Buttner v. RD Palmer Enterprises, Inc. et al

Filing 145

MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDERED, that Plaintiffs Motion (Dkt. No. 77) for partial summary judgment against Defendants RD Palmer Enterprises, Inc., Richard Palmer, and Rich and Gardner Construction Company, Inc. is DENIED; and it is further ORDERED, t hat Defendant Rich and Gardner Construction Company, Inc.s Cross-Motion (Dkt. No. 83) for partial summary judgment is GRANTED; and it is further ORDERED, that Defendant Rich and Gardner Construction Company, Inc.s Motion (Dkt. No. 89) for partial sum mary judgment is GRANTED; and it is further ORDERED, that Plaintiffs copyright infringement claims against Defendant Rich and Gardner Construction Company, Inc. are DISMISSED and Defendant Rich and Gardner Construction Company, Inc. is DISMISSED from this action; and it is further ORDERED, that Defendants Richard Palmer and RD Palmer Enterprises, Inc.s Cross-Motion (Dkt. No. 84) for summary judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, consistent with this Memorandum-Decision and Order; and it is further ORDERED, that Plaintiffs copyright infringement claims against Defendants Richard Palmer and RD Palmer Enterprises, Inc. are DISMISSED; and it is further ORDERED, that Defendant Rich and Gardner Construction Company, Inc.s Motion (Dkt. No . 89) for summary judgment is GRANTED; and it is further ORDERED, that Defendant Rich and Gardner Construction Company, Inc.s Second Motion (Dkt. No. 133) for summary judgment is DENIED as moot; and it is further ORDERED, that Defendant Robert Charle s Abbott, Jr.s Motion (Dkt. No. 91) for judgment on the pleadings is DENIED as moot; and it is further ORDERED, that Defendant Robert Charles Abbott, Jr.s Motion (Dkt. No. 93) for summary judgment is DENIED as moot; and it is furtherORDERED, that Pla intiffs Letter Motion (Dkt. No. 98) to withdraw claims against Defendant Robert Charles Abbott, Jr. is DENIED as moot; and it is further ORDERED, that all claims against Defendant Robert Charles Abbott, Jr. are DISMISSED with prejudice and Defendant Robert Charles Abbott, Jr. is DISMISSED from this action; and it is further ORDERED, that Defendant Rich and Gardner Construction Company, Inc.s Motion (Dkt. No. 124) to preclude Plaintiffs damages expert is DENIED as moot; and it is further ORDERED, that Defendant Dunn & Sgromo Engineers, PLLC Motion (Dkt. No. 131) for summary judgment is GRANTED; and it is further ORDERED, that Plaintiffs copyright infringement claims against Defendant Dunn & Sgromo Engineers, PLLCs are DISMISSED and Defendant Dunn & Sgromo Engineers, PLLC is DISMISSED from this action; and it is further ORDERED, that Plaintiffs Letter Motion (Dkt. No. 143) to strike is DENIED as moot; and it is further ORDERED, that if Plaintiff wishes to maintain this action in the Nort hern District, he must file within thirty (30) days of the date of this Memorandum-Decision and Order a memorandum of law asserting the basis for the Court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs remaining breach of contract claim aga inst Defendants Richard Palmer and RD Palmer Enterprises, Inc. Defendants may file a response within ten (10) days of Plaintiffs memorandum. If Plaintiff fails or elects not to file a memorandum of law on the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, the Clerk shall close this case. Signed by Senior Judge Lawrence E. Kahn on March 31, 2015. (sas)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
BRIAN R. BUTTNER, individually and
d/b/a APPLIED DESIGN RESEARCH
ASSOCIATES,
Plaintiff,
-against-

5:13-CV-0342 (LEK/ATB)

RD PALMER ENTERPRISES, INC.;
RICHARD PALMER; RICH AND
GARDNER CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, INC.; DUNN & SGROMO
ENGINEERS, PLLC; and ROBERT
CHARLES ABBOTT, JR.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDER
I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Brian R. Buttner (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action alleging copyright

infringement and related state law claims against Defendants Rich and Gardner Construction
Company, Inc. (“Rich and Gardner”); RD Palmer Enterprises, Inc. and Richard Palmer (together,
“Palmer”); and Dunn & Sgromo Engineers, PLLC (“Dunn & Sgromo”) (collectively, “Defendants”).
Dkt. No. 1 (“Complaint”). On Nov 27, 2013, the Court granted Defendants’ Motion for partial
judgment on the pleadings, leaving only Plaintiff’s claims for copyright infringement against all
Defendants and breach of contract against Palmer remaining. See Dkt. No. 59 (“November Order”)
at 9. Presently before the Court are several Motions and Cross-Motions for summary judgment by
the parties. Dkt. Nos. 77 (“Plaintiff Motion”); 83 (“Rich and Gardner Cross-Motion”); 84 (“Palmer
Cross-Motion”); 89 (“Rich and Gardner Motion”); 131 (“Dunn & Sgromo Motion”); 133 (“Rich

and Gardner Second Motion”).1 For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion is denied,
Defendants’ Motions for summary judgment on the copyright infringement claims are granted, and
Palmer’s Cross-Motion for summary judgment on the breach of contract claim is denied.
II.

BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
The material facts are not in dispute except where otherwise noted. Plaintiff, who does

business as Applied Design Research Associates, is an architect who resides in New York. Dkt. No.
77-1 (“Plaintiff Statement of Material Facts - Plaintiff Motion”) ¶¶ 1-3. On March 14, 2006, Palmer
hired Plaintiff to provide various services relating to the renovation of a gas station in Cortland,
New York, owned and operated by Palmer. Dkt. No. 84-1 (“Palmer Statement of Material Facts Cross Motion”) ¶ 1. Plaintiff was contracted to design a new building, or an addition to the existing
building, for what amounted to essentially a combined Dunkin’ Donuts, convenience store, and gas
station. See id. ¶ 3.
Among the services Plaintiff rendered was the creation of architectural drawings. Pl. SMF Pl. Mot. ¶ 4. Plaintiff registered his architectural drawings and architectural work with the
Copyright Office, which were identified by Copyright Registration Numbers VAu-1-073-656 and
VAu-1-075-551, respectively. Id. ¶¶ 5-6. In total, Plaintiff’s works consisted of the following: (1)
eight site plans; (2) a floor plan dated July 19, 2006, and two elevations dated January 12, 2007 (the
“2006 Buttner Plans”); and (3) a floor plan dated April 10, 2008, and two elevations dated August 5,

