Greeson v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 17

DECISION AND ORDER denying # 14 Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings; granting # 17 Defendant's cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Commissioner's determination is affirmed, and the Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed. Signed by Chief Judge Glenn T. Suddaby on 6/23/16. (lmw)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_________________________________________
LESLIE JO GREESON,
Plaintiff,
v.

3:15-CV-0365 (GTS)

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
_________________________________________
APPEARANCES:

OF COUNSEL:

LEGAL ASSISTANCE OF W. NEW YORK, INC.
Counsel for Plaintiff
215 North Cayuga Street
Ithaca, NY 14850

GREGG A. THOMAS, ESQ.

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL–REGION II
Counsel for Defendant
26 Federal Plaza, Room 3904
New York, NY 10278

SIXTINA FERNANDEZ, ESQ.
Assistant United States Attorney

GLENN T. SUDDABY, Chief United States District Judge
DECISION and ORDER
Currently before the Court, in this Social Security action filed by Thomas Schieno
(“Plaintiff”) against the Commissioner of Social Security (“Defendant” or “the Commissioner”)
seeking Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”)
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c), are the parties’ cross-motions for judgment on the
pleadings. (Dkt. Nos. 10, 12.) For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion is denied and
Defendant’s cross-motion is granted.

I.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND
A.

Factual Background

Plaintiff was born on April 25, 1964. She graduated from college with a degree in
psychology. Her employment history consists of work as a bookkeeper, a town clerk and a
social welfare examiner. Generally, her alleged disability consists of chronic pain syndrome,
fibromyalgia, a ruptured disk, degenerative disk disease, scoliosis, carpal tunnel syndrome,
migraines, chronic fatigue syndrome, Raynaud’s disease, and bilateral rotator cuff tendinitis.
Plaintiff’s alleged disability onset date is November 18, 2010.
B.

Relevant Procedural History

On October 27, 2011, Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI under Titles II and XVI of the
Social Security Act. Her application was initially denied, after which she timely requested a
hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“the ALJ”). On May 29, 2013, Plaintiff appeared
before the ALJ, Marie Greener. (T. 30.) On July 8, 2013, the ALJ issued a written decision
finding Plaintiff not disabled under the Social Security Act. (T. 22.) On January 26, 2015, the
Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, rendering the ALJ’s decision the final
decision of the Commissioner. (T. 1-3.) Thereafter, Plaintiff timely sought judicial review in
this Court.
C.

The ALJ’s Decision

Generally, in her decision, the ALJ made the following six findings of fact and
conclusions of law. (T. 11-22.) First, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial
gainful activity since November 18, 2010, the alleged onset date. (T. 13.) Second, the ALJ
found that Plaintiff had one severe impairment: degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine.

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(Id.) Third, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s impairments do not meet or equal the severity of the
listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925, and
416.926. (T. 16-17.) Fourth, the ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) to perform sedentary work. (T. 17.) Fifth, the ALJ found Plaintiff able to
perform her past relevant work as a town clerk. (T. 20.) Sixth, and finally, the ALJ found that
there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can
perform, and therefore found her not disabled. (T. 20-21.)
II.

THE PARTIES’ BRIEFINGS ON THE ALJ’S DECISION
A.

Plaintiff’s Arguments

Generally, Plaintiff makes three arguments in support of her motion for judgment on the
pleadings. First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to give proper weight to the medical opinion
evidence from various medical sources. (Dkt. No. 14 at 9-13 [Pl.’s Mem. of Law].) Second,
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly assess Plaintiff’s credibility. (Id. at 13-17.)
Third, and finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial
evidence. (Id. at 17-22.)
B.

Defendant’s Arguments

Generally, Defendant makes two arguments in support of her cross-motion for judgment
on the pleadings. First, Defendant argues that the ALJ properly evaluated the medical opinion
evidence in determining Plaintiff’s RFC. (Dkt. No 15 at 7-12 [Def.’s Mem. of Law].) Second,
and finally, Defendant argues that the ALJ’s credibility determination is supported by substantial
evidence. (Id. at 12-15.)

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III.

RELEVANT LEGAL STANDARDS
A.

