Raffe et al v. American National Red Cross et al

Filing 85

SUMMARY ORDER: It is ordered that the # 80 Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is GRANTED, therefore the # 76 Memorandum-Decision & Order is amended to reflect that defendants' motion for Summary Judgment regarding plaintiff's claims against them pursuant to New York Labor Law sections 191 and 195 is GRANTED, disposing of this action in its entirety. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of the defendants' and close this case. Signed by Senior Judge Neal P. McCurn on 1/17/2012. (jmb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Michael J. Raffe,
Plaintiff,
-v.-

5:08-cv-00211

American National Red Cross, American
National Red Cross of Tompkins County,
and Jennifer Yarbrough,
Defendants.

APPEARANCES
WIGGINS & KOPKO, LLP
Attorneys for Plaintiff
308 North Tioga Street
Ithaca, NY 14850

EDWARD E. KOPKO, ESQ.

EPSTEIN BECKER & GREEN, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendants
250 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10177

LAURI FAITH RASNICK, ESQ.
MARGARET C. THERING, ESQ.

Neal P. McCurn, Senior District Judge
Summary Order
Currently before the court is defendants’ unopposed1 motion to alter or
amend this court’s November 30, 2011 memorandum, decision and order

1

Plaintiff has submitted a Status Report indicating that he is not opposing
defendants’ motion. See Dkt. No. 84.

(“MDO”) granting in part and denying in part defendants’ motion for summary
judgment against plaintiff, pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See Dkt. No. 80. In the interest of justice, defendants’ motion is
granted, and summary judgment is awarded to defendants against plaintiff,
dismissing this action in its entirety.
Familiarity with this court’s very recent MDO granting in part and denying
in part defendants’ motion for summary judgment is presumed and will not be
discussed in detail here, except as is relevant to the pending motion. See Dkt. No.
76. Pursuant to the MDO, summary judgment was denied solely as to plaintiff’s
claims under New York Labor Law sections 191 and 195. Defendants now submit
what they refer to as “new undisputed documentary evidence” which, they argue,
establishes that they are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s sections 191
and 195(6) claims, and accordingly seek that relief by their present Rule 59(e)
motion.
To be sure, Rule 59(e) only provides for review of final judgments, not, as
here, an interlocutory order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Nonetheless, “[a] district
court has the inherent power to reconsider and modify its interlocutory orders prior
to the entry of judgment ....” J.C. Penney Corp., Inc. v. Carousel Center Co., L.P.,
No. 5:02-cv-1360, 2009 WL 3246794, at*3 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2009) (quoting
United States v. LoRusso, 695 F.2d 45, 53 (2d Cir.1982)).
Courts may grant a motion to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59(e)
where (1) there is an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) new evidence
not previously available comes to light; or (3) it becomes necessary to remedy a
clear error of law or to prevent obvious injustice. See Weiss v. City of New York,
No. 96-cv-8281, 2003 WL 21414309, at *1 (citing Virgin Atlantic Airways v.
2

Nat’s Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir. 1992). “The standard for
granting a Rule 59(e) motion is strict and reconsideration is generally denied as a
Rule 59(e) motion is not a vehicle for reargument or asserting arguments that
could and should have been made before judgment issued.” Id. (citation and
quotation omitted). Where the basis for a Rule 59(e) motion is, as here, newly
discovered evidence, the movant bears the burden to establish that
(1) the newly discovered evidence was of facts that
existed at the time of trial or other dispositive
proceeding, (2) the movant must have been justifiably
ignorant of them despite due diligence, (3) the evidence
must be admissible and of such importance that it
probably would have changed the outcome, and (4) the
evidence must not be merely cumulative or impeaching.
Becnel v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. 11-cv-1615, 2011 WL 6599229, *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 21, 2011) (quoting United States v. International Broth. of Teamsters, 247
F.3d 370, 392 (2d Cir.2001)). Finally, it is important to note that relief under Rule
59(e) is an “extraordinary remedy to be employed sparingly in the interests of
finality and conservation of scarce judicial resources.” Stewart Park and Reserve
Coalition Inc. (SPARC) v. Slater, 374 F. Supp. 2d 243, 253 (N.D.N.Y. 2005)
(quoting USA Certified Merchants, LLC v. Koebel, 273 F. Supp. 2d 501, 503
(S.D.N.Y. 2003)).
In support of their Rule 59(e) motion, defendants have produced evidence
relevant to their summary judgment motion on plaintiff’s claims pursuant to
sections 191 and 195(6) of New York’s Labor Law. Briefly, section 191 provides
in pertinent part that “[a] clerical and other worker shall be paid [by his employer]
the wages earned in accordance with the agreed terms of employment, but not less
frequently than semi-monthly, on regular pay days designated in advance by the
3

