PPC Broadband, Inc. v. Corning Gilbert Inc.
Filing
43
MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDER - That Magistrate Judge David E. Peebles's September 18, 2014 35 Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED in its entirety. That the following meanings shall be affixed to the patent claim terms in dispute: Disputed Term: connector body and/or connector body member. Construction: "structure of the connect that is secured to the post at one end and includes an open end for receiving a portion of the coaxial cable. The structure can be comprised of more than one piece and is therefore not limited to a single integral or unitary one-piece component." Disputed Term: A first end. Constuction: No construction necessary. Disputed Term: A first central bore extending about said tubular post . Construction: "a cavity lying between the inner wall of the connector body and the post". Disputed Term: Fastener Member. Construction: "the structure of the connector that deforms the connector body member inwardly toward the po st when slid over the connector body". Disputed Term: Central passageway. Construction: "a cavity in the center of the fastener member extending between the first and second ends therof". Disputed Term: Secured to the connector b ody prior to installation. Construction: "the first end of the fastener member is secured to the connector body in the pre-installed state and prior to the prepared end of the coaxial cable being inserted in to the second end of the fastener m ember during installation". Disputed Term: Cental passageway being dimensioned to compress the first end of the connector body radially inward to decrease the volume of the first central bore. Construction: "the central passageway conta ins a portion of reduced diameter that contacts the connector body and compresses the body radially inwardly toward the post, thereby decreasing the volume of the first central bore". Disputed Term: Ramped surface. Construction: "a surfa ce inside the fastener member that starts at one diameter toward the first opening and gradually narrows to a smaller diameter toward the second opening". Disputed Term: Wherein the fastener member is slidingly moved from the first preinstalle d configuration to the second end of the connector body without rotation. Construction: "the fastener member is configued to slide from its first pre-installed position toward the second end of the connector body without having to be rotated". Disputed Term: First end of said connector body is secured to said fastener member by a press fit. Construction: No construction necessary. Signed by Chief Judge Gary L. Sharpe on 3/3/2015. (jel, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
________________________________
PPC BROADBAND, INC.,
d/b/a PPC,
Plaintiff,
5:13-cv-538
(GLS/DEP)
v.
CORNING OPTICAL
COMMUNICATIONS RF, LLC,
Defendant.
________________________________
APPEARANCES:
OF COUNSEL:
FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
Hiscock, Barclay Law Firm
Syracuse Office
One Park Place
300 South State Street
Syracuse, NY 13202-2078
FOR THE DEFENDANT:
Harter, Secrest Law Firm
Rochester Office
1600 Bausch & Lomb Place
Rochester, NY 14604-2711
DLA Piper LLP
DC Office
500 Eighth Avenue NW
Washington, DC 22004
Gary L. Sharpe
Chief Judge
DOUGLAS J. NASH, ESQ.
JOHN D. COOK, ESQ.
JASON C. HALPIN, ESQ.
BELLA S. SATRA, ESQ.
MARK E. GALVEZ, ESQ.
DAVID M. LASCELL, ESQ.
JERAULD E. BRYDGES, ESQ.
JOSEPH P. LAVELLE, ESQ.
ANDREW N. STEIN, ESQ.
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. Introduction
Plaintiff PPC Broadband, Inc., doing business as PPC, commenced
this action against defendant Corning Optical Communications RF, LLC, 1
for alleged infringement of one of PPC’s coaxial cable connector patents,
U.S. Patent No. 6,676,446 (“‘446 patent”). (See generally Compl., Dkt. No.
1.) Following the parties’ request for the construction of ten disputed terms
in the patent in suit, the court referred the matter to Magistrate Judge David
E. Peebles for a Markman2 hearing. (Dkt. Nos. 23, 24, 27, 28, 32.) In a
Report and Recommendation (R&R) filed September 18, 2014, Judge
Peebles recommended constructions for eight of the disputed terms, and,
with respect to the remaining two, recommended that no construction was
necessary. (Dkt. No. 35.) Pending are Corning’s objections to the R&R.
