Smith et al v. City of Syracuse et al
Filing
36
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER denying Defendants' 29 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Senior Judge Neal P. McCurn on 1/31/2012. (amt)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
44444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444
SHAUNDEL SMITH and
FRANK SMITH,
Plaintiffs,
-v.-
5:10CV00352 (NPM/GHL)
THE CITY OF SYRACUSE, DETECTIVE
THOMAS SKARDINSKI, DETECTIVE
SEAN LYNCH, DETECTIVE GEORGE
HACK, SERGEANT EDWARD
TAGLIALATELA, DETECTIVE STEVEN
KILBURN, DETECTIVE EDWARD
MACBLANE, LIEUTENANT CONLEY,
DETECTIVE PATRICK DECASTRO,
Defendants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------APPEARANCES:
OF COUNSEL:
Law Office of Antoinette L. Williams, P.C.
Attorney for Plaintiffs
One Wolfs Lane
Pelham, NY 10803
Antoinette L. Williams, Esq.
City of Syracuse
Office of Corporation Counsel
Attorney for Defendants
233 East Washington Street
Room 301 City Hall
Syracuse, NY 13202
James P. McGinty, Esq.
Michelle K. Venezia, Esq.
NEAL P. McCURN, Senior District Court Judge
MEMORANDUM - DECISION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs Shaundel Smith (“Shaundel”) and Frank Smith (“Frank”)
(collectively, “plaintiffs”) bring this action seeking monetary and declaratory relief
against the City of Syracuse (“City”), Detective Thomas Skardinski
(“Skardinski”), Detective Sean Lynch (Lynch”), Detective George Hack (“Hack”),
Sergeant Edward Taglialatela (“Taglialatela”), Detective Steven Kilburn
(“Kilburn”), Detective Edward MacBlane (MacBlane”), Lieutenant Conley
(“Conley”), Detective Patrick DeCastro (“DeCastro”), all individually and in their
official capacities, (collectively, “defendants”).
Plaintiffs seek redress for alleged violations of their civil rights pursuant to
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 and the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution and the laws of the State of New
York. Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that defendants subjected Shaundel to an illegal
search of his person and home, an illegal seizure of his person, unlawful arrest,
false imprisonment, illegal detention, excessive force, medical neglect,
harassment, humiliation and intimidation. Plaintiffs allege that defendants
subjected Frank to an illegal search of his person and home, unlawful arrest, false
2
imprisonment, illegal detention, excessive force, harassment, humiliation and
intimidation. Plaintiffs seek compensatory damages to be assessed against all
defendants and punitive damages against the police officer defendants in their
individual capacities, together with the costs and disbursements of this action.
The court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983
and 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331, 1343 and 1367. Currently before
the court is defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 29) pursuant to
Rule 56(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1 For the reasons stated below,
the motion for summary judgment is denied in its entirety.
I.
Facts and Procedural History
The following facts are taken from the plaintiffs’ amended complaint and
sworn deposition testimony.2 Plaintiffs Shaundel and Frank Smith are brothers,
1
The court notes that the defendants’ submission does not conform to the Rule
7.1(a)(1) of the Local Rules of the Northern District of New York, in that it does not include a
table of contents or citations to decisions contained within the memorandum of law. However,
for the sake of judicial economy, and to avoid requiring plaintiffs to respond to an amended
version, the court considers the document at hand.
2
The court also notes that plaintiffs did not conform to the Local Rules, which state
in pertinent part that “the non-movant’s response shall mirror the movant’s Statement of Material
Facts by admitting and/or denying each of the movant’s assertion in matching numbered
paragraphs.” L.R. 7.1(a)(3). Accordingly, again for the sake of judicial economy, the court draws
the facts from plaintiff’s response and from the record, resolving all ambiguities and drawing all
permissible factual inferences in favor of the plaintiffs, the parties against whom summary
judgment is sought. See Security Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 391
F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 2004).
