Coppola v. The Town of Plattekill et al
Filing
68
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDERED, that Ulster Defendants Motion (Dkt. No. 50) and Plattekill Defendants Motion (Dkt. No. 60) are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part in accordance with this Memorandum-Decision and Order; and it is furtherORDERED, that t he following claims are DISMISSED with prejudice: Plaintiffs Monell claims against Ulster County and Plattekill, and her claims against Paul Van Blarcum and Joseph Ryan in their official capacities; and it is furtherORDERED, that the remainder of Pla intiffs claims survive dismissal; and it is furtherORDERED, that Plaintiffs Amendment Motion (Dkt. No. 56-2 at 1213) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part in accordance with this Memorandum-Decision and Order; and it is further ORDERED, that Plaintif fs Second Amendment Motion (Dkt. No. 62-2 at 1617) is DENIED as moot; and it is further ORDERED, that Plaintiff is directed to file, within seven days of the filing of this Memorandum-Decision and Order, a non-redlined copy of the Proposed Second Ame nded Complaint (Dkt. No. 56-3) that is modified according to the Courts instructions outlined in this opinion. This pleading shall be deemed the operative pleading in this action, and shall supersede the Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 42) in its entirety. Signed by Senior Judge Lawrence E. Kahn on March 22, 2018. (sas)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
EUGINIA COPPOLA,
Plaintiff,
-against-
1:17-CV-1032 (LEK/ATB)
TOWN OF PLATTEKILL, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Euginia Coppola brings this action against Health Alliance Hospital Broadway
Campus; Access: Support for Living, Inc.; the Town of Plattekill, New York; Ulster County,
New York; and numerous employees of each of these defendants. Dkt. No. 42 (“Amended
Complaint”). Plaintiff alleges violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution in connection with her arrest and involuntary hospitalization at Health
Alliance Hospital on November 19, 2016. Id. ¶ 1. Plattekill, Plattekill Police Chief Joseph Ryan,
and Plattekill police officers John Rafferty and Brian Benjamin (together, “Plattekill
Defendants”) move to dismiss the claims alleged against them. Dkt. Nos. 60 (“Plattekill
Motion”), 60-1 (“Plattekill Memorandum”). Ulster County, Ulster County Sheriff Paul Van
Blarcum,1 and Ulster County deputy John McGuire2 (together, “Ulster Defendants”) also move to
dismiss all claims alleged against them except for the unreasonable search and seizure claims
against McGuire. Dkt. Nos. 50 (“Ulster Motion”), 50-1 (“Ulster Memorandum”); see also Am.
Compl. ¶ 47. Plaintiff moves to file a second amended complaint. Dkt. Nos. 56-2 at 12–13
(“Amendment Motion”); PSAC. For the reasons that follow, each motion is granted in part and
denied in part.
II.
BACKGROUND
A. Factual History
The facts described in this section are drawn from the Amended Complaint. Plaintiff is a
fifty-five year old female who lives in Highland, New York. Am. Compl. ¶ 6. Stone walls
surround her property. Id. ¶ 23. Around April 2016, Plaintiff observed that large stones had been
removed from the walls on her property, and she reported this to the Plattekill Police Department.
Id. ¶¶ 25–26. In September 2016, Plaintiff again observed that stones had been removed from the
walls, and she filed a second report with the Department. Id. ¶ 27. Plaintiff called the Department
again on November 17, 2016, after seeing “four people on her property.” Id. ¶ 31. Ryan then told
Plaintiff that “her case was closed.” Id. Two days later, Plaintiff called the Ulster County
1
The Amended Complaint refers only to a “Paul Van Blarcum,” Am. Compl., but
Plaintiff’s proposed second amended complaint, Dkt. No. 56-3 (“PSAC”), refers to this
defendant as both “VanBlarcum”, id. ¶ 60, and “Van Blarcum,” id. ¶ 52. Because the captions of
the Amended Complaint and the PSAC both refer to him as “Van Blarcum,” the Court will
address him as Van Blarcum. The Court urges Plaintiff’s counsel to be more diligent in future
filings.
2
The Amended Complaint refers only to a “Deputy John McQuire,” Am. Compl.
However, because the Ulster Defendants refer to this defendant as John McGuire, e.g., Ulster
Mem. at 1, and because the PSAC corrects the spelling of his last name to McGuire, e.g., PSAC
¶ 13, the Court will refer to him as McGuire.
2
Sheriff’s Department “to report a crime occurring on her property.” Id. ¶ 32. McGuire, Rafferty,
Benjamin, and two agents from Access: Support for Living responded to Plaintiff’s call and
arrived at her property in a patrol car. Id. ¶¶ 33, 36. The three officers “started treating Plaintiff of
[sic] being delusional.” Id. ¶ 34. Plaintiff maintains that she did not behave in a threatening
manner. Id. ¶ 52.
“Plaintiff asked the officers to leave her property” and attempted to return inside her
house, but McGuire “grabbed [her], twisted [her] back and arms, . . . and then handcuffed [her].”
Id. ¶ 35. He then frisked her, “yanked on [her] pants, and put [her] in the marked patrol car.” Id.
¶ 36. Rafferty said that the officers had to “take Plaintiff’s firearm.” Id. Plaintiff asked for water,
but “[t]he officers replied that [she] could not get . . . water until she disclosed the location of her
firearm.” Id. ¶ 37. Plaintiff revealed the location of her gun, but “told the officers that they did
not have permission to go into her house.” Id. The officers entered her house while she was in the
patrol car, and took her gun. Id. ¶¶ 38, 64. “The officers [then] put Plaintiff into an ambulance
and transported [her] to” Health Alliance Hospital. Id. ¶ 69. “Plaintiff’s blood and urine were
taken by the [h]ospital” and Plaintiff remained in the hospital “overnight for mental health
evaluation.” Id. ¶¶ 44–45. The evaluation revealed that Plaintiff did not suffer from mental
illness, and that she was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Id. ¶¶ 41, 44. She was
released from the hospital on November 20, 2016. Id. ¶ 41.