Standard of Review

A court reviewing a denial of disability benefits may not determine de novo whether
an individual is disabled. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Wagner v. Sec’y of Health & Human
Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990). Rather, the Commissioner’s determination will be
reversed only if the correct legal standards were not applied, or the determination was not
supported by substantial evidence. See Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 986 (2d Cir. 1987)
(“Where there is a reasonable basis for doubt whether the ALJ applied correct legal principles,
application of the substantial evidence standard to uphold a finding of no disability creates an
unacceptable risk that a claimant will be deprived of the right to have her disability
determination made according to the correct legal principles.”); accord, Grey v. Heckler, 721
F.2d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1983); Marcus v. Califano, 615 F.2d 23, 27 (2d Cir. 1979).
“Substantial evidence” is evidence that amounts to “more than a mere scintilla,” and has
been defined as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Where evidence is
deemed susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the Commissioner’s conclusion
must be upheld. See Rutherford v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1982).
“To determine on appeal whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial
evidence, a reviewing court considers the whole record, examining evidence from both sides,
because an analysis of the substantiality of the evidence must also include that which detracts
from its weight.” Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1988).

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If supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s finding must be sustained
“even where substantial evidence may support the plaintiff’s position and despite that the court’s
independent analysis of the evidence may differ from the [Commissioner’s].” Rosado v.
Sullivan, 805 F. Supp. 147, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). In other words, this Court must afford the
Commissioner’s determination considerable deference, and may not substitute “its own
judgment for that of the [Commissioner], even if it might justifiably have reached a different
result upon a de novo review.” Valente v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 733 F.2d 1037, 1041
(2d Cir. 1984).
B.

Standard to Determine Disability

The Commissioner has established a five-step evaluation process to determine whether an
individual is disabled as defined by the Social Security Act. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520. The
Supreme Court has recognized the validity of this sequential evaluation process. Bowen v.
Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987). The five-step process is as follows:
First, the [Commissioner] considers whether the claimant is currently
engaged in substantial gainful activity. If he is not, the [Commissioner]
next considers whether the claimant has a “severe impairment” which
significantly limits his physical or mental ability to do basic work
activities. If the claimant suffers such an impairment, the third inquiry is
whether, based solely on medical evidence, the claimant has an
impairment which is listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. If the
claimant has such an impairment, the [Commissioner] will consider him
disabled without considering vocational factors such as age, education,
and work experience; the [Commissioner] presumes that a claimant who is
afflicted with a “listed” impairment is unable to perform substantial
gainful activity. Assuming the claimant does not have a listed
impairment, the fourth inquiry is whether, despite the claimant’s severe
impairment, he has the residual functional capacity to perform his past
work. Finally, if the claimant is unable to perform his past work, the
[Commissioner] then determines whether there is other work which the
claimant could perform. Under the cases previously discussed, the
claimant bears the burden of the proof as to the first four steps, while the
[Commissioner] must prove the final one.
Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982).
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IV.

ANALYSIS
A.

Whether the ALJ Properly Weighed the Medical Opinion Evidence

After careful consideration, the Court answers this question in the affirmative for the
reasons provided in Defendant’s memorandum of law. (Dkt. No. 15 at 6-12.) To those reasons,
the Court adds the following analysis.
Under what is known as the “treating physician rule,” the ALJ shall give a treating
source’s opinion “controlling weight” if it is supported by “medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques,” and is “not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence” in
the record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). If the opinion is not afforded controlling weight, the
ALJ must determine the proper weight to afford it by considering (1) the length, nature, and
extent of the treatment relationship, (2) how well the medical source supports his or her opinion
with evidence, (3) how consistent the opinion is with regard to the entire record, (4) whether the
source had a relevant specialization, and (5) any other relevant factors. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c).
When assigning weight to the opinion of a medical source other than a treating physician, an
ALJ must still consider the opinion’s supportability, its consistency with the record, the medical
source’s specialization, any examining relationship that existed, and any other relevant evidence.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1)-(6).
In rejecting a treating physician’s opinion or assigning weight to medical evidence, an
ALJ need not expressly enumerate each factor considered if the ALJ’s reasoning and adherence
to the treating physician rule is clear. See, e.g., Atwater v. Astrue, 512 F. App’x 67, 70 (2d Cir.
2013) (“We require no such slavish recitation of each and every factor where the ALJ’s
reasoning and adherence to the regulation are clear.”).