3
and at all times relevant to this action, these young African-American males lived
together in an apartment in DeWitt, NY. Frank graduated from Keuka College
with a degree in criminal justice and at the time of his deposition was one class
short of obtaining a master’s degree in criminal justice administration. At the time
of the incident giving rise to this action, Frank was employed as a health service
specialist with the Center for Community Alternatives in Syracuse, NY, and was
an HIV and AIDS educator in five of the state correctional facilities. Shaundel
pursued a bachelor’s degree in fine arts on Long Island, NY. He states that he
completed three years of college, and at the time of deposition, intended to
complete his degree. At all times relevant to this action, Shaundel was employed
as a dishwasher at the Renaissance Hotel in Syracuse, NY. Deposition testimony
reveals that neither of these young men had a criminal history.
On November 5, 2008, a young man named Khalic Pitts was shot and killed
in the City of Syracuse. In the course of the subsequent police investigation, a
confidential informer told police detectives that plaintiff Shaundel Smith was a
witness to the shooting. Shaundel had attended junior high school with the
shooting victim. Shaundel testifies in his deposition that he had been in the
vicinity of the shooting earlier in the evening, and did in fact see Mr. Pitts at a
restaurant on Westcott Street. Shaundel asserts that he had continued on to a
4
friend’s house after seeing Pitts, and did not witness the shooting that occurred
approximately two hours later, but later heard about the shooting on the television
news.
After the Pitts murder, defendants followed up on the information provided
by the informant. On November 12, 2008, defendants Skardinski and Lynch were
assigned to interview Shaundel. At approximately 6:00 p.m. that evening, Frank
had returned home to his apartment in DeWitt, and had fallen asleep when he
heard someone knocking at his door. Through the peephole on his door, Frank
saw two individuals standing there. They identified themselves as police officers
and said they were looking for Shaundel.3 Frank told them that Shaundel was not
at home, and the officers left a business card, with the admonition for Frank to tell
Shaundel they needed to talk to him.
Frank went back to sleep and some time later, after Shaundel had returned
home from work, was again awakened by police officers banging on the apartment
door. Shaundel had worked until midnight, and had returned home at
approximately 12:15 a.m. on November 13, 2008. He arrived at the apartment he
shared with Frank by walking through a wooded area, after being dropped off by a
3
Deposition testimony subsequently revealed that the two individuals were
detectives Skardinski and Lynch.
5
friend on a road adjoining the street he lived on. Shaundel was approached from
the vicinity of the parking lot by two unidentified men (subsequently identified as
defendants Skardinski and Lynch) who shouted that they wanted to speak to
Shaundel. Not knowing the men, Shaundel continued on and entered the
apartment. Once Shaundel entered the apartment, the two defendants allegedly
tried to enter the apartment by turning the door knob. Plaintiffs allege that
Skardinski and Lynch insisted that plaintiffs open the door, and continued to
pound on the door, attempting to gain entry. Plaintiffs soon began to hear more
defendants outside of the apartment door. Plaintiffs allege that defendants
directed their flashlight beams into a bedroom window, and became increasingly
loud, threatening to go get a warrant if plaintiffs did not open the door, and also
shouting that they had an arrest warrant for Shaundel. Plaintiffs allege that the
defendants used profanity and threats in an attempt to intimidate the plaintiffs into
opening the door.
Plaintiffs allege that defendants requested a key from a maintenance worker
who lived upstairs in the same apartment building. Defendants then attempted to
gain entry with the key, but plaintiffs thwarted that attempt by grasping the lock
from inside of the apartment. Plaintiffs allege that the banging on the door and
yelling became louder and more disturbing. The officers allegedly told Frank that
6
he was also going to be arrested for obstructing governmental administration.
Upon assurances by the defendants that they only wanted to talk to Shaundel,
plaintiffs opened the door. Plaintiffs allege that once the door was opened, the
defendants entered the apartment with weapons drawn, and one defendant pushed
a gun into Shaundel’s side. Plaintiffs allege that they were ordered to the floor
where they were handcuffed, while defendants searched the premises, including
the kitchen, bathroom, and the bedrooms of both plaintiffs. After the plaintiffs
were taken outside, several defendants allegedly remained in the apartment and
continued their search, without benefit of a warrant or permission from the
plaintiffs.
