Graven et al v. Children's Home, R.T.F., Inc. et al

Filing 34

DECISION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part # 23 Plaintiff's Motion for Voluntary Dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2); and granting in part and denying in part # 30 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff's #[2 3] motion is granted in part to the extent it requests the dismissal of Plaintiffs' federal claims, and the remanding of their state claims) and denied in part (to the extent it requests that the dismissal of Plaintiffs' federal claims be w ithout prejudice). Defendants' # 30 Motion to dismiss is granted in part (to the extent it requests that the dismissal of Plaintiffs' federal claims be with prejudice) and denied in part (to the extent it requests that the Court also dism iss Plaintiffs' state claims with prejudice). Plaintiffs' federal claims are dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiffs' state claims are remanded to New York State Supreme Court, Chenango County, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1447(c). Signed by Judge Glenn T. Suddaby on 3/30/15. (lmw)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_____________________________________________
KELLY GRAVEN and ELIZABETH BRIGGS,
Individually and as parents of DGB, an infant,
Plaintiffs,

3:14-CV-0342
(GTS/DEP)

v.
CHILDREN’S HOME, R.T.F., INC. a/k/a Stillwater
R.T.F. a/k/a Stillwater Residential Treatment Center;
JANEE P. VALENZUELA, Executive Director,
Stillwater R.T.F.; JOHN AND JANE DOES,
employees and staff of Stillwater R.T.F.; and
KRISTEN BURGHARDT, Licensed Clinical Social
Worker, Stillwater R.T.F.,
Defendants.
_____________________________________________
APPEARANCES:

OF COUNSEL:

LAW OFFICE OF RONALD R. BENJAMIN
Counsel for Plaintiffs
P.O. Box 607
Binghamton, NY 13902-0607

RONALD R. BENJAMIN, ESQ.

MACKENZIE HUGHES LLP
Counsel for Defendants
101 South Salina Street
PO Box 4967
Syracuse, NY 13221-4967

STEPHEN T. HELMER, ESQ.
JENNIFER PLOETZ WILLIAMS, ESQ.

GLENN T. SUDDABY, United States District Judge
DECISION and ORDER
Currently before the Court, in this civil rights action filed by Kelly Graven and Elizabeth
Briggs on behalf of the infant DGB (“Plaintiffs”) against Stillwater Residential Treatment Center
and certain of its employees (“Defendants”), are Plaintiffs’ motion for voluntarily dismissal of
their federal claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2), and Defendant Stillwater’s cross-motion

for judgment on the pleadings with regard to Plaintiffs’ state claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(c). (Dkt. Nos. 23, 30.) For the reasons set forth below, both motions are granted in part and
denied in part.
I.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND
Liberally construed, Plaintiffs’ Complaint asserts the following five claims: (1) a claim of

negligence under state law; (2) a claim of gross negligence under state law; (3) a claim of
interference with the right to an Individualized Education Plan (“IEP) or Free Access to Public
Education (“FAPE”) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C.
§ 1400 et seq.; (4) a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42
U.S.C. § 1983; and (5) a procedural due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42
U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. No. 1, Attach. 1 [Plfs.’ Compl.].)
Generally, in their motion for voluntarily dismissal of their three federal claims pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2), Plaintiffs request an Order (1) granting them leave to voluntarily
dismiss those federal claims (on the ground that they request relief that is redundant of the relief
requested by their “overlapping” state claims), (2) declining to exercise supplement jurisdiction
over their remaining two state claims (of negligence and gross negligence), and (3) remanding
those state claims to state court. (Dkt. No. 23, Attach. 3 [Plfs.’ Memo. of Law].)
Generally, in its response to Plaintiffs’ motion and cross-motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’
two state claims (and/or strike certain allegations) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), Defendant
Stillwater asserts two arguments. (Dkt. No. 30, Attach. 7 [Def. Stillwater’s Opp’n Memo. of
Law].) First, argues Defendant Stillwater, as an initial matter, Defendant Stillwater does not
oppose Plaintiffs’ request to dismiss their three federal claims. (Id.) Second, argues Defendant

