Crouch v. Astrue
Filing
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DECISION and ORDERED, that the Report-Recommendation (Dkt. No. 17) is APPROVED and ADOPTED in its entirety; and it is further ORDERED, that the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED; and it is further ORDERED, that the Plaintiffs Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is DISMISSED. Signed by Senior Judge Lawrence E. Kahn on January 28, 2013. (sas)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
JESSICA CROUCH, on behalf of K.C.,
Plaintiff,
-against-
5:11-CV-0820 (LEK/ESH)
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner
of the Social Security Administration,
Defendant.
DECISION and ORDER
I.
INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the Court following a Report-Recommendation filed on December
31, 2012, by the Honorable Earl S. Hines, United States Magistrate Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b) and L.R. 72.3(d) of the Northern District of New York. Dkt. No. 17 (“ReportRecommendation”). After fourteen days from the service thereof, the Clerk has sent the entire file
to the undersigned, including the Objection by Plaintiff Jessica Crouch (“Plaintiff”), which was filed
on January 14, 2013. Dkt. No. 18 (“Objection”).
II.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed a protective application for Supplementary Security Income (“SSI”) on behalf
of K.C., a minor, on September 18, 2007, because of K.C.’s attention deficit hyperactivity disorder
(“ADHD”). Report-Rec. at 1. After an August 6, 2010, hearing before an Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”), Plaintiff’s application was denied. Id. at 2. On May 17, 2011, the Appeals Council
denied Plaintiff’s request for review, rendering the ALJ’s August 13, 2010, written decision the
final decision of the Commissioner. Id. Plaintiff subsequently filed this appeal.
In his Report-Recommendation, Judge Hines recommended that the Commissioner’s
decision denying Plaintiff SSI benefits be affirmed in full. Id. at 23. For the following reasons, the
Court adopts the Report-Recommendation in its entirety and dismisses Plaintiff’s Complaint. Dkt.
No. 1 (“Complaint”).
III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court is to “make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified
proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). Where,
however, an objecting “party makes only conclusory or general objections, or simply reiterates his
original arguments, the Court reviews the report and recommendation only for clear error.” Farid v.
Bouey, 554 F. Supp. 2d 301, 307 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting McAllan v. Von Essen, 517 F. Supp. 2d
672, 679 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)) (citations and quotations omitted); see also Brown v. Peters, No.
95-CV-1641, 1997 WL 599355, at *2-3 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1997). “A [district] judge . . . may
accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the
magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
IV.
DISCUSSION
A. The Report-Recommendation
In his Report-Recommendation, Judge Hines found the ALJ’s conclusion that K.C. is not
disabled, and therefore not eligible for SSI benefits, legally valid and supported by substantial
evidence in the record. In making that finding, Judge Hines first reviewed the relevant
administrative decision-making process at length and then addressed three challenges Plaintiff
levied at the ALJ’s decision. First, Judge Hines determined that the ALJ followed the legal
standards set forth in Social Security Ruling 06-03p in finding that K.C. did not “functionally equal”
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a disability listed in the “Listing of Impairments.”1 Report-Rec. at 18-20; see 20 C.F.R. § 404,
subpt. P, app’x 1, at 112.11 (2012) (listing ADHD); SSR 06-03p, 71 Fed. Reg. 45,593, 2006 WL
2329939 (Aug. 9, 2006). Second, Judge Hines rejected Plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ was
required to re-contact one of the medical treating sources, because the evidence the source provided
was adequate and had no obvious gaps. Report-Rec. at 21. Finally, Judge Hines found that the
ALJ’s credibility assessment and corresponding assignment of weight to the various testimonial
sources were supported by substantial evidence and not patently unreasonable. Id. at 22.
B. Objection
Plaintiff makes a single compound objection to the Report-Recommendation: that Judge
Hines failed to equate “a serious problem” and “a very serious problem” on a teacher questionnaire
with, respectively, “a marked limitation” and “an extreme limitation” under the Commissioner of
Social Security’s definitions; and that Judge Hines consequently erred in finding that the ALJ
properly weighed the opinion of Ms. Renee Homer, K.C.’s special education teacher. Obj. at 1-3;
see Report-Rec. at 16 n.17. Plaintiff contends that if the ALJ had given Ms. Homer’s opinion the
greater weight to which it was entitled, the ALJ might have found that K.C. is disabled. Obj. at 3.
C. Decision To Adopt the Report and Recommendation
As Plaintiff notes, the pertinent regulations use “seriously” and “very seriously” in defining
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Six “domains” are used to gauge functional equivalence to a listed impairment when a
child, like K.C., does not “medically equal” one of the listed impairments. See Report-Rec. at 3; 20
C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(1)(i)-(vi). To functionally equal a listed impairment, the child must be found
to have a “marked limitation” in two of the domains or an “extreme limitation” in one. See ReportRec. at 4.
