Jaworski v. Colvin

Filing 15

MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDER - That the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED and Jaworski's complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is DISMISSED. Signed by Judge Gary L. Sharpe on 9/30/2015. (jel, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
________________________________
SCOTT JAWORSKI,

Plaintiff,

3:14-cv-510
(GLS)

v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
________________________________
APPEARANCES:
OF COUNSEL:
FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
Lachman, Gorton Law Firm
P.O. Box 89
1500 East Main Street
Endicott, NY 13761-0089
FOR THE DEFENDANT:
HON. RICHARD S. HARTUNIAN
United States Attorney
100 South Clinton Street
Syracuse, NY 13261
Steven P. Conte
Regional Chief Counsel
Social Security Administration
Office of General Counsel, Region II
26 Federal Plaza, Room 3904
New York, NY 10278
Gary L. Sharpe
District Judge

PETER A. GORTON, ESQ.

SANDRA M. GROSSFELD
Special Assistant U.S. Attorney

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. Introduction
Plaintiff Scott Jaworski challenges the Commissioner of Social
Security’s denial of Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental
Security Income (SSI), seeking judicial review under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g)
and 1383(c)(3). (Compl., Dkt. No. 1.) After reviewing the administrative
record and carefully considering Jaworski’s arguments, the court affirms
the Commissioner’s decision and dismisses the complaint.
II. Background
On May 4, 2009, Jaworski filed applications for DIB and SSI under
the Social Security Act (“the Act”), alleging disability since September 2,
2001. (Tr.1 at 67-68, 128-30.) After his applications were denied, (id. at
76-81), Jaworski requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ), which was held on April 19, 2011, (id. at 33-66, 82-83). On July 19,
2011, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision denying the requested
benefits. (Id. at 9-24.) After the Appeals Council’s subsequent denial of
review, Jaworski commenced an action in Federal District Court and, on

1

Page references preceded by “Tr.” are to the Administrative Transcript. (Dkt. No. 8.)

2

consent of the parties, the matter was remanded for further administrative
proceedings. (Id. at 1-6, 558-60.) Thereafter, the Appeals Council
remanded the case back to the ALJ who, on February 14, 2014, again
denied Jaworski’s claim following an additional hearing held on December
31, 2013. (Id. at 439-59, 495-525, 561-65.)2 This became the
Commissioner’s final determination upon the Appeals Council’s denial of
review. (Id. at 291-94.)
Jaworski commenced the present action by filing his complaint on
May 2, 2014 wherein he sought review of the Commissioner’s
determination. (Compl.) The Commissioner filed an answer and a certified
copy of the administrative transcript. (Dkt. Nos. 7, 8.) Each party, seeking
judgment on the pleadings, filed a brief. (Dkt. Nos. 12, 13.)
III. Contentions
Jaworski contends that the Commissioner’s decision is tainted by
legal error and is not supported by substantial evidence. (Dkt. No. 12 at 925.) Specifically, Jaworski claims that the ALJ: (1) rendered a residual
functional capacity (RFC) determination that is unsupported by substantial

2

The Appeals Council also instructed the ALJ to consolidate Jaworski’s May 2009
claims with his subsequent application for SSI benefits, filed while his appeal of the ALJ’s
unfavorable decision was pending. (Tr. at 564, 679-84.)

3

evidence; (2) failed to make a proper credibility determination; and (3)
improperly determined that he was capable of performing work which
exists in significant numbers in the national economy. (Id.) The
Commissioner counters that the appropriate legal standards were used by
the ALJ and his decision is also supported by substantial evidence. (Dkt.
No. 13 at 7-18.)
IV. Facts
The court adopts the parties’ undisputed factual recitations. (Dkt.
No. 12 at 1-9; Dkt. No. 13 at 1.)
V. Standard of Review
The standard for reviewing the Commissioner’s final decision under
42 U.S.C. § 405(g)3 is well established and will not be repeated here. For
a full discussion of the standard and the five-step process by which the
Commissioner evaluates whether a claimant is disabled under the Act, the
court refers the parties to its previous decision in Christiana v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 1:05-CV-932, 2008 WL 759076, at *1-2 (N.D.N.Y.
Mar. 19, 2008).
3

42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) renders section 405(g) applicable to judicial review of SSI
claims. As review under both sections is identical, parallel citations to the regulations
governing SSI are omitted.