Frank was taken from his house wearing only a t-shirt and boxer shorts. On
the ride to the Syracuse Public Safety Building (“PSB”), Frank asked that the cuffs
be loosened as they were too tight. The officers refused, and when they reached
the PSB, Frank was taken into a room and handcuffed to a metal bar, where he
remained for approximately one hour. At that time, the handcuffs were removed
and Frank was taken to another room where he was interrogated for two or three
hours and then released without being charged. Prior to his release, Frank alleges
that he was made to apologize to the officers for being disrespectful, which he
states he did to facilitate his release, and his apology was met with laughter. He
7
asked for and was given a ride home by the two officers who had transported him
to the PSB.
Shaundel was questioned about the Pitts homicide, with the defendants
alleging that Shaundel witnessed the homicide. Defendants forced Shaundel to
view pictures of his deceased friend. The pictures showed the decedent on the
operating table and showed the bullet wounds in the deceased’s body. Shaundel
asserts that he was shown the photographs continuously, and found them to be
shocking, causing him extreme emotional distress.
When Shaundel had not returned home by the morning of November 14,
Frank retained an attorney for his brother. Plaintiffs allege that defendants refused
to cooperate with Shaundel’s attorney and even denied that he was in custody.
Shaundel was allegedly denied access to his attorney. When Frank returned home
from work on the afternoon of November 14, he learned that Shaundel had been
released from the PSB at approximately 12:30 p.m., had met with his attorney, and
had then returned to the home the brothers shared.
Shaundel alleges that while he remained in defendants’ custody until Friday,
November 14, he was denied adequate food, beverage and medication. Shaundel
8
suffers from vertigo4 and was prescribed medicine for that ailment. That medicine
was left behind at his home when Shaundel was taken into custody. In addition,
Shaundel alleges that he was confined to an area that was extremely hot and
uncomfortable. In a perceived attempt to pressure Shaundel into signing a
statement that he witnessed the homicide of his friend, defendants allegedly
threatened Shaundel with arrest, that they would tell the homicide victim’s family
that Shaundel was involved in the death of the victim, and that defendants would
lock Shaundel in the same unit as the suspect who was in custody for the
homicide. After several hours of continuous interrogation with no sleep, and
while suffering from vertigo without being given his prescribed medication,
coupled with the threats outlined above, Shaundel asserts that he told defendant
Hack that he would sign a statement that he witnessed the shooting of Pitts. Hack
allegedly crafted a statement which Shaundel signed, at which point Shaundel was
allowed to sleep. When Shaundel awoke, he immediately recanted his story and
advised Hack that he would not testify before a grand jury.
Shaundel was released from custody on November 14, 2009 without being
4
The symptoms of vertigo set forth by the National Institute of Health are a
sensation that you or the room is moving or spinning. The spinning sensation may cause nausea
and vomiting in some people. Other symptoms can include difficulty focusing the eyes,
dizziness, hearing loss in one ear, loss of balance, and/or ringing in the ears. See
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/001432.htm (2012).
9
charged with any crime. Defendants allegedly continued to harass Shaundel after
his release by going to his place of employment to ask questions, harassing him
when they saw him on the street and continuing to intimidate him.
Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Claim with the City within 90 days of the
incident. A 50-h hearing was held, and subsequent to the 50-h hearing, defendants
made no offer of payment. This action followed. Plaintiffs’ amended complaint
alleges nine causes of action. Defendants filed their motion for summary
judgment on June 1, 2011.
II.
