Chu et al v. Rosa

Filing 42

DECISION and ORDER: ORDERED that 1. Defendant's 32 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction is DENIED; and 2. Defendants are directed to file and serve and ANSWER to plaintiffs' amended complaint on or before December 6, 2024. IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed by Judge David N. Hurd on 11/22/2024. (ham)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------N.C. ex rel. YIATIN CHU; CHINESE
AMERICAN CITIZENS ALLIANCE OF
GREATER NEW YORK; INCLUSIVE
EDUCATION ADVOCACY GROUP; and
HIGHER WITH OUR PARENT
ENGAGEMENT,
Plaintiffs,
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1:24-CV-75

BETTY A. ROSA, in her official capacity
as Commissioner of Education for the
State of New York,
Defendant.
-------------------------------APPEARANCES:

OF COUNSEL:

PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
555 Capital Mall, Suite 1290
Sacramento, CA 95814

DAVID J. HOFFA, ESQ.
ERIN E. WILCOX, ESQ.

LEGAL INSURRECTION
FOUNDATION: EQUAL
PROTECTION PROJECT
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
18 Maple Ave. 280
Barrington, RI 02806

JAMES R. NAULT, ESQ.
WILLIAM A. JACOBSON, ESQ.

LETITIA JAMES
Attorneys for Defendant
The Capitol
Albany, NY 12224

LELA M. GRAY, ESQ.

DAVID N. HURD
United States District Judge
DECISION and ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 17, 2021, plaintiffs Yiatin Chu (“Chu”), Chinese American
Citizens Alliance of Greater New York (“CACAGNY”), Inclusive Education
Advocacy Group (“IEAG”), and Higher With Our Parent Engagement Group
(“HOPE”) filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the Commissioner of
Education for the State of New York, Betty A. Rosa (“defendant”). Dkt. No. 1.
Thereafter, plaintiffs amended their complaint, substituting Chu’s minor
child N.C., represented by Chu, as the individually named plaintiff. Dkt. No.
28. Together, N.C. ex rel Chu, CACAGNY, IEAG, and HOPE (collectively
“plaintiffs”) assert that the State of New York’s Science and Technology
Entry Program (“STEP”) violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment because it impermissibly imposes race-based
eligibility requirements. Id.
Defendant has moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”)
12(b)(1) to dismiss the amended complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Dkt. No. 32. The motion has been fully briefed and will be
considered on the basis of the submissions and without oral argument. Dkt.
Nos. 40–41.
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II. BACKGROUND
STEP is an early college program that permits eligible students interested
in science, technology, and related fields to enter summer or year-long
programs that give students a “head start” to pursue their career goals. Am.
Compl. ¶ 2. To that end, STEP provides participants with tutoring, college
admissions counseling, and research opportunities. Am. Compl. ¶ 2. These
benefits are funded by New York State. Id. The program defines eligible
students as either (1) members of minorities that have been historically
underrepresented in “target fields”; or (2) those who are economically
disadvantaged. Id. ¶ 13. STEP defines underrepresented minorities as
Black, Hispanic, American Indian, or Alaskan Native. Id.
N.C. is a seventh-grade student interested in a career in science and
technology with an overall grade point average (“GPA”) above 80. Am.
Compl. ¶ 7. Id. She is prepared to apply for STEP. Id. N.C. is AsianAmerican. Id. Due to her race, she is not deemed an underrepresented
minority. Id. ¶¶ 7, 13. N.C.’s family’s total annual income exceeds the limits
established by the program and is thus ineligible for the program. Id. As a
result, she has not applied for admission. Id.
CACAGNY is a non-profit organization located in New York City. Am.
Compl. ¶ 8. CACAGNY’s mission is to “empower Chinese Americans by
advocacy for Chinese-Americans based on principles of fairness and equal
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opportunity[.]” Id. CACAGNY’s member-base includes parents of another
seventh-grade student who is ineligible for STEP under the income
requirements and is not otherwise eligible as a member of a historically
underrepresented minority. Id. She has not applied for the program due to
her ineligibility. Id.
IEAG is a “grassroots parent organization” located in New York City. Am.
Compl. ¶ 9. IEAG’s mission is to “fight discriminatory eligibility and
admissions practices that restrict applicants based on race and ethnicity.” Id.
IEAG’s members include the parents of an eleventh-grade student who
attempted to apply for entry to STEP but was unable to complete her
application because she does not qualify as a racial minority and because her
family’s total annual income exceeds the income requirements. Id. Another
IEAG member’s son, an eighth-grade student was also unable to apply for
STEP for the same reasons. Id.
HOPE is another nonprofit organization located in New York City. Am.
Compl. ¶ 10. HOPE’s mission is to help Chinese-American parents in the
New York City area understand and navigate available educational
opportunities for their children. Id. Members of HOPE include parents of a
sixth-grade student who is also unable to apply for STEP because he does not
qualify as a racial minority and cannot satisfy the family income
requirements. Id.
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Plaintiffs’ lawsuit seeks both declaratory and injunctive relief invalidating
the race-based eligibility criteria as unconstitutional and enjoining the State
of New York from enforcing it.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
“A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under
Rule 12(b)(1) when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional
power to adjudicate it.” Forjone v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 414 F. Supp. 3d
292, 297–98 (N.D.N.Y. 2019) (cleaned up). Rule 12(b)(1) motions may be
either facial or fact-based. Carter v. HealthPort Techs., LLC, 822 F.3d 47, 56
(2d Cir. 2016).
Facial Rule 12(b)(1) motions are “based solely on the allegations of the
complaint . . . and exhibits attached to it[.]” Id. To resolve a facial motion,
the district court must “determine whether the pleading alleges facts that
affirmatively and plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has standing to sue.”
Id. (cleaned up). In doing so, the district court “must accept the complaint’s
allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
plaintiff.” Wagner v. Hyra, 518 F. Supp. 3d 613, 623 (N.D.N.Y. 2021) (quoting
Nicholas v. Trump, 433 F. Supp. 3d 581, 586 (S.D.N.Y. 2020)).
By contrast, a defendant who makes a fact-based Rule 12(b)(1) motion
submits extrinsic evidence. Carter, 822 F.3d at 57. If defendant’s extrinsic
evidence reveals a dispute of fact whether jurisdiction is proper, plaintiff
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must proffer evidence to controvert defendant’s evidence. Id. To resolve a
fact-based motion, the district court must then make findings of fact to
determine whether plaintiff has standing to sue. Id.
IV. DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs’ amended complaint sets forth an equal protection claim brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 27–34. According to plaintiffs,
the State of New York’s STEP program is violative of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it imposes impermissible
racially discriminatory eligibility criteria. Id. Defendant has moved
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) to dismiss plaintiffs’ amended complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. Def.’s Mem., Dkt. No. 32-2 at 3. 1
A. Standing
Standing implicates the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. David v.
Whittaker, 2024 WL 4512407, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2024) (citation
omitted). This is because “Article III limits the judiciary’s power to hear only
‘cases or controversies.’” Grinnell v. United States Env’t Prot. Agency, –F.
Supp. 3d–, 2024 WL 2945718, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. June 6, 2024) (quoting U.S.
CONST. art. III § 2); Collins v. Ne. Grocery, Inc., –F. Supp. 3d–, 2024 WL
3829636, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2024) (quoting SM Kids, LLC v. Google