1

Also before the Court are Motions for judgment on the pleadings and for summary
judgment by Defendant Robert Charles Abbott, Jr. (“Abbott”). Dkt. Nos. 91; 93. Plaintiff and
Abbott subsequently stipulated to dismissal with prejudice of all claims against Abbott, and
therefore Abbott’s Motions are moot. See Dkt. Nos. 130; 132.
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2008 (the “2008 Buttner Plans”) (collectively, the “Buttner Plans”). Dkt. No. 83-2 (“Rich and
Gardner Statement of Material Facts - Cross-Mot.”) ¶ 6.
Plaintiff’s agreement with Palmer permitted Palmer to use the Buttner Plans to seek quotes
from contractors. Id. ¶ 9. Accordingly, the 2008 Buttner Plans were provided to Rich and Gardner
to prepare a cost estimate. Id. After Palmer and Plaintiff’s one-year agreement expired, Palmer
ceased engagement with Plaintiff—allegedly due to Plaintiff’s “inability to move the [project]
through various regulatory hurdles.” Id. ¶ 8; see also Palmer SMF - Cross-Mot. ¶¶ 4-7. Palmer then
retained Rich and Gardner to complete the project. Rich and Gardner SMF - Cross-Mot. ¶ 12.
Rich and Gardner later drafted a set of plans (the “Earliest Rich and Gardner drawings”) “based on,
but different than, the Buttner Plans.” Id. ¶ 15. Palmer and Rich and Gardner then procceded with
the construction of the project based on Rich and Gardner’s plans, and the project was completed in
July 2011 (the “Station As-Built”). Id. ¶¶ 16-18.
Dunn & Sgromo is an engineering firm that was retained by Palmer in July 2007 to be the
site engineer and obtain the necessary municipal approvals for the project. Dkt. No. 131 (“Dunn &
Sgromo Statement of Material Facts”) ¶¶ 9, 13. Plaintiff provided Dunn & Sgromo with the Buttner
Plans to prepare a series of traffic studies to be submitted to the New York State Department of
Transportation (“DOT”) to obtain necessary permits for the project. Id. ¶ 14. Dunn & Sgromo
worked with Plaintiff on modifying the Buttner Plans to meet DOT’s requirements. Id. ¶ 15. The
scope of Dunn & Sgromo’s authorization to modify and utilize the Buttner Plans, however, is in
dispute. See id. ¶¶ 16-18; Dkt. No. 136-3 (“Plaintiff Response Statement of Material Facts - Dunn
& Sgromo”) ¶¶ 13, 16-20.

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B. Procedural Background
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleged (1) copyright infringement, misappropriation, unjust
enrichment, and unfair competition against all Defendants; and (2) breach of contract against
Palmer. Compl. In the November Order, the Court dismissed all but Plaintiff’s copyright
infringement claim against all Defendants and Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim against Palmer.
Nov. Order.
Several Motions and Cross-Motions for summary judgment ensued. Plaintiff has moved for
partial summary judgment against Palmer and Rich and Gardner on Plaintiff’s claim that the Earliest
Rich and Gardner drawings infringed on the 2008 Buttner Plans. See Pl. Mot; Dkt. No. 77-4
(“Plaintiff Memorandum - Plaintiff Motion”). Rich and Gardner has filed a Cross-Motion on the
same issue, while Palmer filed a Cross-Motion on both the alleged infringement of the Earliest Rich
and Gardner drawings and the Station As-Built, as well as on the breach of contract claim. Rich and
Gardner Cross-Mot.; Palmer Cross-Mot.; Dkt. Nos. 84-4 (“Palmer Memorandum - Cross-Motion”);
85 (“Rich and Gardner Memorandum - Cross Motion”). Rich and Gardner then filed a Motion for
partial summary judgment on the issue of infringement by the Station As-Built. Rich and Gardner
Mot.; Dkt. No. 89-1 (“Rich and Gardner Memorandum - Motion”). Dunn & Sgromo has separately
moved for summary judgment on the copyright infringement claims against it. Dunn & Sgromo
Mot.; Dkt. No. 131-17 (“Dunn & Sgromo Memorandum”). Rich and Gardner has also filed a
Second Motion for summary judgment on both infringement claims, but based on different grounds.
Rich and Gardner Second Mot.2 Rich and Gardner and Plaintiff were also granted leave to file

2

The parties dispute whether Rich and Gardner’s Second Motion was a permissible filing or
an unauthorized sur-reply. Because the Court finds infra that Rich and Gardner is entitled to
summary judgment on all copyright infringement claims against it based on the Cross-Motions and
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Memoranda of law on the Second Circuit’s recent decision in Zalewski v. Cicero Builder Dev. Inc.,
754 F.3d 95 (2014). Dkt. Nos. 112; 113.
III.

LEGAL STANDARD
A. Summary Judgment
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure instructs a court to grant summary judgment

if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). Although “[f]actual disputes that are irrelevant or
unnecessary” will not preclude summary judgment, “summary judgment will not lie if . . . the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see also Taggart v. Time, Inc., 924 F.2d 43, 46 (2d
Cir. 1991).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of informing the court of the basis
for the motion and of identifying those portions of the record that the moving party claims will
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
323 (1986). If the moving party shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, the
burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate “the existence of an element essential to that
party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Id. This requires the
nonmoving party to do “more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Mere
conclusory allegations, speculation, or conjecture will not avail a party opposing summary

Rich and Gardner’s Motion, Rich and Gardner’s Second Motion is therefore moot, and the Court
need not address whether the Motion could otherwise be considered.
5

judgment. Kulak v. City of N.Y., 88 F.3d 63, 71 (2d Cir. 1996).
At the same time, a court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the nonmoving party. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150
(2000); Nora Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Grp. of Am., Inc., 164 F.3d 736, 742 (2d Cir. 1998). A
court’s duty in reviewing a motion for summary judgment is “carefully limited” to finding genuine
disputes of fact, “not to deciding them.” Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., 22 F.3d 1219, 1224
(2d Cir. 1994). “The role of the court is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the
matter, but rather to perform the ‘threshold inquiry of whether there is the need for a trial.’” Feder
v. Target Stores, No. 11-CV-3675, 2014 WL 1651955, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2014) (quoting
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (1986)).
B. Copyright Infringement
As discussed in greater detail infra, this case turns on the issue of substantial similarity.
“[B]ecause the question of substantial similarity typically presents an extremely close question of
fact, questions of non-infringement have traditionally been reserved for the trier of fact.” Peter F.
Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal citation
omitted). Nevertheless, “it is entirely appropriate for a district court to resolve that question as a
matter of law, ‘either because the similarity between two works concerns only non-copyrightable
elements of the plaintiff’s work, or because no reasonable jury, properly instructed, could find that
the two works are substantially similar.’” Id. (quoting Warner Bros. Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720
F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1983)).

