Briggs & Stratton Corporation et al v. Chongqing RATO Power Co., Ltd. et al
Filing
78
DECISION AND ORDER denying 75 Motion to Bifurcate. Signed by US Magistrate Judge Andrew T. Baxter on 11/7/13. (tab)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
__________________________________________
BRIGGS & STRATTON CORPORATION, et al.
No. 5:13-CV-316
(LEK/ATB)
Plaintiffs,
v.
CHONGQING RATO POWER CO., LTD., et al.,
Defendants.
__________________________________________
MATTHEW M. WOLF, ESQ., et al., for Plaintiffs
JEFFREY M. OLSON, ESQ., et al., for Defendants
ANDREW T. BAXTER, U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
DECISION AND ORDER
Presently before this court is defendants’ letter motion dated October 4, 2013
(Dkt. No. 75) seeking to bifurcate the issue of patent damages from liability, and to
stay damages discovery pending resolution of liability issues. The plaintiffs have
opposed the motion by letter brief dated October 25, 2013 (Dkt. No. 76), and the
defendants filed a brief reply (Dkt. No. 77). After considering the written submissions
of the parties, and for the reasons set forth below, this court denies the motion to stay
damages discovery. The defendants’ motion to bifurcate liability and damage issues at
trial is also denied, but without prejudice to renewing that motion before the presiding
District Judge following the completion of discovery.
I.
Background1
Plaintiffs Briggs & Stratton Corporation and Briggs & Stratton Power Products
Group (collectively, “plaintiffs”), manufacturers of “Ferris”-branded lawn mowers,
initiated this patent infringement action against Defendant Chongqing RATO Power
Company and its subsidiaries, Defendants RATO North America and Denver Global
Products (collectively, “defendants”), manufacturers of an allegedly infringing lawn
mower named “RAVEN.” (Compl., Dkt. No. 1). Plaintiffs’ Ferris-branded lawn
mowers feature an independent suspension enabling the two front wheels to move
over terrain independently of each other. Plaintiffs purport to hold many patents
relating to mower suspensions, but assert in this action multiple claims relating to two
patents–U.S. Patent No. 6,510,678 (hereinafter the “678 Patent”) and U.S. Patent No.
7,107,746 (hereinafter the “746 Patent”). (See Pls.’ Asserted Claims and Infringement
Contentions, Dkt. No. 75 at 17-38). As set forth in their complaint, plaintiffs seek,
among other things, injunctive relief and damages of “no less than a reasonable
royalty.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 7-8).2
On April 12, 2013, plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction, based on the
alleged infringement of two particular claims by the defendants–claim 39 of the 678
1
Additional background regarding this action is set forth in Senior U.S. District Judge
Lawrence E. Kahn’s Memorandum-Decision and Order denying plaintiffs’ motion for a
preliminary injunction. (Dkt. No. 70). See Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Chongquing [sic] Rato
Power Co., 5:13-CV-316 (LEK/ATB), 2013 WL 3972391 (N.D.N.Y. July 23, 2013). This
decision and order presumes familiarity with Judge Kahn’s prior Memorandum-Decision and
Order.
2
The Civil Case Management Plan also suggests that plaintiffs are seeking damages of
lost profits. (Dkt. No. 71 at 4).
2
Patent,3 and claim 6 of the 746 Patent.4 (Dkt. No. 27). In the Memorandum-Decision
and Order denying the motion, Judge Kahn found that defendants raised a substantial
question as to the validity of claim 39 of the 678 Patent, because the claim failed to
satisfy the written-description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1 (Dkt. No. 70 at 1014) and on the grounds of obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (Dkt. No. 70 at 1424). However, Judge Kahn rejected defendants’ stated basis for challenging the
validity of claim 6 of the 746 Patent and concluded that plaintiffs “have raised at least
a sufficiently serious question going to the merits of their claim that the RAVEN
infringes claim 6”5 (Dkt. No. 70 at 31-33). Nonetheless, Judge Kahn denied the
preliminary injunction, finding that plaintiffs did not sustain their burden of proving
irreparable harm. (Dkt. No. 70 at 37-41).
Defendants have asserted a number of counterclaims, including false
advertising and unfair and deceptive trade practices under the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C.
