s] firearm because he had never dealt with someone in such an
emotional[ly] distraught state who also possessed a firearm.” Ulster Defs.’ SMF ¶ 137.8 In
contacting Budd, Maguire was apparently following UCSO protocol. See Van Blarcum Aff. ¶ 5.
Budd instructed Maguire to seize Plaintiff’s weapon. See Ulster Defs.’ SMF ¶ 138; see
also Maguire Dep. at 46 (“[Budd] just said that we need to take the gun.”); Dkt. 127-7 (“Raftery
Affidavit”) ¶ 16.
Thus, qualified immunity applies under Second Circuit precedent if Budd’s order—that
Maguire seize Plaintiff’s weapon in connection with her confinement pursuant to MHL §
9.41—was “apparently valid.” Though courts have not defined what makes an order from a
superior “apparently valid,” the inquiry is fact-specific. See, e.g., Anthony v. City of New York,
339 F.3d 129, 138 (noting that an order was apparently valid “in light of the substance of the
911 call and all of the surrounding circumstances known to” the officers). The Court concludes
that Budd’s order was indeed “apparently valid” because it arose in the context of an MHL
8
Plaintiff denies this fact, citing Maguire’s years of law enforcement experience and his
training on the use of warrants. See Pl.’s Resp. to Ulster Defs.’ SMF ¶ 137. Because this denial
does not specifically contradict the Ulster Defendants’ statement—that Maguire had never dealt
with such a distraught individual who owned a gun—the Court deems the Ulster Defendants’
statement admitted by Plaintiff. See L.R. 7.1(a)(3) (“The Court shall deem admitted any properly
supported facts set forth in the Statement of Material Facts that the opposing party does not
specifically controvert.”).
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confinement, not in the context of a traditional arrest.
In sum, the Court decides Maguire is immune for searching Plaintiff’s home after
confining her for three reasons. First, there is no “clearly established” right to be free from even
warrantless searches of a home out of which a daycare is operated. Second, the right is further
clouded by uncertainty surrounding probable cause in mental health contexts. Lastly, in
searching Plaintiff’s home for the firearm, Maguire relied on an “apparently valid” order from a
superior. The Court therefore grants summary judgment to Maguire.
B. The Town Defendants
1. Ryan9, 10
Like Van Blarcum, Ryan argues that he is entitled to summary judgment because he was
not personally involved in the events of November 19, 2016. See Town Defs.’ Mem. of Law at
14. Again, the Court agrees.
The parties agree that Ryan was not present at Plaintiff’s property on November 19,
9
In its March 2018 Order, the Court dismissed the Amended Complaint’s fifth cause of
action against the Town of Plattekill, see March 2018 Order at 23, and dismissed Plaintiff’s official
capacity claims against Ryan, see id. at 24, 29. The fifth cause of action was based on Monell, 436
U.S. 658. After the March 2018 Order, Plaintiff filed the Second Amended Complaint, including
the fifth cause of action and listing Ryan as the only defendant for that claim. See SAC at 25. But
“in no event does the Monell analysis of governmental policy or practice apply to allegations
against someone acting in his or her individual capacity.” Amory v. Katz, No. 15-CV-1535, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175342, at *12 (D. Conn. Dec. 19, 2016) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.
159, 167–68 (1985)). Therefore, the fifth cause of action contained in the Second Amended
Complaint is dismissed.
10
Ryan is not named as a defendant in any cause of action besides the fifth, which the
Court has dismissed, see supra n.9. See generally SAC. Nevertheless, because “a fair reading of
the claim suggests” that Ryan was intended to be included as a defendant on the first cause of
action for unreasonable search and seizure, the Court analyzes whether Ryan is entitled to summary
judgment on that claim. Marr v. Me. Dep’t of Human Servs.,No. 01-CV-224, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7378, at *3 n.1 (D. Me. Apr. 24, 2002).
