Centrone v. Astrue

Filing 17

MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDER - That the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED and Centrone's Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is DISMISSED. Signed by Chief Judge Gary L. Sharpe on 11/21/2012. (jel, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
________________________________
MARTHA A. CENTRONE,
Plaintiff,

5:11-cv-923
(GLS)

v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Commissioner of Social
Security,
Defendant.
________________________________
APPEARANCES:
OF COUNSEL:
FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
Olinksy Law Group
300 S. State Street
5th Floor, Suite 520
Syracuse, NY 13202
FOR THE DEFENDANT:
HON. RICHARD S. HARTUNIAN
United States Attorney
100 South Clinton Street
Syracuse, NY 13261

HOWARD D. OLINSKY, ESQ.

BENIL ABRAHAM
Special Assistant U.S. Attorney

Steven P. Conte
Regional Chief Counsel
Social Security Administration
Office of General Counsel, Region II
26 Federal Plaza, Room 3904
New York, NY 10278
Gary L. Sharpe
Chief Judge
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

I. Introduction
Plaintiff Martha A. Centrone challenges the Commissioner of Social
Security’s denial of Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) and seeks judicial review under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g)
and 1383(c)(3). (See Compl., Dkt. No. 1.) After reviewing the
administrative record and carefully considering Centrone’s arguments, the
court affirms the Commissioner’s decision and dismisses the Complaint.
II. Background
On January 22, 2007, Centrone filed an application for DIB and SSI
under the Social Security Act (“the Act”), alleging disability since December
14, 2005. (See Tr.1 at 141-47, 148-52.) After her application was denied,
Centrone requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ),
which was held on July 17, 2009. (See id. at 49-76.) A supplementary
hearing was also conducted on June 29, 2010, during which the ALJ
received testimony from an impartial medical expert. (See id. at 28-48.)
On August 18, 2010, the ALJ issued a decision denying the requested
benefits, which became the Commissioner’s final determination upon the
1

Page references preceded by “Tr.” are to the Administrative
Transcript. (See Dkt. No. 8.)
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Social Security Administration Appeals Council’s denial of review. (See id.
at 1-3, 16-22.)
Centrone commenced the present action by filing a Complaint on
August 4, 2011 wherein she sought review of the Commissioner’s
determination. (See Compl. ¶¶ 1-7.) The Commissioner filed an answer
and a certified copy of the administrative transcript. (See Dkt. Nos. 7, 8.)
Each party, seeking judgment on the pleadings, filed a brief. (See Dkt.
Nos. 13, 16.)
III. Contentions
Centrone contends that the Commissioner’s decision is tainted by
legal error and is not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically,
Centrone claims the ALJ: (1) incorrectly weighed opinion evidence in
determining her Residual Functional Capacity (RFC); (2) improperly
evaluated her credibility; and (3) failed to consult a vocational expert. (See
Dkt. No. 13 at 9-19.) The Commissioner counters that substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s decision. (See generally Dkt. No. 16.)
IV. Facts
The evidence in this case is undisputed and the court adopts the
parties’ factual recitations. (See Dkt. No. 13 at 1-8; Dkt. No. 16 at 2.)
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V. Standard of Review
The standard for reviewing the Commissioner’s final decision under
42 U.S.C. § 405(g)2 is well established and will not be repeated here. For a
full discussion of the standard and the five-step process used by the
Commissioner in evaluating whether a claimant is disabled under the Act,
the court refers the parties to its previous opinion in Christiana v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 1:05-CV-932, 2008 WL 759076, at *1-2 (N.D.N.Y.
Mar. 19, 2008).
VI. Discussion
A.

RFC Determination
Centrone first contends that the ALJ’s RFC determination3 “is the

product of numerous legal errors committed while weighing opinion
evidence.” (Dkt. No. 13 at 9-14.) More specifically, Centrone objects to the
weight afforded to the opinion of Dr. Thomas Weiss, the impartial medical
2

Review under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) is identical. As
such, parallel citations to the Regulations governing SSI are omitted.
3

A claimant's RFC “is the most [she] can still do despite [her]
limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). In assessing a claimant’s RFC,
an ALJ must consider “all of the relevant medical and other evidence,”
including a claimant’s subjective complaints of pain. Id. § 404.1545(a)(3).
An ALJ’s RFC determination must be supported by substantial evidence in
the record. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
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expert, Dr. Andrew Merritt, her treating physician, and the disability analyst.
(See id.) The Commissioner counters that the ALJ properly evaluated the
opinions of record and that his RFC is supported by substantial evidence.4
(See Dkt. No. 16 at 7-11.) The court agrees with the Commissioner.
Medical opinions, regardless of the source, are evaluated by
considering several factors outlined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). Controlling
weight will be given to a treating physician’s opinion that is “well-supported
by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and
is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence.” Id.
§ 404.1527(c)(2); see Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 32 (2d Cir. 2004).
Unless controlling weight is given to a treating source’s opinion, the ALJ is
required to consider the following factors in determining the weight
assigned to a medical opinion: whether or not the source examined the
claimant; the existence, length and nature of a treatment relationship; the
frequency of examination; evidentiary support offered; consistency with the
record as a whole; and specialization of the examiner. See 20 C.F.R.