3
Claim 39 relates to a method for preventing full spring compression of the independent
suspension of a mower. (See Dkt. No. 70 at 38 n.18). Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary
injunction described this claim as follows: “Claim 39 of the ‘678 patent is generally directed to a
method for manufacturing a lawn mower with independent suspension. The claim requires
coupling at least two wheels to a lawn mower frame via respective independent suspensions.
Each independent suspension has a spring and a “load compensation adjuster”–e.g., a shock
absorber–that is positioned inside the coil of the spring. The load compensation adjuster is
configured such that it prevents the spring from reaching full compression under high loads.”
(Dkt. No. 27-1 at 13).
4
Plaintiffs described this claim as follows: “Claim 6 of the ‘746 patent is generally
directed to a lawn mower product having independent suspensions. Each wheel on the left and
right of the mower is pivotably coupled to a beam in the center of the mower’s frame, e.g., via a
wishbone suspension arm. The distance from the pivots of each suspension arm to the centerline
of the mower is 0% to 20% of the track width of the mower.” (Dkt. No. 27-1 at 13).
5
That alleged infringement of claim 6 relates to the RAVEN’s use of “central
longitudinal beams and pivotable coupling.” (See Dkt. No. 70 at 41).
3
§ 1125(a)), and false advertising under New York, North Carolina, and Wisconsin
law. (Dkt. No. 68 at 7-12). With respect to their counterclaims, defendants seek
injunctive relief, as well as “an award to Denver of all profits, sums and gains received
by [plaintiffs] of any kind made as a result of their false advertising” and “an award of
all damages sustained by Denver by reason of [plaintiffs’] acts of false advertising.”
(Dkt. No. 68 at 13). Plaintiffs’ letter brief noted that defendants’ motion to bifurcate
did not reference its counterclaims and argued that the false advertising counterclaims
would generate discovery that substantially overlapped with discovery relating to
patent infringement damages. (Dkt. No. 76 at 1, 2). Defendants’ reply stated that, “if
the Court grants [the] motion to bifurcate, [Denver] will agree to accept a nominal
damage award of $1 should it prevail on its false advertising counterclaims (in
addition to whatever injunctive relief and/or costs and fees that may be awarded).”
(Dkt. No. 77 at 1).
II.
Applicable Law6
Plaintiffs’ motion implicates Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides, in pertinent part, that “[f]or convenience, to avoid
prejudice, or to expedite and economize, the court may order a separate trial of one or
more separate issues [or] claims . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b); see also Amato v. City of
Saratoga Springs, New York, 170 F.3d 311, 316 (2d Cir. 1999). The decision of
6
The statement of applicable law draws heavily on Magistrate Judge Peebles’ ReportRecommendation in Cornell Research Found., Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 5:01-CV-1974
(NAM/DEP), 2006 WL 2739678, at *4-5, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97053, at *11-13 (N.D.N.Y.
Aug. 15, 2006) (Report-Recommendation), adopted, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68711 (N.D.N.Y.
Sept. 25, 2006).
4
whether to bifurcate a trial “is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court.”
Getty Petroleum Corp. v. Island Transp. Corp., 862 F.2d 10, 15 (2d Cir. 1988). The
burden of demonstrating that bifurcation is appropriate rests with the party seeking
such relief. Aldous v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 94-CV-1090 (TJM), 1996 WL 312189,
at *1 (N.D.N.Y. May 30, 1996).
When exercising its discretion to order such relief, the court must consider
“whether bifurcation would (1) avoid unfair prejudice to a party, (2) provide for
convenience, and (3) expedite the proceedings and be more economical.” Carson v.
City of Syracuse, 92-CV-777 (NJM), 1993 WL 260676, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. July 7, 1993);
see also Witherbee v. Honeywell, Inc., 151 F.R.D. 27, 29 (N.D.N.Y. 1993). In order
for separate trials in a single case to be appropriate, the issues to be bifurcated must be
distinct; bifurcation is not suitable where the evidence pertaining to the issues to be
separately tried can reasonably be expected to overlap. Aldous v. Honda Motor Co.,
Ltd., 1996 WL 312189, at *1-2; see also Hanlin Group, Inc. v. Village of Solvay, New
York, 88-CV-773 (TJM), 1990 WL 164694, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 1990) (denying
bifurcation in order to promote efficiency in light of evidentiary overlap).