(Dkt. No. 36.) Largely for the reasons articulated by Judge Peebles, and
for the reasons that follow, Judge Peebles’ recommendations are adopted
in their entirety.
1
On June 27, 2014, the court approved the parties’ stipulation to amend the caption in
this case, in order to reflect that Corning Gilbert Inc. has changed its formal corporate name to
Corning Optical Communications RF, LLC. (Dkt. No. 34.)
2
See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d 517
U.S. 370 (1996)
2
II. Standard of Review
Before entering final judgment, this court reviews report and
recommendation orders in cases it has referred to a magistrate judge. If a
party properly objects to a specific element of the magistrate judge’s
findings and recommendations, this court reviews those findings and
recommendations de novo. See Almonte v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, No.
Civ. 904CV484GLS, 2006 WL 149049, at *3, *5 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2006).
In those cases where no party has filed an objection, only vague or general
objections are made, or a party resubmits the same papers and arguments
already considered by the magistrate judge, this court reviews the findings
and recommendations of the magistrate judge for clear error. See id. at *45.
III. Discussion
Although there were ten disputed terms at issue in the R&R,
Corning’s objections relate only to the proposed construction of three of the
terms: “connector body/connector body member”; “a first end”; and
“wherein the fastener member is slidingly moved . . . without rotation.”
(Dkt. No. 36 at 9-22.) In response to Corning’s objections, PPC argues
that Judge Peebles’ recommendations were appropriate and should be
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adopted by this court. (Dkt. No. 39 at 8-25.) The court will address each of
the terms, and the respective recommended constructions to which
Corning has objected, below.
A.
Connector Body
Judge Peebles recommended that the term “connector body” and/or
“connector body member” be given the construction: “structure of the
connector that is secured to the post at one end and includes an open end
for receiving a portion of the coaxial cable. This structure can be
comprised of more than one piece and is therefore not limited to a single
integral or unitary one-piece component.” (Dkt. No. 35 at 17-24, 47.)
Corning has made a specific objection to this recommended construction,
arguing that it conflicts with prior decisions of this court, and, in particular, it
disputes the language indicating that the connector body is not limited to a
single integral or unitary one-piece component. (Dkt. No. 36 at 9-18.) The
court has thus reviewed this recommendation de novo.
When faced with “an actual dispute regarding the proper scope” of a
patent claim, the court must construe the allegedly infringed claim to
determine its meaning and scope. O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation
Tech. Co., Ltd., 521 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In so doing, the
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court is cognizant that unless the patentee “acts as his own lexicographer”
or “disavows the full scope of a claim term either in the specification or
during prosecution,” the words of a claim are “given their plain and ordinary
meaning [as understood by] one of skill in the art.” See Thorner v. Sony
Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365-67 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
When “the meaning of a claim term as understood by persons of skill in the
art is not readily apparent,” the court must construe the disputed claim
terms in order to resolve such disputes. O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1360.
Here, Corning argues that Judge Peebles’ recommended
construction should not be adopted, because it conflicts with this court’s
construction of the term “connector body” in other patents, from other
litigation between these two parties, and constitutes an improper limiting
instruction. (Dkt. No. 36 at 9-13, 16-18); see PPC Broadband, Inc. v.
Corning Optical Commc’ns RF, LLC (PPC II), No. 5:12-cv-911, 2014 WL
4199244, at *1-2 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2014); John Mezzalingua Assocs., Inc.
v. Corning Gilbert Inc. (PPC I), No. 5:11-cv-761, 2012 WL 5880674, at *1-2
(N.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2012). In PPC I, which involves patents from the same
family as the ‘446 patent at issue here, the court adopted the magistrate
judge’s recommendation that the term “connector body” required no further
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construction, as there was “neither ambiguity in the terms, nor a dispute as
to the scope of the claim,” and thus gave this term its plain and ordinary
meaning. 2012 WL 5880674, at *1-2. However, in PPC II, given that the
parties plainly disputed the scope of the claim term—specifically, whether it
encompassed a connector body that was composed of more than one
piece—and that there was no indication in the patent claims or
specifications that the inventors intended to restrict the term to a single
component, the court opted to construe the term as not limited to a “single
or unitary one-piece component.” 2014 WL 4199244, at *2. Thus, Corning
argues that, in the instant case, the term should be construed as it was in
PPC I, and not given the construction from PPC II as Judge Peebles
recommends, because the additional language regarding the composition
of the connector body would render this construction inconsistent with the
construction used in PPC I. (Dkt. No. 36 at 9-13.)
