Griffin v. Smith et al

Filing 10

DECISION AND ORDERED, that the Report-Recommendation (Dkt. No. 7) is APPROVED and ADOPTED in its entirety; and it is further ORDERED, that Plaintiffs claims against Defendants Martin E. Smith, Gerald F. Mollen, and Robin Engler be DISMISSED without l eave to replead pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(B)(iii) and 1915A(b)(2), and that the Clerk of the Court enter judgment and close this action. Signed by Senior Judge Lawrence E. Kahn on October 07, 2016.***A copy of this Order & subsequent Judgment were served upon pro se party via US Mail & Certified Mail. (sas)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
RUDOLPH W. GRIFFIN,
Plaintiff,
-against-

3:16-CV-00519 (LEK/DEP)

MARTIN E. SMITH, et al.,
Defendants.

DECISION AND ORDER
I.

INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the Court following a Report-Recommendation filed on June

16, 2016, by the Honorable David E. Peebles, U.S. Magistrate Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b) and Local Rule 72.3. Dkt. No. 7 (“Report-Recommendation”). Pro se Plaintiff Rudolph
W. Griffin timely filed Objections. Dkt. No. 9 (“Objections”).
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
Within fourteen days after a party has been served with a copy of a magistrate judge’s

report-recommendation, the party “may serve and file specific, written objections to the proposed
findings and recommendations.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); L.R. 72.1(c). If no objections are made, or
if an objection is general, conclusory, perfunctory, or a mere reiteration of an argument made to
the magistrate judge, a district court need review that aspect of a report-recommendation only for
clear error. Barnes v. Prack, No. 11-CV-0857, 2013 WL 1121353, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 18,
2013); Farid v. Bouey, 554 F. Supp. 2d 301, 306–07, 306 n.2 (N.D.N.Y. 2008); see also
Machicote v. Ercole, No. 06-CV-13320, 2011 WL 3809920, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2011)
(“[E]ven a pro se party’s objections to a Report and Recommendation must be specific and

clearly aimed at particular findings in the magistrate’s proposal, such that no party be allowed a
second bite at the apple by simply relitigating a prior argument.”). “A [district] judge . . . may
accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the
magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). Otherwise, a court “shall make a de novo determination of
those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which
objection is made.” Id.
III.

DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s Objections fail to respond to the two bases upon which Judge Peebles

recommended dismissal of the claims. The first ground of Judge Peebles’s decision was
Plaintiff’s failure to follow the rule established by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87
(1994), which held that a plaintiff asserting a § 1983 claim that challenges the constitutionality of
her conviction “must prove that the conviction . . . has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged
by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or
called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Judge Peebles also
relied on the absolute immunity afforded to prosecutors and judges. Rep.-Rec. at 8–11. Instead of
addressing these issues, Plaintiff appears to rehash the allegations in his Complaint regarding the
withholding of exculpatory evidence, the introduction of false and/or perjured testimony at trial,
and misrepresentations about a plea agreement reached with a witness. Dkt. No. 1 (“Complaint”)
at 4–8; Objs. at 1–2. Plaintiff also invokes the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and refers to
the “Just Compensation doctrine,” Objs. at 3, but these statements are not responsive to Judge
Peebles’s Report-Recommendation, and in any event they are conclusory, see Barnes, 2013 WL
1121353, at *1. Plaintiff quotes from Grooves v. Witherspoon, 379 F. Supp. 52, 60 (E.D. Tenn.
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1974), which held that “fraud upon the Court, or fraud which induces an adversary to withdraw
his defense or prevents him from presenting an available defense, is the type which equity will
relieve.” However, Plaintiff fails to show how this broad principle applies to this case, in which
prosecutorial and judicial immunity provide Defendants with absolute protection from suit, Rep.Rec. at 8–11, and which is barred in any event by Heck, id. at 7–8.
Since Plaintiff fails to state any specific objections to the Report-Recommendation, the
Court has reviewed the Report-Recommendation for clear error and has found none.
IV.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is hereby:
ORDERED, that the Report-Recommendation (Dkt. No. 7) is APPROVED and

ADOPTED in its entirety; and it is further
ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Martin E. Smith, Gerald F.
Mollen, and Robin Engler be DISMISSED without leave to replead pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(B)(iii) and 1915A(b)(2), and that the Clerk of the Court enter judgment and close this
action; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court serve a copy of this Decision and Order on all
parties in accordance with the Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:

October 07, 2016
Albany, New York

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