B. Procedural History
Plaintiff commenced this action on September 3, 2017. Dkt. No. 1 (“Complaint”). She
filed her Amended Complaint on November 6, 2017. Am. Compl. The Amended Complaint
alleges, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, unreasonable search and seizure, false imprisonment, municipal
3
liability, and substantive due process claims in connection with her detention and hospitalization
on November 19, 2016. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 46–175. The Plattekill Defendants moved to dismiss the
claims alleged against them, Plattekill Mot.; Plattekill Mem., as did the Ulster Defendants, with
the exception of the unreasonable search and seizure claims against John McGuire, Ulster Mot;
Ulster Mem. Plaintiff responded to each motion, Dkt. Nos. 56-2 (“Ulster Response”), 62-2
(“Plattekill Response”), and the Plattekill and Ulster Defendants replied, Dkt. Nos. 58 (“Ulster
Reply”), 67 (“Plattekill Reply”). Plaintiff also moved to file a second amended complaint. Am.
Mot.; PSAC.
III.
LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A court must accept as
true the factual allegations contained in a complaint and draw all inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party. Allaire Corp. v. Okumus, 433 F.3d 248, 249–50 (2d Cir. 2006). Plausibility,
however, requires “enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal
evidence of [the alleged misconduct].” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. The plausibility standard
“asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not
require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Where a court is
4
unable to infer more than the mere possibility of the alleged misconduct based on the pleaded
facts, the action is subject to dismissal. Id. at 678–79.3
IV.
DISCUSSION
A. Unreasonable Search and Seizure Claims
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by
performing an “unreasonable search and seizure.” Am. Compl. ¶ 47. Plaintiff does not clearly
state the legal theories underlying these claims. However, based on the pleading’s factual
allegations, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶¶ 53–62, and the briefing by the parties, e.g., Ulster Mem. at 11;
Ulster Resp. at 11, it appears that Plaintiff’s unreasonable search and seizure cause of action
involves false arrest claims and claims related to the officers’ warrantless search of her house and
seizure of her gun. The Court analyzes each claim below.
1. False Arrest Claims4
3
Plattekill Defendants have moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plattekill Mem. at 1. “The standard for granting a Rule
12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is identical to that of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for
failure to state a claim.” Patel v. Contemporary Classics of Beverly Hills, 259 F.3d 123, 126 (2d
Cir. 2001) (collecting cases).
4
Plaintiff alleges both false arrest and false imprisonment claims. Am. Compl.
¶¶ 52–69, 113–30. The two claims are based on identical factual allegations. Id. Under New York
law, the elements of false imprisonment and false arrest claims are identical. Biswas v. City of
New York, 973 F. Supp. 2d 504, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). Plaintiff maintains, confusingly, that her
false imprisonment and false arrest claims are distinct because the “false arrest” claim concerns
her initial detention in the patrol car, while her false imprisonment claim concerns her
“confine[ment] at the hospital.” Ulster Resp. at 12. However, this distinction is artificial. Both
Plaintiff’s initial detention and her overnight hospitalization are analyzed identically whether
alleged as a false arrest or false imprisonment claim. Because the claims are identical, the Court
treats these two causes of action as one false arrest claim. See, e.g., Williams v. City of New
York, No. 10-CV-2676, 2012 WL 511533, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2012) (stating that, because
the plaintiff’s false imprisonment and false arrest claims were identical, the court would “treat
them as a single claim for false arrest”); Jackson v. City of New York, 29 F. Supp. 3d 161, 169
5
Plaintiff alleges that Rafferty, Benjamin, and McGuire arrested her on November 19,
2016 without probable cause, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 48–69. In order to state a claim pursuant to § 1983, a plaintiff must allege “(1) ‘that
some person has deprived him of a federal right,’ and (2) ‘that the person who has deprived him
of that right acted under color of state . . . law.’” Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75, 85 (2d Cir. 2005)
(quoting Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980)). State action is an essential element of a
§ 1983 claim. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982); see also Hudgens v.
NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976) (“It is, of course, a commonplace that the constitutional
guarantee of free speech is a guarantee only against abridgment by government, federal or
state.”). Moreover, “[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff
must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual
actions, has violated” a federal right. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.
In this Circuit, false arrest claims are evaluated using “the law of the state in which the
arrest occurred.” Russo v. City of Bridgeport, 479 F.3d 196, 203 (2d Cir. 2007). “Under New
York law, a plaintiff claiming false arrest ‘must show that (1) the defendant intended to confine
the plaintiff, (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not consent
to the confinement, and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged.’” Warr v. Liberatore,
270 F. Supp. 3d 637, 645 (W.D.N.Y. 2017) (quoting Savino v. City of New York, 331 F.3d 63,
75 (2d Cir. 2003)).
n.8 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2014) (finding that the plaintiff’s false arrest and false imprisonment
claims were “duplicative,” and “constru[ing] them to set forth one claim for false arrest”).
6
Plattekill Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a false arrest claim because her
detention was privileged under New York law and because Rafferty and Benjamin’s participation
in Plaintiff’s detention did not rise to the level of state action. Plattekill Mem. at 6–10. Plattekill
Defendants also argue that the Plattekill officers are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.
Id. at 16–19.
a. Privilege
Plattekill Defendants argue, Plattekill Mem. at 9, that Plaintiff’s arrest was privileged
pursuant to New York Mental Hygiene Law § 9.41, which states that a “police officer . . . may
take into custody any person who appears to be mentally ill and is conducting himself or herself
in a manner which is likely to result in serious harm to the person or others.” Mental Hygiene
Law § 9.01 defines the phrase “likely to result in serious harm” as
(a) a substantial risk of physical harm to the person as manifested by
threats of or attempts at suicide or serious bodily harm or other
conduct demonstrating that the person is dangerous to himself or
herself, or (b) a substantial risk of physical harm to other persons as
manifested by homicidal or other violent behavior by which others
are placed in reasonable fear of serious physical harm.
“Probable cause to believe that the criteria for a mental health arrest pursuant to [this provision]
have been met is a defense to a false arrest claim arising from such an arrest.” Heller v. Bedford
Cent. Sch. Dist., 144 F. Supp. 3d 596, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing Kerman v. City of New York,
261 F.3d 229, 235 n.8 (2d Cir. 2001)). “[A] showing of probable cause in the mental health
seizure context requires only a ‘probability or substantial’ chance of dangerous behavior, not an
actual showing of such behavior.” Kusak v. Klein, No. 11-CV-6557, 2015 WL 510053, at *5
7
(W.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Hoffman v. County of Delaware, 41 F.