Discussion
Currently before the court is the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiffs’
§1983 claims because the officers had probable cause to believe that plaintiffs
were engaging in the obstruction of governmental administration. Defendants also
argue that the officers are entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified
immunity. The City and defendant officers sued in their official capacities also
argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs’ Monell claim as
plaintiffs are unable to point to specific deficiencies in the police officers’
training, or to establish that the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries were the result of such
deficiencies. Finally, defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment
10
on plaintiffs’ claims that defendants failed to provide medical attention because
the facts are insufficient to establish that defendants acted with deliberate
indifference to Shaundel’s serious medical needs.
A.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 Generally
In order to prevail on a claim under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, a plaintiff must
establish the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the
United States, and that the violation was committed by a person acting under color
of state law. Section 1983 states in pertinent part that
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or
the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress, except that in any action brought against a
judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such
officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be
granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or
declaratory relief was unavailable....
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2012).
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the defendants
were acting under the color of state law.
11
B.
Motion for Summary Judgment
A motion for summary judgment shall be granted “if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c). See also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552
(1986); Security Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 391 F.3d
77, 82 (2d Cir. 2004). “[I]n assessing the record to determine whether there is a
genuine issue as to a material fact, the court is required to resolve all ambiguities
and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom
summary judgment is sought[.]” See Security Ins., 391 F.3d at 83, citing
Anderson V. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (1986).
“Only when reasonable minds could not differ as to the import of the evidence is
summary judgment proper.” Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir.
1991), citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-51.
While the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact falls upon the moving party, once that burden is met, the non-moving
party must “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial,”
see Koch v. Town of Brattleboro, Vermont, 287 F.3d 162, 165 (2d Cir. 2002),
12
(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)), by a showing sufficient to establish the existence of
every element essential to the party’s case, and on which that party will bear the
burden of proof at trial, see Peck v. Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 326 F.3d 330, 337
(2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S.Ct. 540 (2003).
C.
Probable Cause
Defendants first posit that the existence of probable cause to arrest the
plaintiffs on the basis of obstruction of governmental administration entitles them
to summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ §1983 claims for false arrest, false
imprisonment, and unlawful detention. Plaintiffs counter that defendants did not
have probable cause to arrest Shaundel, so they could not have had probable cause
to arrest Frank for obstructing their efforts.
“Probable cause exists if a law enforcement official, on the basis of the
totality of the circumstances, has sufficient knowledge or reasonably trustworthy
information to justify a person of reasonable caution in believing that an offense
has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested. The probable-cause
standard is a practical, nontechnical conception that deals with the factual and
practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men,
not legal technicians, act. Because the standard is fluid and contextual, a court
13
must examine the totality of the circumstances of a given arrest.” U.S. v.
Steppello, --- F.3d ----, 2011 WL 6450795 at *4 (2d. Cir. 2011) (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted).
New York Penal Law § 195.05 states in pertinent part that “[a] person is
guilty of obstructing governmental administration when he intentionally obstructs,
impairs or perverts the administration of law or other governmental function or
prevents or attempts to prevent a public servant from performing an official
function, by means of intimidation, physical force or interference, or by means of
any independently unlawful act ... Obstructing governmental administration is a
class A misdemeanor.” NY Penal § 195.05 (West 2012). Here, there was no
evidence that the confidential informant, deemed reliable by the defendants, had
alleged that Shaundel had any involvement in the shooting or had committed a
crime, only the allegation that he had possibly witnessed the fatal shooting event.
Also, the facts of the case do not infer that the officers had any intent to arrest
Shaundel, but only wanted to question him in furtherance of the Pitts murder
investigation.