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Here, Plaintiff appears to argue that the ALJ’s decision to disregard the medical source
statements of Dr. Jacob Skezas, M.D., was arbitrary. More specifically, she criticizes the ALJ’s
decision to give greater weight to the opinion of a consultative examiner, Dr. Pamela Tabb,
M.D., whom Plaintiff repeatedly refers to as a “pediatrician.” (Dkt. No. 14 at 9, 11.) Plaintiff
similarly criticizes the ALJ’s reliance on the opinions of State Agency Medical Consultant Dr. S.
Kosick, which opinions Plaintiff argues are primarily based on Dr. Tabb’s consultative
examination. (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff argues that the ALJ then “had to concoct” a reason to give less
weight to the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating physicians in order to find Plaintiff not disabled.
(Id.) Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ “overrule[d] a judgment rendered by the current
treating physician with extensive personal contact with the claimant,” and improperly relied on
her own lay analysis of the medical evidence. (Id. at 12.)
The administrative record makes clear that there are inconsistencies between the various
medical sources. However, contrary to Plaintiff’s arguments, the ALJ is not required to assign
greater weight to a treating physician’s opinion than to the opinion of a consultative examiner.
In fact, “[t]he Commissioner is not required, nor even necessarily permitted, to accept any single
opinion, even that of a treating physician, as dispositive on the determination of disability.”
Francois v. Astrue, 09-CV-6625, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61456, at *17-18 (S.D.N.Y. June 18,
2010) (citing Green-Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99, 106 [2d Cir. 2008]). Rather, “[g]enuine
conflicts in the medical evidence are for the Commissioner to resolve.” Veino v. Barnhart, 312
F.3d 578, 588 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Richardson, 402 U.S. at 399). Contrary to Plaintiff’s
characterization of the ALJ’s analysis, the ALJ was merely resolving evidentiary conflicts,
which is one of her roles as an ALJ.

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As discussed above, a treating source’s opinion is entitled to controlling weight only
when it is well supported by “medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques,” and is “not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence” in the record. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). Dr. Skezas’s Physical RFC assessments, dated April 24, 2013, are not
well supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques, and are in
fact inconsistent with other substantial evidence.
The primary basis for Dr. Skezas’s treatment appears to be Plaintiff’s self-reported
subjective symptoms. (T. 466-475.) Dr. Skezas’s own treatment notes indicate that he is not
experienced with regard to pain disorders or qualified to practice pain management, and that he
began managing Plaintiff’s pain condition only after her prior pain management specialist
stopped accepting her insurance. (T. 449.)
Furthermore, Dr. Skezas found no cause for Plaintiff’s symptoms. More specifically, Dr.
Skezas noted that a neurologist, Dr. Endo, did not find any neurological cause for her pain. (T.
474.) He also noted that lab results showed mostly insignificant abnormalities, and that X-rays
were unremarkable. (T. 471.) In his own words, he was “not really sure what [Plaintiff] has
with respect to her symptoms.” (Id.) Although he could not find a cause for her self-reported
pain symptoms, he nevertheless prescribed narcotics to prevent her from entering withdrawal.
(Id.) His initial diagnoses of Plaintiff’s disorders were followed by question marks. (T. 474.)
Under these circumstances, the Court finds that Dr. Skezas’s opinions were not well supported
by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.
Furthermore, Dr. Skezas’s opinions included a number of limitations that are unsupported
by the medical record and indeed are inconsistent with other substantial evidence. For example,

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Dr. Skezas opined that Plaintiff is able to reach and manipulate objects only five percent of an
eight-hour workday. (T. 519.) However, the medical record is devoid of any manipulative
restrictions, either in the form of medical observations or self-reporting. On the contrary, at her
consultative examination, Plaintiff exhibited a full range of motion in her shoulders, elbows,
forearms and wrists, as well as intact dexterity and 5/5 grip strength. (T. 319.) Moreover,
although Dr. Skezas opined that Plaintiff could never squat, Plaintiff performed a full squat at
her consultative examination. (T. 519, 318.) Similarly, although Dr. Skezas opined that Plaintiff
could only sit for fifteen minutes at a time, Dr. Halpert opined in an identical document that
Plaintiff had no limitation in sitting. (T. 517, 521.)
Plaintiff argues that Dr. Halpert’s opinion should be disregarded because it is based only
on the conditions for which he treats her: migraines and numbness. (Dkt. No. 14 at 19.)
However, it is not as clear as Plaintiff suggests that Dr. Halpert based his opinions only on those
two conditions. Dr. Halpert opined in the same document that Plaintiff can stand only for ten to
fifteen minutes, can only rarely lift objects, and can only occasionally twist, stoop, crouch and
climb. (T. 521-23.) It is unclear how these restrictions related to migraines and numbness.
Notably, although “numbness” could contribute to difficulty manipulating objects, Dr. Halpert
noted no manipulation limitations. (T. 523.) Similar contradictions appear throughout
Plaintiff’s medical history. For example, treatment notes from Dr. Halpert repeatedly report that
Plaintiff has no back pain or myalgias, at least on the days he treated her. (T. 429, 427.)
Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, it does not appear that Dr. Halpert was merely unaware of
conditions other than those for which he treated Plaintiff, because he also notes Plaintiff’s weight
loss, nausea and sinus infections. (Id.) In short, because Dr. Skezas’s opinions are inconsistent

