Graven et al v. Greene Central School District
Filing
34
DECISION & ORDER granting in part and denying in part # 16 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Defendant's motion is granted in part (to the extent that it requests the dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint) but denied in part (to the exten t that it requests that the dismissal be immediate and without a prior opportunity to amend). It is ordered that Plaintiffs shall have 30 days from the date of this Decision and Order in which to file an Amended and/or Supplemental Complaint that cures the pleading defects identified in this Decision and Order, and that if they fail to do so, their Complaint shall be DISMISSED without further Order of the Court. Signed by Judge Glenn T. Suddaby on 3/31/15. (lmw)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
__________________________________________
KELLY GRAVEN and ELIZABETH BRIGGS
on behalf of DGB, an infant,
Plaintiffs,
3:14-CV-0806
(GTS/DEP)
v.
GREENE CENT. SCH. DIST.,
Defendant.
__________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
OF COUNSEL:
LAW OFFICE OF RONALD R. BENJAMIN
Counsel for Plaintiffs
P.O. Box 607
Binghamton, NY 13902-0607
RONALD R. BENJAMIN, ESQ.
HOGAN SARZYNSKI
Counsel for Defendant
P.O. Box 660
Binghamton, NY 13902-0660
WENDY K. DeWIND, ESQ.
GLENN T. SUDDABY, United States District Judge
DECISION and ORDER
Currently before the Court, in this action filed by Kelly Graven and Elizabeth Briggs on
behalf of the infant DGB (“Plaintiffs”) against the Greene Central School District (“Defendant”)
under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), is Defendant’s motion to
dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(7). (Dkt.
No. 16.) For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s motion is granted in part and denied in
part.
I.
RELEVANT BACKGROUND
A.
Plaintiffs’ Complaint
Because the parties have (in their memoranda of law) demonstrated an adequate
understanding of the allegations and claim asserted in Plaintiffs’ Complaint, the Court will not
repeat that information in this Decision and Order, which is intended primarily for the review of
the parties. Rather, the Court will state merely that, as relief for their IDEA claim, Plaintiffs
seek an Order directing Defendant to cooperate in placing their son, DGB, in a residential
treatment facility (“RTF”) that has expertise in treating his Reactive Attachment Disorder
(“RAD”), and assuming financially responsibility for the cost of that placement, due to its
obligation to provide DGB with a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) under the IDEA.
(Dkt. No. 1.)
B.
Parties’ Arguments on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
1.
Defendant’s Memorandum of Law
Generally, in its memorandum of law, Defendant asserts three arguments. (Dkt. No. 16,
Attach. 5 [Def.’s Memo. of Law].)
First, argues Defendant, Plaintiffs’s Complaint must be dismissed for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), because they have failed to exhaust their
administrative remedies before filing this action, given that an administrative appeal was filed
from the decision of the Impartial Hearing Officer (“IHO”) to the New York State Education
Department Office of State Review (“SRO”) but no decision has yet been received regarding that
appeal. (Id.)
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Second, argues Defendant, in any event, Plaintiffs’ Complaint must be dismissed for
failure to join all parties necessary to permit complete relief and to prevent multiple and
inconsistent obligations under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(8) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 9, because (a) DGB is
currently in the care of the New York State Office of Mental Health (which may make a decision
that is contrary to this Court’s decision), (b) the Chenango County Department of Social
Services is actively investigating an abuse-and-neglect complaint pursuant to Article 10 of the
New York State Family Court Act and could make their own placement recommendation (which
may be contrary to this Court’s decision), and (c) the Afton Central School District, as the
district of residence of DGB’s parents, is currently responsible for making the 2014-2015 special
education placement (which may be contrary to this Court’s decision). (Id.)
Third, argues Defendant, in any event, Plaintiffs’ Complaint must be dismissed for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), because DGB
was discharged from Stillwater effective July 11, 2014 (pursuant to the Memorandum and Order
of New York State Supreme Court Justice Kevin M. Dowd) and thus Defendant no longer bears
an obligation to place DGB (given that he is currently not located in the Greene Central School
District but is a resident of the Afton Central School District). (Id.)
2.
Plaintiffs’ Opposition Memorandum of Law
Generally, in their opposition memorandum of law, Plaintiffs assert three arguments.
(Dkt. No. 24 [Plfs.’ Opp’n Memo. of Law].)
First, argue Plaintiffs, Defendant’s lack-of-subject-matter-jurisdiction argument
(regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies) fails because, under the applicable standard of
review, the Complaint alleges facts that, if true, would clearly excuse exhaustion. (Id.)
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Second, argue Plaintiffs, Defendant’s failure-to-join-a-party argument (regarding the
pending actions and/or responsibilities of the New York State Office of Mental Health, the
Chenango County Department of Social Services, and the Afton Central School District) fails
because Defendant has not shown why this Court cannot accord complete relief to Plaintiffs
solely from Defendant, and indeed offers mere speculation regarding what action(s) the
referenced entities may take that could conflict with the Court’s decision. (Id.)
Third, argue Plaintiffs, Defendant’s failure-to-state-a-claim argument (regarding DGB’s
current location and residence) fails because, in fact, “DGB is still at Stillwater” and, in any
event, Defendant’s argument is based on its interpretation of state law that is no longer viable
after the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7
(1993) (Id.)
3.
