Interface Solutions, Inc. v. Workers United Service Employees International Union Rochester Regional Joint Board and its Local Union No. 701-T
Filing
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MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDER - that Interface's 1 Motion to Vacate the arbitral award with respect to the remedies ordered is GRANTED and Workers United's counterclaim for confirmation of the arbitral award (Dkt. No. 8) is DISMISSED. Signed by Judge Gary L. Sharpe on 10/26/2011. (jel, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_________________________________
INTERFACE SOLUTIONS, INC.,
Petitioner,
5:11-cv-286
(GLS)
v.
WORKERS UNITED SERVICE
EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL
UNION ROCHESTER REGIONAL
JOINT BOARD and its LOCAL
UNION NO. 701-T,
Respondents.
_________________________________
APPEARANCES:
OF COUNSEL:
FOR THE PETITIONER:
Bond, Schoeneck Law Firm
One Lincoln Center
Syracuse, NY 13202-1355
PATRICK V. MELFI, ESQ.
ANDREW D. BOBREK, ESQ.
FOR THE RESPONDENTS:
Chamberlain, D’Amanda Law Firm
2 State Street
1600 Crossroads Building
Rochester, NY 14614
MICHAEL T. HARREN, ESQ.
Gary L. Sharpe
District Court Judge
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. Introduction
Petitioner Interface Solutions, Inc. (“Interface”), commenced this
action against respondents Workers United Service Employees
International Union Rochester Regional Joint Board and its Local Union
No. 701-T (“Workers United”), pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 185 and 9 U.S.C. §
10, seeking an order partially vacating an arbitrator’s award. (See Pet.,
Dkt. No. 1.) Pending are Interface’s motion to vacate the arbiter’s award of
the Rule of 90 pension benefit and Workers United’s counterclaim for
confirmation of the award. (See Dkt. Nos. 1, 8.) For the reasons that
follow, Interface’s motion is granted and Workers United’s counterclaim is
dismissed.
II. Background
This case arises out of the termination of Deborah Crary, an
employee at one of Interface’s plants, in accordance with the collective
bargaining agreement (“CBA”) between Interface and Workers United.
(See Pet. ¶¶ 5-8, Dkt. No. 1.) Following their inability to resolve the dispute
over Crary’s termination under the CBA’s grievance procedures, the parties
submitted the matter to Robert Kingsley Hull for arbitration. (Id. ¶ 9.) In so
doing, the parties stipulated the following issues: “Did [Interface] discharge
employee Deb Crary in violation of the standards set forth in Section 8.7 of
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the [CBA]? If so, what should the remedy be?” (See Dkt. No. 1, Attach. 7
at 9.) After three days of hearings between December 2009 and January
2010, and the submission of post-hearing briefs by both parties, Hull issued
a decision on December 17, 2010. (See Pet. ¶¶ 11-12, Dkt. No. 1.)
Although Hull ruled that Crary’s termination did not violate the CBA, he
nonetheless found that Interface “failed to justify” the loss of Crary’s full
pension (i.e., a Rule of 90 pension), and thus “retroactively restored” it. (Id.
¶¶ 18-22.) Interface now seeks to vacate the portion of the arbitral award
that restores Crary’s Rule of 90 pension. (Id. ¶ 23.)
III. Discussion
Interface alleges that Hull “exceeded the scope of the issue
submitted to him for resolution by the parties.” (Dkt. No. 1, Attach. 2 at 3.)
Specifically, it argues that because Hull found that Interface did not violate
the CBA, the first question before him, he was not permitted to address the
second question on remedies. (Id. at 3-4.) Workers United asserts, in their
response, that Hull did not exceed his authority under the CBA, and even if
he did, Interface was required to pursue its objection through further
arbitration. (See Dkt. No. 8, Attach. 2 at 5-13.) The court agrees with
Interface.
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A.
The arbitration award
When reviewing an arbitral award, the court accords the arbitrator’s
decision “a high degree of deference”; “even a barely colorable justification
for the outcome reached” must be upheld. 187 Concourse Assoc. v.
Fishman, 399 F.3d 524, 526 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotations and
citations omitted); see also United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc.,
484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987) (“[A]s long as the arbitrator is even arguably
construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his
authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not
suffice to overturn his decision.”). However, where the arbitrator has
exceeded his authority, the court may vacate the award. See 187
Concourse, 399 F.3d at 527; 9 U.S.C. § 10.
To this end, the Second Circuit’s decision in 187 Concourse—the
principle case relied on by Interface—is indistinguishable. There, the Court
explicated the appropriate inquiry as follows:
The principal question for the reviewing court is whether the
arbitrator’s award draws its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement, since the arbitrator is not free merely to dispense his
own brand of industrial justice. In addition, “[t]he scope of
authority of arbitrators generally depends on the intention of the
parties to an arbitration, and is determined by the agreement or
submission.”
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187 Concourse, 399 F.3d at 527 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
When applied to the questions presented in that case,1 the Court found that
the arbitrator exceeded his authority because he was only permitted to
answer the second (remedies) question, if he answered the first (“just
cause”) question in the negative. See id.
Here, the questions before Hull were: “Did [Interface] discharge
employee Deb Crary in violation of the standards set forth in Section 8.7 of
the [CBA]? If so, what should the remedy be?” (See Dkt. No. 1, Attach. 7
at 9) (emphasis added). The phrase “if so” renders the second question
dependent on an affirmative answer to the first question. (See id.) By
finding that Interface did not violate Section 8.7, Hull abrogated his own
authority to answer the remedies question. Because his consideration and
restoration of Crary’s Rule of 90 pension exceeded the authority granted to
him by the parties, Interface’s motion to vacate the award of pension
benefits is granted and Workers United’s counterclaim for confirmation is
dismissed.2
1
The questions presented to the arbitrator in 187 Concourse were: “Was the Grievant
discharged for just cause? If not, what shall the remedy be?” 399 F.3d at 527.
2
Workers United further argues that Section 8.7 of the CBA permitted Hull to reach the
question of remedies. (See Dkt. No. 8, Attach. 2 at 7-11.) This argument is equally unavailing.
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B.
The duty to pursue objections through arbitration
Workers United’s argument that Interface was required to pursue its
objection to Hull’s award through further arbitration is unpersuasive as it
relies on Hull’s sua sponte grant of jurisdiction over the implementation of
the award to himself. (See Dkt. No. 8, Attach. 2 at 11.) As discussed in
Interface’s Reply, the doctrine of ex functus officio nullified Hull’s authority
to retain jurisdiction over the matter once a final award was entered.3 See
Ottley v. Schwartzberg, 819 F.2d 373, 376 (1987). Accordingly, Interface
was not required to pursue its objection with Hull.
IV. Conclusion
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that Interface’s motion to vacate the arbitral award with
respect to the remedies ordered (Dkt. No. 1) is GRANTED and Workers
United’s counterclaim for confirmation of the arbitral award (Dkt. No. 8) is
DISMISSED; and it is further
Compensation under section 8.7 of the CBA is limited by the following statement: “In the event
that it should be decided under the grievance procedure that the employee’s claim is proved . .
. .” (See Dkt. No. 1, Attach. 3 at 17) (emphasis added). As such, compensation is
impermissible where, as here, the employee failed to prove her claim.
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Moreover, as Hull no longer has authority to adjudicate this dispute, the court is not
required to remand the proceedings to him for further consideration in accordance with this
memorandum-decision and order. See Ottley v. Schwartzberg, 819 F.2d 373, 376 (1987).
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ORDERED that the Clerk close this case; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk provide a copy of this MemorandumDecision and Order to the parties.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
October 26,2011
Albany, New York
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