Bockeno v. Colvin

Filing 14

DECISION AND ORDER denying # 11 Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings; granting # 12 Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings; AFFIRMING Defendant's decision denying disability benefits; and dismissing Plaintiff's complaint. Signed by Chief Judge Glenn T. Suddaby on 9/15/15. (lmw)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
____________________________________________
KRISTEN J. BOCKENO,
Plaintiff,
v.

5:14-CV-0365
(GTS)

COMM’R OF SOC. SEC.,
Defendant.
____________________________________________
APPEARANCES:

OF COUNSEL:

OLINSKY LAW GROUP
Counsel for Plaintiff
300 S. State St., Ste. 420
Syracuse, NY 13202

HOWARD D. OLINSKY, ESQ.

U.S. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN.
OFFICE OF REG’L GEN. COUNSEL – REGION II
Counsel for Defendant
26 Federal Plaza – Room 3904
New York, NY 10278

PETER W. JEWETT, ESQ.

GLENN T. SUDDABY, United States District Judge
DECISION and ORDER
Currently before the Court, in this Social Security action filed by Kristen J.
Bockeno (“Plaintiff”) against the Commissioner of Social Security (“Defendant” or “the
Commissioner”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3), are the parties’ crossmotions for judgment on the pleadings. (Dkt. Nos. 11, 12.) For the reasons set forth
below, Plaintiff’s motion is denied and Defendant’s motion is granted.

I.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND
A.

Factual Background

Plaintiff was born on November 28, 1972. (T. 159.) She completed the seventh
grade. (T. 183.) Generally, Plaintiff’s alleged disability consists of depression, anxiety,
and history of heart attack. (T. 182.) Her alleged disability onset date is June 6, 2011.
(Id.) Her date last insured is March 31, 2015. (T. 54.) She previously worked as a
cashier. (T. 233.)
B.

Procedural History

On June 6, 2011, Plaintiff applied for a period of Disability Insurance Benefits
(“SSD”) under Title II, and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI, of the
Social Security Act. (T. 54.) Plaintiff’s application was initially denied, after which she
timely requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“the ALJ”). On
September 11, 2012, Plaintiff appeared before the ALJ, Scott M. Staller. (T. 36-52.) On
October 9, 2012, ALJ Staller issued a written decision finding Plaintiff not disabled
under the Social Security Act. (T. 16-35.) On February 12, 2014, the Appeals Council
(“AC”) denied Plaintiff’s request for review, rendering the ALJ’s decision the final
decision of the Commissioner. (T. 1-6.) Thereafter, Plaintiff timely sought judicial review
in this Court.
C.

The ALJ’s Decision

Generally, in his decision, the ALJ made the following five findings of fact and
conclusions of law. (T. 19-35.) First, the ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status
requirements through March 31, 2015 and Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial
gainful activity since June 6, 2011. (T. 21.) Second, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the
severe impairments of coronary artery disease status post old myocardial infarction,
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major depressive disorder, an anxiety disorder, a histrionic personality disorder, and a
panic disorder without agoraphobia. (Id.) Third, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have
an impairment that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments located in
20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix. 1. (T. 22-23.) Fourth, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work with the
following additional limitations:
[Plaintiff] could occasionally climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl.
[Plaintiff] would be able to understand, remember, and carry out simple
instructions as well as make judgments on simple work related decisions.
She should have only brief, infrequent, and superficial contact with the
public and only occasional contact with coworkers and supervisors. She
would be limited to a job with only occasional decision-making and only
occasional changes in the work setting. [Plaintiff] could maintain attention
and concentration for two-hour segments over an eight-hour period and
complete a normal workweek without excessive interruptions from
psychologically or physically based symptoms.
(T. 24.) 1 Fifth, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was incapable of performing her past
relevant work; however, there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the
national economy Plaintiff could perform. (T. 29-30.)
II.

THE PARTIES’ BRIEFINGS ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
A.

Plaintiff’s Arguments

Plaintiff makes three separate arguments in support of her motion for judgment
on the pleadings. First, Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in rejecting the opinion of Stephen
F. Coleman, Psy.D. (Dkt. No. 11 at 14-20 [Pl.’s Mem. of Law].) Second, Plaintiff argues

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Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or
carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a job is in
this category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the
time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered capable of performing a full
or wide range of light work, you must have the ability to do substantially all of these activities. If someone
can do light work, we determine that he or she can also do sedentary work, unless there are additional
limiting factors such as loss of fine dexterity or inability to sit for long periods of time. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1567(b), 416.967(b).