Various deposed defendants have testified that the plaintiffs had the right to
not open their door and to refuse to be interviewed. The defendants allege that
plaintiffs’ refusal to let the defendants [who were unknown to the plaintiffs] into
14
their home, and their refusal to be interviewed [after midnight, with the apartment
surrounded by law enforcement] amounted to obstruction of governmental
administration. Incredibly, the defendants also argue that inconsistencies in
Shaundel’s responses given after he was in custody were enough to “establish
probable cause to believe that Shaundel was obstructing governmental
administration by withholding information relevant to the homicide and gave the
[d]efendants sufficient grounds to hold Shaundel for questioning about the
murder.” Doc. No. 29-1. These alleged inconsistencies were noted only after
Shaundel and Frank had been forcibly removed from their home and taken into
custody, yet are being touted as probable cause for the initial act of detaining the
plaintiffs. Doc. No. 29-9, pp. 14-15. Additionally, the defendants argue that
although they had probable cause to charge Frank with obstructing governmental
administration, the defendants elected not to charge him once it became clear that
his behavior had not been an attempt to conceal information about the homicide
under investigation. Accordingly, the court finds that questions of fact remain
whether the defendants had probable cause for the physical apprehension and
subsequent detention of the defendants, and whether the plaintiffs exhibited the
requisite element of “intimidation, physical force or interference, or by means of
15
any independently unlawful act”5 for this misdemeanor charge. The court finds
that there remains a genuine issue of material fact that precludes it from granting
summary judgment on this issue.
D.
Deliberate Indifference to a Serious Medical Need
Shaundel brings a claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need
against the defendants. Shaundel argues generally that this was a violation of his
constitutional rights, leaving the court to determine the appropriate analysis.
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiffs’
§1983 excessive force claim because plaintiffs cannot demonstrate the “deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need” necessary to establish liability under the
Eighth Amendment.
“A convicted prisoner’s claim of deliberate indifference to his medical
needs by those overseeing his care is analyzed under the Eighth Amendment
because the right the plaintiff seeks to vindicate arises from the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual punishment.’” Caiozzo v.
Koreman, 581 F.3d 63, 69 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted). “In the case
of a person being held prior to trial, however, the ‘cruel and unusual punishment’
5
NY Penal § 195.05 (West 2012).
16
proscription of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution does not apply, because
as a pre-trial detainee [the plaintiff is] not being punished” Id. (internal citations
and quotations omitted). “Instead, a person detained prior to conviction receives
protection against mistreatment at the hands of prison officials under the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment if the pretrial detainee is held in federal
custody, or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if held in state
custody.” Id.
This court has recently held that “when the State takes a person into its
custody and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes on it a
corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general
well-being.” Malay v. City of Syracuse, 2011 WL 4595201 at * 12. “The rationale
for this principle is simple enough: when the State by the affirmative exercise of
its power so restrains an individual’s liberty that it renders him unable to care for
himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his basic human needs— e.g.
food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety—it transgresses the
substantive limits on state action set by the ... Due Process Clause.” Id. (quoting
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199 (1989).
Accordingly, the court finds that the instant case is properly analyzed under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
17
This court has recently stated that “courts tend to apply the Eighth
Amendment standard when deciding a pre-trial detainee's claim for deliberate
indifference to a medical need under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Dzwonczyk v.
Syracuse Police Dept., 710 F.Supp. 2d 248, 268 (N.D.N.Y. 2008). “Accordingly,
in order for a pre-trial detainee to establish a claim for deliberate indifference to a
medical need, a plaintiff must allege (1) a deprivation that is ‘sufficiently serious,’
i.e., a deprivation that presents a ‘condition of urgency, one that may produce
death, degeneration, or extreme pain,’ and (2) reckless indifference, that is,
‘defendants were aware of plaintiff's serious medical needs and consciously
disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm.’” Id. (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
Defendants argue that “[w]hile uncomfortable, vertigo does not pose a
‘substantial risk of serious harm to those it inflicts,’” citing Molina v. New York,
697 F.Supp.2d 276 (N.D.N.Y. 2010). The defendant’s poorly worded statement
infers that Molina deals with vertigo, which it does not. Defendants assertions
amount to little more than their opinion as to Shaundel’s medical condition. The
court notes that vertigo, like any medical malady, can have various degrees of
severity. For example, a headache can be a minor irritant, or it can be debilitating
for some people. The Mayo Clinic website advises that “[v]ertigo usually results
18
from a problem with the nerves and the structures of the balance mechanism in
your inner ear (vestibular system), which sense movement and changes in your
head position. Sitting up or moving around may make it worse. Sometimes vertigo
is severe enough to cause nausea, vomiting and imbalance.”6 Shaundel states that
he was under a doctor’s treatment for vertigo, and while he was in custody, he was
not given food or his prescription medication for his illness. Shaundel states he
had just finished work at midnight, shortly before he was taken into custody. He
was interrogated for approximately four hours, and was not given food or water
for the first four to five hours while being interrogated. The room where he was
being held did not have a bed, and when Shaundel attempted to sleep, the officers
would reenter the room and attempt to interrogate him again. Shaundel argues that
the defendants had no authority to remove him from his residence and take him
into custody for two days, and the defendants’ aggressive interrogation tactics
worsened Shaundel’s vertigo condition.