1 Pagination corresponds to CM/ECF header.

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LLC, 963 F.3d 206, 211 (2d Cir. 2020)) (“The standing doctrine, which
emerges from Article III, is designed ‘to ensure that federal courts do not
exceed their authority as it has been traditionally understood.’”).
There is a case or controversy “where there are ‘adverse parties with
personal interests in the matter.’” Grinnell, 2024 WL 2945718, at *5 (quoting
Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the
Separation of Powers, 17 Suffolk U. L. REV. 881, 882 (1983)). The Supreme
Court has defined a “personal interest” as having satisfied the “irreducible
constitutional minimum of standing[.]” Collins, 2024 WL 3829636, at *3
(quoting N.Y. State Corr. Officers & Police Benevolent Ass’n, Inc. v. Hochul,
607 F. Supp. 3d 231, 238 (N.D.N.Y. 2022)). That is, the plaintiff must
demonstrate an “actual or imminent, concrete and particularized injury-infact that is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and is
likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Grinnell, 2024 WL
2945718, at *5 (quoting Dep’t of Educ. v. Brown, 600 U.S. 551, 561 (2023)).
While plaintiffs’ requested relief is not required to completely redress the
alleged injury, plaintiffs’ requested relief must still “‘serve to . . . eliminate
any effects of’ the alleged violation that produced the injury” to be sufficient.
Am. Cruise Lines v. United States, 96 F.4th 283, 286 (2d Cir. 2024) (quoting
Steele Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 105–06 (1998)).