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the ALJ’s credibility finding was unsupported by substantial evidence. (Id. at 20-22.)
Third, and lastly, Plaintiff argues the step five determination was unsupported by
substantial evidence because the ALJ relied upon an incomplete hypothetical question
asked to the vocational expert (“VE”). (Id. at 22-23.)
B.

Defendant’s Arguments

In response, Defendant makes three arguments. First, Defendant argues the ALJ
properly discounted Dr. Coleman’s opinion. (Dkt. No. 12 at 4-7 [Def.’s Mem. of Law].)
Second, Defendant argues the ALJ’s credibility determination was supported by
substantial evidence. (Id. at 8-10.) Third, and lastly, Defendant argues Plaintiff was
capable of performing other work in the national economy. (Id. at 10-11.)
III.

RELEVANT LEGAL STANDARD
A.

Standard of Review

A court reviewing a denial of disability benefits may not determine de novo
whether an individual is disabled. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Wagner v. Sec’y
of Health & Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990). Rather, the
Commissioner’s determination will only be reversed if the correct legal standards were
not applied, or it was not supported by substantial evidence. See Johnson v. Bowen,
817 F.2d 983, 986 (2d Cir. 1987) (“Where there is a reasonable basis for doubt whether
the ALJ applied correct legal principles, application of the substantial evidence standard
to uphold a finding of no disability creates an unacceptable risk that a claimant will be
deprived of the right to have her disability determination made according to the correct
legal principles.”); Grey v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1983); Marcus v. Califano,
615 F.2d 23, 27 (2d Cir. 1979).

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“Substantial evidence” is evidence that amounts to “more than a mere scintilla,”
and has been defined as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct.
1420, 1427 (1971). Where evidence is deemed susceptible to more than one rational
interpretation, the Commissioner’s conclusion must be upheld. See Rutherford v.
Schweiker, 685 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1982).
“To determine on appeal whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial
evidence, a reviewing court considers the whole record, examining evidence from both
sides, because an analysis of the substantiality of the evidence must also include that
which detracts from its weight.” Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1988).
If supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s finding must be
sustained “even where substantial evidence may support the plaintiff’s position and
despite that the court’s independent analysis of the evidence may differ from the
[Commissioner’s].” Rosado v. Sullivan, 805 F. Supp. 147, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). In other
words, this Court must afford the Commissioner’s determination considerable
deference, and may not substitute “its own judgment for that of the [Commissioner],
even if it might justifiably have reached a different result upon a de novo review.”
Valente v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 733 F.2d 1037, 1041 (2d Cir. 1984).
B.

Standard to Determine Disability

The Commissioner has established a five-step evaluation process to determine
whether an individual is disabled as defined by the Social Security Act. See 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520, 416.920. The Supreme Court has recognized the validity of this sequential
evaluation process. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42, 107 S. Ct. 2287
(1987). The five-step process is as follows:
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First, the [Commissioner] considers whether the claimant is currently
engaged in substantial gainful activity. If he is not, the [Commissioner]
next considers whether the claimant has a “severe impairment” which
significantly limits his physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.
If the claimant suffers such an impairment, the third inquiry is whether,
based solely on medical evidence, the claimant has an impairment which
is listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. If the claimant has such an
impairment, the [Commissioner] will consider him disabled without
considering vocational factors such as age, education, and work
experience; the [Commissioner] presumes that a claimant who is afflicted
with a “listed” impairment is unable to perform substantial gainful activity.
Assuming the claimant does not have a listed impairment, the fourth
inquiry is whether, despite the claimant’s severe impairment, he has the
residual functional capacity to perform his past work. Finally, if the
claimant is unable to perform his past work, the [Commissioner] then
determines whether there is other work which the claimant could perform.
Under the cases previously discussed, the claimant bears the burden of
the proof as to the first four steps, while the [Commissioner] must prove
the final one.
Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982).
IV.

ANALYSIS
A.

Whether the ALJ Properly Assessed Dr. Coleman’s Opinion.