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IV.

DISCUSSION
A. Copyright Infringement: Rich and Gardner and Palmer
1. Preliminary Issues
Plaintiff has alleged two distinct claims of copyright infringement against Rich and Gardner

and Palmer: (1) that the Earliest Rich and Gardner drawings infringed on the 2008 Buttner Plans;
and (2) that the Station As-Built infringed on the 2008 Buttner Plans. See generally Pl. Mem. - Pl.
Mot. The Court notes that the parties’ Motions address the individual claims for copyright
infringement separately, and the burden in each case remains with the moving party. However, the
appropriateness of awarding summary judgment as to all claims has been placed before the Court,
and the issues presented in each are quite similar. Therefore, for purposes of clarity and efficiency,
the Court has consolidated the issues in its analysis infra, but indicates a particular party’s burden
where necessary.
Another preliminary matter the Court must address is that both Palmer and Rich and Gardner
argue that the proper analysis requires comparing their works not just to the 2008 Buttner Plans, but
to the entirety of the Buttner Plans. See generally Rich and Gardner Mem. - Cross-Mot.; Palmer
Mem. - Cross Mot. Palmer and Rich and Gardner assert that Plaintiff may not “pick and choose”
which portion of his copyrighted work should be analyzed, as the “work” for which Plaintiff possess
a copyright includes eight site plans, two floor plans, and four elevations. See Rich and Gardner
Mem. - Cross-Mot. at 12-13. In support, Rich and Gardner cites Zalewski, 875 F. Supp. 2d at 153
n.22, where the court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the court should compare only a portion of
their architectural works, “[b]ecause the substantial similarity analysis . . . concerns the ‘total
concept and overall feel’ of plaintiffs’ works, [and thus] it is insufficient to demonstrate that a single

7

component of the design, such as an individual floor plan or elevation view, has been copied.”
(quoting Tufenkian Import/Export Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 133 (2d
Cir. 2003)). Although the Court is persuaded by this language, it was made in dicta, and Rich and
Gardner has provided no binding authority—and the Court is aware of none—establishing whether
the proper comparison should be made with respect to the entirety of Plaintiffs’ works.3 In any
event, the Court need not fashion a rule in this case because, even comparing only the 2008 Buttner
Plans—which are indisputably the most similar of Plaintiff’s drawings to the Earliest Rich and
Gardner Drawings—the Court finds that “no reasonable jury, properly instructed, could find that the
two works are substantially similar.” Warner Bros. Inc., 720 F.2d at 240 (citation omitted).
2. Legal Standard
Copyright protection extends to “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium
of expression.” 17 U.S.C. § 102. Following the passage of the Architectural Works Copyright
Protection Act (“AWCPA”), “architectural works were added to the list of copyrightable works of
authorship.” Axelrod & Cherveny Architects, P.C. v. Winmar Homes, No. 05-CV-711, 2007 WL
708798, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2007) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(8)); see also 17 U.S.C. § 101
(defining an “architectural work” as “the design of a building as embodied in any tangible medium
of expression, including a building, architectural plans, or drawings”). It is well-settled that
architectural drawings receive copyright protection under both 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) and
§ 102(a)(8). See Attia v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 201 F.3d 50, 52 n.3 (2d Cir. 1999); see also H.R.

3

The Court is aware of an “aggregate analysis” being employed in other scenarios, such as
evaluating alleged infringement of a book in comparison to a television series. See Castle Rock
Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Pub. Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 138 (2d Cir. 1998). However, the Court is not
aware of a clear rule with respect to architectural works specifically.
8

REP. NO. 101-735, at 17 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6950 (“An individual
creating an architectural work by depicting that work in plans or drawing[s] will have two separate
copyrights, one in the architectural work (section 102(a)(8)), the other in the plans or drawings
(section 102(a)(5)).”).
“In order to make out a claim of copyright infringement for an architectural work—or any
work—a plaintiff must establish three things: 1) that his work is protected by a valid copyright, 2)
that the defendant copied his work, and 3) that the copying was wrongful.” Zalewski, 754 F.3d at
100 (citing Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468, 472-73 (2d Cir. 1946) and Laureyssens v. Idea
Grp., Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 139-41 (2d Cir. 1992)). Moreover, “[d]e minimis copying is not
actionable.” Id. (citing Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1997)).
3. Application
a. Valid Copyright
In judicial proceedings, a certificate of copyright registration “made before or within five
years after first publication of the work shall constitute prima facie evidence of the validity of the
copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate.” 17 U.S.C. § 410(c). Once the plaintiff has
established a prima facie case of copyright validity, “the burden to prove otherwise shifts to the
defendants.” CJ Prods. LLC v. Snuggly Plushez LLC, 809 F. Supp. 2d 127, 142 (E.D.N.Y. 2011)
(citing Hasbro Bradley, Inc. v. Sparkle Toys, Inc., 780 F.2d 189, 192 (2d Cir. 1985)).
Here, Plaintiff registered the architectural drawings with the Copyright Office on July 27,
2011. See Dkt. 77-6. Neither Rich and Gardner nor Palmer disputes the validity of the copyright,
and thus there is no triable issue of fact with regard to the validity of Plaintiff’s copyright.