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2016. See Town Defendants’ SMF ¶ 69; Dkt. No. 127-13 (“Plaintiff’s Response to Town
Defendants’ SMF”) ¶ 69. Ryan did not learn of the events until the next day. See Town
Defendants’ SMF ¶ 68. Nevertheless, Plaintiff argues Ryan is liable because he was grossly
negligent in supervising Raftery and Benjamin and because he eventually learned of the events
and “did nothing to remedy the unconstitutional acts occurring.” See Pl.’s Opp’n to the Town
Defs.’ Mot. at 32–33. But the record “does not evidence any blameworthy conduct,” making
supervisory liability inappropriate. See, e.g., Clintron, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18825, at *16.
And Plaintiff’s failure-to-remedy argument fails because the alleged violations occurred a full
day before Ryan learned of them. See Harnett v. Barr, 538 F. Supp. 2d 511, 524 (N.D.N.Y.
2008) (“If the official is confronted with a violation that has already occurred and is not
ongoing, then the official will not be found personally responsible for failing to ‘remedy’ a
violation.”).
Plaintiff again cites to the Second Amended Complaint to show Ryan “permitted and
tolerated the practice of warrantless detention, illegal search, illegal seizure, and involuntary
confinement of individuals and warrantless entry and search of residences of individuals
believed to have made a false report.” See Pl.’s Opp’n to Town Defs.’ Mot. at 32 (citing SAC ¶
150). But, as stated in the Van Blarcum discussion, unsworn allegations in a complaint are
insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. See Zayas, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
141698, at *17. And, again, conclusory allegations are also insufficient to overcome a summary
judgment motion. See, e.g., Censor, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 216.
Because Plaintiff has failed to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether
Ryan was personally involved in the alleged constitutional violations, the Court grants Ryan
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summary judgment. Plaintiff’s cross-motion is denied to the extent it seeks summary judgment
on Ryan’s personal involvement.
2. Benjamin
Plaintiff has only an unreasonable search and seizure claim remaining against Benjamin.
See supra n.4 (explaining that Plaintiff’s third cause of action is dismissed as duplicative). As
with the Maguire discussion, the Court will analyze this cause of action as both an allegedly
false arrest of Plaintiff and an allegedly unreasonable search of her home to locate the firearm.
Benjamin argues that: (1) Plaintiff does not have a viable Fourth Amendment claim
against him because exceptions to the warrant requirement applied; (2) Plaintiff’s confinement
was privileged under MHL § 9.41; (3) he was not personally involved in the allegedly unlawful
search of Plaintiff’s home; and (4) he is entitled to qualified immunity. See Town Defs.’ Mem.
of Law at 2–3. The Court finds that Benjamin is immune for his role in Plaintiff’s confinement
and was not personally involved in the post-confinement search. Accordingly, the claim against
him is dismissed.
a. Plaintiff’s Confinement
As with Maguire, the right Plaintiff alleges Benjamin violated—the right to be free from
false arrest—is clearly established. See Robinson, 821 F.2d at 921. This leaves whether
Benjamin’s conduct was “objectively reasonable” as the only remaining inquiry in the qualified
immunity analysis. Because the Court concludes Benjamin acted reasonably under the
circumstances in confining Plaintiff, he is immune.
As discussed above, the Second Circuit has held that a subordinate officer is entitled to
qualified immunity when he relies on a supervisor’s “apparently valid” order. See Varrone, 123
23
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F.3d at 82 (2d Cir. 1997). While Maguire was the subordinate in the context of his decision to
seize Plaintiff’s firearm, he was Benjamin’s supervisor in the combined UCSO and TPPD
response to Plaintiff’s property on November 19, 2016. See Dkt. No. 122-6 (“Benjamin
Affidavit”) ¶ 9 (“Deputy Maguire was the Officer in Charge at the scene and, as such, had
command and control. I responded for the sole purpose of providing assistance to the [UCSO]
Officer in Charge, under his command and orders.”). The fact that Maguire—being employed
by UCSO—was not technically Benjamin’s supervisor is not relevant to the qualified immunity
analysis. See Anthony, 339 F.3d at 138 (“Plausible instructions from a superior or fellow officer
support qualified immunity where, viewed objectively in light of the surrounding
circumstances, they could lead a reasonable officer to conclude that the necessary legal
justification for his actions exists (e.g. a warrant, probable cause, exigent circumstances).”)
