Reddy v. Catone et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER granting 9 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim/Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction: The Court hereby ORDERS that Defendants' motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 9) is GRANTED; and the Court furtherORDERS that Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice; and the Courtfurther ORDERS that Plaintiff may file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days of the date of this Memorandum-Decision and Order; and the Court furtherORDERS that, if Plaint iff does not timely file an amended complaint, the Clerk of the Court is instructed, without further order of the Court, to enter judgment for Defendants and close this case; and the Court further ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision and Order on the parties in accordance with the Local Rules. Signed by U.S. District Judge Mae A. D'Agostino on 6/11/2014. (ban)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
____________________________________________
DEEPIKA REDDY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
5:13-CV-707
(MAD/ATB)
LOUIS J. CATONE, in his official capacity
as Director of the Office of Professional
Discipline, of the New York State Education
Department and in his individual capacity;
DONALD T. SHERIDAN, in his official capacity
as Professional member of the New York State
Board of Dentistry and in his individual capacity;
ROBERT E. PARKER, DDS, in his individual
capacity;
RICHARD KONYS, JR., in his individual
capacity,
Defendants.
____________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
OF COUNSEL:
GILLES R. R. ABITBOL, ESQ.
66 Chestnut Street
Phoenix, New York 13135
Attorney for Plaintiff
GILLES R. ABITBOL, ESQ.
OFFICE OF THE NEW YORK
STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL
The Capitol
Albany, New York 12224
Attorneys for Defendants
GREGORY J. RODRIGUEZ, AAG
Mae A. D'Agostino, U.S. District Judge:
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, a dentist licensed to practice in the State of New York, commenced this action
on June 19, 2013. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants improperly subjected her to disciplinary
proceedings and thereby violated the United States Constitution and New York State
Constitution, causing her economic, emotional, and reputational harm. Plaintiff seeks injunctive
relief, declaratory judgments, and monetary damages. See Dkt. No. 1 ("Complaint"). Presently
before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Dkt. No. 9. Plaintiff has opposed the motion. Dkt. No. 17.
II. DISCUSSION
Defendants raise a number of arguments in support of their motion to dismiss Plaintiff's
Complaint in its entirety. Defendants first argue that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
with respect to nearly all of Plaintiff's claims by virtue of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which
prohibits federal review of state court judgments. Defendants note that Plaintiff unsuccessfully
challenged a procedural aspect of the state disciplinary proceedings against her, pursuant to
Article 78 of the New York C.P.L.R., and thus contend that she is prohibited from seeking federal
court review of the state court's determination. Similarly, Defendants also argue that this Court
must give the state court decision preclusive effect and that Plaintiff is thereby collaterally
estopped from attacking that decision. Defendants next argue that Plaintiff's complaint fails to
state a claim under any of the following theories: Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process
(including her "stigma-plus" claims), Fourteenth Amendment equal protection, Fourth
Amendment search and seizure, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 conspiracy. In addition,
Defendants contend that Plaintiff's state law claims should be dismissed on the merits or, should
the Court dismiss each of Plaintiff's federal law claims, that the Court should decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. Defendant Cantone also seeks dismissal of
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Plaintiff's first and second causes of action against him for lack of any allegations of his personal
involvement. Finally, Defendants assert that the Complaint should be dismissed for failing to set
forth a short and plain statement of the claims, as required under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
A.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8
With respect to the pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Second Circuit has stated as follows:
Rule 8 provides that a complaint "shall contain . . . a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The statement should be plain because the
principal function of pleadings under the Federal Rules is to give
the adverse party fair notice of the claim asserted so as to enable
him to answer and prepare for trial. See, e.g., Geisler v. Petrocelli,
616 F.2d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 1980); 2A Moore's Federal Practice ¶
8.13, at 8-61 (2d ed. 1987). The statement should be short because
"[u]nnecessary prolixity in a pleading places an unjustified burden
on the court and the party who must respond to it because they are
forced to select the relevant material from a mass of verbiage." 5 C.
Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1281, at 365
(1969).
When a complaint does not comply with the requirement that it be
short and plain, the court has the power, on its own initiative or in
response to a motion by the defendant, to strike any portions that
are redundant or immaterial, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f), or to dismiss
the complaint. Dismissal, however, is usually reserved for those
cases in which the complaint is so confused, ambiguous, vague, or
otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well
disguised. See Gillibeau v. City of Richmond, 417 F.2d 426, 431
(9th Cir. 1969). When the court chooses to dismiss, it normally
grants leave to file an amended pleading that conforms to the
requirements of Rule 8. See generally 5 C. Wright & A. Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1281, at 366-67; 2A Moore's
Federal Practice ¶ 8.13, at 8-81 to 8-82 n.38.
Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 41-42 (2d Cir. 1998).
