Daniels v. Regan et al
Filing
35
ORDERED, that Plaintiff's cross-motion to strike or otherwise exclude the search warrant application, Dkt. No. 29-1, is DENIED; and it is further ORDERED, that the Hudson Defendants' motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 8, is GRANTED; and it is furt her ORDERED, that Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action and Fifth Cause of Action against Defendants Keyser and Waithe are DISMISSED without prejudice; and it is further ORDERED, that Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action and Fifth Cause of Action against Defendant Police Department of the City of Hudson are DISMISSED with prejudice; and it is further ORDERED, that Defendants Keyser, Waithe, and the Police Department of the City of Hudson are DISMISSED as parties in this action; and it is furt her ORDERED, that Plaintiff's cross-motion to amend the Complaint, Dkt. No. 29-1, is DENIED; and it is further ORDERED, that the Clerk serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision and Order on all parties in accordance with the Local Rules. IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed by Senior Judge Lawrence E. Kahn on 1/29/2025. (tll)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
PERRY DANIELS,
Plaintiff,
-against-
1:24-CV-997 (LEK/TWD)
JOHN REGAN, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I.
INTRODUCTION
On July 16, 2024, Plaintiff Perry Daniels brought this action in state court against the
Police Department of the City of Albany (“Albany Police Department” or “Albany P.D.”),
Albany P.D. Detective John Regan, Albany P.D. Officer Anthony Scalise (collectively, “Albany
Defendants”), the City of Hudson Police Department (“Hudson Police Department” or “Hudson
P.D.”), Hudson P.D. Lieutenant Jeffrey Keyser, Hudson P.D. Detective Rodney Waithe
(collectively, “Hudson Defendants”), and Jerry Campana. Dkt. No. 2 at 3–36 (“Complaint”). The
case was subsequently removed to federal court. Dkt. No. 1. On August 20, 2024, the Hudson
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against them. Dkt. No. 8-3 (“Motion”).
Plaintiff filed a response in opposition, a cross-motion to strike or otherwise exclude the search
warrant application exhibit included by the Hudson Defendants in their Motion, and a crossmotion to amend the Complaint. Dkt. No. 29-1 (“Response” or “Cross-Motions”). Plaintiff also
filed a proposed amended complaint. Dkt. No. 29 at 32–64 (“Proposed Amended Complaint” or
“PAC”). The Hudson Defendants filed a reply in support of their Motion and in opposition to
Plaintiff’s Cross-Motions. Dkt. No. 30.
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For the reasons that follow, the Hudson Defendants’ Motion is granted. Plaintiff’s CrossMotions are denied.
II.
BACKGROUND
The Court limits its narration of the background to the facts relevant to the instant Motion
and Cross-Motions.
Prior to his arrest on February 7, 2022, Plaintiff lived in Albany, New York, and he
worked in Hudson, New York. Compl. ¶ 15. Every morning, Plaintiff would wait for the bus to
pick him up for work on the corner of Central Avenue and Madison Avenue in Albany. Id. ¶ 16.
At the end of each day, the bus would transport Plaintiff from Hudson back to Albany. Id. ¶ 17.
“While waiting for the bus[,] Albert Dandridge would also be waiting at the bus stop.” Id. ¶ 18.
“Dandridge was known by [Plaintiff] as ‘Sunny.’” Id. Plaintiff “recognized Sunny from riding on
the bus from Albany to Hudson and then from Hudson back to Albany on work days.” Id. ¶ 21.
“On February 7, 2022, Sunny was arrested by the Hudson Police at the bus stop in
Hudson while he was waiting to be transported from Hudson to Albany.” Id. ¶ 19. Plaintiff was
also at the bus stop when Sunny was arrested. Id. ¶ 20. After Sunny’s arrest, Plaintiff “noticed
that Sunny had left a backpack behind at the bus stop.” Id. ¶ 22. Plaintiff “took the backpack
with him . . . intending to give it back to Sunny the next time he saw him.” Id. Plaintiff “did not
know the contents of the backpack when he picked it up.” Id. ¶ 23. It “was locked, so [Plaintiff]
was unable to open the backpack.” Id. ¶ 24. “At the time of [Plaintiff’s] possession[,] the
backpack had a gun in it.” Id. ¶ 48.
On the same day, “[Defendant] Jeff[rey] Keyser of the Hudson Police Department gave a
tip to Albany Police Detective John Regan about a missing backpack that had a gun in it and that
might be found at the bus stop on Central Avenue and Manning Boulevard in Albany.” Id. ¶ 27.
