Neroni v. Zayas et al

Filing 77

MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDERED, that Defendants Motion (Dkt. No. 66) for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) is GRANTED; and it is further ORDERED, that Plaintiffs Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is DISMISSED. Signed by Senior Judge Lawrence E. Kahn on June 04, 2015. (sas)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
FREDERICK J. NERONI,
Plaintiff,
-against-

3:13-cv-0127 (LEK/DEP)

STEVEN D. ZAYAS, et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDER
I.

INTRODUCTION
This matter returns before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for judgment on the pleadings

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).1 Dkt. Nos. 66 (“Motion”); 66-2 (“Memorandum”).2
Defendants seek to dismiss the remainder of Plaintiff Frederick J. Neroni’s (“Plaintiff”) Amended
Complaint. Mem. at 1; Dkt. No. 4 (“Amended Complaint”). For the following reasons,
Defendants’ Motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted.
II.

BACKGROUND3
The Court briefly recounts the facts of the case necessary to the resolution of the present

1

The remaining Defendants are: Steven D. Zayas (“Zayas”), staff attorney of the Third
Department Committee on Professional Standards (the “Committee”); Monica Duffy (“Duffy”),
Chairperson of the Committee; Karen Peters (“Peters”), Chief Justice of the Third Department; Eric
Schneiderman (“Schneiderman”), New York State Attorney General (collectively, the “State
Defendants”); and Richard D. Northrup, Jr. (“Northrup”), District Attorney of Delaware County
New York (together with the State Defendants, “Defendants”).
2

Northrup has filed a Response supporting the State Defendants’ Motion seeking dismissal
of Plaintiff’s Complaint. Dkt. No. 68.
3

In deciding a Rule 12(c) Motion, a court must accept all factual allegations in the plaintiff’s
complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. See Hayden v. Paterson,
594 F.3d 150, 160 (2d Cir. 2010).

Motion. For a more complete statement of the facts, reference is made the Court’s March 31, 2014,
Memorandum-Decision and Order. Dkt. No. 46 (“Order”).
Plaintiff commenced this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Declaratory Judgment Act,
28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202, on February 3, 2013, alleging various constitutional violations related to
his disbarment. Dkt. No. 1; Am. Compl. Plaintiff seeks monetary, declaratory, and injunctive
relief. See generally Am. Compl.
Defendants moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
Dkt. Nos. 18; 20. On March 31, 2014, the Court granted in part Defendants’ Motion, dismissing
various defendants and claims. See generally Order. The following claims survived the Court’s
Order: (1) a claim for injunctive and declaratory relief against Zayas, Duffy, Peters, Northrup, and
Schneiderman, and for monetary relief against Zayas, based on post-disbarment investigations and
possible prosecution for the unauthorized practice of law related to Plaintiff’s spouse’s law practice;
and (2) a claim for declaratory and injunctive relief against Zayas and Duffy, and for monetary relief
against Zayas, based on access to the disciplinary file on which Plaintiff’s disbarment was based.
Order at 22.
Plaintiff’s claim for relief based on post-disbarment investigations relates to two
investigations for unauthorized practice of law initiated by the Committee since Plaintiff’s
disbarment on July 7, 2011, by the New York State Supreme Court Appellate Division, Third
Department. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 17, 34. The first investigation occurred in November 2011, when a
non-attorney local criminal court justice attempted to serve legal papers on Plaintiff’s spouse at their
residence in Delhi, New York. Id. ¶¶ 2, 37. Plaintiff’s spouse is an attorney and maintains a home
2