Plaintiffs argue that whether a specific medical condition poses a
“substantial risk of harm” is a question of fact. The court concurs. The court is
not told the particular seriousness of Shaundel’s condition, or actions, if any, that
6
http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/dizziness/DS00435/DSECTION=causes
(2012).
19
Shaundel could have taken to alleviate his symptoms, which were denied to him.
Shaundel was last treated for vertigo at a hospital emergency room on October 1,
2008, approximately six weeks before the incident before the court. He was given
medication to ingest when a vertigo attack began. The record must be developed
as to the seriousness of Shaundel’s vertigo during the time he was in custody.
Accordingly, the court finds that there remains a genuine issue of material fact that
precludes it from granting summary judgment on this issue.
E.
Excessive Force
Defendants next argue that pursuant to the Eight Amendment, plaintiffs’
claims of excessive force must fail because the plaintiffs cannot demonstrate the
“wantonness” necessary to establish liability under the Eight Amendment.
Plaintiff argues that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether plaintiff
can demonstrate wantonness under the Eight Amendment. The court finds that
defendants, and plaintiffs as well, erroneously analyzed this claim under the Eight
Amendment. The Second Circuit is clear that “[Plaintiff’s] claim that he was
subjected to excessive force as a pretrial detainee would arise under the Fifth
Amendment, and not the Eighth Amendment as the district court had found,
because as a pretrial detainee he cannot be punished at all. See Iqbal v. Hasty, 490
F.3d 143, 168 (2d Cir.2007), rev'd on other grounds, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S.
20
----, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2008). We therefore proceed by analyzing
[plaintiff’s] claims under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.”
Johnston v Maha, 606 F.3d 39, 41 (2d Cir. 2010). As stated above, “a person
detained prior to conviction receives protection against mistreatment at the hands
of prison officials under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment if the
pretrial detainee is held in federal custody, or the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment if held in state custody.” Malay v. City of Syracuse, 2011
WL 4595201 at * 12. Accordingly, defendants’ argument fails on the issue of
excessive force, and when argued under the appropriate standard, questions of fact
remain. The court denies summary judgment on the issue of excessive force.
F.
Right to Counsel
Defendants argue that since the right to counsel in a criminal proceeding
attaches only upon the filing of criminal charges, the defendants’ interaction with
Shaundel never triggered his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Plaintiffs argue
that once Shaundel requested an attorney, the defendants’ interrogation should
have ceased and Shaundel should either have been released or given the
opportunity to speak with an attorney.
The Sixth Amendment states in pertinent part that “[i]n all criminal
21
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial ..., and
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” USCA CONST
Amend. VI (West 2012). “[T]his Sixth Amendment right only attaches during
critical stages of the criminal proceedings ... in Miranda v. Arizona,7 the Supreme
Court interpreted the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to
provide additional rights to all suspects undergoing custodial interrogation.”