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“The sole information [the Hudson] [D]efendants relied upon to give [the] tip” were “statements
by [Defendant] Campana,” a private individual who reported his truck as stolen earlier that
morning. Id. ¶¶ 96, 51. Campana owned the backpack and the gun inside it, which were in his
vehicle at the time that it was stolen. Id. ¶¶ 50, 99.
Campana’s statements to members of the Hudson Police Department “contradicted each
other” and were “false.” Id. ¶¶ 96, 94. Campana “refused to sign and refused to swear [the
statements as] true.” Id. ¶ 95. “Keyser knew or should have known that [] Campana was a liar
and that his statements to the Hudson Police were false.” Id. ¶ 94.
Later that afternoon, “after working in Hudson all day, [Plaintiff] was dropped off at the
bus stop on the corner of Central Avenue and Manning Boulevard.” Id. ¶ 28. “[A]t
approximately 4:43 PM [Plaintiff] was arrested” by Regan. Id. ¶ 29. Regan also took the
backpack that Plaintiff had in his possession. Id.
The Hudson Police Department then submitted a search warrant application to the
Honorable Richard M. Koweek, Columbia County Judge, seeking to search Plaintiff and the
“bookbag that [Plaintiff] had on his person when detained.” Dkt. No. 8-2 at 1. The application
was submitted by Hudson P.D. Detective Nicolas Pierro, “based upon personal knowledge.” Id.
at 1–2. Pierro asserts that on February 7, 2022, the Hudson Police Department received a call
stating that Campana’s truck had been stolen. Id. at 2. Members of the Hudson Police
Department then met with Campana and conducted multiple interviews. Id.
The application recounts Campana’s statements in those interviews. Id. at 2–3. “In his
second deposition, Campana advised police that his loaded Springfield Arms .45 caliber handgun
was also in the center console of the vehicle, along with two loaded magazines.” Id. at 2. The
application also states that in a separate interview, Campana told Defendant Waithe that he “did
3
not originally tell the full story to officers.” Id. at 3. Campana then explained that on the night his
vehicle was stolen, he met with other men to “explore” his “sexual feelings towards males.” Id.
According to Plaintiff, the search warrant application “relied exclusively on false
statements given by [] Campana which [Keyser and Waithe] knew or should have known were
false.” Compl. ¶ 130. Campana’s statements were “unsworn and unsigned,” “contradicted by his
previous statements,” and “false and full of lies.” Id. ¶¶ 131–33. “Keyser and Waithe did not
disclose to Judge Koweek that [] Campana had made perjurious statements to the Hudson Police,
that [] Campana had refused to reveal to the truth of his statements, and that [] Campana’s
statements did not implicate [Plaintiff] in stealing the backpack.” Id. ¶ 139.
Judge Koweek signed a search warrant authorizing the police to search Plaintiff and the
backpack. Dkt. No. 8-2 at 5; Compl. ¶ 30. In the backpack, members of the Albany Police
Department found a .45 caliber handgun with five rounds of ammunition. Id. ¶ 31. Plaintiff “did
not know there was a gun in the locked backpack.” Id. ¶ 49.
In the Complaint, Plaintiff presents six causes of action. As relevant to this Motion and
Cross-Motions, Plaintiff brings two claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Hudson
Defendants. Compl. ¶¶ 89–105 (“Third Cause of Action”), 127–142 (“Fifth Cause of Action”).
In the Third Cause of Action, Plaintiff alleges that the Hudson Defendants’ “tip to the Albany
Police, without probable cause and known to be based on false information, violated [P]laintiff’s
constitutional right to be free from illegal seizure and detention of his person and property
protected by the Fourth [and Fourteenth] Amendment.” Id. ¶ 104. In the Fifth Cause of Action,
Plaintiff alleges that the Hudson Defendants’ inclusion of “false statements in the application for
a search warrant . . . were not [] sufficient to make out probable cause to issue a search warrant . .
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. [which] violated [P]laintiff’s constitutional right to be free from illegal search and seizure of
property in his possession protected by the Fourth [and Fourteenth] Amendment.” Id. ¶¶ 140–41.
III.
DISCUSSION
“Because determining the universe of properly considered materials is a necessary
predicate to considering [a defendant’s] motion to dismiss,” the Court turns first to Plaintiff’s
motion to strike or otherwise exclude the search warrant application exhibit included in the
Hudson Defendants’ Motion. City of Austin Police Ret. Sys. v. Kinross Gold Corp., 957 F. Supp.