office at their residence. Id. ¶ 37. Plaintiff accepted service at the justice’s insistence.4 Id. ¶ 38.
The justice then reported Plaintiff to the Committee for unauthorized practice of law, alleging that
Plaintiff had accepted service on an attorney’s behalf and had been sitting at his computer and
talking to a man, while another man was walking through the door. Id. ¶ 39. Plaintiff claims the
men were contractors who were remodeling his kitchen. Id. ¶ 42. The Committee investigated the
complaint and sent Plaintiff a questionnaire, asking Plaintiff to identify the men in his house and
what Plaintiff had been doing with them. Id. ¶ 44. Plaintiff answered the questionnaire and the
Committee subsequently informed Plaintiff that the complaint was unfounded. Id. ¶ 48. The
Committee initiated a second investigation against Plaintiff based on charges that Plaintiff had
served documents for proceedings in which his spouse was involved.5 Id. ¶ 49. Plaintiff only
became aware of the second investigation when the Committee notified him that the charges were
unfounded. Id. ¶ 50.
III.

LEGAL STANDARD
In considering a Rule 12(c) motion, courts “employ[] the same standard applicable to

dismissals pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” In re Thelen LLP, 736 F.3d 213,
218 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Johnson v. Rowley, 569 F.3d 40, 43 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation
marks and alteration omitted)). Thus, a court must “accept all factual allegations in the complaint as
true and draw all reasonable inferences in [the plaintiff’s] favor.” Hayden, 594 F.3d at 160. “[A]
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

4

Under New York Law, service may be effected on an attorney by leaving papers with “a
person of suitable age and discretion” at the attorney’s residence. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 2103(b)(4).
5

Under New York law, a person may serve legal papers so long as they are at least eighteen
years of age and not a party to the action. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 2103(a).
3

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A complaint may be dismissed only where it appears that
there are not “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 570. Plausibility requires “enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery
will reveal evidence of [the alleged misconduct].” Id. at 556. The plausibility standard “asks for
more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
IV.

DISCUSSION
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(g)(2)
Before addressing the merits of Defendants’ Motion, the Court must first consider whether

the Motion is barred under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(g)(2). Rule 12(g)(2) states that
“[e]xcept as provided in Rule 12(h)(2) or (3), a party that makes a motion under [Rule 12] must not
make another motion under [Rule 12] raising a defense or objection that was available to the party
but omitted from its earlier motion.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(g)(2). Defendants have already made a
Motion under 12(b)(6) to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, Dkt. No. 18, but now purport to raise
different issues, Dkt. No. 73 (“Reply”) at 1. Plaintiff argues that Defendants should be barred from
making a second Motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. Dkt. No. 70 (“Response”) at 1.
Under Rule 12(h)(2), a party may raise a 12(b)(6) failure-to-state a claim defense that it
omitted from an earlier motion, (1) in any pleading allowed or ordered under Rule 7(a); (2) by a
motion under Rule 12(c); or (3) at trial. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(2); see also Albers v. Bd. of Cnty.
Comm’rs, 771 F.3d 697, 701 (10th Cir. 2014) (“[A]lthough Rule 12(g)(2) precludes successive
motions under Rule 12, it is expressly subject to Rule 12(h)(2).”); Ennenga v. Starns, 677 F.3d 766,
4

773 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Rule 12(h)(2) specifically expects failure-to-state a claim defenses from the
Rule 12(g) consolidation requirement.”); Clark St. Wine & Spirits v. Emporos Sys. Corp., 754 F.
Supp. 2d 474, 480 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (allowing successive 12(b)(6) motion where it could be
construed as a Rule 12(c) motion). Therefore, Defendants are not barred from raising their failureto-state a claim defense because the instant Motion is brought under Rule 12(c).
B. Analysis
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s remaining claims on the following grounds: (1) the
Committee’s post-disbarment investigations did not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and
Plaintiff is not entitled to an injunction against future investigations; (2) Plaintiff has failed to state a
due process claim for the alleged denial of access to his disciplinary file; and (3) Zayas is entitled to
qualified immunity. Mem. at 1.
1. Post-Disbarment Investigations
a. The Committee
Plaintiff seeks injunctive and declaratory relief against Zayas, Duffy, and Peters, and
monetary relief against Zayas, on the ground that the Committee’s post-disbarment investigations
violated his constitutional rights because (1) the Committee does not have authority to investigate
disbarred attorneys and (2) the Committee is not entitled to discovery in its investigations of
professional misconduct. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 77-78, 81.
Plaintiff first argues that the Committee’s authority is limited to overseeing attorneys, and
that since a disbarred attorney is not an “attorney,” the Committee does not have the authority to
investigate disbarred attorneys. Resp. at 3. However, under the applicable statutes and court rules,
the Committee clearly has jurisdiction over disbarred attorneys. See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 90(2); 22
5