9

b. Actual Copying
“Actual copying may be established ‘either by direct evidence of copying or by indirect
evidence, including access to the copyrighted work, similarities that are probative of copying
between the works, and expert testimony.’” Castle Rock Entm’t, 150 F.3d at 137 (quoting
Laureyssens, 964 F.2d at 140).
Here, Plaintiff offers two arguments to establish that Palmer and Rich and Gardner directly
copied Plaintiff’s drawings. First, Plaintiff argues that Steve Small, an employee of Rich and
Gardner, admitted that he “referred” to Plaintiff’s architectural drawings while drafting his design of
the floor plan and elevations. Pl. Mem. - Pl. Mot. at 12 (citing Dkt. No.77-18 (“Small Deposition”)
at 18:1-7 (“Q: . . . [D]id you refer to the paper form of the [Buttner] drawings during the process of
creating your AutoCAD design? A: I would refer to them, I believe, yeah. Q: Okay. So you go
back to them and look at them while you were drawing up your design. A: I believe so, yeah.”).
Second, Plaintiff points out that the initial proposal from Rich and Gardner to Palmer, submitted by
non-party Joe Donegan, stated, “Our proposal is based on the site plans by Dunn & Sgromo
Engineers . . . and the architectural drawings by Applied Design Research Associates showing the
new building and floor plan and elevation.” Id. at 12 (citing Dkt. No. 77-11, Ex. 7 at 8); see also id.
at 6 (indicating that in the contract between Palmer and Rich and Gardner under § 9.1.5 titled “The
Drawings,” included “Floor plan and elevation drawing by Applied Design Research Associates”).
Although Rich and Gardner and Palmer dispute whether this evidence constitutes direct
copying, see Rich and Gardner Mem. - Cross-Mot. at 6-7; Palmer Mem. - Cross-Mot. at 3, the Court
is persuaded by Plaintiff’s arguments. However, because the Court finds that this case turns on
element three—wrongful copying—it assumes, without deciding, that Plaintiff has met his burden in

10

demonstrating actual copying.4
c. Wrongful Copying/Substantial Similarity5
“The standard test for substantial similarity between two items is whether an ‘ordinary
observer, unless he set out to detect the disparities, would be disposed to overlook them, and regard
[the] aesthetic appeal as the same.’” Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 111 (2d Cir.
2001) (quoting Hamil Am., Inc v. GFI, 193 F.3d 92, 100 (2d Cir. 1999)). In applying the “ordinary
observer test,” the question raised is whether “an average lay observer would recognize the alleged
copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted work.” Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd.
(Inc.), 71 F.3d 996, 1002 (2d Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, where works
4

Plaintiff also argues that Palmer and Rich and Gardner’s direct copying of the 2008 Buttner
Plans is evident in the fact that Plaintiff’s plans had a red “progress print stamp,” and Palmer and
Rich and Gardner both later produced copies where the stamp was black and white; thus, the blackand-white versions were clearly copies of the original version with the red stamp. Pl. Mem. - Pl.
Mot. at 10-11. Palmer and Rich and Gardner argue that these prints were only copied as part of
their disclosure requirements for this litigation and thus do not constitute wrongful copying.
See Rich and Gardner Mem. - Cross-Mot. at 6-7; Palmer Mem. - Cross-Mot. at 3. Although Palmer
and Rich and Gardner have provided persuasive evidence on this issue, their argument speaks not to
a lack of actual copying, but that any coping was not wrongful copying. Such argument is more
properly analyzed under the third element of the infringement analysis. In any event, it does not
refute Plaintiff’s other evidence of actual copying.
5

Before engaging in the wrongful copying analysis—i.e. the substantial similarity
analysis—the Court notes briefly the common confusion that arises in the use of the term
“substantial similarity.” As stated by the Second Circuit in Zalewski:
When an original work contains many un protected elements, . . . a close similarity
between it and a copy may prove only copying, not wrongful copying. This is because
the similarity may derive only from these unprotected elements. For clarity, the term
“substantial similarity” is properly reserved for similarity that exists between the
protected elements of a work and another work. If two works are “substantially
similar,” any copying was wrongful. . . . By contrast, similarity that relates to
unprotected elements is probative only of copying—not wrongful copying—and is
referred to as “probative similarity.”
754 F.3d at 101.
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“have both protectible and unprotectible elements”—as Plaintiff has conceded here, see Pl. Mem. Pl. Mot. at 15—the analysis must be “more discerning,” Fisher-Price, Inc. v. Well-Made Toy Mfg.
Corp., 25 F.3d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1994), and “must attempt to extract the unprotectible elements
from . . . consideration and ask whether the protectible elements, standing alone, are substantially
similar,” Knitwaves, Inc., 71 F.3d at 1002 (emphasis omitted). In applying the “more discerning
ordinary observer” test, the Court is principally guided “by comparing the contested design’s ‘total
concept and overall feel’ with that of the allegedly infringed work,” Tufenkian, 338 F.3d at 133; see
also Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 272 (2d Cir. 2001); Knitwaves Inc., 71 F.3d at 1003, as
instructed by the Court’s “good eyes and common sense,” Hamil Am., 193 F.3d at 102 (alteration
omitted).
Because Plaintiff’s drawings contain many unprotectible elements, “in the end, our inquiry
necessarily focuses on whether the alleged infringer has misappropriated the original way in which
the author has ‘selected, coordinated, and arranged’ the elements of his or her work.” Gaito
Architecture, 602 F.3d at 66 (quoting Knitwaves Inc., 71 F.3d at 1004) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Moreover, “the narrow scope of protectible expression necessitates that plaintiffs show
something akin to ‘near identity’ between the works in question to prevail.” Zalewski v. T.P.
Builders, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 2d 135, 148 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) aff’d sub nom. Zalewski, 754 F.3d 95
(citing, inter alia, Nimmer § 13.03[A][4] (“More similarity is required when less protectible matter
is at issue.”).6