Supp. 2d 195, 209 (N.D.N.Y. 1999)).
Treating the factual allegations in the Amended Complaint as true, the officers on
Plaintiff’s property did not have probable cause to believe that she was dangerous to herself or
others. Plaintiff maintains that did not behave threateningly, was not under the influence of drugs
or alcohol, and “knew exactly where she was.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 40–42. She states that McGuire,
Benjamin, and Rafferty sent her to the hospital after she made numerous reports to the Plattekill
Police Department and to the Ulster County Sheriff’s Department. Id. ¶¶ 25–29. Even if the
officers considered these reports to be irritating or implausible, it does not appear that Plaintiff
ever threatened to harm anybody or to commit suicide when making these reports or when
speaking to the officers outside of her house. See Greenaway v. County of Nassau, 97 F. Supp.
3d 225, 233–34 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (holding that the defendants did not establish that the
plaintiff’s behavior created a likelihood of serious harm to himself or others where the plaintiff
“engaged in ‘bizarre and unreasonable’ behavior, including stripping naked and rubbing paint on
[himself] . . . and making gestures that some officers interpreted as ‘threatening’”).
Moreover, even if Plaintiff, as the officers allegedly posited, “admitted to having a gun
and shooting it off regularly,” Am. Compl. ¶ 45, the mere fact that she owned a weapon and had
fired it does not indicate that she was likely to use the gun to injure herself or others. She could
use the gun, for instance, at a shooting range. Cf. Hoffman, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 209–10 (finding
that psychiatric center employee had probable cause to issue order to seize the plaintiff where the
plaintiff “threatened violence towards certain city officials, . . . was known to have a large
collection of firearms and . . . was believed to have sandbagged his apartment as protection from
8
an attack”).
For these reasons, Plaintiff plausibly alleges that her overnight detention for psychiatric
evaluation was not privileged.
b. State Action/Personal Involvement
Plattekill Defendants also argue that the false arrest claim against Benjamin and Rafferty
must fail for lack of state action. Plattekill Mem. at 5–8. However, the Court concludes, with
little difficulty, that their conduct on Plaintiff’s property satisfied § 1983’s state action
requirement. An individual performs state action “when he exercises ‘some right or privilege
created by the State . . . or by a person for whom the State is responsible,’ and is ‘a person who
may fairly be said to be a state actor.’” Marino v. Jonke, No. 11-CV-430, 2012 WL 1871623,
at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2012) (quoting Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937). “Generally, a public employee
acts under color of state law when he acts in his official capacity or exercises his responsibilities
pursuant to state law.” Id; see also Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 548 (2d Cir. 1994) (observing
that a police officer performs state action when he “invokes the real or apparent power of the
police department”). Benjamin and Rafferty are public employees, and they drove to Plaintiff’s
property in response to a 911 call, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 48–49, which suggests that they encountered
Plaintiff in their official capacity. The actions attributable to Benjamin and Rafferty during this
encounter, therefore, constitute state action. Plattekill Defendants cite Barrett v. Harwood, 189
F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 1999), in support of their argument. Mem. at 7. However, Barrett is inapposite
because it found only that a police officer’s “mere presence” to keep the peace at the scene of a
repossession did not “convert[] a private repossession into state action.” 189 F.3d at 301–02. It
9
did not state that a police officer who plays a secondary role in an arrest has not performed state
action.
It may be that Plattekill Defendants confused state action with personal involvement,
which a plaintiff must also allege to state a § 1983 claim. E.g., Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865,
873 (2d Cir. 1995). To the extent that Plattekill Defendants intended to argue that Plaintiff’s false
arrest claims against Benjamin and Rafferty must fail for lack of personal involvement, e.g.,
Plattekill Mem. at 8 (“[T]he Amended Complaint does not state that any [Plattekill] Defendant
ever threatened to arrest Plaintiff, has never [sic] arrested Plaintiff, nor in any way aided in
Plaintiff being handcuffed.”), this argument, too, is meritless.
In Colon v. Coughlin, the Second Circuit held that
[t]he personal involvement of a supervisory defendant may be shown
by evidence that: (1) the defendant participated directly in the alleged
constitutional violation, (2) the defendant, after being informed of the
violation through a report or appeal, failed to remedy the wrong, (3)
the defendant created a policy or custom under which
unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed the continuance of
such a policy or custom, (4) the defendant was grossly negligent in
supervising subordinates who committed the wrongful acts, or (5) the
defendant exhibited deliberate indifference . . . by failing to act on
information indicating that unconstitutional acts were occurring.
58 F.3d at 873. Plaintiff alleges that “the officers put [her] in an ambulance and transported [her]
to” Health Alliance Hospital after finding her gun inside her house. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 33, 35–36,
69. Plaintiff’s reference to “the officers” suggests that she alleges that each officer present on her
property—including Benjamin and Rafferty—participated in placing her in the ambulance and
sending her to the hospital. See Messina v. Mazzeo, 854 F. Supp. 116, 125 (E.D.N.Y. 1994)
(interpreting allegation regarding the use of excessive force by “defendant [p]olice [o]fficers” as
10
an allegation “that all of these individual police officers participated in using excessive force
when they arrested” the plaintiff); see also Silicon Knights, Inc. v. Crystal Dynamics, 983 F.
Supp. 1303, 1309 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (“Courts have denied motions to dismiss a complaint against
individual defendants where the complaint alleged that all defendants engaged in the alleged
tortious acts, although the complaint did not set forth the specific acts committed by each
defendant.”). Plaintiff, therefore, sufficiently alleges that Benjamin and Rafferty “participated
directly in” her false arrest. Colon, 58 F.3d at 873.
c. Qualified Immunity
The doctrine of qualified immunity entitles public officials to freedom from liability for
civil damages, as a result of the consequences of the performance of their discretionary duties,
when “their conduct does not violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable person
would have been aware.” Zalaski v. City of Hernandez, 723 F.3d 382, 388 (2d Cir. 2013). “The
determination of qualified immunity depends both on the specific facts of an official’s
actions—e.g., ‘what situation confronted [him], what acts he performed, and his motivation in
performing those acts’—and on the clarity of the legal rules governing that particular conduct.”