(emphasis added).
Because Benjamin acted objectively reasonably in relying upon Maguire in the decision
to confine Plaintiff, he is protected by qualified immunity.
b. Search of Plaintiff’s Home
Benjamin is entitled to summary judgment on the portion of Plaintiff’s unreasonable
search and seizure claim against him that relates to the retrieval of the firearm. As discussed
with regard to Van Blarcum and Ryan, personal involvement is a prerequisite for § 1983
damages. See, e.g., Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994). The parties agree that
Benjamin did not participate in the post-confinement firearm retrieval. See Town Defs.’ SMF ¶
57; Pl.’s Resp. to Town Defs.’ SMF ¶ 57. Plaintiff does not contest the Town Defendants’
contention that Benjamin is entitled to summary judgment on the weapon search on the ground
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that he was not personally involved. See generally Pl.’s Opp’n to Town Defs.’ Mot.
Accordingly, the Court grants Benjamin summary judgment on this issue.
3. Raftery
Plaintiff also has only an unreasonable search and seizure claim remaining against
Raftery. See supra n.4 (explaining that Plaintiff’s third cause of action is dismissed as
duplicative). As above, the Court will analyze this cause of action as both an allegedly false
arrest of Plaintiff and an allegedly unreasonable search of her home to locate the firearm.
a. Plaintiff’s Confinement
The Court incorporates its analysis of Benjamin’s role in Plaintiff’s confinement and
also concludes that Raftery is entitled to qualified immunity for his role. Like Benjamin,
Raftery stood in the doorway of Plaintiff’s home while Maguire entered to confine Plaintiff.
See Town Defendants’ SMF ¶ 46. Plaintiff admits that Raftery “followed Maguire because he
was the lead officer[.]” Pl.’s Opp’n to the Town Defs.’ Mot. at 34. As with Benjamin, Raftery
acted objectively reasonably in relying on “apparently valid” orders from Maguire, the officer in
charge of the coordinated response between UCSO and TPPD. See Raftery Aff. ¶¶ 8–10, 14.
b. Search of Plaintiff’s Home
Like Maguire and unlike Benjamin, Raftery was involved in the post-confinement
firearm search of Plaintiff’s home. See Raftery Aff. ¶ 17. With regard to the weapon search,
Raftery again relied on “apparently valid” directions from Maguire. See id. ¶¶ 17–18. In Goode,
a court in this Circuit granted summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds to a
subordinate officer for merely following instructions. 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18132, at *18.
This Court reaches the same result, dismissing the remaining claim against Raftery.
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C. The Access Defendants
Plaintiff asserts: (1) an unreasonable search and seizure claim against all of the Access
Defendants; and (2) a Monell claim against Access and Anderson-Winchell. The Access
Defendants argue these claims should be dismissed because they are not state actors or, if they
are state actors, because they are immune. See Dkt. No. 123-13 (“Access Defendants’
Memorandum of Law”) at 9, 19. The Court agrees that the Access Defendants are not state
actors and accordingly dismisses the claims against them.
“Because the United States Constitution regulates only the Government, not private
parties, a litigant claiming that his constitutional rights have been violated must first establish
that the challenged conduct constitutes state action.” Flagg v. Yonkers Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 393
F.3d 178, 186 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A plaintiff pressing a claim
of violation of his constitutional rights under § 1983 is thus required to show state action.”
Tancredi v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 316 F.3d 308, 312 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Brentwood Acad.
v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 n.2 (“If a defendant’s conduct
satisfies the state-action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, the conduct also
constitutes action ‘under color of state law’ for § 1983 purposes.”).
In a § 1983 action, courts utilize three tests in assessing whether “the actions of a
nominally private entity are attributable to the state[.]” Sybalski v. Indep. Grp. Home Living
Program, Inc., 546 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 2008). The first—the compulsion test—asks whether
“the entity act[ed] pursuant to the coercive power of the state or is controlled by the state[.]” Id.