In the present matter, Plaintiff's Complaint contains more than 400 paragraphs (exclusive
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of subparagraphs) spanning over 150 pages of text. Attached to the Complaint is a set of exhibits
totaling approximately 300 additional pages. The Complaint is also replete with gratuitous
allegations, e.g., Complaint ¶ 210 ("It is not by magic that Mr. Catone affects the consent order to
the vitiated proceedings, he actually interprets the law as giving an opportunity to settle on by
resolving the other. . . . If the summary suspension procedure was dropped, what is the legal
paper, the legal document that proves that the action was discontinued?"), speculative assertions,
e.g., id. ¶¶ 92, 187 ("The only conclusion that we can establish because of difference of dates is
that Dr. Parker's affidavit was prepared by the prosecuting attorney's office and submitted to Dr.
Parker for signature"), and legal argument, e.g., id. ¶ 175 ("If every complaint addressed directly
to the board of regents ends up in the hands of the director of the office of professional discipline
and is automatically requalified by the perpetrator of the violations of the Law, then the whole
process which establishes the control of the Board of regents as to the respect of due process is
deprived of its own reason to exist").
In short, Plaintiff's Complaint fails to adhere to the requirements under Rule 8 that a
pleading contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief" and that "[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise, and direct." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2),
(d)(1). The Court declines to undertake the exercise of striking each of the redundant and/or
immaterial allegations. Even if the Court were to attempt to strike all offending paragraphs and
counts, the remainder of the Complaint would still suffer from the same infirmities that the Court
noted above. As such, the Complaint is dismissed in its entirety without prejudice. See
Salahuddin, 861 F.2d at 43 (affirming the dismissal of a complaint under Rule 8 that "span[ned]
15 single-spaced pages" and "contain[ed] a surfeit of detail" with "explicit descriptions of 20-odd
defendants, their official positions, and their roles in the alleged denials of [the plaintiff's]
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rights"); Blakely v. Wells, 209 Fed. Appx. 18 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that "the District Court acted
within the bounds of permissible discretion" in dismissing the plaintiff's complaint, "which
spanned 57 pages and contained 597 numbered paragraphs"); Hill v. Griffin, No. 10-CV-6419,
2013 WL 1866861, *3 (W.D.N.Y. May 2, 2013) (holding that the plaintiff's 229-paragraph and 76
page complaint "falls far short of satisfying F.R.C.P. 8's directives"); Infanti v. Scharpf, No. 06
CV 6552, 2008 WL 2397607, *2 (E.D.N.Y. June 10, 2008) (dismissing complaint which "spans
90 pages, consists of 500 numbered paragraphs and 27 counts, and references 124 pages of
exhibits"); VTech Holdings Ltd. v. Pricewaterhousecoopers, LLP, No. 03 Civ. 1413, 2003 WL
21756623, *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2003) (finding "nothing short and very little plain about" a
complaint that was "113 pages and 179 numbered paragraphs in length, exclusive of exhibits and
scores (perhaps hundreds) of separate subparagraphs"); Glasheen v. City of Albany, No. 98-CV1503, 1999 WL 1249409 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1999) (dismissing the plaintiff's complaint, which
"consist[ed] of 445 paragraphs in 74 pages, [and was] rife with irrelevant information and prolix
in the extreme").
As noted above, Defendants have raised a number of additional problems with Plaintiff's
complaint, which Defendants contend warrant dismissal. "Had [Plaintiff] filed a well organized
complaint of reasonable length, the Court would sort through it allegations one at a time and
address each. To do so in this context, however, would be enormously wasteful of resources
upon which other litigants have an equal call." VTech Holdings, 2003 WL 21756623, *2. Under
these circumstances, the Court finds that the interests of justice would be best served by
dismissing the Complaint with leave to replead. Should Plaintiff elect to replead, the Court
cautions Plaintiff to also be mindful of the following in so doing: Eleventh Amendment
immunity generally extends to state officials sued in their official capacities for retrospective
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relief; individual liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires allegations of personal involvement;
the pleading standards for conspiracy claims require specific, non-conclusory allegations; equal
protection claims require specific allegations of similarly situated individuals who were treated
differently than the plaintiff; and illegal search and seizure claims require allegations of an
unreasonable, non-consensual seizure.
III. CONCLUSION
After carefully reviewing the entire record in this matter, the parties' submissions and the
applicable law, and for the above-stated reasons, the Court hereby
ORDERS that Defendants' motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 9) is GRANTED; and the Court
further
ORDERS that Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice; and the Court
further
ORDERS that Plaintiff may file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days of the date
of this Memorandum-Decision and Order; and the Court further
ORDERS that, if Plaintiff does not timely file an amended complaint, the Clerk of the
Court is instructed, without further order of the Court, to enter judgment for Defendants and close
this case; and the Court further
ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision
and Order on the parties in accordance with the Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: June 11, 2014
Albany, New York
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