In support of their motion to bifurcate damage proceedings, defendants rely
heavily on the recent en banc decision of the Federal Circuit in Robert Bosch, LLC v.
Pylon Mfg. Corp., 719 F.3d 1305, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2013), which upheld the decision of
a Delaware district judge who has concluded that bifurcation “is appropriate, if not
necessary, in all but exceptional patent cases. (Defs.’ 10/4/13 Ltr. Brf. at 3 (citation
omitted)). However, notwithstanding dicta in the Bosch decision cited by defendants,
5
the Federal Circuit still recognizes that district judges “are best positioned to make
[the bifurcation] determination on a case-by-case basis.” Id. at 1319-20 (a district
judge “may decide, for example, for reasons of efficiency due to the commonality of
witnesses or issues in any particular case, that bifurcation is not warranted”).
Moreover, despite the dominant role of the Federal Circuit in developing the
law in patent cases, the decision whether to bifurcate damage proceedings is
determined by the law of the circuit in which the district court is located. See, e.g.,
Medtronic Xomed, Inc. v. Gyrus ENT LLC, 440 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1335 (M.D. Fla.
2006) (“[b]ecause bifurcation of liability and damages is not unique to patent law, the
law of the Eleventh Circuit applies to this issue”) (citing Wexell v. Komar Industries,
Inc., 18 F.3d 916, 919 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“[t]his court applies the law of the pertinent
regional circuit when the precise issue to be addressed involves an interpretation of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”)). The prevailing view in the Second Circuit
still seems to be that bifurcation of damages in patent cases is “the exception, not the
rule.” See, e.g., Plew v. Ltd. Brands, Inc., 08 Civ. 3741, 2012 WL 379933, at *9, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14966, at *25 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2012); WeddingChannel.com. Inc.
v. The Knot, Inc., 03 Civ. 7369(RWS), 2004 WL 2984305, at *1, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 25749, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2004); Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v.
Simple.com, Inc., 247 F.R.D. 63, 67 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
A decision that patent liability and damage issues should be bifurcated for trial
purposes does not necessarily resolve the issue of whether damages discovery should
be stayed at the outset. See, e.g., Foseco, Inc. v. Consolidated Aluminum Corp. 851 F.
6
Supp. 369, 371 (E.D. Mo. 1991) (bifurcating trial on liability and damage issues, but
declining to bifurcate discovery “[i]n the interest of judicial economy and
expediency”). See also Enzo Life Scis., Inc. v. Digene Corp., 02-212, 2003 WL
21402512, at *4-5, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10202, at *13-18 (D. Del. June 10, 2003).7
III.
Analysis
This court finds that discovery on damages in this case should not be stayed. I
also conclude, at this early stage of the proceedings, that the defendants have not
sustained their burden of demonstrating that a bifurcation of trial would be
appropriate. However, after further pretrial proceedings, the presiding District Judge
may, in his discretion, revisit the issue of whether a bifurcation of liability and damage
issues at trial would be warranted.
A.
Defendants’ Likelihood of Prevailing on Liability
In support of their motion, defendants argue that Judge Kahn’s preliminary
analysis of the merits of plaintiffs’ claims “suggest that [plaintiff] is vulnerable to
losing on one or both patents” and that bifurcation would avoid the waste of
substantial resources addressing damage issues if the defendants prevail as to liability.
7
While defendants described the holding in Enzo case as “bifurcating patent damages
from liability” (Dkt. No. 75 at 2), Enzo actually held that a trial would be bifurcated to separately
address patent infringement claims, validity defenses, and counterclaims. (Enzo, in dicta, did
state that “[t]ypically, courts bifurcate patent cases into liability and damage trials.” Id., 2003
WL 21402512, at *5, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10202, at *16.) However, the Enzo court denied a
motion to stay discovery on the counterclaims, finding that “a more difficult question” than the
issue of bifurcation of trial. Id., 2003 WL 21402512, at *5, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10202, at
*17-18 (while the counterclaims may be mooted or simplified depending on the outcome of the
patent issues, this factor is outweighed by the importance of judicial efficiency and fairness in
resolving the counterclaims).