Village of Freeport v. Barrella, 814 F.3d 594, 609 (2d Cir. 2016) (alteration in original) (quoting
Lore v. City of Syracuse, 670 F.3d 127, 162 (2d Cir. 2012)). In deciding whether an officer’s
actions were objectively reasonable in light of existing law, “the inquiry is not how courts or
lawyers might have understood the state of the law at the time of the challenged conduct. Rather,
‘[t]he relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether
it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he
confronted.” Zalaski, 723 F.3d at 389 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001)).
11
As stated above, Plaintiff successfully alleges a false arrest claim based on her detention
and her subsequent hospitalization. Benjamin and Rafferty are entitled to qualified immunity if it
would not necessarily be clear to a reasonable officer that” they did not have probable cause to
detain Plaintiff for psychiatric evaluation. The Court finds, based on the facts as alleged in the
Amended Complaint, that no reasonable officer could believe that they had probable cause, and
that Plaintiff alleges that Benjamin and Rafferty violated clearly established law by detaining her.
In Kerman v. City of New York, the Second Circuit evaluated the constitutionality of
plaintiff Kerman’s involuntary hospitalization, and whether “reasonable officers could . . .
disagree as to whether Kerman presented a threat of harm to himself or others.” 261 F.3d at 241.
Police officers responded to a 911 call stating that Kerman was “off his medication and acting
crazy and possibly had a gun.” Id. at 233. Kerman stated “that he was calm during most of his
encounter” with the officers. Id. at 240–41. The officers handcuffed Kerman and searched his
apartment for a gun for an hour before placing him on an ambulance and sending him to a
hospital. Id. at 233–34. Kerman raised an unlawful seizure claim against one of the officers. Id.
at 240. Id. Because, based on Kerman’s version of events, his “conduct” did not “demonstrate[] a
dangerous mental state,” and because the officers “failed to reasonably investigate his mental
state” in the hour that they spent searching his apartment, the court held that a genuine issue of
material fact existed regarding whether the defendant officer was entitled to qualified immunity
on Kerman’s unlawful seizure claim. Id. at 241.
The result in Kerman suggests that Benjamin and Rafferty are not entitled to qualified
immunity at this stage. Plaintiff, like Kerman, claims that she did not exhibit threatening
behavior toward the officers during their encounter. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 40–42. Moreover, while the
12
officers in Kerman at least arrived at Kerman’s apartment in response to a 911 call attesting to
his mental instability and dangerousness, the Amended Complaint suggests that Benjamin and
Rafferty had no basis to believe that Plaintiff presented a threat to herself or others. In fact,
Plattekill Defendants never identify what justified Plaintiff’s detention, let alone facts suggesting
that they reasonably believed that she presented a threat to herself or others. The Court cannot
say, therefore, that a reasonable officer could have found probable cause to detain Plaintiff for
psychiatric evaluation. Accordingly, the Court denies Plattekill Defendants’ Motion to dismiss
Plaintiff’s false arrest claims against Benjamin and Rafferty on the basis of qualified immunity.
2. Claims Relating to the Search of Plaintiff’s House
Plaintiff alleges that, after McGuire handcuffed her and placed her in the patrol car,
McGuire, Benjamin, and Rafferty unlawfully entered her house without a warrant and seized her
gun. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 37–38, 64. Plattekill Defendants argue that Benjamin and Rafferty did not
engage in “state action” with respect to the search of Plaintiff’s home and the seizure of her gun,
and that they are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to this claim. Plattekill Mem. at 7–8,
16–19.
a. State Action/Personal Involvement
As observed in the false arrest discussion, Plattekill Defendants’ state action argument
apparently confuses the questions of whether a state official has engaged in “state action” and
whether a state actor is personally involved in a constitutional violation. In any event, Plattekill
Defendants argue that Benjamin and Rafferty’s participation in the search of Plaintiff’s house
and the seizure of her gun was too minimal to sustain a finding of liability under § 1983.
Plattekill Mem. at 6–7. Their argument, however, consists solely of the observation that
13
“Plaintiff claims that an unidentified law enforcement officer retrieved her firearm.” Id. at 6.
However, the Amended Complaint never makes such an amorphous allegation. Rather, Plaintiff
states that Rafferty declared that the officers needed to take Plaintiff’s gun, Am. Compl. ¶ 36,
which suggests that he instigated the search and seizure. Also, Plaintiff states that she asked for a
glass of water, but “[t]he officers” refused to give her water until she told them where she kept
her gun. Id. ¶ 37. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that “[t]he officers entered [her] house, searched the
house, and took [her] firearm.” Id. ¶ 38.
As stated in the false arrest discussion, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that Benjamin and
Rafferty engaged in state action by arriving on her property in response to her 911 call.
Moreover, the officers “invoke[d] . . . the authority of the” Plattekill Police Department when
they entered Plaintiff’s property to search for her gun. Pitchell, 13 F.3d at 548. Plaintiff also
sufficiently alleges Benjamin and Rafferty’s personal involvement. Rafferty instigated the seizure
of Plaintiff’s gun and, as with Plaintiff’s false arrest claim, she alleges that each officer present
on her property told her to reveal the location of her gun, and that each officer entered her home
and searched for her gun. Therefore, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that Benjamin and Rafferty
directly participated in the search of her home and the seizure of her gun.
b. Qualified Immunity
Plattekill Defendants argue that Benjamin and Rafferty are entitled to qualified immunity
on Plaintiff’s claims related to the allegedly unlawful search of her home and seizure of her gun.
Plattekill Mem. at 16–19. The right to be free from warrantless searches and seizures, subject to
limited exceptions, is clearly established. The Fourth Amendment protects persons from
“unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “The ‘physical entry of the home
14
is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.’” Montanez v.
Sharoh, 444 F. App’x 484, 486 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585
(1980)). “Thus, ‘[i]t is a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures
inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.’” Id. (alteration in original)
(quoting Payton, 445 U.S. at 586). Therefore, officers may not enter a residence without a
warrant unless certain limited exceptions apply. Id. at 486–87. For instance, officers may enter a
residence without a warrant if “exigent circumstances” necessitate their intervention. Kentucky v.