The second—the close nexus test—asks if the state “provide[d] significant encouragement to
the entity, the entity is a willing participant in joint activity with the state, or the entity’s
26
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functions are entwined with state policies[.]” Id. Finally, the third test asks if “the entity has
been delegated a public function by the state[.]” Id. “The principal inquiry . . . is whether the
party’s actions may be ‘fairly attributable to the state.’” Wolotsky v. Huhn, 960 F.2d 1331,
1335 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)).
“The existence of a contract does not by itself ‘render all of the contractor’s conduct
state action[.]’” Stegemann v. Rensselaer Cty. Sheriff’s Office, No. 15-CV-21, 2020 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 168100, at *14 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2020) (quoting Cooper v. United States Postal
Serv., 577 F.3d 479, 492 (2d Cir. 2009)); see also Doe v. Rosenberg, 996 F.Supp. 343, 352
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (hospital’s contract with state agency to operate a psychiatric wing insufficient
to render it a state actor), aff’d 166 F.3d 507 (2d Cir. 1999); but see McCullum v. Tepe, No. 08CV-387, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171206, at *30 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 28, 2011) (finding that a
private, non-profit corporation that contracted with a county to provide mental health services
and its employee were state actors).
The Access Defendants do not qualify as state actors under any of the afore-mentioned
tests. This case is analogous to Pino v. Higgs, in which a federal appeals court found that a
therapist had not engaged in state action. See 75 F.3d 1461 (10th Cir. 1996); see also Gessner v.
Mazzitti, No. 12-CV-2185, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103644, at *23 (M.D. Pa. June 17, 2013)
(“The state action requirement of § 1983 has been construed to preclude federal civil rights
claims against private mental health counseling services.”) (collecting cases). In Pino, the
therapist instructed an officer to detain and transport the appellant to a hospital for psychiatric
evaluation. See 75 F.3d at 1465. The Tenth Circuit reasoned that the therapist “did nothing
more than provide information which the police officers . . . may have considered in making
27
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their independent judgments.” Id. at 1466. The therapist’s “position with a non-public
organization . . . while lending credibility to her opinion, carries with it no special stategenerated authority that would make her conduct attributable to the state.” Id.
As in Pino, a mental health professional—Matthew Maher— influenced the police’s
decision to confine Plaintiff. See Maguire Aff. ¶ 13. But that decision was ultimately law
enforcement’s, not Access’, to make. See MHL § 9.41 (“Any . . . police officer . . . may take
into custody any person who appears to be mentally ill . . . .”) (emphasis added). Because the
statute empowers only law enforcement to act, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s contention that there
was the requisite “joint activity” here. The Access Defendants’ expression of an opinion is
therefore not “fairly attributable to the state.” Wolotsky, 960 F.2d at 1335 (quoting Lugar, 457
U.S. at 937). Because the Court finds the Access Defendants are not state actors, it grants them
summary judgment and denies Plaintiff’s cross-motion on this issue.
Having concluded that the Access Defendants did not engage in state action, the Court
must also dismiss the Monell claim against Access and Anderson-Winchell. See, e.g., Watson
v. Methacton Sch. Dist., 513 F. Supp. 2d 360 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (“The court finds that Plaintiff’s
Monell allegation cannot survive the motion for summary judgment for several reasons. First,
since the court has found that there was no state action, it follows that Plaintiff cannot establish
that a policy, practice or custom of the state caused her to suffer a constitutional injury.”).
V.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is hereby:
ORDERED, that the Ulster Defendants’ Motion (Dkt. No. 121), the Town Defendants’
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Motion (Dkt. No. 122), and the Access Defendants’ Motion (Dkt. No. 123) are GRANTED;
and it is further
ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment (Dkt. No. 127)
is DENIED in its entirety; and it is further
ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 71) is
DISMISSED; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Clerk close this action; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court shall serve a copy of this MemorandumDecision and Order on all parties in accordance with the Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.11
DATED:
November 24, 2020
Albany, New York
11
Due to the delays and disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, some
cases/motions were not disposed of prior to the end of the reporting period.
29
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