N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. § 806.3. New York Judiciary Law § 90(2) authorizes the appellate
division of the supreme court in each department to remove attorneys from practice. Any order of
removal shall include a provision ordering the attorney to refrain from the practice of law in any
form; any violation of such order may be punished as a contempt of court. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 90(2).
The Third Department’s Rules of Court provide for the appointment of the Committee, which shall
investigate “all matters . . . involving alleged misconduct by an attorney in the third judicial
department.” 22 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. § 806.3. Plaintiff argues that the plain language of
§ 806.3 limits the Committee’s jurisdiction to “attorneys.” However, § 90.2 provides that each
appellate division may punish a violation of a disbarment order as a contempt of court; since the
Committee is responsible for investigating attorney misconduct in the Third Department, it would
therefore also be responsible for initiating contempt proceedings against disbarred attorneys. See In
re Abbott, 572 N.Y.S.2d 467, 467 (App. Div. 1991) (contempt proceeding against disbarred attorney
initiated by Committee). In Lader v. Finnerty, a state supreme court considered the exact argument
made by Plaintiff, and stated that “[t]here can be no dispute that the Grievance Committee may
institute a motion for contempt based upon a disbarred attorney’s violation of his order of
disbarment.” 658 N.Y.S.2d 191, 193 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997).6
Plaintiff also argues that only the New York State Attorney General is authorized to
investigate and prosecute the unauthorized practice of law in a civil contempt proceeding. Resp. at
6

Plaintiff objects to Defendants’ citation of Lader because that case arose in the Second
Department and involved different Rules of Court. Resp. at 2. However, the Second Department
Rule of Court—like the Third Department Rule of Court—applies to all “attorneys.” Compare 22
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. §§ 691.1(a); 691.4 with 22 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. §§ 806.1;
806.3. The plaintiff in Lader argued that the Second Department Grievance Committee only had
“jurisdiction to investigate attorneys.” Lader, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 193 (emphasis in original). Lader,
therefore, is directly relevant to the present case.
6

5; see also N.Y. JUD. LAW § 476-a(1) (authorizing Attorney General to maintain civil and criminal
actions based upon the unauthorized practice of law). However, there is no conflict between the
Attorney General’s authority to maintain an action for the unauthorized practice of law, and the
Committee’s authority to investigate attorney misconduct and bring contempt proceedings for
violations of a disbarment order. See 22 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. § 806.3; N.Y. JUD. LAW
§ 90(2); see also Lader, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 194 (“[T]here is no authority for the proposition that the
Grievance Committee cannot conduct a concurrent investigation regarding possible contempt of the
order of disbarment, while the Attorney General investigates possible ‘unlawful practice of the
law.’”).
Plaintiff further argues that even assuming that the Committee does have the authority to
initiate contempt proceedings against disbarred attorneys, it is not entitled to preliminary discovery.
Resp. at 3-4. Section 806.4 of the Third Department’s Rules of Court specifically establishes
procedures for the investigation of professional misconduct. See 22 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS.
§ 806.4. Upon receipt of a complaint containing allegations sufficient to establish a charge of
professional misconduct, the chief attorney of the Committee shall request a written statement from
the attorney being investigated and may require that attorney to appear and be examined under oath.
Id. § 806.4(b). Plaintiff fails to state a claim that these procedures for investigation preliminary to a
contempt charge somehow violate his rights to privacy and freedom of association. See Resp. at 7.
Plaintiff cites no authority—and the Court is aware of none—for the proposition that investigation
by a grievance committee into professional misconduct might be implicate either the right to privacy
or freedom of association. To the extent that those rights might be implicated by the Committee’s
investigations, the Court finds that any burden on Plaintiff is outweighed by the Government’s
7

