Doe v. Skidmore College
Filing
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DECISION AND ORDERED, that the parties Joint Motion (Dkt. No. 24) is GRANTED; and it is further ORDERED, that the Courts prior Memorandum-Decision and Order (Dkt. No. 15) is VACATED. Signed by Senior Judge Lawrence E. Kahn on February 03, 2020. (sas)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
JANE DOE,
Plaintiff,
-against-
1:17-CV-1269 (LEK/CFH)
SKIDMORE COLLEGE,
Defendant.
DECISION AND ORDER
I.
INTRODUCTION
Jane Doe, a former student at Skidmore College, filed this suit on November 17, 2017,
alleging that Skidmore violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and New York
Human Rights Law (“NYHRL”) by failing to reasonably accommodate her learning disability.
Dk. No. 1 (“Complaint”). On February 16, 2018, Skidmore moved for judgment on the
pleadings. Dkt. No. 9. In an August 20, 2018 Memorandum-Decision and Order, the Court
denied Skidmore’s motion as to the ADA and NYHRL claims. Dkt. No. 15 (“August MDO”).1
The case entered discovery, but before discovery was complete, the parties agreed to settle the
case contingent upon the Court vacating the August MDO.
Now before the Court is the parties’ joint motion asking the Court to vacate the August
MDO under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 60(b). Dkt. No. 24 (“Joint Motion”). For
the below reasons, the Court grants the Joint Motion.
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For additional factual background, the Court refers readers to the August MDO.
II.
DISCUSSION
A court may vacate a decision under FRCP 60(b)(6) for “any . . . reason that justifies
relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6), including as a condition of settlement, see, e.g., BMC, LLC v.
Verlan Fire Ins. Co., No. 04-CV-105, 2008 WL 2858737, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. July 22, 2008).
“Vacatur of a judgment or order as part of a settlement is an ‘extraordinary remedy,’ and should
be granted only in ‘exceptional circumstances.’” Id. at *1 (quoting U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co.
v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 26 (1994)); see also Microsoft Corp. v. Bristol Tech., Inc.,
250 F.3d 152, 154 (2d Cir. 2001). “In determining whether a proposed settlement constitutes an
exceptional circumstance that justifies the vacatur of a district court order, opinion, or judgment,
courts weigh the private interests served by settlement and vacatur against the public interests
prejudiced thereby.” In re Take-Two Interactive Sec. Litig., No. 06-CV-803, 2008 WL 3884360,
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2008); see also United States v. Reid, No. 96-CV-2004, 2000 WL
1843291, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2000) (“The decision to vacate an order is discretionary and
involves a balancing of interests.”) (citing Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 61–62 (2d Cir.
1986)). The burden is on the party or parties seeking vacatur to show that such relief “is
equitably justified by exceptional circumstances.” Major League Baseball Props. Inc. v. Pac.
Trading Cards Inc., 150 F.3d 149, 151 (2d Cir. 1998).
Here, the balance of the interests falls on the side of granting the parties’ motion for
vacatur. Beginning with the private interests of the litigants, the fact that the Joint Motion was
brought by both parties weighs in favor of granting vacatur. See Chamberlain ex rel. Aberdeen
Glob. Income Fund, Inc. v. Aberdeen Asset Mgmt. Ltd., No. 02-CV-5870, 2005 WL 1378757, at
*1 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2005) (“[V]acatur is authorized . . . particularly where the victor [and] the
losing party [are] in agreement that vacatur would be desirable.”). Second, vacatur would result
in settlement, enabling “the parties to avoid the further expenditure of valuable time and
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resources.” BMC, 2008 WL 2858737, at *2. This consideration is particularly poignant here,
where the litigation is still young and the parties have yet to complete paper discovery or conduct
depositions. Joint Mot. at 1, 4.
Nor would the public interest be unduly prejudiced by vacatur. First, “there is no
evidence to suggest that vacatur in this case would adversely impact nonparties to the litigation.”
Pitterman v. Gen. Motors LLC, No. 14-CV-967, 2018 WL 6435902, at *3 (D. Conn. Dec. 7,
2018). Next, the August MDO was decided early in the case, before “considerable judicial
resources . . . ha[d] already been expended in litigating the issues.” Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v.
Home Ins. Co., 882 F. Supp. 1355, 1358 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (denying vacatur where the case had
already proceeded to trial, and trial “lasted twelve days, involved a great many exhibits[,] and
[resulted in] a judgment approximating $7 million”). Further, “the public interest in preserving
judicial precedent is ‘less compelling when, as here, the judgment to be vacated is one of a
federal district court’ because ‘[d]istrict court decisions, unlike the decisions of States’ highest
courts and federal courts of appeals, are not precedential in the technical sense[.]’” Pitterman,
2018 WL 6435902, at *2 (quoting ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 547 F.3d 109, 112
(2d Cir. 2008)) (alterations in original). Finally, Jane Doe requested unusual accommodations
from Skidmore, “evidenced by the fact that neither party could point to any relevant or
applicable case law in support of their positions.” Joint Mot. at 3 (citing Dkt. Nos 9, 12). This
reduces the August MDO’s precedential value even further, given that “it addresses an issue that
is [not] likely to be revisited with any regularity.” See Am. Home Assur. Co. v. Kuehne & Nagel
(AG & CO.) KG, No. 06-CV-6389, 2010 WL 1946718, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2010) (“[T]he
public interest in preserving the Opinion is relatively small, given the narrow issues resolved in
the Opinion.”).
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Moreover, allowing vacatur here, with settlement contingent upon it, is consistent with
the “[s]everal district courts within this circuit [that] have . . . found exceptional circumstances to
exist where vacatur would permit a settlement to proceed.” Zomber v. Stolz, No. 09-CV-4637,
2012 WL 1427775, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2012); see also BMC, 2008 WL 2858737, at *2
(finding that the “private interest of the parties in settling this litigation outweighs any public
interest in preserving the finality of judgments and the development of decisional law”);
Chamberlain, 2005 WL 1378757, at *1 (granting Rule 60(b) motion in order to permit the parties
to proceed to settlement); Vladimir v. U.S. Banknote Corp., 976 F. Supp. 266, 267 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (concluding that “vacatur of the jury verdict as a condition of the settlement is appropriate
in this case”). By contrast, in many of the cases where a court declined to grant vacatur, the
moving party filed the FRCP 60(b) motion after the matter settled, rather than as a condition
precedent to settlement. See, e.g., Leser v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n, No. 09-CV-2362, 2014 WL
2154993, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. May 22, 2014) (“Leser has already settled the matter, and
therefore . . . surrender[ed] his claim to the equitable remedy of vacatur.”) (internal quotation
marks omitted). In view of this case law and the public and private interest factors discussed
above, the Court finds that the parties have met their burden of demonstrating exceptional
circumstances.
III.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is hereby:
ORDERED, that the parties’ Joint Motion (Dkt. No. 24) is GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Court’s prior Memorandum-Decision and Order (Dkt. No. 15) is
VACATED; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Clerk serve a copy of this Decision and Order on all parties in
accordance with the Local Rules.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:
February 03, 2020
Albany, New York
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