2

Stillwater, however, rather than remand Plaintiffs’ remaining two state claims, the Court should
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims and dismiss them with prejudice on each of
four alternative grounds: (a) to the extent that Plaintiffs’ allegations relate to the development
and implementation of the IEP or FAPE, they relate to an alleged violation of the IDEA, and
allegations that give rise to an IDEA claim cannot also give rise to claim of negligence or gross
negligence;1 (b) in any event, the state claims are barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel,
because New York State Supreme Court Justice Kevin M. Dowd’s Decision and Order of July 3,
2014, was a final determination on the merits (of the issues of whether Defendant Stillwater’s
discharge of DGB was appropriate and therefore not negligent, and whether DGB suffered from
Reactive Attachment Disorder or “RAD”), and Plaintiffs had a full and fair opportunity to
contest that decision; (c) in any event, under New York law, Plaintiffs (who are DGB’s parents)
cannot maintain a claim for emotional injuries allegedly caused by negligence and gross
negligence of Defendant Stillwater (under either a bystander theory or the direct-duty theory);
and (d) in any event, Plaintiffs’ claim for gross negligence should be dismissed because they
have not alleged facts plausibly suggesting that Defendant Stillwater’s conduct evinces a
reckless disregard for the rights of others or smacks of intentional wrongdoing.
Generally, in reply, Plaintiffs assert two arguments. (Dkt. No. 32 [Plfs.’ Reply Memo. of
Law].) First, argue Plaintiffs, as an initial matter, the Court should grant Plaintiffs’ request to
voluntarily dismiss their three federal claims because Defendant Stillwater does not oppose that

1

Defendant Stillwater also argues that, another reason Plaintiffs’ IDEA claim
against it should be dismissed with prejudice is that the IDEA does not create a cause of action
against non-profit corporations or private citizens, and Plaintiffs allege facts plausibly suggesting
that Stillwater is a non-profit corporation (and its employees private citizens). (Dkt. No. 30,
Attach. 7, at 11-12 [attaching pages “6” and “7” of Def. Stillwater’s Opp’n Memo. of Law].)
3

request. (Id.) Second, argue Plaintiffs, their remaining two state claims should not be dismissed
because (a) Plaintiffs have alleged facts plausibly suggesting a claim for negligence and/or gross
negligence, regardless of their allegations giving rise to a violation of the IDEA (because the
failure to integrate experiences at school with those at the facility may well constitute
negligence, independent of any obligations under the IDEA); (b) under the circumstances, the
doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply because Defendant Stillwater has not articulated an
identity of issues, and in any event Plaintiffs did not have a full and fair opportunity to be heard
on those issues; (c) Defendant Stillwater’s emotional-injuries argument fails because, by
applying the factual allegations of the Complaint to the bystander and direct-duty theories of
liability, Stillwater is attempting to adjudicate the facts, which is not appropriate on a motion for
judgment on the pleadings; and (d) Defendant Stillwater’s emotional-injuries argument fails
because the Complaint’s factual allegations do evince a reckless disregard for the rights of others
or smacks of intentional wrongdoing, for example, the allegation that Stillwater deliberately
drove a wedge between DGB and his parents by telling him the only reason he could not go
home was because his parents object to him coming home. (Id.)
II.

GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARDS
Because the parties have (in their memoranda of law) demonstrated an adequate

understanding of the legal standards governing their cross-motions, Plaintiffs’ claims and the
doctrine and theories asserted by Defendant Stillwater, the Court will not recite those legal
standards in this Decision and Order, which is intended primarily for the review of the parties.

4

III.

ANALYSIS
After carefully considering the matter, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ motion for voluntarily

dismissal of their three federal claims for the reasons stated in their memoranda of law. (See,
supra, Part I of this Decision and Order.) However, the Court finds that the only terms under
which such dismissal would be proper, for purposes of Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2), would be if the
dismissal were with prejudice. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relies on both (1) the
defect in Plaintiff’s IDEA claim identified by Defendant Stillwater in its opposition
memorandum of law, and (2) the need to avoid the vexatious reassertion of the federal claims in
state court (and re-removal of the case to this Court). As a result, Plaintiffs’ three federal claims
are dismissed with prejudice.
Finally, regarding whether the Court should exercise its discretion to continue to
entertain, and decide the pleading sufficiency of, Plaintiffs’ remaining two state claims, the
Court declines to do so under the circumstances under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), and remands the
state claims to state court, which is more familiar with the legal issues identified by the parties.
ACCORDINGLY, it is
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for voluntarily dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
41(a)(2) (Dkt. No. 23) is GRANTED in part (to the extent it requests the dismissal of Plaintiffs’
federal claims, and the remanding of their state claims) and DENIED in part (to the extent it
requests that the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ federal claims be without prejudice); and it is further
ORDERED that Defendants’ cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) (Dkt. No. 30) is GRANTED in part (to the extent it requests that the
dismissal of Plaintiffs’ federal claims be with prejudice) and DENIED in part (to the extent it
requests that the Court also dismiss Plaintiffs’ state claims with prejudice); and it is further
5

ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ federal claims (Dkt. No. 1, Attach. 1) are DISMISSED with
prejudice; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ state claims (Dkt. No. 1, Attach. 1) are REMANDED to
New York State Supreme Court, Chenango County, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1447(c).
Dated: March 30, 2015
Syracuse, New York

6