Wood v. Ercole, 644 F.3d 83, 86 n.1 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotations and
citations omitted). In Miranda, the Supreme Court stated that “we concern
ourselves primarily with [the] interrogation atmosphere and the evils it can bring
... In each of the cases, the defendant was thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and
run through menacing police interrogation procedures. The potentiality for
compulsion is forcefully apparent ... It is obvious that such an interrogation
environment is created for no purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the
will of his examiner. ” Id., 384 U.S. at 456, 57. The Miranda Court ultimately held
that “[a]ccordingly, we hold that an individual held for interrogation must be
clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the
7
384 U.S. 436, 458 (1966).
22
lawyer with him during interrogation ... As with the warnings of the right to
remain silent and that anything stated can be used in evidence against him, this
warning is an absolute prerequisite to interrogation.” Id. at 471.
In the defendants’ memorandum of law, despite the record as a whole
indicating that Shaundel was being sought for questioning only as a possible
witness to the Pitts murder, defendants argue that “[d]etectives Lynch and
Skardinski went to the [p]laintiffs’ residence knowing that a confidential
informant had placed Shaundel Smith at the scene of a homicide.” Doc. No. 29-1,
p. 12. They also state that “[g]iven their knowledge of Shaundel’s involvement in
a murder, Shaundel’s flight and refusal to open the apartment door gave the
detectives a reasonable basis on which to conclude that probable cause existed to
arrest Shaundel.” Id. (emphasis added). Defendants also state, apparently for the
first time, that defendants were unable to confirm Frank’s identity due to his
refusal to open the door, and “[g]iven Shaundel’s apparent connection to the
homicide suspect, detectives Lynch and Skardinski had reason to suspect that it
was the person responsible for Khalik Pitts’ murder that was in the apartment with
Shaundel.” Doc. No. 29-1, p. 13. The court contrues this statement to mean that
Shaundel, and/or whoever was in the apartment with Shaundel was being sought
as a suspect in the Pitts murder, and accordingly, should have been read his
23
Miranda rights before interrogation. In addition, defendants argue that there was
probable cause to arrest both men on obstructing governmental administration, so
the court construes both men as suspects in that regard, until the defendants
decided to set them free without charges levied against them. There is nothing in
the record indicating that either Frank or Shaundel was notified of his right to
remain silent or right to an attorney, and conversely, the plaintiffs do not argue
that either Frank or Shaundel asked for an attorney. In addition, the court finds
that questions of fact remain on the issue of whether Shaundel was denied access
to the attorney that Frank subsequently hired for him. Accordingly, summary
judgment is denied on this issue.
G.
Qualified Immunity
“Under federal law, a police officer is entitled to qualified immunity where
(1) his conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known, or (2) it was objectively
reasonable for him to believe that his actions were lawful at the time of the
challenged act.” Pinter v. City of New York, 2011 WL 5604689 (2d Cir. 2011).
The defendants argue that all of their actions with respect to the plaintiffs’ claims
were supported by the necessary probable cause, and therefore constitutionally
permissible. In regard to defendants Lynch and Skardinski, defendants argue that
24
they are entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity because they
had an objectively reasonable basis for believing their actions were constitutional.
“Given their knowledge of Shaundel’s involvement in a murder, Shaundel’s flight
and refusal to open the apartment door gave the detectives a reasonable basis on
which to conclude that probable cause existed to arrest Shaundel.” Doc. No. 29-1,
pp. 12-13. Throughout the deposition testimony, the court notes that the officers
state Shaundel was interviewed as a potential witness to the murder, not as a
suspect or as someone having any involvement in the crime.
Plaintiffs argue that no reasonable person looking at the evidence in the
light most favorable to the plaintiffs could objectively conclude that it was
reasonable for the defendants to believe they were engaging in lawful conduct and
had the authority to do so. Plaintiffs argue that defendants had no authority to
order plaintiffs to open their door, no authority to interrogate plaintiffs, no
authority to charge plaintiffs with a crime and no authority to detain, arrest and
seize the plaintiffs. Because there was no probable cause for arrest for obstruction
of government administration, plaintiffs argue that the officers are not entitled to
qualified immunity. Plaintiffs proffer that all of the defendants played a role or
multiple roles in illegally entering the plaintiffs’ residence, illegally searching the
plaintiffs and their residence, unlawfully detaining, interrogating and arresting the
25
plaintiffs, depriving Shaundel of medical attention and causing injury to the
plaintiffs.