4

VI. Discussion
A.

RFC Determination
First, Jaworski contends that the ALJ’s errors in weighing various

medical opinions of record, as well as his failure to adopt any one such
opinion, renders his RFC determination unsupported by substantial
evidence. (Dkt. No. 12 at 9-18.) Further, Jaworski argues that the ALJ
failed to consider the combined effect of obesity with his other impairments
in making the RFC determination. (Id. at 18-19.) The Commissioner
counters, and the court agrees, that the ALJ appropriately weighed the
medical opinion evidence before him, and his RFC determination is
supported by substantial evidence. (Dkt. No. 13 at 12-16.)
A claimant’s RFC “is the most [he] can still do despite [his]
limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). In assessing a claimant’s RFC,
an ALJ must consider “all of the relevant medical and other evidence,”
including a claimant’s subjective complaints of pain. Id. § 404.1545(a)(3).
An ALJ’s RFC determination must be supported by substantial evidence4 in
the record. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). If it is, that determination is
4

“Substantial evidence is defined as more than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion.” Alston v.
Sullivan, 904 F.2d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

5

conclusive and must be affirmed upon judicial review. See id.; Perez v.
Chater, 77 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1996).
Here, the ALJ determined that, despite chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease (COPD) and mild lumbar spine degenerative disc disease,
Jaworski retains the RFC to perform light work5 as long as he avoids
concentrated exposure to respiratory irritants, such as smoke, dust, and
fumes. (Tr. at 445-46.) In making this determination, the ALJ gave little
evidentiary weight to the opinions of treating physician Darlene Denzien6
and consultative examiner Justine Magurno.7 (Id. at 451-52.) According to
Jaworski, this was in error, as the ALJ failed to consider the relevant
regulatory factors for weighing opinion evidence, and, ultimately, Dr.
5

Light work requires lifting no more than twenty pounds at a time with frequent lifting or
carrying of up to ten pounds. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b). Further, “the full range of light
work requires standing or walking, off and on, for a total of approximately [six] hours of an
[eight]-hour workday.” SSR 83-10, 1983 WL 31251, at *6 (1983).
6

In October 2013, Dr. Denzien opined that, due to COPD and chronic low back pain,
Jaworski was able to sit for only four hours, and stand and walk for one hour of a workday,
could never lift or carry more than five pounds, needed more than one ten minute rest period
every hour, and would miss more than four days of work per month. (Tr. at 810-12.) Dr.
Denzien also opined that Jaworski should not be exposed to any dust or fumes. (Id. at 811.)
This opinion was largely consistent with Dr. Denzien’s previous functional assessment of
Jaworski, completed in June 2011. (Id. at 436-38.) Dr. Denzien later concluded that Jaworski
would be off task for more than thirty-three percent of the workday due to his impairments. (Id.
at 813.)
7

According to Dr. Magurno, Jaworski has marked limitations for bending, twisting,
lifting, carrying, reaching, pulling, sitting, and standing, and should avoid known respiratory
irritants due to his asthma. (Tr. at 248-54.) Further, Dr. Magurno opined that Jaworski is
moderately limited in his ability to walk. (Id. at 253.)

6

Denzien’s opinions were deserving of controlling weight. (Dkt. No. 12 at
10-16.)
Medical opinions, regardless of the source, are evaluated by
considering several factors outlined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c).
Controlling weight will be given to a treating physician’s opinion that is
“well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence.” Id.
§ 404.1527(c)(2); see Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 32 (2d Cir. 2004).
Unless controlling weight is given to a treating source’s opinion, the ALJ is
required to consider the following factors in determining the weight
assigned to a medical opinion: whether or not the source examined the
claimant; the existence, length and nature of a treatment relationship; the
frequency of examination; evidentiary support offered; consistency with the
record as a whole; and specialization of the examiner. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(c). The ALJ must provide “‘good reasons’ for the weight given
to the treating source’s opinion.” Petrie v. Astrue, 412 F. App’x 401, 407
(2d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). “Nevertheless, where ‘the evidence of
record permits [the court] to glean the rationale of an ALJ’s decision,’” it is
not necessary that the ALJ “‘have mentioned every item of testimony
7