2d 277, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). Next, the Court addresses the Hudson Defendants’ motion to
dismiss. Last, the Court rules on Plaintiff’s motion to amend the Complaint.
A. Motion to Strike or Otherwise Exclude the Search Warrant Application
Plaintiff asks that the Court “strike or otherwise exclude the application for the search
warrant sworn to by Detective Pierro.” Cross-Mots. at 1. At the outset, Plaintiff’s request that the
Court strike the search warrant application is denied. When a court considers whether to exclude
additional materials for the purpose of deciding a motion to dismiss, “the extreme sanction of
striking” is not required. Phillips v. City of New York, No. 21-CV-8149, 2024 WL 4307923, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2024) (cleaned up). Plaintiff’s claim that he is “prejudiced by the use of the
unsealed search warrant application” is not convincing. Cross-Mots. at 1. The Court finds the
sanction of striking unwarranted here.
The Court now considers whether to exclude the search warrant application in its
consideration of the instant motions. “[T]he court, when ruling on a motion to dismiss, may only
consider the facts alleged in the pleadings, documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by
reference in the pleadings, or matters of which the court may take judicial notice.” Estate of
Axelrod v. Flannery, 476 F. Supp. 2d 188, 199 (D.Conn. 2007). However, “where a document is
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not incorporated by reference, the court may nevertheless consider it where the complaint ‘relies
heavily upon its terms and effect,’ which renders the document ‘integral’ to the complaint.”
Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Int’l Audiotext
Network, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 62 F.3d 69, 72 (2d Cir.1995)). This is because a plaintiff
“should not so easily be allowed to escape the consequences of its own failure” when he does not
attach or otherwise incorporate a document that is integral to the complaint. Cortec Indus., Inc. v.
Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 47 (2d Cir. 1991).
Here, the Fifth Cause of Action hinges entirely on the contents of the search warrant
application that led to a search of Plaintiff and the backpack. Plaintiff alleges that by submitting
the application, Defendants Keyser and Waithe violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights because
they relied entirely on false statements from Defendant Campana. See Compl. ¶¶ 130–35, 137–
40. Because the alleged false statements in the search warrant application are central to
Plaintiff’s claim, the application and its contents are integral to the Complaint. Accordingly, the
Court will consider the search warrant application in this Order. See Green v. City of Mount
Vernon, 96 F. Supp. 3d 263, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (considering a search warrant affidavit
because the plaintiffs’ claims for unreasonable search and seizure were “explicitly based on their
assertions that the warrant was invalid”); Vessa v. City of White Plains, No. 12-CV-6989, 2014
WL 1271230, at *4 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2014) (considering the search warrant order because
“the crux” of the plaintiff’s case is that the defendants “wrongfully obtained the warrant at issue
using fabricated and unsubstantiated information”); Cayo v. Sefcik, No. 14-CV-38, 2014 WL
3419578, at *5 n.10 (D.Conn. July 11, 2014) (considering the contents of an arrest warrant
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application because “they are discussed extensively in the complaint”). Plaintiff’s cross-motion
to strike or exclude the search warrant application is denied. 1
B. Motion to Dismiss
1. Legal Standard
To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a
“complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A court must accept as true the factual allegations
contained in a complaint and draw all inferences in favor of a plaintiff. See Allaire Corp. v.
Okumus, 433 F.3d 248, 249–50 (2d Cir. 2006). A complaint may be dismissed pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) only where it appears that there are not “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Plausibility requires “enough fact[s] to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [the alleged misconduct].” Id. at
556.
The plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Supreme Court
has stated that “the pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual
allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not
1
In finding that the search warrant application may be considered, the Court need not convert the
Hudson Defendants’ Motion to a motion for summary judgment. See Brodeur v. City of New
York, No. 99-CV-651, 2002 WL 424688, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2002) (holding that it is
appropriate to consider a search warrant application without converting a motion to dismiss to a
motion for summary judgment).
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permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,” the pleader has not
demonstrated that she is entitled to relief and the action is subject to dismissal. Id. at 679.
2. Analysis
a. Claims against Defendants Keyser and Waithe
In the Third Cause of Action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Keyser and Waithe
violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights by providing a tip to the Albany Police based on false
information. Compl. ¶¶ 89–105. In the Fifth Cause of Action, Plaintiff alleges that Keyser and
Waithe violated Plaintiff’s constitutional right to be free from illegal search and seizure by
relying upon exclusively false information in the search warrant application. Id. ¶¶ 127–142. The
Hudson Defendants argue that these claims must be dismissed because Plaintiff “has not pleaded
any facts supporting a plausible inference of Detective Waithe or Lieutenant Keyser’s personal
involvement in the alleged unconstitutional actions.” Mot. at 10. The Court agrees.