King, 563 U.S. 452, 461 (2011). Officers may also enter a residence with “consent to search from
an individual authorized to give it.” Cullen v. Vill. of Pelham Manor, No. 03-CV-2168, 2009 WL
1507686, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 2009); see also Koch v. Town of Brattleboro, 287 F.3d 162,
167, 169 (2d Cir. 2002) (listing consent and the existence of exigent circumstances as two
exceptions to the warrant requirement).
Plattekill Defendants do not appear to dispute that the right to be free of warrantless
searches of one’s home, subject to limited exceptions, is clearly established. Instead, they argue
that reasonable officers could have believed that (1) Plaintiff consented to the search of her
house, (2) they “had probable cause to enter [the home] and seize [Plaintiff’s] firearm since she
had already been” detained, and (3) they “had probable cause to believe that the mental health of
Plaintiff could have led to her harming herself or others with her firearm once she was released
from her [sic] for mental health evaluation.” Plattekill Mem. at 18. The Court addresses each of
these arguments below.
15
i. Consent
Plattekill Defendants argue that a reasonable officer could believe that Plaintiff consented
to the entry into and search of her house because she “identified the location of her firearm for
retrieval.” Plattekill Reply at 6. It is true that “consent may be inferred from an individual’s
words, gestures, or conduct,” United States v. Grant, 375 F. App’x 79, 80 (2d Cir. 2010)
(summary order) (quoting United States v. Buettner-Janusch, 646 F.2d 759, 764 (2d Cir. 1981)).
Moreover, some courts have found implied consent to a search when a person informs police
officers of the location of their firearm. E.g., United States v. Wilson, 914 F. Supp. 2d 550, 566
(S.D.N.Y. 2012). However, to determine whether someone consented to a search, “the Court
must ask: ‘what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between
the officer and the suspect?’” United States v. Long Huang You, 198 F. Supp. 2d 393, 396
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991)). While Plaintiff allegedly
revealed the location of her gun to the officers in exchange for water, she then “told the officers
that they did not have permission to get into her house.” Am. Compl. ¶ 37. The Court rejects the
proposition that, notwithstanding Plaintiff’s explicit refusal of consent, a reasonable officer could
have interpreted Plaintiff’s disclosure of the location of her gun in exchange for a drink of water
as her implied consent to the entry and search of her home and the seizure of her gun.
Plattekill Defendants also state, “Plaintiff admits that after she was” placed into the patrol
car, “she requested to be let into her house and was granted that request,” and the officers
searched for her gun while she was inside her house. Plattekill Mem. at 6 (citing Am. Compl.
¶¶ 37–38). It is unclear whether this is intended to suggest that a reasonable officer could believe
that Plaintiff impliedly consented to a search of her house. In any case, this interpretation of the
16
Amended Complaint is either the product of a willful misrepresentation of the pleading’s content,
or Plattekill Defendants’ counsel’s inattention to detail. The cited paragraphs of the Amended
Complaint state that Plaintiff told the officers where her gun was, that they could not enter her
house, and that, despite Plaintiff’s objections, the officers entered and searched her home. Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 37–38; see also id. ¶¶ 63–64 (reaffirming that, while the officers searched Plaintiff’s
house, she was still handcuffed in the back of the patrol car). Plattekill Defendants’ insistence to
the contrary is nowhere to be found in the pleading.
In conclusion, the Court finds that no reasonable officer could believe that Plaintiff
consented to the search of her home or seizure of her gun.
ii. Exigent Circumstances
Plattekill Defendants argue that reasonable officers could believe that their search of
Plaintiff’s home was justified because Plaintiff could have used the gun to “harm[] herself or
others . . . once she was released from her [sic] for mental health evaluation.” Plattekill Mem.
at 18. This argument is meritless. As stated above, no reasonable officer could find, based on the
facts as alleged in the Amended Complaint, that Plaintiff posed a threat to herself or others. More
importantly, even if Plaintiff did behave threateningly, there is no basis to support the conclusion
that this threat was sufficiently urgent to justify the warrantless entry and search of her home.
“[T]he core question” when determining whether exigent circumstances permit the
warrantless entry and search of a residence “is whether the facts, as they appeared at the moment
of entry, would lead a reasonable, experienced officer . . . to believe that there was an ‘urgent
need to render aid or take action.’” Rivera ex rel. Rivera v. Leto, No. 04-CV-7072, 2008 WL
5062103, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2008) (quoting United States v. Klump, 536 F.3d 113,
17
117–18 (2d Cir. 2008)). The “‘mere possibility of danger’ does not ‘make it objectively
reasonable to believe that the circumstances were exigent.’” Id. (quoting Hurlman v. Rice, 927
F.2d 74, 81 (2d Cir. 1991)). The Second Circuit has observed that the exigent circumstances
exception may apply, for instance, when “police officers . . . are in hot pursuit of a fleeing
suspect,” or when officers must enter a residence “to prevent the imminent destruction of
evidence.” United States v. Moreno, 701 F.3d 64, 72–73 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting King, 563 U.S.
at 460–61). The exception also allows officers to enter a residence “without a warrant to render
emergency aid and assistance to a person whom they reasonably believe to be in distress and in
need of that assistance.” Tierney v. Davidson, 133 F.3d 189, 196 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Root v.
Gauper, 438 F.2d 361, 364 (8th Cir. 1971)). In light of the “numerous and consistent Second
Circuit decisions” discussing the exigent circumstances exception, the “constitutional right not to
have [one’s] home entered and searched without a warrant in the absent of exigent
circumstances,” and the law governing the applicability of this exception, are clearly established.
Rivera, 2008 WL 5062103, at *7.
Here, Plattekill Defendants do not seriously contend that an exigent threat justified their
entry into Plaintiff’s home and the search and seizure of her gun. The officers were not rendering
urgent assistance, preventing the destruction of evidence, or pursuing a fleeing felon. Moreover,
Plattekill Defendants allegedly entered and searched Plaintiff’s house while she was handcuffed
in a patrol car. Thus, even if Plaintiff was inclined to use her gun to harm herself or others—a
proposition for which the Court finds no support in the Amended Complaint—there was no
imminent threat of her using that gun when the officers entered her house. See United States v.