presented to him or have explained why he considered particular evidence
unpersuasive or insufficient to lead him to a conclusion of disability.’” Id.
(citation omitted).
In this case, as noted by the ALJ, Dr. Denzien began treating
Jaworski in June 2001 for complaints of back pain. (Tr. at 247.) One week
later, Jaworski reported that his pain had improved significantly, but he still
felt unable to work. (Id. at 246.) By the end of June, Dr. Denzien
recommended that Jaworski return to work part time for two weeks, at
which time she would reevaluate his back. (Id. at 243.) In July 2001, Dr.
Denzien recommended that Jaworski attend physical therapy, but he
lacked health insurance to pay for it. (Id. at 241.) Dr. Denzien
recommended Jaworski seek reduced medical fees so that he could use
the savings to pay for physical therapy. (Id. at 241.) Thereafter, Jaworski
visited Dr. Denzien sporadically, largely when needing paperwork
completed for various governmental programs. (Id. at 222, 224, 226, 237,
780-81.)
For instance, in February 2002 Jaworski requested that Dr. Denzien
write a note in order for him to receive benefits under a heating assistance
program. (Id. at 237.) Dr. Denzien agreed that Jaworski was unable to
8

perform “his previous type of employment” and could not do “a lot of lifting.”
(Id.) Thereafter, in May of 2003, Jaworski contacted Dr. Denzien’s office
seeking a note for the Department of Social Services (DSS) as well as
other benefit programs, although he did not want to be seen in the office.
(Id. at 234.) In September 2004, Jaworski was seen for pain in his thoracic
spine which began after “moving furniture around.” (Id. at 233-34.) He
was in no acute distress, sensation was intact, deep tendon reflexes were
normal, and straight leg raising was negative, but he experienced
tenderness to palpation and flexion was limited to forty-five degrees. (Id. at
233.) In August 2006, Jaworski was seen by a physician’s assistant in Dr.
Denzien’s office. (Id. at 231.) Jaworski was again seeking paperwork to
be completed on his behalf, and explained that he could not stand for more
than fifteen minutes “without falling to his knees in agony.” (Id.)
Subsequently, in April 2007, Jaworski requested that Dr. Denzien
mark him unable to work on a Social Services’ form. (Id. at 229.) On
examination, Jaworski refused to flex more than fifteen degrees and
jumped when Dr. Denzien superficially touched his skin. (Id.)
Nevertheless, deep tendon reflexes, strength, sensation, and straight leg
raising were all within normal limits on examination, and Jaworski was able
9

to put on his socks and shoes without assistance. (Id.) Dr. Denzien
completed the Social Services’ form, finding Jaworski disabled for three
months, and again referred Jaworski to physical therapy. (Id.) However,
Dr. Denzien also cautioned Jaworski that if physical therapy was not
attended during that time, Dr. Denzien would thereafter indicate that
Jaworski was able to return to work. (Id.) At his office visit four months
later, Jaworski admitted that he failed to attend physical therapy, and Dr.
Denzien provided him a note saying that he could return to work.8 (Id. at
226.) Jaworski was not seen again until June 2008, when he sought a
note to relieve him from jury duty,9 and next in May 2009, when he needed
disability paperwork completed. (Id. at 222, 224.)
In January 2010, Dr. Denzien pointed out that, according to a
pulmonary function test, Jaworski’s COPD was severe. (Id. at 362.)
However, she also noted that Jaworski only used Albuterol to treat his
COPD occasionally, and did not use his other prescriptions after they failed

8

Jaworski explained to Dr. Denzien that he failed to call to set up a physical therapy
appointment until after her referral to physical therapy had expired, and he never sought a new
referral because “it never crossed his mind.” (Tr. at 226.)
9

Notably, although physical examination at this time showed rhonchi occasionally,
tenderness in the lumbar spine, decreased range of motion of the lumbar spine, and difficulty
getting on and off of the exam table, Jaworski was still smoking daily and not using his
inhalers, and reported that his back pain was controlled by his pain medication. (Tr. at 224.)