interests in (1) preventing professional misconduct by attorneys and (2) not bringing unfounded
contempt proceedings. See Lader, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 194 (“The gravity of harm to the petitioner by
the Grievance Committee’s investigation is greatly outweighed by the public’s interest in being
protected from the unscrupulous conduct of disbarred attorneys.”).
Thus, insofar as Plaintiff seeks relief against the Committee, Plaintiff has failed to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, and those claims are accordingly dismissed.
b. Schneiderman and Northrup
Plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief against Schneiderman and Northrup to prevent future
investigations and prosecution for unauthorized practice of law related to his spouse’s law practice.
See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 12, 14. As noted supra, the Attorney General is authorized to bring actions for
the unauthorized practice of law. See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 476-a(1). Although the Court found in its
March 31, 2014 Order that Plaintiff has standing to seek injunctive relief against prosecution for the
unauthorized practice of law by the Attorney General, Order at 12, the Amended Complaint does
not contain any allegations regarding the Attorney General. There are no allegations that the
Attorney General has investigated or has contemplated investigating Plaintiff for unauthorized
practice of law. See generally Am. Compl. Thus, to the extent Plaintiff seeks an injunction against
the Attorney General, Plaintiff is seeking a broad injunction ordering the Attorney General not to
bring unauthorized practice of law charges against Plaintiff for activities that do not constitute the
practice of law. Such “obey the law” injunctions are disfavored because they “are vague, do not
require the defendants to do anything more than that already imposed by law, subject the defendants
to contempt rather than statutorily prescribed sanctions, and are not readily capable of enforcement.”
Rowe v. N.Y. State Div. of Budget, No. 11-CV-1150, 2012 WL 4092856, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 17,
8

2012) (Kahn, J.) (citing N.L.R.B. v. Express Pub. Co., 312 U.S. 426, 435-36 (1941)). Accordingly,
there is no available relief for Plaintiff against the Attorney General, and Plaintiff’s claim for an
injunction against future prosecution for the unauthorized practice of law is dismissed.
2. Access to File
a. Extra Pleading Materials
Before addressing the parties’ arguments, the Court notes that both parties have submitted
extra pleading materials. Defendants have submitted a series of e-mails between Plaintiff’s counsel
and the Clerk of the Third Department regarding an appointment to view Plaintiff’s file. See Dkt.
No. 66-1 at Ex. A. Plaintiff has submitted voluminous exhibits, an affidavit from Plaintiff, and an
affirmation from Plaintiff’s counsel. See Dkt. Nos. 70-1 through 70-24.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d), if a court considers extra pleading materials on
a motion under Rule 12(c), then that motion “must be treated as one for summary judgment under
Rule 56 . . . [and] [a]ll parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that
is pertinent to the motion.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d). “‘[T]he complaint is deemed to include any
written instrument attached to it as an exhibit or any statements or documents incorporated in it by
reference.’” Int’l Audiotext Network, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 62 F.3d 69, 72 (2d Cir. 1995)
(quoting Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 47 (2d Cir. 1991)). A court may
consider documents not incorporated by reference, where the complaint “relies heavily upon [their]
terms and effects.” Id.
The Court applies this standard to the e-mails Defendants seek to introduce. Defendants
argue that consideration of the e-mails is appropriate because the Amended Complaint necessarily
relied upon them. Mem. at 13. The Court does not agree that the e-mails are “integral” to the
9