6

The Court dispels any notion that this standard amounts to categorically affording
architectural works less protection. Indeed, “Courts should treat architectural copyrights no
differently than other copyrights.” Zalewski, 754 F.3d at 104. The standard discussed supra
pertains to any copyrighted work consisting of largely unprotectible elements and is not exclusive to
architectural works.
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Before the Court turns to the comparison of the works at issue, it notes that “[w]here, as
here, [P]laintiff[] point[s] to a variety of alleged similarities between two works, we are required to
determine whether any alleged ‘similarities are due to protected aesthetic expressions original to the
allegedly infringed work, or whether the similarity is to something in the original that is free for the
taking.’” Gaito Architecture, 602 F.3d at 67 (quoting Tufenkian, 338 F.3d at 134-35); see also
Zalewski, 754 F.3d at 103 (discussing, in comparing architectural works, the appropriate standard
for substantial similarity and noting “[t]he central question of this case is how to . . . separate the
protectible from the unprotectible in architectural works”). “In these cases, we ‘must be more
discerning, [and] ignor[e] those aspects of a work that are unprotectible’ as we apply the test, lest we
conflate mere copying with wrongful copying.’” Id. at 102 (quoting Laureyssens, 964 F.2d at 141).
The Second Circuit’s recent decision in Zalewski, 754 F.3d 95, and relevant provisions of
the Code of Federal Regulations, are particularly instructive on which elements in architectural
works are unprotectible and thus should not be considered in the Court’s substantial similarity
analysis. Specifically, unprotectible elements of architectural works include, but are not limited, to:
(1) “Standard configurations of spaces,” 37 C.F.R. § 202.11(d)(2); (2) “individual standard features,
such as windows, doors, and other staple building components,” id.; (3) market expectations,
Zalewski, 754 F.3d at 105; (4) “any design elements attributable to building codes, topography,
structures that already exist on the construction site, or engineering necessity,” id.; (5) “generalized
notions of where to place functional elements, how to route the flow of traffic, and . . . methods of
construction,” id. (quoting Attia, 201 F.3d at 55); (6) design parameters, described as “constraints
placed on an architect by the way her client plans to use the building,” Zalewski, 754 F.3d at 106;
and (7) “features that are essential or common to the architectural style within which the builder

13

designed the structure,” Zalewski, 875 F. Supp. 2d. at 145.
In comparing the 2008 Buttner Plans to both the Earliest Rich and Gardner drawings and the
Station As-Built, the Court has conducted a visual examination of the following: (1) Plaintiff’s
version of a side-by-side comparison between the 2008 Buttner Plans (floor plans and elevation
drawings) and the Earliest Rich and Gardner drawings, Dkt. No. 77-13, Ex. 9; (2) Rich and
Gardner’s version of a side-by-side comparison between the 2008 Buttner Plans and the Earliest
Rich and Gardner drawings, Dkt. No. 83-7, Ex. B; (3) Rich and Gardner’s side-by-side comparison
of the 2008 Buttner plans and the Station As-Built, Dkt. No. 83-6, Ex. A; (4) the Buttner site plans,
Dkt. No. 83-8, Ex. C; (5) the 2008 Buttner plans, Dkt. No. 83-10, Ex. E; (6) the Earliest Rich and
Gardner drawings, Dkt. No. 83-11, Ex. F; and (7) photographs of the Station As-Built, Dkt. No. 8314, Ex. I. The Court has also carefully reviewed, inter alia, the parties’ respective Affidavits and
Statements of Material Facts, and Buttner’s Interrogatory Response. Dkt. Nos. 77-2 through 3; 8919 through 20; 84-3; Pl. SMF - Pl. Mot.; Rich and Gardner SMF - Cross-Mot.; Palmer SMF - CrossMot.
The Court first considers Plaintiff’s Motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of
infringement by the Earliest Rich and Gardner drawings. Plaintiff has submitted a side-by-side
comparison of the 2008 Buttner Plans and the Earliest Rich and Gardner drawings and “respectfully
submit[s] that the drawings are virtually identical.” Pl. Mem. - Pl. Mot. at 17. However, Plaintiff’s
argument is wholly conclusory. Plaintiff does not make a single reference to his Exhibit to describe
how the works are similar, nor which elements in his drawings are protectible. See id. Thus,
Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate his entitlement to summary judgment on his first claim for
copyright infringement.

14

Turning to Palmer’s and Rich and Gardner’s Motions, they have argued at length asserting
numerous differences between the 2008 Buttner Plans and Earliest Rich and Gardner drawings and
the Station As-Built. See generally Rich and Gardner Mem. - Cross-Mot.; Palmer Mem. - CrossMot.; Rich and Gardner Mem. - Mot. Plaintiff has failed to specifically contradict their
arguments—instead, focusing primarily on the relevant legal standards—or inform the Court of any
triable facts at issue. However, because Plaintiff is the non-movant with respect to the remaining
Motions, the Court must resolve all inferences in his favor. Therefore, the Court has carefully
reviewed the entirety of Plaintiff’s submissions and has found one instance in which Plaintiff offers
specific arguments with respect to the copying of protectible elements.7 See Dkt. No. 100-2
(“Plaintiff Response to Rich and Gardner Cross-Motion”) at 9 (“[T]he following is a list of some of
the specific instances of protectible elements being common throughout Plaintiff’s Drawings, Rich
& Gardner’s drawings, and/or the as-built structure itself.”). The Court notes that this list was
provided with respect to establishing probative similarity—the second element discussed supra—as
opposed to substantial similarity. See id. However, the Court will consider Plaintiff’s list to the
extent it may help him survive Rich and Gardner’s and Palmer’s Motions for summary judgment on
the copyright infringement claims.
Plaintiff alleges that the following elements contained in the 2008 Buttner Plans were
improperly appropriated in the Earliest Rich and Gardner Drawings and the Station As-Built:
(1) A Dutch gabled roof with integrated front gable to accentuate the Dunkin[’] Donut[s]
store;

7

Plaintiff has also included a list of “original design elements” in his Response to
Defendants’ First Set of Interrogatories, but it pertains only to the Buttner Plans and does not
contain any reference to similarities between Plaintiff’s drawings and the allegedly infringing works.
See Dkt. No. 89-18 at 17-18.
15