10

to provide immediate relief. (Id. at 362.) Subsequent treatment notes
indicate that Dr. Denzien’s office would not complete disability paperwork
for Jaworski because he had not been examined in a year. (Id. at 780.) In
May 2012, Dr. Denzien reviewed Jaworski’s previous diagnostic tests, and
noted that a 2006 MRI revealed mild degenerative disk disease, and recent
x-rays showed no change since 2007 with some mild osteoarthritis and
degenerative disk disease. (Id. at 774.) With respect to Jaworski’s COPD,
Dr. Denzien commented that recent pulmonary function tests showed
“better control.” (Id.) At that time, Jaworski’s physical examination was
benign, other than some tenderness of the lumbar paraspinal muscle. (Id.)
Dr. Denzien’s most recent treatment note of record, from August 2013,
indicates that Jaworski was having no problems with his breathing, and his
back pain was “well controlled as usual.” (Id. at 805.)
The ALJ’s detailed discussion of Dr. Denzien’s treatment notes
highlights the lack of clinical findings with respect to Jaworski’s low back
impairment and the inconsistency between the level and frequency of his
treatment with the level of his complaints. (Id. at 448-51.) Notably, at the
December 2013 administrative hearing, Jaworski explained that he had
never attended physical therapy because every time he called a cab, “the
11

cab just never showed up.”10 (Id. at 506.) In addition, Jaworski testified
that he had never received injections or seen a specialist with respect to
his lower back impairment, and took only Ibuprofen and Tramadol, which
mostly relieved his back pain.11 (Id. at 506-07.) Jaworski also testified that
he had been walking to places more often, including the grocery store
located a few blocks from his home, and was able to carry groceries home
in a backpack. (Id. at 510-11.) The ALJ noted that Jaworski’s chest x-rays
have been normal, he failed to use his COPD medications, he smokes
daily, and, at the time of the hearing, he had failed to refill several of his
prescriptions for COPD in over a year and a half. (Id. at 224, 362, 408,
410, 427-28, 434, 450, 509, 792.) Thus, the ALJ concluded that the
severe functional limitations articulated by Dr. Denzien were not
well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques and inconsistent with other substantial evidence of record, and,

10

Jaworski contends that it was error for the ALJ to fault him for his inability to pay for
physical therapy. (Dkt. No. 12 at 13 n.11.) However, Jaworski’s testimony and treatment
notes indicate that it was a lack of desire to attend, and not an inability to pay, that prevented
him from ever attending physical therapy. (Tr. at 226, 229, 506.)
11

Indeed, in June 2008, Jaworski reported that Tramadol maintains reasonable control
of his back pain, and in August 2013 he reported that his back pain was “well controlled as
ususal.” (Tr. at 224, 805.)

12

therefore, not deserving of controlling weight. (Id. at 451.)12
In addition to the lack of clinical findings and Jaworski’s sporadic
treatment history, the opinion of consultative examiner Gilbert Jenouri is
inconsistent with Dr. Denzien’s restrictive opinion. After examining
Jaworski in December 2012, Dr. Jenouri opined that Jaworski suffered only
mild restrictions in his ability to lift, carry, walk, stand, bend, and climb
stairs, but should avoid known respiratory irritants. (Id. at 793-96.) While it
would have been prudent for the ALJ to thoroughly discuss Dr. Jenouri’s
opinion, because it is clear from his direct citation to the opinion that the
ALJ reviewed it, (id. at 445), and, more importantly, because the opinion is
consistent with the ALJ’s RFC determination,13 the court is not persuaded
that the ALJ’s failure to do so constitutes reversible error. See Walzer v.
12