“It is well settled that, in order to establish a defendant’s individual liability in a suit
brought under [Section] 1983, a plaintiff must show, inter alia, the defendant’s personal
involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d
133, 138 (2d Cir. 2013). “Accordingly, a Section 1983 plaintiff must allege a tangible connection
between the acts of the defendant and the injuries suffered.” Rasheen v. Adner, 356 F. Supp. 3d
222, 233 (N.D.N.Y. 2019) (cleaned up). “[A] plaintiff must plead and prove ‘that each
Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the
Constitution.’” Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 618 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 676).
With respect to the Third Cause of Action, Plaintiff alleges that Keyser and Waithe
violated his constitutional rights solely by providing a tip to another police department. Their
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actions cannot be considered direct participation in the eventual search, seizure, and detention of
Plaintiff. See Nunez v. City of New York, No. 14-CV-4182, 2016 WL 1322448, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 31, 2016) (dismissing Fourth Amendment claims for lack of personal involvement against
police officers who “[a]t most . . . were involved in parts of the investigation . . . that ultimately
resulted in [the] [p]laintiff’s arrest”); Simpson v. Town of Warwick Police Dep’t, 159 F. Supp. 3d
419, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (dismissing Fourth Amendment claim for lack of personal
involvement because there is no basis “to charge the named [police officer] defendants for a
search performed by a completely separate police department”). Accordingly, the Court finds no
“tangible connection” between the actions of Keyser and Waithe and the constitutional violations
alleged by Plaintiff. See Rasheen, 356 F. Supp. 3d at 233. Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action
against Keyser and Waithe is dismissed.
With respect to the Fifth Cause of Action, Plaintiff alleges that Keyser and Waithe
violated his rights by relying upon exclusively false information in drafting and submitting the
search warrant application. However, the search warrant application states that it was submitted
by Hudson P.D. Detective Nicolas Pierro and was based upon his personal knowledge; it was not
drafted or submitted by Keyser or Waithe. To the extent Plaintiff alleges that Keyser and Waithe
contributed to drafting the search warrant application, he fails to do so with any particularity.
The only potentially related, concrete allegation is that Waithe interviewed Campana, whose
statements were later included in the search warrant application. This alone is insufficient to find
personal involvement in the submission of the search warrant application; there is no “tangible
connection” between this action and the alleged constitutional violation. Plaintiff’s Fifth Cause
of Action against Keyser and Waithe is dismissed.
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b. Claims Against the Hudson Police Department
Plaintiff also brings the Third Cause of Action and the Fifth Cause of Action against the
Hudson Police Department. The Hudson Defendants argue that the claims must be dismissed
because the Hudson Police Department is a “non-suable entity as a matter of law.” Mot. at 10.
The Court agrees. “Under New York law, departments that are merely administrative arms of a
municipality do not have a legal identity separate and apart from the municipality and, therefore,
cannot sue or be sued.” Davis v. Lynbrook Police Dept., 224 F. Supp. 2d 463, 477 (E.D.N.Y.
2002). The Hudson Police Department is an administrative arm of the City of Hudson. See id.
(finding that the Lynbook Police Department is an administrative arm of the Village of
Lynbrook). Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against the Hudson Police Department are dismissed
with prejudice. 2
C. Motion to Amend the Complaint
“Leave to amend should be freely given when justice so requires, but should generally be
denied in instances of futility, undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure
deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, or undue prejudice to the non-moving party.”
United States ex rel. Ladas v. Exelis, Inc., 824 F.3d 16, 28 (2d Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). “A
proposed amendment to a complaint is futile when it ‘could not withstand a motion to dismiss.’”
Balintulo v. Ford Motor Co., 796 F.3d 160, 164–65 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Lucente v. IBM
2
Even if Plaintiff had brought these claims against the City of Hudson, the real party-in-interest,
Plaintiff’s claims would fail. “[A] municipality can be held liable under Section 1983 if the
deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights under federal law is caused by a governmental custom,
policy, or usage of the municipality.” Jones v. Town of East Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir.
2012) (citing Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978)). In the
Complaint, Plaintiff fails to allege the existence any municipal custom, policy, or usage by the
Hudson Police Department, nor can one be inferred by the Court. “[A] single incident alleged in
a complaint . . . does not suffice to show a municipal policy.” Dean v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 297
F. Supp. 2d 549, 555 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (quoting DeCarlo v. Fry, 141 F.3d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 1998)).