Amended Complaint. The Amended Complaint does not rely heavily upon the terms of the e-mails.
Rather, the e-mails are relevant as evidence on Plaintiff’s claim that he was denied access to his file.
Therefore, the Court must either exclude the e-mails and decide Defendants’ Motion on the
Amended Complaint alone, or convert the Motion into one for summary judgment. Islip U-Slip
LLC v. Gander Mountain Co., 2 F. Supp. 3d 296, 302 (N.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting Fonte v. Bd. of
Managers of Cont’l Towers Condo., 848 F.2d 24, 25 (2d Cir. 1988)). “Federal courts have
‘complete discretion to determine whether or not to accept the submission of any material beyond
the pleadings’ offered in conjunction with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and thus complete discretion in
determining whether to convert the motion to one for summary judgment.” Carione v. United
States, 368 F. Supp. 2d 186, 191 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting 5C Charles Alan Wright, Federal
Practice & Procedure § 1366 (3d ed. 2004)). The “essential inquiry,” in determining whether to
convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, “is whether the non-movant
should reasonably have recognized the possibility that the motion might be converted into one for
summary judgment or was taken by surprise and deprived of a reasonable opportunity to meet facts
outside the pleadings.” Krijn v. Pogue Simone Real Estate Co., 896 F.2d 687, 689 (2d Cir. 1990)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the Court declines to consider Defendants’ submission and will not convert the Motion
to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Although Plaintiff submitted numerous exhibits of
his own, there is nothing to indicate to the Court that Plaintiff had sufficient notice of the possibility
that the Motion might be converted. Defendants explicitly argued that the Court should consider
their submission under Rule 12, without converting to the Motion into one for summary judgment.
Mem. at 13. Moreover, Plaintiff’s submissions are not relevant to the issue of Plaintiff’s access to
10

his file, and the record is therefore incomplete. More importantly, the Court does not find that
consideration of Defendants’ submission would be “likely to facilitate the disposition of the action.”
Carione, 368 F. Supp. 2d at 191. As discussed infra, the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim
for Plaintiff’s access to his file; dismissal of that claim is therefore proper, without reference to
Defendants’ submission.
For the same reasons, the Court also declines to consider Plaintiff’s extra-pleading
submissions. Plaintiff’s submissions are largely irrelevant to his claims, and purport to show a
pattern of harassment by various Committee members. Therefore, consideration of Plaintiff’s
submissions would not be likely to facilitate the disposition of the action.
b. Analysis
Plaintiff claims that Defendants have denied him access to the disciplinary file on which his
disbarment is based. Am. Compl. ¶ 54. Plaintiff claims that he has sought access to the file under
the New York Freedom of Information Law (“FOIL”) and New York Judiciary Law § 255. Id. ¶ 19.
The Committee, through Zayas, has allegedly directed Plaintiff to Judiciary Law § 90(10) to access
the file. Id. ¶ 67. Plaintiff asserts that he has a due process right as a subject of investigation to
access the file. Id. ¶¶ 61, 69. Plaintiff requests declaratory and injunctive relief regarding his access
to the file.7 Id. ¶ 63.
As the Court has previously noted, the contours of Plaintiff’s access to file claim are unclear.
However, it appears from Plaintiff’s Response that the file he is seeking access to is what he refers
to as the Committee’s “entire disciplinary file.” Resp. at 10. Plaintiff seems to believe that the

7

The Court has previously held that Plaintiff may only seek relief from Defendants Zayas
and Duffy on his access to file claim. Order at 15.
11