7
(Defs.’ 10/4/2013 Ltr. Brf. at 2). In denying plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary
injunction, Judge Kahn found that the defendants raised a substantial question as to
the validity of claim 39 of the 678 Patent. However, as Judge Kahn’s decision noted,
“[a]t the preliminary-injunction stage, . . . a defendant need only demonstrate
vulnerability by raising a ‘substantial question concerning either infringement or
validity,’ which ‘requires less proof than the clear and convincing showing necessary
to establish invalidity’ at trial.” (Dkt. No. 70 at 5 (citations omitted)). Moreover,
plaintiff raised only one claim with respect to the 678 Patent in connection with its
preliminary injunction, but is pursuing other claims in connection with that patent in
this case which Judge Kahn has not yet addressed. (See Pls.’ Asserted Claims and
Infringement Contentions, Dkt. No. 75 at 17-25).
Judge Kahn also found that plaintiffs “raised at least a sufficiently serious
question going to the merits of their claim that the RAVEN infringes claim 6” of the
746 Patent. (Dkt. No. 70 at 33). The District Court cautioned that plaintiffs failed to
show “where the longitudinal pivot axes of the RAVEN’s wheels are located,” and
concluded “without a proper analysis of the kinematics involved in the pivoting of the
RAVEN’s wheels,” the court could not determine with certainty whether the RAVEN
embodied the “central” requirement of the “central longitudinal beam” limitation.
(Dkt. No. 70 at 33).8 However, plaintiff’s patent contentions (Dkt. No. 75 at 29)
provide further information about the location of the pivot axes on the RAVEN mower
8
“This necessarily means that Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the beams are
placed so that the pivot axes are spaced, as required by claim 1[from which claim 6 depends],
‘between about 0% and about 20% of the track width.’” (Dkt. No. 70 at 33).
8
that tends to confirm Judge Kahn’s “understanding” that the pivot axes are indeed
centrally located, as required to embody the relevant patent claims (Dkt. No. 70 at
33).9 Hence, it appears, based on Judge Kahn’s preliminary findings, that plaintiffs
have demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of their
infringement claim with respect to claim 6 of the 746 patent.
Judge Kahn’s preliminary review of some of plaintiffs’ claims does not suggest
that the defendants will necessarily prevail on all liability issues in this case. At this
early stage of the proceedings, the defendants have not made an adequate showing
with respect to the merits of their position on liability to support a stay of discovery on
damages or bifurcation at trial. See, e.g., Kimberly-Clark Worldwide, Inc. v. First
Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 09-C-0916, 2010 WL 3521567, at *1, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 98573, at *4-5 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 7, 2010) (denying bifurcation because, based
on the court’s prior rulings, “it does not appear improbable that the jury will have to
address damages in some form”); Real v. Bunn-O-Matic Corp., 195 F.R.D. 618, 623
(N.D. Ill. 2000) (where there is a “possibility, given the Court’s previous rulings” that
plaintiff will prevail on liability issues, “this Court will not preclude a plaintiff from
proceeding in the normal course of a trial and present[ing] evidence on both liability
and damages merely because a defendant may ultimately prevail”). After further
discovery and other pretrial proceedings develop more information about the merits of
plaintiffs’ claims, the presiding District Judge may decide to reconsider whether
9
Whether plaintiff can ultimately prove that the RAVEN’s pivot axes are centrally
located may depend on further kinematic analysis (see Defs.’ 10/4/2013 Ltr. Brf. at 6) and on
how certain claims are ultimately construed (see Pls.’ Ltr. Brf. at 5-6).
9
bifurcation of the trial is appropriate.
B.
Complexity of Damages Analysis and Overlap with Liability Issues
Defendants also argue that proceedings relating to damages in this case will be
particularly complex because two plaintiffs have asserted multiple claims with respect
to two patents embodying “a distinct and minor feature of a far larger machine.”
According to the defendants, “the damage analysis will require separating the value of
the patented features from the unpatented features, which the Federal Circuit
acknowledges is a “difficult and error prone task.” (Defs.’ 10/4/2013 Ltr. Brf. at 1-2,
citing, LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 66 (Fed. Cir.