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Corp., 310 F.3d 243, 258 (2d Cir. 2002)). The proposed pleading must “be judged by the same
standards as those governing the adequacy of a filed pleading” if it were attacked by a motion to
dismiss. Anderson News, L.L.C. v. Am. Media, Inc., 680 F.3d 162, 185 (2d Cir. 2012).
The allegations in Plaintiff’s Proposed Amended Complaint largely resemble those of the
Complaint. The only relevant addition to the facts is that Plaintiff now alleges that Hudson P.D.
Detective Nicolas Pierro “drafted,” “swor[e] to,” and “submitted” the search warrant application.
PAC ¶¶ 134, 32. Further, Plaintiff alleges that the “search warrant application submitted by []
Pierro contained fraudulent misrepresentations and/or omissions which were made with the
intention to obtain sufficient probable cause to obtain a search warrant.” Id. ¶ 106. These
additions do not cure the deficiencies stated above with respect to Plaintiff’s claims against the
Hudson Defendants.
Plaintiff also includes Pierro as a defendant in this action and brings the Third Cause of
Action and Fifth Cause of Action against him. Id. ¶¶ 93, 132. With respect to the Third Cause of
Action, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Pierro for the same reasons as those discussed in
Part III.B.2.a of this Order. Plaintiff does not plead any facts supporting a plausible inference
that Pierro was personally involved in providing a tip to the Albany Police, let alone violating
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
With respect to the Fifth Cause of Action, Plaintiff’s claim against Pierro also fails. The
Court finds Plaintiff cannot state a claim that Pierro violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
“The United States Constitution provides persons the right to be free from unreasonable
searches and arrests.” Fabrikant v. French, 691 F.3d 193, 214 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing U.S. Const.
amend. IV). If the search is not “unreasonable,” then no constitutional violation has occurred.
Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991) (“The Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all
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state-initiated searches and seizures; it merely proscribes those which are unreasonable.”).
Typically, “an arrest or search pursuant to a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate is presumed
reasonable because such warrants may issue only upon a showing of probable cause.” Fabrikant,
691 F.3d at 214 (quoting Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d 139, 155–56 (2d Cir. 2007)). “[T]o challenge
the probable cause for a search warrant, ‘the plaintiff must make a substantial preliminary
showing that the affiant knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth,
made a false statement in his affidavit and that the allegedly false statement was necessary to the
finding of probable cause.’” Id. (quoting Golino v. City of New Haven, 950 F.2d 864, 870 (2d
Cir. 1991)).
Here, Plaintiff fails to make a preliminary showing that Pierro knowingly, intentionally,
or recklessly made a false statement in the search warrant application. In the Proposed Amended
Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the search warrant application contained fraudulent
misrepresentations and omissions, made with the intent to prove probable cause. The Court finds
these allegations to be largely conclusory. To state a viable claim, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by merely conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678.
To the extent that Plaintiff sufficiently alleges the existence of fraudulent
misrepresentations or omissions in the search warrant application, it is limited to the false
statements from Campana, which are attributed to Campana himself. See Dkt. No. 8-2 at 2–3.
There is no showing that Pierro personally made any false statements. Moreover, Pierro directly
noted Campana’s inconsistent statements in the search warrant application. See id. at 3
(“Campana . . . stated that he did not originally tell the full story.”). Accordingly, because
Plaintiff fails to show that Pierro knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly made a false statement
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in the search warrant application, Plaintiff’s Fifth Cause of Action against Pierro fails. The Court
finds that Plaintiff’s cross-motion to amend the Complaint is futile. The cross-motion is denied.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is hereby:
ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s cross-motion to strike or otherwise exclude the search
warrant application, Dkt. No. 29-1, is DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Hudson Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 8, is GRANTED;
and it is further
ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action and Fifth Cause of Action against
Defendants Keyser and Waithe are DISMISSED without prejudice; and it is further
ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action and Fifth Cause of Action against
Defendant Police Department of the City of Hudson are DISMISSED with prejudice; and it is
further
ORDERED, that Defendants Keyser, Waithe, and the Police Department of the City of
Hudson are DISMISSED as parties in this action; and it is further
ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s cross-motion to amend the Complaint, Dkt. No. 29-1, is
DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Clerk serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision and Order on all
parties in accordance with the Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:
January 29, 2025
Albany, New York
LAWRENCE E. KAHN
United States District Judge
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