Jaworski argues that remand is required because the ALJ noted that Dr. Denzien’s
opinions failed to provide a specific diagnosis for Jaworski’s back condition, and, instead,
“describe[d] it as ‘chronic back pain.’” (Tr. at 451; Dkt. No. 12 at 10-11.) As the ALJ
considered all of the diagnoses of record, concluded that Jaworski suffered from mild lumbar
spine degenerative disc disease, and evaluated Dr. Denzien’s opinions on the basis of their
evidentiary support and consistency with the record, the court sees no reason to remand on
this basis. (Tr. at 445-51.) Indeed, the ALJ was correct in noting that symptoms are not in
and of themselves distinct impairments, as the former are used to establish the latter. See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1508.
13

Jaworski argues that Dr. Jenouri’s opinion is inconsistent with the RFC determination
because it precludes Jaworski from exposure to respiratory irritants, while the RFC
determination precluded him from “concentrated exposure” to respiratory irritants. (Compare
Tr. at 446, with id. at 796; Dkt. No. 12 at 18.) However, as this opinion is consistent with the
opinions of Drs. Denzien and Magurno, which the ALJ discounted for the reasons discussed
elsewhere, remand is unnecessary on this basis as well.

13

Chater, No. 93 Civ. 6240, 1995 WL 791963, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26,
1995) (explaining that, where discussion of an omitted medical report
“would not have changed the outcome of the ALJ’s decision,” such
omission constitutes “harmless error”).
With respect to consultative examiner Magurno, the ALJ explained
that Jaworski would not cooperate with the examination by refusing to
change out of his clothes and refusing to allow Dr. Magurno to test his
reflexes. (Tr. at 251-52, 449.) Further, Dr. Magurno’s opinion was not
supported by diagnostic images, because the June 2009 x-ray Dr.
Magurno reviewed revealed only a transitional L5 vertebral body, and was
otherwise unremarkable. (Id. at 255.) The height of the vertebral bodies
and intervertebral disc spaces were well maintained, and the pedicles were
intact throughout. (Id.) Further, Dr. Magurno reviewed past x-ray results
indicating a normal lumbosacral spine. (Id. at 252.) Because the ALJ
found Jaworski’s subjective complaints not entirely credible, see infra Part
VI.B, and the results of Dr. Magurno’s examination were unreliable due to
Jaworski’s refusal to cooperate with the examination, the ALJ discounted
Dr. Magurno’s functional assessment. (Tr. at 452); see Roy v. Massanari,
No. Civ. 3:01 CV306, 2002 WL 32502101, at *3 (D. Conn. June 12, 2002)
14

(explaining that, there is no “basis in law by which an ALJ must accept a
medical opinion in its entirety even when premised on arguably false
representations”).
Finally, Jaworski argues that the ALJ failed to consider the combined
effects of his obesity with his other impairments. (Dkt. No. 12 at 18-19.)
This argument, which is devoid of any citation to the administrative record,
overlooks the fact that “there is no obligation on an ALJ to single out a
claimant’s obesity for discussion in all cases.” Cruz v. Barnhart, No. 04
CIV 9011, 2006 WL 1228581, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2006). Here,
Jaworski points to no medical evidence that he is limited by his obesity,
and a review of the record, including the administrative hearing, reveals no
subjective complaints of such limitations. (Dkt. No. 12 at 18-19.) As such,
the court determines that the ALJ did not err in failing to explicitly address
Jaworski’s obesity in his RFC determination.
In sum, contrary to Jaworski’s arguments, the ALJ provided good
reasons for choosing to discount the opinions of Drs. Denzien and
Magurno. (Tr. at 446-52.) In reaching that conclusion, the ALJ explicitly
referenced 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527, as well as relevant Social Security
Rulings. (Id. at 447.) Further, it is evident from the ALJ’s direct citation to
15