Atkinson, 653 F. Supp. 668, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (“The mere existence of a weapon,
18
without . . . [a] reasonable belief in[] an imminent threat posed by the weapon, does not justify a
warrantless intrusion under the exigency test.”); cf. United States v. Guadalupe, 363 F. Supp. 2d
79, 82 (D. Conn. 2004) (finding that exigent circumstances permitted officers to enter an
apartment to retrieve a gun because the officers were “engaged in a struggle with [the
d]efendant” and the defendant threw his “gun into an apartment where his companion had just
taken refuge”). The Court concludes that the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint provide no
basis for a reasonable officer to believe that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry
and search of Plaintiff’s home or the seizure of her gun.
iii. Search Incident to Arrest
Plattekill Defendants also support their qualified immunity defense by arguing that a
reasonable officer could believe that they had “probable cause to enter Plaintiff’s residence and
seize her firearm since she had already been placed into the custody of the Ulster County
Sheriff’s Department.” Plattekill Mem. at 18. This argument is unavailing. While a warrantless
search may be valid if it is performed “incident to an arrest,” Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 33
(1970), this exception is clearly inapplicable here. It has been the case for decades that “a search
incident to arrest may only include ‘the arrestee’s person and the area within his immediate
control,’” which is “the area from which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible
evidence.” Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 339 (2009) (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752 (1969)). Moreover, “[i]f a search of a house is to be upheld as incident to an arrest, that
arrest must take place inside the house, not somewhere outside—whether two blocks away,
twenty feet away, or on the sidewalk near the front steps.” Vale, 399 U.S. at 33–34.
19
Plaintiff alleges that she was handcuffed in the back of a patrol car when the officers
searched her house for her gun. Because she was far from her gun and immobilized when the
search took place, no reasonable officer would think that Plaintiff could “gain possession of” her
gun from her location. See United States v. Blue, 78 F.3d 56, 60 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[I]n
determining whether or not an area is within the arrestee’s ‘immediate control,’ we consider not
only the arrestee’s location, but also the nature of any restraints that have been imposed upon the
person”) (internal citations omitted); United States v. Cancel, 167 F. Supp. 3d 584, 591
(S.D.N.Y. 2016) (finding that an officer’s search of an arrestee’s bag was not incident to arrest
because the arrestee was “handcuffed behind his back,” “remained at least one bench seat away
from the bag,” and was “flanked” by two police officers).
Moreover, the holding in Vale—that a search of a home is not incident to an arrest if the
arrest takes place outside the home—clearly forecloses this exception’s applicability to the
officers’ search. Plattekill Defendants make no mention in their briefing of Vale or any of the
longstanding rules regarding the search incident to arrest exception. Instead, they assert that a
reasonable police officer could believe that it was lawful to enter and search Plaintiff’s home
without a warrant simply because she was detained. Plattekill Mem. at 18. This argument borders
on frivolous. The proposition that a reasonable officer could believe that he or she has unfettered
discretion to search a residence simply because the occupant of that residence has been arrested
ignores decades of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which courts have shaped around the
notion that “physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth
Amendment is directed.” Montanez, 444 F. App’x at 486. The Court finds that no reasonable
20
officer could believe that Plaintiff’s detention justified the warrantless entry and search of her
home.
Because Plaintiff alleges that Benjamin and Rafferty violated clearly established law
when they entered and searched her home and seized her gun without a warrant, they are not
entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s unreasonable search and
seizure claims against Benjamin and Rafferty survive dismissal.
B. Monell Claims5
Plaintiff alleges Monell claims against Ulster County and Plattekill, and against Van
Blarcum and Ryan in their official capacities. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 131–48; see also Ulster Resp. at 8
(citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.C., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). Both Plattekill and Ulster
Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a Monell claim because she does not adequately
plead that the alleged constitutional violations that McGuire, Benjamin, and Rafferty carried out
were sanctioned by an official policy or custom. Plattekill Mem. at 10–14; Ulster Mem. at 6–10.
To establish a Monell claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead and prove that the
deprivation of his constitutional rights was “caused by a governmental custom, policy, or usage
of the municipality.” Jones v. Town of East Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing
Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–91). First, a plaintiff may show the existence of a municipal policy or
custom by alleging
(1) a formal policy officially endorsed by the municipality; (2) actions
or decisions made by municipal officials with decision-making
5
As part of her Monell claim, Plaintiff also argues that McGuire, Benjamin, and Rafferty
violated her constitutional rights pursuant to policies that Van Blarcum and Ryan formulated.
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 132–48. However, because the PSAC adds factual detail to this argument, PSAC
¶ 150, the Court addresses this argument in its discussion of Plaintiff’s Amendment Motion.
21
authority; (3) a practice so persistent and widespread that it
constitutes a custom of which policymakers must have been aware;
or (4) a failure by policymakers to properly train or supervise their
subordinates, such that the policymakers exercised “deliberate
indifference” to the rights of the plaintiff and others encountering
those subordinates.
McLennan v. City of New York, 171 F. Supp. 3d 69, 94 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). “Second, the plaintiff
must establish a causal connection—an ‘affirmative link’—between the policy and the
deprivation of his constitutional rights.” Vippolis v. Village of Haverstraw, 768 F.2d 40, 44
(2d Cir. 1985).
Plaintiff first alleges that Ulster County and Plattekill “permit and tolerat[e] a practice of
warrantless detaining, searching, seizing, and involuntarily confining individuals and warrantless
entry and searching residences of individuals believed to have made a false report.” Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 137, 145. However, “mere allegations of a municipal custom or practice of tolerating
official misconduct are insufficient to demonstrate the existence of such a custom unless
supported by factual details.” Triano v. Town of Harrison, 895 F. Supp. 2d 526, 535 (S.D.N.Y.