(2) A projected dining bay in front (south) elevation to accentuate the Dunkin[’]
Donut[s] store;
(3) The placement of the dining area, tables, and chairs in proximity to the large,
southerly facing windows in dining area of the Dunkin Donut store to use sunlight as a
partial replacement for electrical lighting and to provide a comfortable dining experience
for customers;
(4) Stonework along the lower section of the building exterior (all sides) to deemphasize
the commercial nature of this store and enhance the horizontal lines of the building;
(5) Stone facing on the main entry columns to enhance entrance “sense of arrival” versus
utility or service doors on the west drive-thru side;
(6) Square portal window for the Manger’s Office on the North East corner of the
building facing the fuel aisles;
(7) Cupola with vents and arched trim on the ridge of the Dutch hip roof aligned with
the main entry as a focal point and to break up the long roof line;
(8) Recessed directional entrance doors;
(9) Interior layout of the Convenience Store beer/cooler room that incorporates cooler
doors and shelves from the existing ExxonMobil store on site. Mr. Palmer requested
to work existing equipment into new design if feasible;
(10) Location of the Manager’s Office with visual access to the fuel aisle in lieu of space
at back of store;
(11) Prominent cashier counter at the center of the store to control entry access and also
have clear visibility of the convenience shopping area;
(12) Angular central wall between the Donut store and convenience store to consolidate
space, provide surveillance, equipment recess, and security for the leased space in afterhours operations of the convenience store portion of the Station;
(13) Specific configuration for the permanent wall alcove to house trash receptacle;
(14) Common plumbing core for restrooms & wet service area for Dunkin[’] Donut[s]
store; and
(15) Decorative circular gable vent to break up plain facade on south elevation high
gable end facing Clinton Avenue.
Id. As outlined below, nearly all of the claimed similarities fall into one of the categories of
unprotectible expression in architectural works discussed supra. The Court addresses each element
in turn.
With respect to the Dutch gabled roof with integrated front gable, Plaintiff has all but
admitted that this choice was unoriginal. See Dkt. Nos. 89-14 through 15 (together, “Buttner
Deposition”) at 202:22-25 (“Q: Are Dutch gabled roofs common to a particular architectural style of
building? A: They can be but they’re coming back very popularly in modern architecture now.”).
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Moreover, courts have noted that use of a gabled entry is not protectible expression. See, e.g.,
Rottlund Co. v. Pinnacle Corp., No. CIV.01-1980, 2004 WL 1879983, at *14 (D. Minn. Aug. 20,
2004), report and recommendation adopted (Oct. 19, 2004) (“The Court ‘filters out’ the use of
individual elements of Rottlund’s drawings. The use of, for instance, gabled entries, lofts, or
fireplaces in this case represent mere ideas that others may utilize without consequence.” (citing
Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 281 F.3d 1287, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
As to the projected dining bay and the placement of dining areas near the windows,
Plaintiff’s Deposition reveals that these decisions were dictated by market forces, particularly
consumer desires when patronizing fast-food establishments. See Buttner Dep. at 201:9-202:7 (“I
would say [customers] certainly desire it.”). However, “[d]esign features used by all architects,
because of consumer demand, . . . get no protection.” Zalewski, 754 F.3d at 105. Buttner also
noted that the projected dining bay and placement of tables and chairs near the windows served a
functional concern. See Buttner Dep. at 201:9-202:7 (noting that many customers prefer to eat near
a window at fast-food establishments so that they can keep an eye on their vehicles while dining).
Regarding the stonework along the lower section of the building exterior, Palmer stated, and
Plaintiff has not disputed, that it was Palmer’s request to have the stonework placed across the
exterior of the wall, and only along the lower part of the wall. See Dkt. No. 83-16 (“Palmer
Deposition”) at 72:2-15. Thus, the stonework is a design parameter not subject to protection. See
Zalewski, 754 F.3d at 106.
As to both the location of the manager’s office and placement of the window to allow the
manager a view of the fuel aisles, it is undisputed that this element was specifically requested by
Palmer, and thus is not original to Plaintiff. See Palmer Dep. at 62:22-63:1 (“Q: Had you expressed

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any requests to Mr. Buttner regarding a location of an office for you in your business? A: Yes. I
wanted it to the front of the gas station just so that way I could keep an eye on the pumps outside.”);
see also Buttner Dep. at 199:7-10 (“A: . . . [T]he specific design of the manager’s office in the
corner of the building so he or she could see the pumps was a specific design parameter requested
by Mr. Palmer.”).
Concerning the recessed directional entrance doors, this is a standard feature that is not
protectible. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.11(d)(2).
As to the interior layout of the beer/cooler room, Plaintiff’s allegation itself states both that
Mr. Palmer requested it, and that it was based on pre-existing structures already in the building. See
Pl. Resp. - Rich and Gardner Cross-Mot. at 9 (noting that the interior layout was designed to
“incorporate[] cooler doors and shelves from the existing ExxonMobil store on site” and that “Mr.
Palmer requested to work existing equipment into new design if feasible”).
Regarding the cashier counter at the center of the store, this choice was irrefutably dictated
by functional concerns to detect and prevent theft. See Buttner Dep. at 198:13-16 (“Q: In
convenience store spaces, is it functional to have the checkout counter in a location where you can
view the merchandise? A: Normally yes. Yes.”); see also id. at 198:21-24 (“Q: What features of
your . . . building address functional or utilitarian concerns? A: I believe in the case of that design,
the central location of the checkout counter . . . not only services to keep an eye on the groceries and
the convenience store area but also a direct visual connection to the fuel pumps; as well as being
what we call in the practice a gate keeper for the only entrance in and out so somebody can’t walk
out with a six-pack of beer and somebody else didn’t see them.”).

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With respect to the angular center wall between the Dunkin’ Donuts store and the
convenience store, it is both a functional element as well as an unprotected standard shape. Indeed,
Plaintiff states it was constructed so as to consolidate space and provide for surveillance and
security. See Pl. Resp. - Rich and Gardner Cross-Mot. at 9; see also Greenberg v. Town of
Falmouth, No. CIV.A. 04-11934, 2006 WL 297225, at *3 (D. Mass. Feb. 8, 2006) (finding plaintiff
architect’s “use of forty-five degree angled walls” both functional and a basic geometric shape not
subject to protection) (citing Yankee Candle Co., Inc. v. Bridgewater Candle Col, LLC, 259 F.3d
25, 35 (1st Cir. 2001)).
As to the common plumbing core for the restrooms and wet service area, Plaintiff admitted
that this is a standard configuration. Buttner Dep. at 198:17-20 (“Q: Is it a standard configuration of
spaces to have rooms that use common utilities such as electricity or plumbing adjacent to each
other? A: Yes, for economy’s sake.”).
Finally, regarding the circular gable vent, while Plaintiff alleges an aesthetic component to
his selection and arrangement of this element, he also makes clear that it was dictated in large part
by a functional or utilitarian concern to allow heat to escape. See Buttner Dep. at 182:8-18 (“Q:
You mentioned the circular vent and the Dutch gable. What was the purpose of that for your
architectural design? A: Twofold. The functional aspect of it was to vent out the top of the truss
space so that heat didn’t build up and then cause moisture buildup, which would have then lead to
mold, which probably the majority of us have in the top of their homes. The second was an
aesthetic element to basically break up just the flat of the EP - EIPS of the two end gables of the
building that I designed.”); see also id. 179:13-19 (“I had to put a ventilation in the top of that,
though, so that’s one of the reasons I went with the Dutch gable on the side, to provide a circular

