Carter v. The City of Syracuse School District et al

Filing 46

MEMORANDUM-DECISION & ORDER: It is ordered that the # 36 Motion to Strike is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART regarding the 34 Amended Complaint, the plaintiff shall file a Second Amended Complaint within 30 days that includes only the followin g causes of action: (1) cause of action pursuant to New York State Human Rights Law against Defendants Dittman and Stewart (currently the third cause of action); (2) cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Dittman, Stewar t, and Lowengard (currently the seventh cause of action); and (3) cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant School District (currently the eighth cause of action). This matter is remanded to Magistrate Judge Dancks for all further pretrial matters. Signed by Senior Judge Frederick J. Scullin, Jr on 3/15/2013. (jmb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_____________________________________________
CORENE D. CARTER a/k/a/ CORENE BROWN,
Plaintiff,

v.

5:10-CV-690
(FJS/TWD)

CITY OF SYRACUSE SCHOOL DISTRICT,
DANIEL LOWENGARD, JOHN DITTMAN,
JILL STEWART, JOHN DOE(S), and JANE
DOE(S),
Defendants.
_____________________________________________
APPEARANCES

OF COUNSEL

BOSMAN LAW FIRM, LLC
6599 Martin Street
Rome, New York 13440
Attorneys for Plaintiff

A.J. BOSMAN, ESQ.
DANIEL W. FLYNN, ESQ.

FERRARA, FIORENZA, LARRISON,
BARRET, & REITZ, P.C.
5010 Campuswood Drive
East Syracuse, New York 13057
Attorneys for Defendants

ERIC J. WILSON, ESQ.
MILES G. LAWLOR, ESQ.

SCULLIN, Senior Judge
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Currently before the Court is Defendants' motion to strike Plaintiff's amended complaint
pursuant to Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Dkt. No. 36-2.

II. BACKGROUND
A.

Alleged workplace discrimination and retaliation1
Plaintiff, an African-American female, has worked as an English teacher for Defendant

School District since 1988. See Dkt. No. 34 at ¶¶ 10, 21. In January 2007, Plaintiff requested
and received a transfer to a high school teaching position at Defendant School District's Institute
of Technology. See id. at ¶ 22. Plaintiff claims that two co-workers at the Institute of
Technology regularly interrupted her class and that she reported these interruptions to Defendant
Dittman. See id. at ¶¶ 23-24. According to Plaintiff, Defendant Dittman agreed that Plaintiff's
race and gender motivated this conduct but refused to take corrective action. See id. at ¶ 24.
Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Dittman selected a Caucasian co-worker, who lacked
teaching credentials, to instruct an advanced English class, despite her request for the position.
See id. at ¶ 26. In December 2007, Plaintiff submitted a written complaint regarding these
incidents; and, within approximately one week, Defendants allegedly stripped her teaching
responsibilities for all but a few students. See id. at ¶ 27.
When Plaintiff returned to teach at the Institute of Technology for the 2008-2009 school
year, students allegedly informed her that school administrators questioned them about her
performance and invited them to complain. See id. at ¶ 29. Plaintiff also claims that her coworkers made racially disparaging comments to students throughout the school year. See id. at
¶ 30. For example, one teacher allegedly told students that then-Presidential-candidate Barack
Obama would never be President because he was Black. See id. When Plaintiff complained

1

The Court has drawn the following facts from the allegations in the amended complaint.
See Dkt. No. 34.
2