2012); see also Duncan v. City of New York, No. 11-CV-3826, 2012 WL 1672929, at *2–3
(E.D.N.Y. May 14, 2012) (finding that “boilerplate statements” that “New York City has a
‘custom and policy of making illegal and false arrests with excessive force’” were insufficient to
state a municipal liability claim). Plaintiff’s more detailed description of the constitutional
violations that Benjamin, Rafferty, and McGuire allegedly committed does not allege the
existence of a municipal policy or custom, either, because “it is well established that a single
incident does not give rise to an unlawful practice by subordinate officials ‘so permanent and
22
well-settled as to constitute custom or usage.’” Plair v. City of New York, 789 F. Supp. 2d 459,
470 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988)).
Second, Plaintiff argues that Mcguire, Benjamin, and Rafferty violated her constitutional
rights pursuant to policies that Van Blarcum and Ryan formulated. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 134–35. As
noted above, a plaintiff may establish the existence of a municipal policy or custom by alleging
“actions or decisions made by municipal officials with decision-making authority.” McLennan,
171 F. Supp. 3d at 94. “[W]hether an official ha[s] final policymaking authority is a question of
state law.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986)). Moreover, “where a
plaintiff relies . . . on the theory that the conduct of a given official represents official policy, it is
incumbent on the plaintiff to establish that element as a matter of law.” Jeffes v. Barnes, 208
F.3d 49, 57–58 (2d Cir. 2000).
Plaintiff does no more than assert that Ryan and Van Blarcum had “final-decision
making,” and that Van Blarcum “was responsible for establishing final law enforcement
policies.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 134–35, 146. These minimal, conclusory statements fall far short of
satisfying Plaintiff’s burden to allege facts creating a plausible inference that either of these
defendants were final policymakers. Plaintiff does not direct the Court to New York State law,
municipal charters, or any other source that could support her claim. Therefore, she fails to allege
that Van Blarcum or Ryan are final policymakers, and her Monell claims against Ulster County
and Plattekill must be dismissed. See W.A. v. Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist.,
No. 14-CV-8093, 2016 WL 1274587, at *12–13 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2016) (dismissing a Monell
claim where the plaintiffs “allege[d] that ‘Coughlin, as an administrator for the District,
possesses policy making authority,’” but “cite[d] no state or county law that actually vests
23
Coughlin with final policymaking authority over the maintenance and protection of student
records”); Canner v. City of Long Beach, No. 12-CV-2611, 2015 WL 4926014, at *6 (E.D.N.Y.
Aug. 18, 2015) (noting a prior order where the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ Monell claim where
the “plaintiffs did not reference any state law supporting their claim that [an official] was a final
policymaker”).
Finally, Plaintiff brings this action against Van Blarcum and Ryan in their individual and
official capacities. Am. Compl. As will be explained below, Plaintiff may proceed with certain
individual capacity claims against these defendants. “However, absent a claim seeking injunctive
relief to remedy an ongoing violation of federal law, ‘a § 1983 suit against a municipal officer in
his official capacity is treated as an action against the municipality itself.’” Hulett v. City of
Syracuse, 253 F. Supp. 3d 462, 498 (N.D.N.Y. 2017) (quoting Lin v. County of Monroe, 66 F.
Supp. 3d 341, 353 (W.D.N.Y. 2014)). “Indeed, ‘district courts have [regularly] dismissed official
capacity claims against individuals as redundant or unnecessary where Monell claims are
asserted against an entity.” Id. at 498–99. This reasoning is applicable here. Plaintiff’s official
capacity claims against Van Blarcum and Ryan do not seek relief from an ongoing deprivation of
her rights, and are thus duplicative of her Monell claim. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the
official capacity claims against Van Blarcum and Ryan.
24
C. Amendment Motion6
Plaintiff filed an Amendment Motion and submitted the PSAC, which corrects various
misspellings of McGuire and Rafferty, e.g., PSAC ¶ 48, adds more facts detailing the
involvement of Health Alliance Hospital and Access: Support for Living, Inc., id. ¶¶ 174–76,
189, 196–97, and adds allegations detailing Van Blarcum and Ryan’s involvement in her alleged
false arrest and in the search of her home, id. ¶¶ 34–38, 55–59, 150–54, 165–69.
Where, as here, a party has amended its pleading once, Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure provides that a party may amend its pleading again “with the opposing party’s
written consent or the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). “[L]eave to amend should be freely
given . . . ‘[i]n the absence of any apparent or declared reason—such as undue delay, bad faith or
dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments
previously allowed, . . . [or] futility of amendment.’” Rusyniak v. Gensini, 629 F. Supp. 2d 203,
212 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). “An amendment to a
pleading is futile if the proposed claim could not withstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to”
Rule 12(b)(6). Lucente v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 310 F.3d 243, 258 (2d Cir. 2002). “The test
then with respect to futility is whether or not the proposed amendment states a claim upon which
relief can be granted.” Henriquez v. Kelco Landscaping, Inc., 299 F.R.D. 376, 378 (E.D.N.Y.
2014) (citing Lucente, 310 F.3d at 258).
6
Plaintiff’s Amendment Motion is appended to the end of the County Response, and she
attached the PSAC as an exhibit in the same submission. At the end of the Town Response,
Plaintiff includes a similar paragraph seeking leave to amend, Dkt. No. 62-2 at 16–17 (“Second
Amendment Motion”), and the PSAC was attached as an exhibit in the same submission, Dkt.
No. 62-3. Plaintiff refers to this submission as her “second” motion to amend. Dkt. No. 62.
Because it is identical to her first Amendment Motion, the Court denies the Second Amendment
Motion as moot.
25
Applying this standard to Plaintiff’s Amendment Motion, the Court finds that amendment
of the pleading is appropriate to the extent that the PSAC corrects typographical errors, adds
minor factual details regarding the involvement of Health Alliance Hospital and Access: Support
for Living, and adds other nonmaterial clarifying details. PSAC ¶¶ 12–13, 16, 33, 40–41, 48, 50,
52, 97, 109–11, 156, 174–76, 189, 196–97. To determine whether Plaintiff may amend her
pleading to add factual details in support of her Monell and supervisory liability claims, the
Court must determine whether the PSAC adequately alleges these claims.
1. Monell Claims
The PSAC adds numerous factual allegations in the sections outlining Plaintiff’s Monell
claims. Id. ¶¶ 150–54, 165–69. While many of these new allegations are irrelevant or redundant,
the PSAC does clarify that Ryan and Van Blarcum ordered Mcguire, Benjamin and Rafferty “to
take Plaintiff’s pistol, and to take Plaintiff to a hospital for mental evaluation.” Id. ¶¶ 150, 165.