Contrary to Corning’s argument, the recommended construction is
not inconsistent with that used in PPC I, where the term was given its plain
and ordinary meaning. As this court has stated, in PPC I, there was
“neither ambiguity in the terms, nor a dispute as to the scope of the claim,”
and thus no construction was necessary. 2012 WL 5880674, at *1-2.
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However, here, as in PPC II, Corning plainly disputes whether the
connector body may be composed of more than one component, and thus
the court is required to resolve this dispute as to claim scope, and the
recommended construction achieves this. See O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1360
(“When the parties raise an actual dispute regarding the proper scope of
. . . claims, the court, not the jury, must resolve that dispute.” (citing
Markman, 52 F.3d at 979)). Although Corning further argues that Judge
Peebles’ recommended construction is not based on the intrinsic evidence
of this case, asserting that “there is nothing in the . . . ‘446 Patent
specification . . . to support the added limitation that the structure of the
claimed connector body ‘can be comprised of more than one piece and is
therefore not limited to a single integral . . . component,’” (Dkt. No. 36 at
13-16), this argument is equally unavailing. Claim terms are generally
given the full scope of their meaning unless there is evidence limiting the
scope. See Home Diagnostics, Inc. v. LifeScan, Inc., 381 F.3d 1352, 1358
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Absent a clear disavowal in the specification or the
prosecution history, the patentee is entitled to the full scope of its claim
language.”) Here, because there is no indication in the ‘446 patent or its
specification that the inventors intended to restrict the term connector body
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to a single unitary structure, it is entitled to its full scope and there is no
basis to limit it to a single or unitary one-piece component. See id.
The court is equally unpersuaded by Corning’s argument that the
recommended construction constitutes a “limiting instruction.” (Dkt. No. 36
at 16-18.) To the contrary, the construction does not limit the scope of the
claim term, and instead resolves an ongoing dispute between the parties
with respect to the claim scope, as the court is obligated to do at this stage
of the litigation. See O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1360. This recommended
construction is therefore adopted.
B.
A First End
With respect to the term “a first end,” Judge Peebles recommended
that no further construction was necessary for this term. (Dkt. No. 35 at
25.) As he noted, during the Markman hearing, counsel for Corning
expressly indicated that it “would not object if [the court] appl[ied] the
construction of [PPC I],” which was that this term required no further
construction. (Dkt. No. 41 at 39); see PPC I, 2012 WL 5880674, at *3.
Despite this concession to the court, Corning now objects to the
recommended construction of this term. (Dkt. No. 36 at 18-20.)
Corning’s objections to the construction of “a first end” consist of
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arguments it already presented to Judge Peebles in its opening claim
construction brief. (Compare Dkt. No. 24 at 16-17, with Dkt. No. 36 at 1820.) Despite its claim that the entire R&R is reviewed de novo, (Dkt. No. 36
at 7), the court need only conduct a clear error review with respect to
arguments that have already been submitted to the magistrate judge. See
Almonte, 2006 WL 149049, at *4. Having reviewed those arguments for
clear error, and finding none, the court adopts Judge Peebles’
recommendation that no construction is necessary.
C.
Wherein the Fastener Member is Slidingly Moved From the First
Preinstalled Configuration Toward the Second End of the
Connector Body Without Rotation
With respect to this term, which appears in dependent Claim 3 of the
‘446 patent, (Dkt. No. 1, Attach. 1 at 31), Judge Peebles recommended
that it be construed as “the fastener member is configured to slide from its
first pre-installed position toward the second end of the connector body
without having to be rotated.” (Dkt. No. 35 at 40-44, 47.) In its objections,
Corning argues that this claim “is invalid for inserting a method step into an
apparatus claim,” (Dkt. No. 36 at 21), and that Judge Peebles’
recommendation constitutes an improper rewriting of an unambiguous
claim, (id. at 21-22).