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The plaintiff bears the burden to establish each element of standing “with
the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the
litigation.’” Do No Harm v. Pfizer Inc., 96 F.4th 106, 115 n.5 (2d Cir. 2024)
(quoting Cacchillo v. Insmed, Inc., 638 F.3d 401, 404 (2d Cir. 2011)). As
relevant here, at the pleading stage, the plaintiff must plausibly allege facts
that, if true, are sufficient to establish standing. See Lujan v. Defs. of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).
i. Injury-in-Fact
The plaintiffs in this action are a minor child, represented by her mother,
and three non-profit organizations. Defendant argues that plaintiffs have not
plausibly alleged an adequate injury-in-fact. Def.’s Mem. at 9–11. Defendant
asserts that plaintiffs have alleged only a “generalized grievance” that is not
concrete, particularized, actual, or imminent because plaintiffs’ children
never actually applied to STEP. Id. But as plaintiffs respond, the injury
alleged in their amended complaint is not the denial of the benefits of STEP,
but the denial of equal treatment under the program’s eligibility criteria.
Pls.’ Opp’n, Dkt. No. 40-1 at 7–8.
This kind of injury is referred to a “government erected barrier.” Roberts
v. Bassett, 2022 WL 785167, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2022). “[A] policy or
program is only a ‘barrier’ if it denies plaintiffs equal treatment in some
manner.” Id. The Second Circuit has articulated three criteria for
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establishing an injury-in-fact under this so-called, “barrier” theory. Id. “(1)
there exists a reasonable likelihood that the plaintiff is in the disadvantaged
group, (2) there exists a government-erected barrier, and (3) the barrier
causes members of one group to be treated differently from members of the
other group.” Id. at *4.
Upon review, plaintiffs have plausibly alleged an injury-in-fact under the
government erected barrier theory. Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that
their children are part of the disadvantaged group and that a government
erected barrier exists. As discussed above, STEP is a New York State funded
program that provides two entry ways for eligible students: as either a
historically underrepresented minority or as economically disadvantaged.
Supra. As a state-funded program with racial classifications, the Court is
satisfied that plaintiffs have plausibly alleged the existence of a government
erected barrier and that their children are members of the disadvantaged
group because Asian-Americans are excluded from the list of historically
underrepresented minorities. Instead, to become eligible, Chinese-Americans
must meet family income requirements not imposed students who qualify as
historically underrepresented minorities. Supra. Further, for the reasons
described, plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that their children have been
treated differently than members of the historically underrepresented
minorities included in the STEP eligibility criteria.
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Thus, plaintiffs have plausibly alleged the existence of an injury-in-fact.
ii. Redressability
Next, plaintiffs’ injuries must be redressable by the requested relief.
Here, plaintiffs are seeking both declaratory and injunctive relief declaring
the STEP racial classification criteria unconstitutional and enjoining the
State of New York from enforcing the race-based eligibility requirements.
Defendant argues that none of the plaintiffs have sustained an injury in
fact that is redressable by a favorable decision from this Court because
plaintiffs’ children would remain ineligible for STEP. Def.’s Mem. at 3.
According to defendant, plaintiffs’ children would remain ineligible due to the
family income requirements that plaintiffs have not challenged. Id. In
defendant’s view, plaintiffs’ requested relief would not permit their children
to enter the program.
STEP, codified as N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6454, defines eligible students for the
program as:
secondary school students who are either economically
disadvantaged
or
minorities
historically
underrepresented in the scientific, technical, health,
and health-related professions as defined by the
regents after consultation with the council
§ 6454. Thus, STEP provides two “doors” for students to become eligible.
Students who qualify as a specified historically underrepresented minority
may pass through “door one.” See id. Students who do not identify as a
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historically underrepresented minority whose family qualifies as
economically disadvantaged may enter STEP through “door two.” See id.
Plaintiffs’ children cannot enter the program through door one. And as
plaintiffs have alleged, their children cannot pass through door two because
they do not qualify as economically disadvantaged. However, this is not fatal
to plaintiffs’ Article III standing.
This is because plaintiffs’ purported injury is not the denial of the benefits
provided under STEP, but the injury caused by not being able to compete for
access on equal footing with other students based on their race. Supra.
If this Court were to grant plaintiffs the relief they have requested, their
children would cease to experience the stigmatic injury they suffer by being
treated differently based on their race. Thus, plaintiffs’ injury is redressable.
Accordingly, defendant’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint for lack of
standing will be denied.
Therefore, it is
ORDERED that
1. Defendant’s motion to dismiss is DENIED; and
2. Defendants are directed to file and serve and ANSWER to plaintiffs’
amended complaint on or before December 6, 2024.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: November 22, 2024
Utica, New York.

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