The Court assumes that Plaintiff intends these allegations to support her claim that Van Blarcum
and Ryan’s orders constituted a policy for purposes of a Monell claim. However, the PSAC, like
the Amended Complaint, does not include any non-conclusory allegations supporting the claim
that either Van Blarcum or Ryan are final policymakers. Accordingly, the Court finds that
amendment of the pleadings to add these facts in support of Plaintiff’s Monell claim is denied as
futile.
2. Supervisory Liability Claims
In their Motion, Ulster Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to state a supervisory
liability claim against Van Blarcum because she included insufficient factual detail regarding his
personal involvement in her false arrest or in the search of her home and the seizure of her gun.
26
Ulster Mem. at 5–6. The PSAC, in a section outlining Plaintiff’s unreasonable search and seizure
claims, alleges that Ryan and Van Blarcum ordered McGuire, Benjamin, and Rafferty “to take
Plaintiff’s pistol, and to take Plaintiff to a hospital for mental evaluation.” PSAC ¶ 55. The Court
finds that amendment of the pleadings to add this fact would enable Plaintiff to state a
supervisory liability claim against Van Blarcum and Ryan. “A supervisory official may be
personally involved in a section 1983 violation where such official . . . ordered that the action be
taken.” Dallio v. Herbert, 678 F. Supp. 2d 35, 43 (N.D.N.Y. July 28, 2009) (quoting Thompson
v. New York, No. 99-CV-875, 2001 WL 636432, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2001)). Therefore, the
Court finds that Plaintiff may amend her pleading to include PSAC ¶¶ 55–59, the paragraphs that
support her supervisory liability claims against Van Blarcum and Ryan.
3. Defendants’ Objections
Plattekill Defendants do not specifically object to Plaintiff amending her pleading to add
minor factual details, to correct tyographical errors, or to add a well-pleaded supervisory liability
claim. Instead, they broadly argue that amendment would be futile because the PSAC “still
do[es] not sufficiently allege ‘state action’ by [Plattekill] Defendants that would subject them to
liability under § 1983.” Plattekill Reply at 7. As stated above, the Court concludes that Plattekill
Defendants’ “state action” objections to the Amended Complaint are meritless. The Court rejects
Plattekill Defendants’ futility argument for the same reason.
Ulster Defendants argue that Plaintiff should be denied leave to amend because she lacks
a good faith basis to allege Van Blarcum’s “‘hands on’ involvement in” the deprivation of her
constitutional rights. Ulster Reply at 4–5. They argue that “Plaintiff has unashamedly made
allegations designed to avoid dismissal of the claims against Van Blarcum and Ulster County for
27
which there is no support from any plausible factual allegations,” and criticize Plaintiff for not
offering “affidavit[s] or documents[] to support the new allegations.” Id. at 4.
As stated above, the Court may, as Ulster Defendants argue, deny a party leave to amend
when that party seeks leave to amend in bad faith. Rusyniak, 629 F. Supp. 2d at 212. It may be
that Plaintiff’s counsel only thought to add allegations regarding Van Blarcum and Ryan’s
personal involvement because Ulster Defendants observed, in their Motion, that Plaintiff’s
supervisory liability claims were defective without such allegations. Ulster Mem. at 5–6.
Moreover, the fact that it has taken Plaintiff’s counsel three attempts to allege a supervisory
liability claim that includes a single fact regarding the personal involvement of either supervisory
defendant suggests a lack of diligence on counsel’s part. However, the Court cannot accept the
argument that Plaintiff or her counsel acted in bad faith simply by seeking leave to amend to
correct deficiencies identified in Ulster Defendants’ Motion. Furthermore, the Court certainly
will not infer bad faith based on Plaintiff’s failure to provide supporting affidavits or other
evidence. At the motion to dismiss stage, Plaintiff need only provide “a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that . . . [she] is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1), not evidence
establishing the truth of her allegations.
Because Plattekill and Ulster Defendants’ objections are unavailing, the Court grants
Plaintiff’s Amendment Motion to the extent described in this Memorandum-Decision and Order.
The Court instructs Plaintiff to file a clean (non-redlined) copy of the PSAC within seven days,
which will be deemed the operative pleading in this action, and which will supersede the
Amended Complaint in its entirety. However, because amendment to include paragraphs
28
bolstering Plaintiff’s Monell claims would be futile, the Court instructs Plaintiff to omit PSAC
¶¶ 150–54 and 165–69 from the copy that she files.
Finally, in their Motions, Ulster and Plattekill Defendants each requested that the Court
dismiss Plaintiff’s supervisory liability claims as alleged in her Amended Complaint. Ulster
Mem. at 5–6; Plattekill Mem. at 14–15. Because the PSAC supersedes the Amended Complaint,
the Court rejects Ulster and Plattekill Defendants’ supervisory liability arguments as moot.
V.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is hereby:
ORDERED, that Ulster Defendants’ Motion (Dkt. No. 50) and Plattekill Defendants’
Motion (Dkt. No. 60) are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part in accordance with this
Memorandum-Decision and Order; and it is further
ORDERED, that the following claims are DISMISSED with prejudice: Plaintiff’s
Monell claims against Ulster County and Plattekill, and her claims against Paul Van Blarcum and
Joseph Ryan in their official capacities; and it is further
ORDERED, that the remainder of Plaintiff’s claims survive dismissal; and it is further
ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s Amendment Motion (Dkt. No. 56-2 at 12–13) is GRANTED
in part and DENIED in part in accordance with this Memorandum-Decision and Order; and it
is further
ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s Second Amendment Motion (Dkt. No. 62-2 at 16–17) is
DENIED as moot; and it is further
ORDERED, that Plaintiff is directed to file, within seven days of the filing of this
Memorandum-Decision and Order, a non-redlined copy of the Proposed Second Amended
29
Complaint (Dkt. No. 56-3) that is modified according to the Court’s instructions outlined in this
opinion. This pleading shall be deemed the operative pleading in this action, and shall supersede
the Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 42) in its entirety; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision and
Order on all parties pursuant to the Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:
March 22, 2018
Albany, New York
30
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