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As above, Corning’s argument that this claim improperly incorporates
a method step, thus rendering the claim indefinite and invalid, was one that
was already presented to, and considered by, Judge Peebles. (Compare
Dkt. No. 24 at 22, with Dkt. No. 36 at 21; Dkt. No. 35 at 41-43.)
Accordingly, the court has reviewed this argument for clear error and found
none. The court agrees with Judge Peebles’ assessment that “[t]here is
nothing in Claim 3 or anything in the ‘446 Patent’s specification suggesting
that someone is required to slide the fastener member toward the
connector body (with or without rotation).” (Dkt. No. 35 at 43.) Rather, the
more logical reading of the claim’s language suggests that infringement
occurs when one “creates a connector . . . that includes a fastener member
capable of being moved from its preinstalled configuration towards the
connector body without being rotated.” (Id.) The language of the claim,
when read in the context of Claim 1, on which it is dependent, does not
suggest that infringement occurs upon the act of sliding a fastener member
toward the connector body without rotating it, but rather further describes
the structure of the invention, explaining that it is a “connector . . . wherein
the fastener member is slidingly moved.” (Dkt. No. 1, Attach. 1 at 31.) The
addition of the language “configured to slide” would not be an
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impermissible rewriting of the claim in order to preserve its validity, as
Corning suggests, (Dkt. No. 36 at 21-22), and, instead, constitutes a
resolution of an ambiguity noted by the parties, in order to ultimately clarify
this claim term’s meaning in the context of this litigation.
D.
Remaining Constructions
No objections having been filed to the remaining recommended
constructions, the court has reviewed them for clear error and found none.
See Almonte, 2006 WL 149049, at *4-5. Accordingly, the remainder of
Judge Peebles’ recommended constructions are adopted.
IV. Conclusion
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that Magistrate Judge David E. Peebles’ September 18,
2014 Report and Recommendation (Dkt. No. 35) is ADOPTED in its
entirety; and it is further
ORDERED that the following meanings shall be affixed to the patent
claim terms in dispute:
Disputed Term
Construction
connector body and/or connector
body member
“structure of the connector that is
secured to the post at one end
and includes an open end for
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receiving a portion of the coaxial
cable. The structure can be
comprised of more than one piece
and is therefore not limited to a
single integral or unitary one-piece
component.”
A first end
No construction necessary
A first central bore extending
about said tubular post
“a cavity lying between the inner
wall of the connector body and the
post”
Fastener member
“the structure of the connector that
deforms the connector body
member inwardly toward the post
when slid over the connector
body”
Central passageway
“a cavity in the center of the
fastener member extending
between the first and second ends
thereof”
Secured to the connector body
prior to installation
“the first end of the fastener
member is secured to the
connector body in the pre-installed
state and prior to the prepared
end of the coaxial cable being
inserted in to the second end of
the fastener member during
installation”
Central passageway being
dimensioned to compress the first
end of the connector body radially
inward to decrease the volume of
“the central passageway contains
a portion of reduced diameter that
contacts the connector body and
compresses the body radially
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the first central bore
inwardly toward the post, thereby
decreasing the volume of the first
central bore”
Ramped surface
“a surface inside the fastener
member that starts at one
diameter toward the first opening
and gradually narrows to a smaller
diameter toward the second
opening”
Wherein the fastener member is
slidingly moved from the first
preinstalled configuration to the
second end of the connector body
without rotation
“the fastener member is
configured to slide from its first
pre-installed position toward the
second end of the connector body
without having to be rotated”
First end of said connector body is
secured to said fastener member
by a press fit
No construction necessary
ORDERED that the Clerk provide a copy of this MemorandumDecision and Order to the parties.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
March 3, 2015
Albany, New York
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