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with the other substantial evidence in the record, they are not entitled to controlling weight, and
the ALJ did not err in assigning them very little weight.
Moreover, Plaintiff criticizes the ALJ’s decision to give greater weight to the opinions of
Dr. Tabb, a consultative examiner, than to those of Plaintiff’s treating physician. However, the
Court notes that a consultative examination can constitute substantial evidence in support of an
ALJ’s decision. See Frawley v. Colvin, 13-CV-1567, 2014 WL 6810661 at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Dec.
2, 2014) (“The opinions of consultative examiners . . . may constitute substantial evidence
where, as here, [they are] supported by the medical evidence in the record.”). Dr. Tabb
performed a number of objective, clinical tests during her examination, and the Court finds that
her opinions are consistent with the longitudinal record of Plaintiff’s limitations, despite Dr.
Skezas’s unsupported opinions to the contrary. Unlike Dr. Skezas, Dr. Tabb did not base her
findings primarily on Plaintiff’s self-reported symptoms. Insofar as this issue implicates
Plaintiff’s credibility, it is addressed below in Part IV.B. of this Decision and Order.
Finally, Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ impermissibly relied on her own lay reading of
the medical evidence is without merit. As Plaintiff admits, the ALJ appears to have adopted the
RFC determination rendered by State Agency Medical Consultant Kosick, whose opinion was
based, at least in part, on Dr. Tabb’s consultative examination. (Dkt. No. 14 at 11.) “An ALJ is
entitled to rely upon the opinion of a State agency medical consultant, since such a consultant is
deemed to be a qualified expert in the field of social security disability.” Hildebrandt v.
Barnhart, 16-CV-0166, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17973, at *27 (N.D.N.Y. March 7, 2007).
Because the ALJ adopted the RFC findings of Dr. Kosick, she did not apply her own lay reading
of the medical evidence in reaching her conclusions. For all of these reasons, the ALJ did not err
in resolving the inconsistencies between the various medical opinions.
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B.

Whether the ALJ Properly Assessed Plaintiff’s Credibility

After careful consideration, the Court answers this question in the affirmative for the
reasons provided in Defendant’s memorandum of law. (Dkt. No. 15 at 12-15.) To those reasons,
the Court adds the following analysis.
Under certain circumstances, subjective reports of pain can support a finding of
disability. Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 135 (2d Cir. 1999); see also Genier v. Astrue, 606 F.3d
46, 49 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (noting that an ALJ must take a claimant’s report of pain and
symptoms into account in rendering decision on disability [citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.929;
McLaughlin v. Sec’y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 612 F.2d 701, 704-05 (2d Cir. 1980)]).
However, the ALJ is not required to blindly accept Plaintiff’s reports of pain, but rather, “may
exercise discretion in weighing the credibility of the claimant’s testimony in light of the other
evidence in the record.” Genier, 606 F.3d at 49 (citing Marcus v. Califano, 615 F.2d 23, 27 [2d
Cir. 1979]). In assessing a claimant’s credibility, the ALJ’s reasoning must be “set forth with
sufficient specificity to permit intelligible plenary review of the record.” Hilsdorf v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 724 F. Supp. 2d 330, 350 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255,
260-61 [2d Cir. 1988]).
The regulations set forth a two-step process to evaluate a claimant’s credibility. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1529(a). First, the ALJ determines whether medical signs or laboratory findings
show the existence of an impairment which “could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or
other symptoms alleged.” Id.; see also SSR 96-7p, 1996 SSR LEXIS 4 at *18 (July 2, 1996). If
the statements about pain or other symptoms are unsupported by medical evidence, they cannot,
on their own, establish that the claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a).