employer.” N.Y. LAB. LAW § 191(1)(d). The statute further provides, “[i]f
employment is terminated, the employer shall pay the wages not later than the
regular pay day for the pay period during which the termination occurred, as
established in accordance with the provisions of this section. If requested by the
employee, such wages shall be paid by mail.” Id. § 191(3). The court denied
summary judgment because it was faced with competing affidavits from plaintiff
and defendants, which created a question of fact regarding whether defendants
complied with section 191 by providing plaintiff all compensation to which he
was entitled. The court also noted that this question could have been resolved by
documentary evidence of plaintiff’s compensation record.
Section 195 provides, in pertinent part:
Every employer shall . . . notify any employee terminated
from employment, in writing, of the exact date of such
termination as well as the exact date of cancellation of
employee benefits connected with such termination. In
no case shall notice of such termination be provided
more than five working days after the date of such
termination.
N.Y. LAB. LAW § 195(6). In support of their motion for summary judgment,
defendants produced only plaintiff’s termination letter, which stated that the
termination was effective January 28, 2008. Plaintiff admits to receiving this letter
and that he was terminated on January 28, 2008. Thus, defendants successfully
established that, in accordance with section 195(6), plaintiff received written
notification of his termination within five business days of the termination.
Referenced in the termination letter is a severance agreement, which was never
produced, and therefore, a question of fact was created as to whether plaintiff was
given notice of the “exact date of cancellation of employee benefits” as required
4

by section 195(6). Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to
plaintiffs’ claims arising under New York Labor Law sections 191 and 195(6) was
denied.
Defendants have now produced plaintiff’s earnings record and benefits
termination notice. See Exs. A & B to Aff. of Rachel Herceg, Dec. 14, 2011, Dkt.
No. 80. The earnings record reflects that plaintiff, whose last day of active
employment was January 17, 2008, was paid his regular biweekly salary through
the pay period ending January 18, 2008. Additionally, plaintiff was paid for his
accrued but unused vacation pay on February 1, 2008. Thus, the new evidence
indisputably shows that plaintiff received all the pay to which he was due upon his
termination in compliance with section 191. The benefits termination notice that
accompanied the letter of termination, which plaintiff admits to receiving, reflects
that plaintiff’s benefits were to be terminated on January 31, 2008. Thus, the new
evidence also indisputably shows that defendants were in full compliance with
section 195.
To be sure, under the strict standards that a court must apply when given
newly submitted evidence in support of a Rule 59(e) motion, this court should not
consider defendants’ newly submitted evidence at all. Defendants have not
proffered any reason whatsoever for their failure to timely submit the earnings
record or the benefits termination letter in support of their motion for summary
judgment. That defendants could not have discovered the earnings record or the
benefit termination notice with due diligence is highly questionable.
Nonetheless, despite defendants’ failure to meet their burden of showing
that the newly submitted evidence could not have been discovered with due
diligence, in the interests of finality and conservation of scarce judicial resources,
5

defendants’ motion to alter or amend this court’s November 30, 2011
memorandum, decision and order is granted. The evidence clearly establishes that
defendants were in full compliance with Labor Law sections 191 and 195 and
therefore no question of fact remains for a jury to decide regarding those claims.
Consequently, a trial on those claims would be futile and a waste of judicial
resources. Moreover, plaintiff has not opposed defendants’ motion.
Therefore, in accordance with the foregoing, it is ORDERED that the
motion by defendants to alter or amend the November 30, 2011 memorandum,
decision and order pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
is GRANTED, and it is further
ORDERED that the November 30, 2011 memorandum, decision and order
is amended to reflect that defendants’ motion for summary judgment regarding
plaintiff’s claims against them pursuant to New York Labor Law sections 191 and
195 is granted, disposing of this action in its entirety.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of defendants
and close this case accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:

January 17, 2012
Syracuse, New York

6