about this discriminatory treatment to Randy Williams, the Director of Personnel for Defendant
School District, he allegedly told her to "dig her heels in." See id. at ¶ 31.
Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that she complained to Defendant Lowengard about
various acts of alleged racial and gender discrimination. See id. at ¶ 32. According to Plaintiff,
Defendant Lowengard responded that she was "hard to get along with" and not a "team player
and he refused to take remedial action. See id. Defendant Dittman allegedly did not take
Plaintiff's complaints seriously and offered her no solution or assistance. See id.
In March 2009, Defendant Stewart observed Plaintiff teaching a tenth grade class. See id.
at ¶ 33. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Stewart issued a "sham evaluation" of her performance.
See id. Plaintiff complained to Ben Frazier, Vice Principal of the Institute of Technology; and he
purportedly told her that such adverse treatment was due to her race and gender. See id. at ¶ 34.
As a result of Defendant Stewart's evaluation, Plaintiff was placed on an "Assistance Plan for
Improvement," which made her "ineligible to participate in such programs as 'Master Teacher',
causing her a loss of income." See id. at ¶ 35.
As a result of Defendants' alleged discriminatory and retaliatory actions, Plaintiff claims
that she received psychiatric treatment and medication for work-related stress. See id. at ¶ 36.
On April 27, 2009, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the New York State
Division of Human Rights ("DHR") and the United States Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC"), alleging unlawful race discrimination. See id. at ¶ 37. Thereafter,
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants "escalated their efforts to harm [her] by constantly contacting
her at home knowing that she was out ill and sending certified mail to her residence." See id. at
¶ 38.

3

Although Plaintiff began teaching at the Institute of Technology for the 2009-2010 school
year, she commenced an extended leave of absence on October 26, 2009. See id. at ¶¶ 39-40.
Plaintiff's treating psychiatrist allegedly ordered this leave because of her work-related stress.
See id. at ¶ 40.
On August 24, 2010, Plaintiff claims that her treating psychiatrist authorized her to return
to work. See id. at ¶ 41. Plaintiff requested a transfer to another school, per her psychiatrist's
recommendation. See id. at ¶¶ 41-42. Defendant School District, however, only offered Plaintiff
her previous position at the Institute of Technology. See id.

B.

Memorandum-Decision and Order dated March 19, 2012
On June 14, 2010, Plaintiff commenced the instant action against Defendants, alleging

fifteen (15) causes of action for unlawful employment discrimination.2 See Dkt. No. 1. On April
29, 2011, Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings and/or for summary judgment with
regard to all of Plaintiff's claims. See Dkt. No. 17. Plaintiff cross-moved to amend the
complaint, proposing to add factual allegations and three new causes of action. See Dkt. No. 24.
On March 19, 2012, the Court issued a Memorandum-Decision and Order ("Order"),
which (1) preserved the third cause of action in its entirety; (2) preserved the seventh cause of
action against Defendants Dittman and Stewart but dismissed without prejudice against
Defendant Lowengard; (3) dismissed the eighth cause of action without prejudice against
Defendant School District; and (4) dismissed the remaining twelve causes of action with
prejudice. See Dkt. No. 32 at 34-35. Additionally, the Court granted Plaintiff's motion to
2

On September 9, 2009, at Plaintiff's request, the DHR dismissed her administrative
complaint so that she could pursue her claim in federal court. See Dkt. No. 34 at ¶ 7. Thereafter,
on March 16, 2010, the EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue letter relating to Plaintiff's race
discrimination charge. See Dkt. No. at 2. This action followed.
4

amend, allowing her to add the proposed factual allegations and replead the two causes of action
dismissed without prejudice. See id.
On May 3, 2012, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, which reiterated the causes of
action that the Court had dismissed with prejudice and renamed Defendants School District and
Lowengard as Defendants. See Dkt. No. 35. Consequently, Defendants brought the instant
motion to strike the amended complaint. See Dkt. No. 36.

III. DISCUSSION
A.

Standard of review
Rule 12(f) provides that a "court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or

any redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous matter." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). "'An
allegation is "impertinent" or "immaterial" when it is neither responsive nor relevant to the issues
involved in the action.'" Anderson v. Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, 850 F. Supp. 2d 392, 416
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quotation omitted). Although "[c]ourts 'possess considerable discretion in
weighing 12(f) motions,' . . . 'motions to strike are not favored and will not be granted unless it
is clear that the allegations in question can have no possible bearing on the subject matter of the
litigation, . . .'" G.L.M. Sec. & Sound, Inc. v. Lojack Corp., No. 10-CV-4701, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 142549, *19 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2012) (internal quotations and other citations omitted).