Defendant’s Reply Memorandum of Law
Generally, in its reply memorandum of law (filed on August 19, 2014), Defendant argues
that, on August 15, 2014, the SRO decided Plaintiffs’ administrative appeal, determining that
Defendant is not required to consider a residential placement for DGB other than the RTF
located by Defendant, and remanding the matter to Defendant to determine if it retains
programmatic responsibility for DGB’s education consistent with the decision. (Dkt. No. 26
[Def.’s Reply Memo. of Law].) Defendant also argues that, “[a]s per the decision of the New
York State Review Officer, the District will be holding a CSE meeting in the next week or so to
determine whether they have any authority over the Student’s programming at this time.” (Id.)
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II.
GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARDS
Because the parties have (in their memoranda of law) demonstrated an adequate
understanding of the legal standards governing Plaintiffs’ IDEA claim and Defendant’s motion,
the Court will not recite that information in this Decision and Order, which (again) is intended
primarily for the review of the parties.
III.
ANALYSIS
As an initial matter, it appears that Defendant’s lack-of-subject-matter-jurisdiction
argument (regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies) has been mooted by the SRO’s
decision of August 15, 2014. The Court notes that it may consider evidence outside the four
corners of a complaint on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). As a result, the Court cannot, at this time, conclude that it lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ Complaint.
Also apparently mooted has been Defendant’s failure-to-state-a-claim argument
(regarding DGB’s current location and residence). While the Court cannot consider Plaintiffs’
argument that “DGB is still at Stillwater” on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, it
can consider the SRO’s decision of August 15, 2014, which the Court finds to be integral to the
Complaint, and which Defendant submitted as an attachment to its reply memorandum of law
without subsequent challenge (by Plaintiffs) to its authenticity.1 In that decision, the SRO
1
See L-7 Designs, Inc. v. Old Navy, LLC, No. 10-573, 2011 WL 2135734, at *1 (2d
Cir. June 1, 2011) (explaining that conversion from a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim to a motion for summary judgment is not necessary under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12[d] if the
“matters outside the pleadings” in consist of, inter alia, [1] documents incorporated by reference
in the complaint (and provided by the parties), or [2] documents that, although not incorporated
by reference, are “integral” to the complaint); DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C., 622 F.3d 104,
111 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Where a document is not incorporated by reference, the court may neverless
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acknowledges uncertainty about DGB’s current location (as of August 15, 2014), specifically,
whether or not he had, in fact, been discharged from Stillwater as directed by Judge Dowd. (Dkt.
No. 26, Attach. 2, at 10.) As a result, the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiff has failed to allege
facts plausibly suggesting that Defendant is DGB’s district of location.
More problematic for Plaintiffs is Defendant’s failure-to-join-a-party argument
(regarding the pending actions and/or responsibilities of the New York State Office of Mental
Health, the Chenango County Department of Social Services, and the Afton Central School
District). The Court is inclined to agree with Defendant that at least one of the three entities it
references is necessary for the reasons Defendant state in its memorandum of law. (See, supra,
Part I.B. of this Decision and Order.) Simply stated, Plaintiffs’ Complaint raises, but does not
dispel, questions about this necessity. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(c) (requiring a party to state
the reasons for not joining a necessary party).
However, whether than immediately dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint on this ground, the
Court finds it fair and efficient, under the circumstances, to first give Plaintiffs an opportunity to
amend and/or supplement their Complaint to correct the aforementioned pleading defects.
Plaintiffs may, in their amended and/or supplemental complaint, also address (among other
consider it where the complaint relies heavily upon its terms and effect, thereby rendering the
document ‘integral’ to the complaint. . . . However, even if a document is ‘integral’ to the
complaint, it must be clear on the record that no dispute exists regarding the authenticity or
accuracy of the document. It must also be clear that there exist no material disputed issues of
fact regarding the relevance of the document.”) [internal quotation marks and citations omitted];
Int'l Audiotext Network, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 62 F.3d 69, 72 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam)
(“[W]hen a plaintiff chooses not to attach to the complaint or incorporate by reference a
[document] upon which it solely relies and which is integral to the complaint, the court may
nevertheless take the document into consideration in deciding [a] defendant's motion to dismiss,
without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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things) the SRO’s decision of August 15, 2014, as well as the CSE meeting held by Defendant
during the weeks following that decision.
Plaintiffs are advised that their amended and/or supplemental complaint must be a
complete pleading, which will supersede their original complaint in all respects, and may not
incorporate by reference any portion of their original Complaint. N.D.N.Y. L.R. 7.1(a)(4).
Plaintiffs are also advised that, should they fail to file such an amended and/or supplemental
complaint within the time allotted, their Complaint shall be dismissed with prejudice. Finally,
the parties are advised that nothing in this Decision and Order shall preclude Defendant from
moving to dismiss any amended and/or supplemental complaint filed by Plaintiffs.
ACCORDINGLY, it is
ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(7) (Dkt. No. 16) is GRANTED in part (to the extent that it
requests the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Complaint) but DENIED in part (to the extent that it
requests that the dismissal be immediate and without a prior opportunity to amend); and it is
further
ORDERED that Plaintiffs shall have THIRTY (30) DAYS from the date of this
Decision and Order in which to file an AMENDED and/or SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT
that attempts to cure the pleading defects identified in this Decision and Order, and that if they
fail to do so, their Complaint shall be DISMISSED without further Order of the Court.
Dated: March 31, 2015
Syracuse, New York
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