After carefully considering the matter, the Court answers this question in the
affirmative, for the reasons stated in Defendant’s memorandum of law. (Dkt. No. 12 at
4-7 [Def.’s Mem. of Law].) The Court adds the following analysis.
In making a determination of the proper weight to afford a medical opinion the
ALJ should consider the following factors: 1) the examining relationship, 2) the
treatment relationship, 3) the supportability of the opinion, 4) the consistency of the
opinion with the record as a whole, 5) any specialization of the source, 6) and “other
factors.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(1)-(6), 416.927(c)(1)-(6).
Dr. Coleman met with Plaintiff on August 6, 2012 for approximately an hour for
the purpose of a psychological evaluation per Plaintiff’s request. (T. 641.) Dr. Coleman
stated he reviewed her medical record, but he was not specific as to which records he
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reviewed. (Id.) On September 10, 2012, he completed a medical source statement. (T.
637-640.) Therein, Dr. Coleman opined Plaintiff was “seriously limited, but not
precluded” in her ability to: maintain attention for two hour segments; maintain a regular
attendance and be punctual; work in coordination with or proximity to others without
being unduly distracted; complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions
from psychologically based symptoms; perform at a consistent pace without an
unreasonable number and length of rest periods; deal with normal work stress; interact
appropriately with the general public; travel in unfamiliar places; and use public
transportation. (T. 638-639.) He further observed Plaintiff was “limited but satisfactory”
in her ability to: remember work-like procedure; understand and remember very short
and simple instructions; sustain an ordinary routine; make simple work-related
decisions; accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors;
get alone with co-workers or peers without unduly distracting them or exhibiting
behavioral extremes; respond appropriately to changes in a routine work setting; and
maintain socially appropriate behavior. (Id.) Dr. Coleman opined Plaintiff would be “offtask” 20 percent of the time during an eight hour workday and would miss more than
four days per month due to her impairments or treatment. (T. 639.)
Plaintiff argues the ALJ’s rational for affording Dr. Coleman’s opinion “little
weight” was improper. (Dkt. No. 11 at 16 [Pl.’s Mem. of Law].) Specifically, Plaintiff
argues the ALJ’s logic was “hypocritical,” the ALJ improperly analyzed the opinions of
other consultative examiners, and the ALJ improperly discredited the opinion because it
was based on subjective complaints. (Id. at 16-20.)
Plaintiff argues the ALJ was “hypocritical” in providing Dr. Coleman’s opinion less
weight due to his role as a consultative examiner and then providing “great weight” to
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consultative examiner Jeanne Shapiro, Ph.D.; however, the ALJ’s analysis of the
medical opinions in the record was thorough, straightforward, and in accordance with
the Regulations. 2
In affording Dr. Coleman’s opinion “little weight” the ALJ raised concerns about
the context of Dr. Coleman’s opinion, namely because Dr. Coleman was retained by
Plaintiff’s counsel to provide evidence. (T. 28.) However, after making note of the
context of Dr. Coleman’s report, the ALJ indicated that he did not question the validity of
Dr. Coleman’s opinion, stating his opinion was “certainly legitimate” and “deserv[ed] due
consideration.” (Id.) To be sure, “the mere fact that a medical report is provided at the
request of counsel or, more broadly, the purpose for which an opinion is provided, is not
a legitimate basis for evaluating the reliability of a report.” Gunter v. Comm'r of Soc.
Sec., 361 F. App'x 197, n.2 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715,
726 (9th Cir.1998)). Although the ALJ expressed concerns about the context of the
report, he went on to indicate that Dr. Coleman’s report was legitimate and proceeded
to properly evaluated it according to the factors in the Regulation as discussed infra.
Further, under the Regulations, the ALJ may take into consideration the nature of a
doctor’s treatment relationship with a plaintiff. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(1)-(2),
416.927(c)(1)-(2).
The ALJ also expressed concern that Dr. Coleman’s evaluation was based
primarily on Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. (Id.) To be sure, a doctor’s reliance on
subjective complaints does not necessarily undermine his opinion of the plaintiff’s
functional limitations. See Green-Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99 (2nd Cir. 2003).

2
Of note, the ALJ afforded consultative examiner Kalyani Ganesh, M.D.’s opinion that
Plaintiff had no gross physical limitations “less weight,” reasoning that the objective medical record
provided for more physical restrictions, thus dampening Plaintiff’s “hypocrisy” argument.