Dr. Denzien’s treatment notes spanning a twelve-year-period, (id. at 44851), that the nature and duration of Dr. Denzien’s treatment relationship
with Jaworski were properly considered. As it is clear that he properly
applied § 404.1527(c), the ALJ did not err in failing to methodically discuss
each individual factor, and his assessment of the opinions of Drs. Denzien
and Magurno is legally sound. See SSR 06-03p, 71 Fed. Reg. 45,593,
45,596 (Aug. 9, 2006) (“Not every factor for weighing opinion evidence will
apply in every case.”). Moreover, in applying the appropriate legal
standards to evaluate these medical opinions, the ALJ arrived at an RFC
determination that is supported by substantial evidence. See Pellam v.
Astrue, 508 F. App’x 87, 89-91(2d Cir. 2013) (holding that, where a
claimant’s treatment records revealed only that she suffered limited or no
pain and was somewhat limited in her range of motion, the ALJ’s RFC
determination, which accounted for these factors, was supported by
substantial evidence, despite the fact that the ALJ claimed to have rejected
the only functional assessment of record).
B.

Credibility Determination
Next, Jaworski argues that the ALJ failed to properly assess his

credibility. (Dkt. No. 12 at 21-25.) According to Jaworski, the ALJ’s
16

credibility finding is unsupported by substantial evidence because the ALJ
failed to consider all of his testimony with respect to his limitations, and
improperly discounted his allegations based on his conservative treatment
history, daily activities, and poor work history. (Id.) The court disagrees.
Once the ALJ determines that the claimant suffers from a “medically
determinable impairment[] that could reasonably be expected to produce
the [symptoms] alleged,” he “must evaluate the intensity and persistence of
those symptoms considering all of the available evidence; and, to the
extent that the claimant’s [subjective] contentions are not substantiated by
the objective medical evidence, the ALJ must engage in a credibility
inquiry.” Meadors v. Astrue, 370 F. App’x 179, 183 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). In performing this analysis, the
ALJ “must consider the entire case record and give specific reasons for the
weight given to the [claimant’s] statements.” SSR 96-7p, 61 Fed. Reg.
34,483, 34,485 (July 2, 1996). Specifically, in addition to the objective
medical evidence, the ALJ must consider the following factors: “1) daily
activities; 2) location, duration, frequency and intensity of any symptoms; 3)
precipitating and aggravating factors; 4) type, dosage, effectiveness, and
side effects of any medications taken; 5) other treatment received; and 6)
17

other measures taken to relieve symptoms.” F.S. v. Astrue, No. 1:10-CV444, 2012 WL 514944, at *19 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2012) (citing 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1529(c)(3)(i)-(vi)).
Here, the ALJ determined that Jaworski’s statements concerning the
intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his symptoms were “not
entirely credible.” (Tr. at 447.) In making this determination, the ALJ
considered the objective medical findings, opinion evidence, Jaworski’s
course of treatment, and his daily activities. (Id. at 451.) In particular, the
ALJ noted that Jaworski has never been referred to a specialist, failed to
attend physical therapy, and consistently had no neurological deficits on
examination. (Id.) Further, the ALJ considered Jaworski’s sporadic
treatment history, mostly aimed at attaining public assistance benefits, and
his failure to use prescribed medication to treat his COPD. (Id.) The ALJ
also noted Jaworski’s own admissions that his medications control his back
pain, the fact that diagnostic images of his back revealed no more than
minimal findings, and his ability to perform the activities of daily living
independently. (Id.)
Jaworski contends that the ALJ’s credibility determination failed to
specify which of his statements were exaggerated or inconsistent with the
18

signs and findings in the record, thereby preventing meaningful judicial
review. (Dkt. No. 12 at 23.) However, the ALJ explicitly stated that
Jaworski’s contention that he cannot sit or stand for more than half of onehour due to asthma and his back impairment, was inconsistent with the
above mentioned evidence. (Tr. at 447.) The ALJ further explained that
Jaworski’s testimony regarding the reasons why he did not attend physical
therapy was inconsistent with Dr. Denzien’s contemporaneous treatment
notes. (Id. at 448.) Next, the ALJ explained that Jaworski’s testimony and
allegations to treating providers with respect to his breathing problems
were inconsistent with his use of prescribed medications. (Id. at 450.)
Thus, the court is satisfied that the ALJ’s credibility determination is
sufficiently specific. See SSR 96-7p, 61 Fed. Reg. at 34,485.
Jaworski also asserts that the ALJ improperly discounted his
subjective complaints due to the fact that he followed a prescribed course
of conservative treatment. (Dkt. No. 12 at 23.) On the contrary, the fact
that he was never referred to a specialist, and received only Ibuprofen and
Tramadol as treatment for his back pain is probative of Jaworski’s
credibility. See SSR 96-7p, 61 Fed. Reg. at 34,487 (explaining that
“[p]ersistent attempts by the individual to obtain relief of pain or other
19