“[D]efendants’ claim of qualified immunity cannot be resolved as a matter
of law as long as distinct questions of fact persist regarding the motive for the
arrest and the existence of probable cause.” Zalaski v. City of Hartford, 2011 WL
2040498 (2d. Cir. 2011). Having found, supra, that questions of fact remain
surrounding the defendants’ claim of probable cause, the court also finds that
questions of fact remain on the issue of qualified immunity.
H.
Municipal and Municipal Employee Liability
Finally, defendants argue that municipalities may be held liable under
§1983 only when a constitutional deprivation is inflicted pursuant to a
government’s policy or custom. Plaintiffs argue that the City failed to train its
defendant officers, and cites considerable deposition testimony as evidence
thereof.
“To set forth a cognizable claim for municipal liability ..., a plaintiff must
plead and prove (1) an official policy or custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be
subjected to (3) a denial of a constitutional right.” Rivera v. City of Yonkers, 470
F.Supp.2d 402, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436
26
U.S. 658 (1978); Batista v. Rodriguez, 702 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1983) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
To assert a claim against a municipality pursuant to Section 1983, a
plaintiff must satisfy the well-settled requirements of Monell v. New
York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 ... (1978). Under
Monell and its progeny, a Section 1983 plaintiff must show that a
violation of his rights by an employee or agent of a municipality was
the result of a “policy or custom” of the municipality. Id. at 694 ....
Conclusory allegations of municipal custom or policy are insufficient
to satisfy this requirement. See Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York,
996 F.2d 522, 536 (2d Cir.1993) (the “mere assertion ... that a
municipality has such a custom or policy is insufficient in the absence
of allegations of fact tending to support, at least circumstantially,
such an inference.”) (quoting Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d
94, 100 (2d Cir.1993)); Cerbelli v. City of New York, 600 F.Supp.2d
405, 411 (E.D.N.Y.2009) (holding same). In addition, a municipality's
failure to train employees to properly protect individuals'
constitutional rights can also serve as a basis for municipal liability
under Monell. Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 94 (2d
Cir.2007).
Davis v. Nassau County, 2011 WL 5401663 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
This court recently held that
A local government entity's alleged failure to train its employees
creates liability under § 1983 only “[i]n limited circumstances.”
Connick v. Thompson, ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1359,
179 L.Ed.2d 417 (2011). Indeed, a “municipality's culpability for a
deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on a
failure to train.” Id. The “stringent standard” of deliberate
indifference applies to failure-to-train claims. Id. at 1360. In order to
prevail, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the municipality was “on
actual or constructive notice that a particular omission in [its] training
27
program causes ... employees to violate citizens' constitutional rights
[and] the policymakers chose to retain that program.” Id. “A pattern
of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is
‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate deliberate indifference for
purposes of failure to train.” Id.
Malay v. City of Syracuse, 2011 WL 4595201 at * 12 (N.D.N.Y. 2011).
Here, plaintiffs assert that not only has the City failed to train its
subordinates, it has failed to ensure that its subordinates understand the rules and
regulations pertaining to interviewing witnesses. “At his deposition, Defendant
Kilborn candidly admitted that he was not able to articulate what the rules and
regulations were pertaining to interviewing witnesses as opposed to interviewing
suspects... Defendant MacBlane was not even aware if there was a policy with
respect to interviewing witnesses ... and he never received any training on
interviewing witnesses.” Doc. No. 33, p. 17. “Defendant Skardinski testified that
in the past eleven years that he ‘maybe’ had training for custodial arrests on two
occasions. Defendant Conley testified that the only training received pertaining to
interviewing witnesses was received at the police academy.” Id. Accordingly,
once again the court is precluded from granting summary judgment in favor of the
defendants by remaining questions of material fact.
28
III.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth supra, the court hereby DENIES defendants’
motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 29) in its entirety.
SO ORDERED.
January 31, 2012
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