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However, this was but one factor in the ALJ’s reasoning. The ALJ properly evaluated
Dr. Coleman’s functional limitations under the factors outlined in the Regulations,
ultimately concluding that his opinion was inconsistent with the objective medical
evidence in the record.
In accordance with the Regulations, the ALJ asserted that Dr. Coleman’s opinion
was not supported by the observations of Plaintiff’s treating mental health providers and
Dr. Shapiro. For example, records from 2009 through 2012 indicate Plaintiff received
her primary mental health treatment through St. Joseph’s Hospital Health Center.
Although Plaintiff’s symptoms of depression and anxiety were often observed, her
treating mental health providers noted her mental health status examinations were
within normal limits. (T. 289, 307, 313, 315, 317, 319, 321, 323, 325-326, 327, 329, 574,
576, 580, 582, 584, 586, 589, 591, 593, 595, 597, 599, 601, and 606.) 3 Dr. Shapiro’s
observations during her mental status examination of Plaintiff mirror the normal results
noted by Plaintiff’s treating providers. (T. 337-338.) Dr. Shapiro and treating mental
health providers’ observations do not support Dr. Coleman’s more extreme limitations.
(T. 637.) Therefore, substantial evidence supports the ALJ determination that Dr.
Coleman’s mental functional limitations were inconsistent with other objective medical
evidence in the record.
Further, the ALJ did not outright reject Dr. Coleman’s opinion, but afforded his
opinion “little weight.” The ALJ’s RFC determination includes non-exertional mental
limitations, some of which are consistent with the limitations imposed by Dr. Coleman
and supported by other medical evidence in the record. For example, the ALJ
3
Mental Status exams observed Plaintiff’s: demeanor/behavior; eye contact; appearance;
level of consciousness; orientation; attention/concentration; memory; speech (tone, rate, volume, clarity);
psychomotor activity; affect; mood; thought process; thought content; perceptual disturbance; insight; and
judgment.

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incorporated Dr. Coleman’s opinion that Plaintiff was “seriously limited, but not
precluded” in her ability to work with or proximity to others without being unduly
distracted (T. 638.) The ALJ’s RFC determination reflects this limitation by limiting
Plaintiff to an occupation which required only “brief, infrequent, and superficial contact
with the public and only occasional contact with coworkers and supervisors” (T. 23.) The
limitation was supported by Dr. Shapiro’s observation that Plaintiff could interact
“moderately well” with others. (T. 338.)
Therefore, the ALJ properly evaluated Dr. Coleman’s opinion in accordance with
the Regulations and did not err in noting the context in which his opinion was procured
because it was but one factor in his overall analysis.
B.

Whether the ALJ Conducted a Proper Credibility Analysis.