4

“Substantial evidence is defined as more than a mere scintilla. It
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to
support a conclusion.” Alston v. Sullivan, 904 F.2d 122, 126 (2d Cir.
1990) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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§ 404.1527(c).
Here, Centrone claims that Dr. Weiss’ opinion should not have been
given great weight because it referenced another opinion, by Dr. Kalyani
Ganesh, that was only given little weight. (See Dkt. No. 13 at 9-11.)
However, this argument is belied by the record. Not only did Dr. Weiss
testify about the objective medical evidence he reviewed, (see, e.g., Tr. at
36, 37, 39, 42), but his report also cites to Dr. Merritt’s report, (see id. at
283), which Centrone avers is entitled to controlling weight, (see Dkt. No.
13 at 11-14). Moreover, Dr. Weiss stated that “there [was] sufficient
objective medical and other evidence to allow [him] to form opinions about
the nature and severity of [Centrone’s] impairment(s).” (Tr. at 277.)
Although Dr. Weiss reviewed the reports of other medical professionals,
there is no evidence that the opinion he rendered was not his own. And
ultimately, since his opinion is consistent with the medical evidence of
record—a point which Centrone fails to address in her brief—it was proper
for the ALJ to assign it great weight. (See Tr. at 20); 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(c)(2).
Likewise, the ALJ did not err in assigning less than controlling weight
to Centrone’s treating physician, Dr. Merritt. (See Dkt. No. 13 at 11-14.)
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Despite testifying on July 17, 2009 that she had only begun seeing Dr.
Merritt approximately one year prior, Centrone now argues that she had an
“extensive treating relationship with Dr. Merritt” dating back to September
2007. (Compare Tr. at 73, with Dkt. No. 13 at 12.) Setting aside the length
of his relationship with Centrone, Dr. Merritt’s report is unpersuasive, as he
was not treating Centrone when he authored it, and the report contains
both conclusory references to objective evidence, as well as conflicting
statements in the clinical findings.5 (See Tr. at 272-76.) Moreover, as the
Commissioner explains, Dr. Merritt’s opinion does not comport with the
diagnostic studies in the record. (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 16 at 11.) Thus,
because it was both unsupported and inconsistent, Dr. Merritt’s opinion
was not entitled to controlling weight. See Halloran, 362 F.3d at 32.
Finally, Centrone’s contention that the ALJ erred in affording “little
weight,” as opposed to “no weight,” to the opinion of the disability analyst
is, simply put, immaterial. (Dkt. No. 13 at 14.) Semantics aside, the ALJ
was clearly unmoved by the disability analyst’s report—as it, unlike the
RFC determination, stated that Centrone had no physical limitations,
5

For example, in response to question six, which states, “Identify
the clinical findings and objective signs,” Dr. Merritt wrote, “No objective
findings, x[-]rays [] significant DJD.” (Tr. at 272.)
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(compare Tr. at 19-20, with Tr. at 250-54)—and correctly identified that it
was “not a medical opinion.”6 (Tr. at 20.)
In sum, the ALJ applied the appropriate legal standards in
considering the medical opinions, and in so doing, arrived at an RFC that is
supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the ALJ’s RFC
assessment is affirmed.
B.

Credibility Assessment
Centrone next argues that the ALJ applied an improper legal

standard in assessing her credibility. (See Dkt. No. 13 at 15-18.) Again,
the court disagrees, as a review of the ALJ’s opinion demonstrates that he
only discounted Centrone’s “subjective complaints of severe pain.” (Tr. at
20.) Despite experiencing extreme pain when she, for example, folds
laundry, Centrone only needs over-the-counter Advil, on an as needed
basis, for pain relief (see id. at 65); gardens and pulls weeds at her sisters,
(see id. at 68); and was able to go parasailing, (see id. at 72). When asked
about daily activities, Centrone initially replied that no one assisted her, but,

6

Besides its value as a potential ground for remand, and the
statutory benefits flowing therefrom, the court is hard-pressed to
understand why Centrone would highlight the disability analyst’s report
given that it undermines her entire disability claim.
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upon further questioning, clarified that “[a]nything physical[] [she cannot]
do.” (Id. at 66.) Simply put, Centrone’s subjective claims are not wholly
credible, and, in finding as such, the ALJ properly weighed “the objective
medical evidence in the record, [Centrone’s] demeanor, and other indicia of
credibility.” Lewis v. Apfel, 62 F. Supp. 2d 648, 651 (N.D.N.Y. 1999)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). It follows that his credibility
assessment is conclusive.
C.

Vocational Expert
Centrone’s final argument—that the ALJ was required to consult a

vocational expert—is also without merit because it implicitly assumes that
Dr. Merritt’s findings are entitled to controlling weight. (See Dkt. No. 13 at
18-19.) However, because the court has already found otherwise, it
suffices to say that Centrone’s argument is untenable. As such, the ALJ’s
decision to forego the use of a vocational expert was appropriate in this
case. (See Tr. at 21.)
D.

Remaining Findings and Conclusions
After careful review of the record, the court affirms the remainder of

the ALJ’s decision as it is supported by substantial evidence.
VII. Conclusion
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WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED and
Centrone’s Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is DISMISSED; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk close this case and provide a copy of this
Memorandum-Decision and Order to the parties.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
November 21, 2012
Albany, New York

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