2012)). Although the patent claims in this case–involving the suspension of a riding
lawnmower–are not particularly complicated, this court will assume, without deciding,
that the damage analysis in this case could prove to be more complex than average.
Nonetheless, I conclude that a stay of damages discovery is not warranted because of
the overlap between certain liability and damages issues, and the prospect of vigorous
disputes between the parties regarding where the line between discovery on those two
areas should properly be drawn. Moreover, staying damages discovery would likely
eliminate the possibility of an early settlement and would, if the District Judge
ultimately decides to bifurcate for trial purposes, preclude a single, bifurcated trial
before the same jury.
As Judge Kahn recognized in his prior opinion, the plaintiff may rebut
defendants’ contention that claim 39 of the 678 Patent is invalid because of
obviousness by offering evidence of, inter alia, the “commercial success of the
10
patented invention.” (Dkt. No. 70 at 15 (citations omitted)). Such evidence would
need to establish a connection between the commercial success of plaintiffs’ Ferrisbranded lawnmowers and the particular invention reflected in claim 39. (Dkt. No. 70
at 23-24). As plaintiffs argue, discovery relating to commercial success would
substantially overlap with discovery relating to damages, which also would be
directed at trying to separate the value of particular patented features of the
lawnmower’s independent suspension from unpatented features of the mower. (Pls.’
Ltr. Brf. at 8 (citing, inter alia, Kimberly-Clark Worldwide, Inc. v. First Quality Baby
Prods., LLC, 2010 WL 3521567, at *2, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98573, at *5
(“[D]amages and liability are not easily compartmentalized. For example, jurors may
need to consider sales and financial records when deciding the liability issue of
whether [plaintiff] has proven ‘commercial success.’ Such financial information is
inherently intertwined with damages issues.”)).
Defendants respond that, “in ordering bifurcation courts have recognized that
the evidence needed to show commercial success is “less extensive and of a different
character from that to prove damages.” (Defs.’ 10/4/2013 Ltr. Brf. at 8) (citing, inter
alia, Paine Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 587 F. Supp. 1112, 1116 (D. Del. 1984)). However, the cases relied upon by
defendant involved circumstances where commercial success could apparently be
demonstrated by analyzing sales and profit data with respect to the overall product
embodying the patent(s). In this case, as Judge Kahn recognized (Dkt. No. 70 at 2324), analysis of commercial success in this case requires a more particularized inquiry
11
into the contribution of a patented feature that is a relatively minor component of the
overall product to the success of that product–a similar exercise required to do the
damages analysis. If the court were to allow discovery regarding validity and
commercial success while staying discovery with respect to damages, it would very
likely become embroiled in disputes between the parties as to whether particular
discovery requests permissibly related to the liability issues or improperly delved into
damage issues. Kimberly-Clark Worldwide, 2010 WL 3521567, at *2, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 98573, at *5 (“[b]ifurcation would likely require the parties, and possibly this
Court, to wade into the morass inherent in drawing lines between discovery relevant to
damages and discovery relevant to liability”).
Plaintiffs have specifically identified other areas in which discovery on liability
and damages issues could overlap significantly (Pls.’ Ltr. Brf. at 8-9), while
defendants have contended, in fairly conclusory fashion, that plaintiffs overstate the
extent of any such overlap (Defs’ 10/28/2013 Ltr. Brf. at 1-2, Dkt. No. 77). In any
event, the disagreement between the parties on the subject would likely contribute to
other disputes regarding the proper scope of discovery, which would unnecessarily
burden the parties and the court, and would delay pretrial proceedings. See, e.g.,
BASF Catalysts LLC v. Aristo, Inc., 2:07-cv- 222, 2009 WL 523123, at *2, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 16263, at *5-6 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 2, 2009) (“many courts have noted that
bifurcation can lead to additional discovery disputes that actually add time and costs
to the litigation,” including “extensive motion practice wrangling over whether certain
pieces of discovery were applicable to the liability case or the willfulness/damages
12
case”) (collecting cases); Foseco, Inc. v. Consolidated Aluminum Corp. 851 F. Supp.
at 371 (if discovery on damages was stayed, “the court’s time would be wastefully
spent . . . in having to separate discovery objections which deal with damages and
with liability”).