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“marked” and “extreme” limitations.2 Even if these pairs of terms ought to be considered
interchangeable in teacher evaluations, however, a review of the testimony quickly shows that the
ALJ’s weighing of the evidence in this case was proper. Moreover, Ms. Homer did not render an
overall assessment in any of the six domains used to gauge disability; her judgment of K.C.’s
“serious” or “very serious” problems related only to certain activities within the domains.
Because the first part of Plaintiff’s objection is thus immaterial, rendering any potential error
in the Report-Recommendation on that point harmless, the Court addresses only the second part of
the objection – the weighing of the evidence. Because Judge Hines already addressed this
argument, see Report-Rec. at 22, and because weighing the evidence is in any event the exclusive
province of the ALJ, see, e.g., Campbell v. Astrue, 465 F. App’x 4, 5 (2d Cir. 2012), the Court need
review Judge Hines’s Report-Recommendation only for clear error. Farid, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 307
(N.D.N.Y. 2008). Nevertheless, out of an abundance of caution, the Court will review de novo the
testimony relevant to Plaintiff’s objection.
A treating physician’s opinion receives controlling weight when it is “well-supported by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the
other substantial evidence in the record.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2); Halloran v.
Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 31-32 (2d Cir. 2004). Where there is conflict, however, the opinion of a
“non-medical source,” such as a teacher, may outweigh the opinion of a medical source (including a
2
See 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(2)(i) (2012) (“We will find that you have a ‘marked’
limitation in a domain when your impairment(s) interferes seriously with your ability to
independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities.” (emphases added)); 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.926a(e)(3)(i) (2012) (“We will find that you have an ‘extreme’ limitation in a domain when
your impairment(s) interferes very seriously with your ability to independently initiate, sustain, or
complete activities.” (emphases added)).
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treating source) when the teacher “has seen the individual more often and has a greater knowledge
of the individual’s functioning over time and if the [teacher’s] opinion has better supporting
evidence and is more consistent with the evidence as a whole.” SSR 06-03p, 2006 WL 2329939, at
*6 (Aug. 9, 2006). Those circumstances are not present here. Specifically, Ms. Homer’s opinion is
neither better supported than the medical sources’ opinions nor more consistent with the overall
evidence.
In Ms. Homer’s opinion, K.C. has “very serious problems” in activities relating to three of
the six domains and “serious problems” in activities relating to four domains. See Dkt. No. 9
(“Administrative Record”) at 196-203. Ms. Homer rendered her opinion in the form of circled
ratings on a form questionnaire, accompanied by a few single-sentence statements but no other
documentation or explanatory evidence. See id. at 196-203, 268-275.
The medical sources, on the other hand, included treatment notes from K.C.’s pediatrician,
Dr. Sivaneswary Ananda, whom K.C. saw thirty-six times during the relevant period; the results of
psychological and intelligence quotient testing by Dr. Stephen Tien, a consultative psychologist; and
conclusions from a childhood disability evaluation by Dr. K. Prowda, a state agency psychiatrist. Id.
at 330-41, 347-86. Dr. Ananda regularly found that K.C.’s ADHD was “under control with
medication.” See id. at 347-48, 351-52, 354, 356-57, 359-60, 372-73, 375-79. Dr. Tien noted “mild
impairments of attention and concentration and recent and remote memory skills,” and that K.C.
“should be able to work close to grade-level” with continued assistance. Id. at 333, 335. Dr.
Prowda found that K.C. had “marked limitations in attending and completing tasks; less than
marked limitations in acquiring and using information, interacting and relating with others, and
caring for himself, and no limitations in all other areas.” Id. at 338-39. Ms. Homer’s opinion was
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not better supported than these medical sources’ opinions and therefore could not have outweighed
them.
Nevertheless, the ALJ gave some weight to Ms. Homer’s opinion, embracing her assessment
that K.C. has a learning disorder affecting his abilities in language and math, and finding that K.C.
had a “marked limitation” in the domain of attending and completing tasks. See id. at 20-22. He
also noted, however, that Ms. Homer’s opinion was inconsistent with other parts of the record. See
id. at 64-65, 199, 269, 334; see also id. at 333-79 (medical sources’ opinions). Where a teacher’s
opinion is inconsistent with the totality of the evidence, it is the ALJ’s prerogative to assign that
opinion only some or little weight. See Bonet ex rel. T.B. v. Astrue, No. 1:11-CV-1140, 2012 WL
3544830, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2012).
The Court therefore finds that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and
in accordance with governing legal principles.
V.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is hereby:
ORDERED, that the Report-Recommendation (Dkt. No. 17) is APPROVED and
ADOPTED in its entirety; and it is further
ORDERED, that the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Plaintiff’s Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is DISMISSED; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court serve a copy of this Decision and Order on all
parties.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:
January 28, 2013
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Albany, New York
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