Committee’s disciplinary file contains information regarding the quorum, concurrence, and voting
requirements in his disbarment proceeding. Id. Plaintiff states that this information may lead to
vacation of his disbarment order. Id. at 11.
Plaintiff attempts to state a substantive due process claim for “unrestricted access to the
materials of investigation.” Resp. at 13. In order to make a substantive due process claim, a
plaintiff must establish (1) a constitutionally protected property interest, and (2) that the defendant
has arbitrarily deprived the plaintiff of that property interest. Crowley v. Courville, 76 F.3d 47, 52
(2d Cir. 1996). Plaintiff has not alleged any facts plausibly suggesting that he has been denied due
process.
Plaintiff states that his FOIL request for the Committee’s disciplinary file has been denied.
Am. Compl. ¶ 19. To constitute a property interest, the plaintiff must have more than an “abstract
need” or “expectation” of a benefit; rather, a plaintiff must have a “legitimate claim of entitlement
to” the benefit. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). It is well
established that there is no property interest in FOIL documents. See Simpson v. Town of
Southampton, No. 06-cv-6743, 2007 WL 1755749, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. June 15, 2007) (citing cases).
An individual making a FOIL request does “not have anything beyond a mere expectation in such
documents, and, thus, do[es] not have an entitlement to requested documents that is protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. The denial of Plaintiff’s FOIL request therefore did not deprive
Plaintiff of any constitutionally protected property interest.
Moreover, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that denial of his FOIL request was arbitrary or
capricious. Plaintiff states that Defendants denied his FOIL request on the ground that the
Committee is part of the judiciary and is therefore not subject to FOIL. Resp. at 16. Defendants
12

correctly state that FOIL does not apply to the judiciary. Mem. at 15 (citing Pasik v. State Bd. of
Law Exam’rs, 478 N.Y.S.2d 270, 273 (App. Div. 1984) (holding that records of State Board of Law
Examiners are exempt from disclosure under FOIL)); see also PUB. OFF. § 86(3) (excluding the
judiciary from the definition of “agency”). Plaintiff confusingly argues that if the Committee’s
records are considered court records, then the Committee “becomes disqualified from prosecuting
[Plaintiff] under the judge-advocate rule.” Resp. at 16. This argument is without merit.
Plaintiff also claims that New York Judiciary Law § 90(10) unconstitutionally restricts his
right to access the Committee’s file. Plaintiff appears to object to the requirement that an individual
seeking records related to an disciplinary investigation demonstrate good cause, because it “vests . .
. unlimited discretion” in the Third Department. Am. Compl. ¶ 68. Plaintiff further argues that the
good cause requirement is inconsistent with the records of a disbarred attorney being public. Resp.
at 13. To the extent Plaintiff believes there is a contradiction here, Plaintiff is misguided: § 90(10)
provides that while an investigation into attorney misconduct is on-going, an individual must
demonstrate good cause to access records; when an investigation has concluded and the charges are
sustained, then the records of the investigation “shall be deemed public records.” N.Y. JUD. LAW
§ 90(10). Thus, Plaintiff is incorrect that the good cause requirement restricts access to public
records.
Furthermore, while § 90(10) may make the records of an attorney disbarment public, it does
not follow that those records will include the information Plaintiff is seeking. Plaintiff states that he
has been informed that the Committee may not maintain the records Plaintiff is seeking—i.e.,
quorum, concurrences, and voting records. Resp. at 11. Yet Plaintiff has cited no authority—and
the Court is aware of none—for the proposition that a subject of an investigation has a property
13

interest in the type of records he is apparently seeking.
Finally, Plaintiff argues at length regarding the transfer of his file and makes numerous
allegations that various members of the Committee should have been disqualified. See Resp. at 1323. Plaintiff suggests that the Committee transferred his file in order to impede his access to it and
tamper with evidence. Id. at 12. These wholly speculative allegations do not state a claim. Insofar
as Plaintiff suggests that various Committee members were subject to disqualification, those
allegations fall within the scope of the Court’s earlier holding that claims seeking to overturn the
disbarment proceeding are barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Order at 8.
3. Qualified Immunity
Because the Court has found that Plaintiff’s remaining claims are subject to dismissal for
failure to state a claim, it need not address Defendants’ argument that Zayas is entitled to qualified
immunity.
V.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is hereby:
ORDERED, that Defendants’ Motion (Dkt. No. 66) for judgment on the pleadings under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) is GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is DISMISSED; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision and
Order on all parties in accordance with the Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

14

DATED:

June 04, 2015
Albany, NY

15