Moreover, even if, as defendants claim, separate experts would address liability
and damages issues, it seems likely that some fact witnesses from both sides would
have information relevant to both areas. Requiring such witnesses possibly to submit
to two rounds of discovery and trial testimony would be highly inefficient. See, e.g.,
Cornell Research Found., Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 2006 WL 2739678, at *5,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97053, at *13 (“bifurcation is not suitable where the same
witnesses may be required to testify at both stages, and where the evidence pertaining
to the issues to be separately tried can reasonably be expected to overlap”) (citations
omitted); Kimberly-Clark Worldwide, 2010 WL 3521567, at *1, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 98573, at *4 (staying damages-related discovery and bifurcation would tend to
cause unnecessary delay and expense and would not promote judicial economy;
bifurcation would require two trials and two sets of discovery). As the court in BASF
noted, “[p]ostponement does not equate with economy.” BASF Catalysts LLC v.
Aristo, Inc., 2009 WL 523123, at *2, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16263, at *5.
Delaying damages discovery until after the adjudication of liability issues
would, during the first, lengthy stage of the proceedings, deprive the parties of critical
information relevant to damages, which could preclude early settlement discussions
and prevent the parties from litigating damage issues promptly after the resolution of
13
liability issues. If the presiding District Judge ultimately were ultimately to decide
that bifurcation of liability and damage issues at trial was appropriate, staying
discovery on damages would preclude the efficient option of having the same jury
address liability and damages at one bifurcated trial. See Foseco, Inc. v. Consolidated
Aluminum Corp. 851 F. Supp. at 371 (in the interest of judicial economy and
expediency, the court would be better served by having parties informed by damages
discovery before the start of trial; if the damages trial is required, then the parties will
be prepared to continue before the same jury without interruption). Moreover, a
lengthy stay of discovery about the nature and extent of damages could discourage the
parties from engaging in settlement discussions during the early stages of the case. Id.
(declining to stay damages discovery despite ordering a bifurcated trial so that the
parties will be fully prepared to negotiate a settlement).
C.
Prejudice
In applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b), the court must balance “two types of
prejudices: first, the possible prejudice of jury confusion on complex issues if
bifurcation is denied, and second, the prejudice of considerable delay resulting if
bifurcation of liability and damages is granted.” BASF Catalysts LLC v. Aristo, Inc.,
2009 WL 523123, at *2, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16263, at *6-7 (citing Real v.
Bunn-O-Matic Corp., 195 F.R.D. at 621). “The first can be tempered with cautionary
warnings, limiting instructions, special verdict forms, and other jury instructions, but
the second only can be cured by denying bifurcation.” Id.
Plaintiffs contend they will be prejudiced by the substantial delay in resolution
14
of this case if discovery and trial on damages must await resolution of liability issues.
Defendants argue they will be prejudiced by the burden of engaging in extensive and
complicated discovery involving damages if they ultimately prevail on liability issues.
As discussed above, the court, at this stage of the proceedings, cannot conclude that
plaintiffs’ prospects of prevailing on some liability issues are so poor that the
defendant should not be required to shoulder the usual burden in civil litigation of
conducting discovery with respect to both liability and damage issues. While not
discounting the possible complexity of damages discovery, this court has concluded
that the requested stay would not promote the efficient and timely litigation of this
case. Accordingly, I find that the defendants have not established that the alleged
prejudice resulting from their obligation to conduct full discovery outweighs the
prejudice to the plaintiff from waiting for two rounds of discovery and trial before
their claims may be fully adjudicated.
At this early stage of the case, the court cannot conclude that a trial on liability
and damages would foster jury confusion that would prejudice defendants. However,
the defendants will have the opportunity to raise that issue again with the presiding
District Judge, after full discovery helps the parties flesh out this issue.
Accordingly, it is hereby:
ORDERED, that, defendants’ motion to stay discovery on damages issues (Dkt.
No. 75) is DENIED. It is further
ORDERED, that defendants’ motion to bifurcate liability and damage issues at
15
trial (Dkt. No. 75) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Dated: November 7, 2013
16
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