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vent in this case.”).
Thus, out of the fifteen elements Plaintiff has claimed to be protectible, the Court finds that
only two constitute protectible expression: (1) the stone facing on the main entry columns, and (2)
the cupola on the Dutch hip roof. The Court must now “extract the unprotectible elements from
[its] consideration and ask whether the protectible elements, standing alone, are substantially
similar.” Knitwaves, Inc., 71 F.3d at 1002.
As to the stone facing on the main entry columns, the Court notes that this element is not
included in the Station As-Built. With respect to the Earliest Rich and Gardner drawings, even
when compared only to the 2008 Buttner plans, the Court finds that they are not substantially
similar. Specifically, the stones in Plaintiff’s drawing are rectangular in shape, whereas in the Rich
and Gardner drawings they are rounded. This difference may seem subtle when considered on an
individual basis; however, the stone facing on the column consists of many stones pieced together to
form a large pattern. Thus, when viewed broadly, a pattern comprised of circular versus rectangular
shapes gives a different overall “concept and feel.” Moreover, the main entry columns on the Rich
and Gardner Drawings are significantly taller than in the 2008 Buttner Plans.
Finally, with regard to the cupola, the Court notes that this element is significantly different
in the Station As-Built. In the 2008 Buttner Plans, the cupola is four-sided, with a spire, and located
to the right-of-center on the roof. However, in the Station As-Built, the cupola is six-sided
(hexagonal), has no spire, and is centered on the roof. Thus, there is a clear difference in the
arrangement and selection of the cupola as between the 2008 Buttner Plans and the Station As-Built.
As compared to the Earliest Rich and Gardner drawings, the Court notes that the type of
cupola used is identical to the 2008 Buttner Plans, and the placement is only slightly altered. Thus,

20

it appears that this element has been improperly appropriated. However, substantial similarity
“requires that the copying [be] quantitatively and qualitatively sufficient to support the legal
conclusion that infringement (actionable copying) has occurred.” Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 138
(quoting Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 75). “‘The quantitative component generally concerns the amount of
the copyrighted work that is copied,’ which must be more than ‘de minimis.’” Id. (quoting
Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 75) (emphasis added). Thus, while Plaintiff’s selection and arrangement of
the cupola constitutes protectible expression, standing alone, wrongful copying of this single
element cannot support a claim of infringement of the 2008 Buttner Plans.
In sum, out of all the elements Plaintiff claims to be both protectible and copied in the
Earliest Rich and Gardner Drawing and the Station As-Built, all but one are either unprotectible,
dissimilar, or not present.8 The Court recognizes the great level of effort and skill utilized by
Plaintiff in producing his architectural works and acknowledges that there is certainly “something of
Plaintiff’s own expression in his work.” Zalewski, 754 F.3d at 107. However, “[t]he primary
objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but ‘[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts.’” Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349,
(1991) (quoting Art. I, § 8, cl. 8). As Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate improper appropriation of
the arrangement, selection, and coordination in the Buttner Plans, under the guidelines set forth in
Zalewski, 754 F.3d 95, and the CFR, the Court finds that Plaintiff has shown at most copying, but
not wrongful copying, either in the Earliest Rich and Gardner drawings or in the Station As-Built.

8

Palmer and Rich and Gardner have also pointed out numerous differences between the
Buttner Plans and both the Earliest Rich and Gardner drawings and Station As-Built. Too numerous
to recite herein, the Court notes that dissimilarity may be relevant to the substantial similarity
analysis. See Attia, 201 F.3d at 58. However, the Court need not address these arguments because
Plaintiff has failed to establish substantial similarity even among the protectible elements.
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Accordingly, Palmer and Rich and Gardner are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
copyright infringement claims.
B. Breach of Contract: Palmer
Palmer argues that he is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim
because Plaintiff provided his plans to Palmer with “actual knowledge and intent” that they be
provided to Rich and Gardner, among others, for the purpose of obtaining construction cost
estimates to attain financing for the project. Palmer Mem. - Cross-Mot. at 19-20. However, Palmer
has not cited any of the language or provisions from the contract to support his claim. The Court
cannot possibly determine whether Palmer breached (or did not breach) the contract without being
apprised of the relevant provisions of the contract at issue. Moreover, although Palmer refers to
Buttner’s alleged “knowledge and intent,” Palmer has not articulated a clear legal theory or provided
any authority to support his position. The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of
informing the court of the basis for the motion and of identifying those portions of the record that
the moving party claims will demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex
Corp., 477 U.S. 317 at 323. Palmer’s failure to inform the Court of the contract language or legal
basis for his defense is therefore fatal to his Motion on the breach of contract claim.
Furthermore, Palmer’s contention that the breach of contract claim is moot if the Court finds
no copyright infringement, see Palmer Mem. - Cross-Mot. at 20, must also be denied because, again,
Palmer has not informed the Court of the relevant language of the contract. Thus, it is unclear
whether the issue of infringement is even relevant to the breach of contract claim. Accordingly,
Palmer has failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s
breach of contract claim.