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Where the medical evidence alone does not substantiate a claimant’s subjective reports of
pain, the ALJ must evaluate the credibility of the claimant’s statements in light of the following
factors: (1) claimant’s daily activities; (2) the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of
claimant’s pain or other symptoms; (3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the type,
dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication claimant takes or has taken to alleviate
pain or other symptoms; (5) treatment–other than medication–claimant receives or has received
for relief of his pain or other symptoms; (6) any measures taken to relieve the symptoms; and (7)
other factors concerning claimant’s functional limitations and restrictions due to pain or other
symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3); see also Hilsdorf, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 349-50.
If the medical evidence does substantiate a claimant’s reported symptoms, the ALJ
proceeds to the second step of the analysis, and evaluates the “intensity and persistence” of the
claimant’s symptoms to determine the extent to which they limit the claimant’s capacity to work.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c). In conducting this evaluation, the ALJ examines not just objective
medical evidence, but also other evidence that may suggest a “greater severity of impairment
than can be shown by objective medical evidence alone.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.929(c)(3). The ALJ
also considers a claimant’s statements about the “intensity, persistence, and limiting effects” of
the symptoms alleged “in relation to the objective medical evidence and other evidence.” 20
C.F.R. § 404.929(c)(4).
Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could
reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms, but that Plaintiff’s statements concerning
the intensity, persistence, and limiting effect of those symptoms were not fully credible. (T. 18.)
The ALJ found Plaintiff’s statements not fully credible because she pursued only conservative

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treatment, which could indicate that Plaintiff’s pain is not as severe as alleged. (Id.) The ALJ
explained that Plaintiff’s treatment notes indicate that her pain was decreased or manageable
with treatment. (Id.) The ALJ explained also that a finding of “not fully credible” was required
because Plaintiff had failed to produce “appropriate, probative evidence” to corroborate the
alleged severity of her symptoms. (T. 19.) Finally, the ALJ reviewed what evidence Plaintiff
had presented, and the ALJ explained how that evidence indicated that Plaintiff could perform
sedentary work. (Id.)
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred when she failed to explicitly analyze the seven factors
located in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3). This argument is without merit. It is true that the ALJ’s
decision “must contain specific reasons for the finding on credibility, supported by the evidence
in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to the individual and to any
subsequent reviewers the weight the [ALJ] gave to the individual’s statements and the reasons
for that weight.” SSR 96-7p, 1996 SSR LEXIS 4. Nevertheless, while it is “not sufficient for
the [ALJ] to make a single, conclusory statement that” the claimant is not credible (id.), remand
is not required where “the evidence of record permits [the Court] to glean the rationale of an
ALJ’s decision.” Mongeur v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1033, 1040 (2d Cir. 1983). Here, the ALJ did
not make a single, conclusory statement, but set out her reasoning in a way that permits the
Court to glean the rationale of her decision (as demonstrated by the Court’s above analysis).
Therefore, failure to slavishly recite the statutory factors does not require remand in this case.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s interpretation of the evidence is incorrect, making
reference to several pieces of evidence that could have been interpreted to support a finding of
disability. For example, Plaintiff takes issue with the fact that “ALJ Greener . . . quote[s] the

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doctors reports showing that claimant’s pain management results improved slightly as a reason
to doubt her credibility when such results can just as easily be said to demonstrate that the
claimant chose wisely when she changed physicians.” (Dkt. No. 14 at 15.) This argument is
without merit for two reasons. First, it is the role of the Commissioner, and not this Court, “to
resolve evidentiary conflicts and to appraise the credibility of the witnesses, including the
claimant.” Aponte v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 728 F.2d 588, 591 (2d Cir.
1984). Second, “[i]f evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the
Commissioner’s conclusion must be upheld.” McIntyre v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 146, 149 (2014).
Here, at the very least, the evidence in question is susceptible to more than one rational
interpretation. For these reasons, the Court finds that the ALJ did not err in appraising Plaintiff’s
credibility.
C.

Whether the ALJ’s Decision Is Supported by Substantial Evidence

After careful consideration, the Court answers this question in the affirmative for the
reasons provided in Defendant’s memorandum of law. (Dkt. No. 15 at 6-15.) To those reasons,
the Court adds the following analysis.
Plaintiff’s argument on this issue relies entirely on her arguments regarding the ALJ’s
interpretation of the medical evidence and Plaintiff’s testimony. (Id.) As a result, Plaintiff’s
argument on this issue fails for the reasons discussed in Parts IV.A. and IV.B. of this Decision
and Order. The ALJ’s determinations with regard to resolving inconsistencies in the medical
evidence and determining Plaintiff’s credibility are supported by substantial evidence. Insofar as
the evidence could be interpreted differently, the Court reiterates that, when “evidence is
susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the Commissioner’s conclusion must be
upheld.” McIntyre, 758 F.3d at 149.

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ACCORDINGLY, it is
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. No. 14) is
DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED that Defendant’s cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. No. 17)
is GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED that the Commissioner’s determination is AFFIRMED; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is DISMISSED.
Dated: June 23, 2016
Syracuse, New York
________________________________
Hon. Glenn T. Suddaby
Chief U.S. District Judge

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