symptoms, such as by increasing medications, trials of a variety of
treatment modalities in an attempt to find one that works[, or] referrals to
specialists . . . generally lend support to an individual’s allegations”). With
respect to the side effects of his medications, Jaworski has not pointed to
any evidence of record that the medications he takes for his back pain,
Ibuprofen and Tramadol, cause any side effects. (Dkt. No. 12 at 23-24.)
Moreover, the fact that he discontinued taking prescribed medication for
his COPD because he saw no “immediate benefit” does not bolster his
credibility. See SSR 96-7p, 61 Fed. Reg. at 34,487.
With respect to his daily activities, the ALJ accurately cited the
evidence of record when he noted that Jaworski is able to cook, clean, do
laundry, and shop. (Tr. at 249, 447.) Although Jaworski testified that he
was restricted in his ability to perform these activities, information about a
claimant’s daily activities recorded by medical sources and reported in the
medical evidence “can be extremely valuable in the adjudicator’s
evaluation of an individual’s statements about pain or other symptoms.”
SSR 96-7p, 61 Fed. Reg. at 34,486. Lastly, with respect to his work
history, the ALJ’s finding that Jaworski did not stop working part time at the
DSS because of his impairments, but rather because he overslept and was
20

asked not to return, is supported by the record. (Tr. at 447, 507-08.)
Further, a poor work history is one of many factors that the ALJ may
consider in weighing the credibility of claimant testimony. See Schaal v.
Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 502 (2d Cir. 1998).
Ultimately, there is no reason to disturb the ALJ’s credibility
assessment, as the ALJ’s reasons are grounded in the evidence and
articulated in his decision. See SSR 96-7p, 61 Fed. Reg. at 34,485-86.
C.

Step Five Determination
Finally, Jaworski claims that the ALJ erred in determining that jobs

exist in significant numbers in the national economy that he is capable of
performing. (Dkt. No. 12 at 19-21.) Specifically, he alleges that the ALJ’s
errors in assessing his RFC and credibility, along with a failure to include in
the hypothetical posed to the vocational expert (VE) the limitations
articulated by Dr. Denzien, fatally undermine the step-five determination.
(Id.) As discussed above, however, the ALJ’s RFC and credibility findings
were legally sound and are supported by substantial evidence. Although
the hypothetical question did not include a recitation of Dr. Denzien’s
limitations, it appropriately encompassed the restrictions contained in the
ALJ’s RFC analysis. (Compare Tr. at 446, with id. at 521-22.) As such,
21

the ALJ’s step-five determination was free of legal error and is supported
by substantial evidence. See Mancuso v. Astrue, 361 F. App’x 176, 179
(2d Cir. 2010) (explaining that, if the ALJ’s RFC assessment is supported
by substantial evidence, it is appropriate for him to rely on that RFC
assessment in questioning the VE.) Although Jaworski argues that his
need to avoid respiratory irritants would preclude him from performing work
as a housekeeper, one of the three jobs the VE identified, because the
finding of one job is sufficient to demonstrate that there is other work that
Jaworski could perform, this argument is meritless. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1566(b); Martin v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:06-CV-720, 2008 WL
4793717, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2008).
D.

Remaining Findings and Conclusions
After careful review of the record, the court affirms the remainder of

the ALJ’s decision as it is supported by substantial evidence.
VII. Conclusion
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED and
Jaworski’s complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is DISMISSED; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk close this case and provide a copy of this
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Memorandum-Decision and Order to the parties.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
September 30, 2015
Albany, New York

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