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C. Copyright Infringement: Dunn & Sgromo
Dunn & Sgromo, which was retained by Palmer as the site engineer for the purpose of
obtaining the necessary municipal approval and permits for the construction of the project, argues
that it is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s copyright infringement claim because: (1) it
had express authorization from Buttner to use and revise the Buttner Plans; (2) Buttner worked with
and assisted Dunn & Sgromo in revising the Plans, and thus acquiesced to any copying; and (3)
Buttner never revoked or limited Dunn & Sgromo’s authority to use and revise the Buttner Plans.
Dunn & Sgromo Mem. at 2-3.
Plaintiff responds that: (1) Dunn & Sgromo hasn’t established a prima facie case for an
implied license, even under the “relaxed” meeting of the minds standard; and (2) even if Plaintiff
gave Dunn & Sgromo a license, it was retroactive and only for one submission to the DOT. See
generally Dkt. No. 136 (“Plaintiff Response - Dunn & Sgromo Motion”). Plaintiff argues at length
that Dunn & Sgromo has not met its burden under the relevant legal standard to demonstrate an
implied license, or that such license was unrestricted. See id. However, Plaintiff has failed to
demonstrate any triable issue of fact because Plaintiff concedes that Dunn & Sgromo was granted, at
minimum, Plaintiff’s permission to make certain, defined changes and to submit on one occasion
the Buttner Plans to the DOT; yet, Plaintiff has failed to adduce any facts demonstrating how
Buttner exceeded the scope of this limited permission. Plaintiff concedes that “Plaintiff was only
permitting Dunn & Sgromo to copy the drawings for one submission to the DOT and to make one
change to one entrance/exit for traffic into the property and the ‘turning arc.’” See id. at 5. Plaintiff
then asserts, “The limited scope of this language did not authorize Dunn & Sgromo to use Plaintiff’s
drawings for its own profit on this project.” Id. However, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts

23

indicating how Dunn & Sgromo wrongfully copied Plaintiff’s works “for its own profit,” or used the
Buttner Plans beyond the permission granted. Indeed, Plaintiff appears to take issue with the fact
that Dunn & Sgromo was used on the project and compensated by Palmer for its services. Id. at 8
(asserting that “Defendants collectively conspired to cut Plaintiff out of the project entirely”).
However, again, Plaintiff fails to specify what acts taken by Dunn & Sgromo allegedly constituted
copyright infringement. Therefore, the Court finds that there is no triable issue of fact and
accordingly grants Dunn & Sgromo summary judgment on Plaintiff’s copyright infringement claim.
D. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Federal district courts are “courts of limited jurisdiction,” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah
Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005), only having original subject-matter jurisdiction over cases in
which there is a federal question, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or in which there is complete diversity of
citizenship between the parties, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Moreover, “a federal court has an
independent duty to determine that it has subject matter jurisdiction and may raise the issue sua
sponte.” D.B. Zwirn Special Opportunities Fund. L.P. v. Tama Broad., Inc., 550 F. Supp. 2d 481,
486 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
Here, the Court has granted Defendants summary judgment on Plaintiff’s copyright
infringement claims, leaving only Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim against Palmer remaining;
thus, there does not appear to be any federal question presented. Moreover, with respect to the
breach of contract claim against Palmer, both Plaintiff and Palmer (and the other Defendants) are
New York citizens, see Compl. ¶¶ 4-9, and therefore diversity of citizenship is lacking. Thus, it
appears that in light of the Court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s copyright infringement claims, it no
longer possesses subject matter jurisdiction over this action. However, in an abundance of caution,

24

the Court will allow Plaintiff thirty days from the date of this Memorandum-Decision and Order to
submit a memorandum of law asserting the basis for subject matter jurisdiction. Palmer shall have
ten days thereafter to file a response. If Plaintiff fails or elects not to file a memorandum of law, the
Clerk shall dismiss this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
V.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is hereby:
ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s Motion (Dkt. No. 77) for partial summary judgment against

Defendants RD Palmer Enterprises, Inc., Richard Palmer, and Rich and Gardner Construction
Company, Inc. is DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED, that Defendant Rich and Gardner Construction Company, Inc.’s Cross-Motion
(Dkt. No. 83) for partial summary judgment is GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED, that Defendant Rich and Gardner Construction Company, Inc.’s Motion (Dkt.
No. 89) for partial summary judgment is GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s copyright infringement claims against Defendant Rich and
Gardner Construction Company, Inc. are DISMISSED and Defendant Rich and Gardner
Construction Company, Inc. is DISMISSED from this action; and it is further
ORDERED, that Defendants Richard Palmer and RD Palmer Enterprises, Inc.’s CrossMotion (Dkt. No. 84) for summary judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part,
consistent with this Memorandum-Decision and Order; and it is further
ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s copyright infringement claims against Defendants Richard
Palmer and RD Palmer Enterprises, Inc. are DISMISSED; and it is further

25

ORDERED, that Defendant Rich and Gardner Construction Company, Inc.’s Motion (Dkt.
No. 89) for summary judgment is GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED, that Defendant Rich and Gardner Construction Company, Inc.’s Second
Motion (Dkt. No. 133) for summary judgment is DENIED as moot; and it is further
ORDERED, that Defendant Robert Charles Abbott, Jr.’s Motion (Dkt. No. 91) for judgment
on the pleadings is DENIED as moot; and it is further
ORDERED, that Defendant Robert Charles Abbott, Jr.’s Motion (Dkt. No. 93) for summary
judgment is DENIED as moot; and it is further
ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s Letter Motion (Dkt. No. 98) to withdraw claims against
Defendant Robert Charles Abbott, Jr. is DENIED as moot; and it is further
ORDERED, that all claims against Defendant Robert Charles Abbott, Jr. are DISMISSED
with prejudice and Defendant Robert Charles Abbott, Jr. is DISMISSED from this action; and it is
further
ORDERED, that Defendant Rich and Gardner Construction Company, Inc.’s Motion (Dkt.
No. 124) to preclude Plaintiff’s damages expert is DENIED as moot; and it is further
ORDERED, that Defendant Dunn & Sgromo Engineers, PLLC Motion (Dkt. No. 131) for
summary judgment is GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s copyright infringement claims against Defendant Dunn &
Sgromo Engineers, PLLC’s are DISMISSED and Defendant Dunn & Sgromo Engineers, PLLC is
DISMISSED from this action; and it is further
ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s Letter Motion (Dkt. No. 143) to strike is DENIED as moot;
and it is further
26

ORDERED, that if Plaintiff wishes to maintain this action in the Northern District, he must
file within thirty (30) days of the date of this Memorandum-Decision and Order a memorandum of
law asserting the basis for the Court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining
breach of contract claim against Defendants Richard Palmer and RD Palmer Enterprises, Inc.
Defendants may file a response within ten (10) days of Plaintiff’s memorandum. If Plaintiff fails or
elects not to file a memorandum of law on the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, the Clerk shall
close this case; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision and
Order on all parties in accordance with the Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:

March 31, 2015
Albany, NY

27