B.

Causes of action previously dismissed with prejudice
Defendants move to strike the amended complaint because it contains the causes of

action that the Court dismissed with prejudice. See Dkt. No. 36-2 at 6-7. Defendants argue that
these previously-dismissed causes of action are immaterial to Plaintiff's action as it presently
stands. See id. Defendants further assert that keeping these claims in the amended complaint
5

will confuse witnesses as to which claims are at issue and lead to discovery disputes between the
parties. See Dkt. No. 36-2 at 7; Dkt. No. 42 at 2.
The Court grants Defendants' motion to strike the amended complaint because the twelve
causes of action that the Court dismissed with prejudice are immaterial to the merits of Plaintiff's
instant action as it stands after the Order.34 Although Plaintiff denies reviving those causes of
action dismissed with prejudice, the Court reaffirms its prior dismissal of those claims with
prejudice for the reasons set forth in the Order.

C.

Defendants School District and Lowengard
Defendants also move to strike the amended complaint because it includes Defendants

School District and Lowengard as named parties, even though the Court previously dismissed all
claims against them. See Dkt. No. 36-2 at 6-7. Plaintiff responds, however, that she has
properly included these Defendants in the amended complaint because the Court's previous
Order allowed her to replead the seventh cause of action against Defendant Lowengard and the
eighth cause of action against Defendant School District. See Dkt. No. 40 at 10. Plaintiff further
argues that she has included new factual allegations under the seventh and eighth causes of
action that relate to Defendants School District and Lowengard. See id.
Initially, Defendants are correct that the Court's previous Order dismissed all claims
against Defendants School District and Lowengard. See Dkt. No. 32 at 34-35. The Court,
3

Although the Court did not explicitly direct Plaintiff to submit an amended complaint
that excluded the claims dismissed with prejudice, such is implicit from the Court's ruling.
4

To the extent Plaintiff asserts that she repled the dismissed claims to preserve her rights
for appeal, the Court rejects such an argument as unnecessary and disingenuous. See GorhamDiMaggio v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. 1:08-CV-019, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52078,
*21-*23 (N.D.N.Y. June 19, 2009) (citing P. Stolz Family P'ship L.P. v. Daum, 355 F.3d 92, 96
(2d Cir. 2004)) (other citations omitted).
6

however, did not dismiss all of those claims with prejudice. See id. The Court provided Plaintiff
with the opportunity to amend the seventh cause of action as to Defendant Lowengard and the
eighth cause of action as to Defendant School District. See id. A review of the amended
complaint demonstrates that Plaintiff has indeed repled these claims with additional factual
allegations against Defendants School District and Lowengard. See Dkt. No. 34 at ¶¶ 32-47.5
Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants' motion to strike the amended complaint on
this ground.

IV. CONCLUSION
After carefully reviewing the entire record in this matter, the parties' submissions, and the
applicable law, and for the above-stated reasons, the Court hereby
ORDERS that Defendants' motion to strike the amended complaint is GRANTED IN
PART and DENIED IN PART; and the Court further
ORDERS that Plaintiff shall file a second amended complaint within thirty (30) days of
the date of this Memorandum-Decision and Order that includes only the following causes of
action: (1) cause of action pursuant to New York State Human Rights Law against Defendants
Dittman and Stewart (currently the third cause of action); (2) cause of action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Dittman, Stewart, and Lowengard (currently the seventh cause
of action); and (3) cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant School
District (currently the eighth cause of action); and the Court further

5

Notably, because Defendants have not moved to dismiss the seventh and eighth causes
of action, as amended, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
Court does not address whether these amended claims against Defendants School District and
Lowengard are viable. The only issue before the Court is whether the amended complaint asserts
any claims against Defendants School District and Lowengard.
7

ORDERS that this matter is remanded to Magistrate Judge Dancks for all further pretrial
matters.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 15, 2013
Syracuse, New York

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