After carefully considering the matter, the Court answers this question in the
affirmative, for the reasons stated in Defendant’s memorandum of law. (Dkt. No. 12 at
6-11 [Def.’s Mem. of Law].) The Court adds the following analysis.
A plaintiff’s allegations of pain and functional limitations are “entitled to great
weight where ... it is supported by objective medical evidence.” Rockwood v. Astrue,
614 F. Supp. 2d 252, 270 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting Simmons v. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd., 982
F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir.1992)). However, the ALJ “is not required to accept [a plaintiff’s]
subjective complaints without question; he may exercise discretion in weighing the
credibility of the [plaintiff’s] testimony in light of the other evidence in the record.” Genier
v. Astrue, 606 F.3d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Marcus v. Califano, 615 F.2d 23, 27 (2d
Cir.1979)). “When rejecting subjective complaints, an ALJ must do so explicitly and with
sufficient specificity to enable the Court to decide whether there are legitimate reasons
for the ALJ’s disbelief.” Rockwood, 614 F. Supp. 2d at 270.
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“The ALJ’s credibility assessment must be based on a two step analysis of
pertinent evidence in the record. First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant
has medically determinable impairments, which could reasonably be expected to
produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.” Id., at 271.
Second, if medically determinable impairments are shown,
then the ALJ must evaluate the intensity, persistence, and
limiting effects of the symptoms to determine the extent to
which they limit the claimant’s capacity to work. Because an
individual’s symptoms can sometimes suggest a greater
level of severity of impairment than can be shown by the
objective medical evidence alone, an ALJ will consider the
following factors in assessing a claimant’s credibility: (1)
claimant’s daily activities; (2) location, duration, frequency,
and intensity of claimant’s symptoms; (3) precipitating and
aggravating factors; (4) type, dosage, effectiveness, and
side effects of any medication taken to relieve symptoms; (5)
other treatment received to relieve symptoms; (6) any
measures taken by the claimant to relieve symptoms; and
(7) any other factors concerning claimant’s functional
limitations and restrictions due to symptoms.
Id. Further, “[i]t is the role of the Commissioner, not the reviewing court, ‘to resolve
evidentiary conflicts and to appraise the credibility of witnesses,’ including with respect
to the severity of a claimant's symptoms.” Cichocki v. Astrue, 534 F. App'x 71, 75 (2d
Cir. 2013) (citing Carroll v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 705 F.2d 638, 642 (2d
Cir.1983)).
Here, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments
could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms, but her statements
concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of these symptoms were not
credible. (T. 24.) Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed in his credibility determination to properly
analyze Plaintiff’s activities of daily living and improperly relied on Plaintiff’s noncompliance with prescribed treatment. (Dkt. No. 11 at 20-22 [Pl.’s Mem. of Law].)
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Regarding activities of daily living, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had only mild
restrictions in this area, specifically noting that Plaintiff could drive, take care of her
personal hygiene, care for her children, perform light housework, shop, and manage
money. (T. 22.) Plaintiff argues this was in error, because the ALJ failed to acknowledge
that these activities caused her fatigue. (Dkt. No. 11 at 21 [Pl.’s Mem. of Law].)
However, the evidence in the record regarding Plaintiff’s activities of daily living does
not support Plaintiff’s allegations that her symptoms were disabling. For example, the
record indicates that despite her symptoms, Plaintiff was capable of performing
activities of daily living. (T. 283, 331.) In 2010 Plaintiff indicated she stopped work due
to lack of childcare, not due to her mental health symptoms. (T. 307.) In early 2011
Plaintiff reported that she was able to function and return to work after being weaned off
medication for her anxiety and depression. (T. 303.) In June of 2011 Plaintiff was
working and took her GED test. (T. 325, 327.) The ALJ properly reasoned that based on
the record as a whole, evidence of Plaintiff’s activities of daily living supported a higher
level of functioning than reported by Plaintiff.
The ALJ also properly analyzed Plaintiff’s non-compliance with medication and
treatment. A plaintiff’s statements:
may be less credible if the level or frequency of treatment is inconsistent
with the level of complaints, or if the medical reports or records show that
the individual is not following the treatment as prescribed and there are no
good reasons for this failure. However, the adjudicator must not draw any
inferences about an individual's symptoms and their functional effects from
a failure to seek or pursue regular medical treatment without first
considering any explanations that the individual may provide, or other
information in the case record, that may explain infrequent or irregular
medical visits or failure to seek medical treatment.
SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186 (1996). Here, the record was replete with notations that
Plaintiff refused to take medication, primarily for fear that it would cause weight gain. (T.
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314, 320, 322, 324, 330, 377, 397, 574, 578, 588, 592, and 603.) In March of 2012
Plaintiff’s mental health provider confronted Plaintiff and questioned her regarding her
refusal to take medication and make changes, but Plaintiff did not have an answer for
her. (T. 592.)
A plaintiff may have a reason for not complying with medication and treatment,
but a reason alone does not provide the plaintiff a “free pass” for non-compliance. SSR
96-7p cautions ALJs not to infer that a plaintiff’s symptoms are not as severe as alleged
without first considering any “good reasons” he or she may have for not following a
treatment plan. The SSR provides examples of “good reasons” as: inability to afford
treatment, treatment is contrary to a religious belief, or side effects are less tolerable
than the symptoms. See SSR 96-7p.
Here, the ALJ properly complied with SSR 96-7p, because he took Plaintiff’s noncompliance with treatment into consideration when analyzing her credibility; and further,
he considered her reasoning for doing so. As directed by SSR 96-7p, the ALJ discussed
Plaintiff’s non-compliance with medication and her reasons for non-compliance. (T. 27.)
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s non-compliance, together with inconsistent
statements, and the objective medical evidence as a whole which showed relatively
normal mental health examinations, did not support Plaintiff’s contention that her mental
health symptoms were disabling. Therefore, because the ALJ properly assessed
Plaintiff’s activities of daily living and properly assessed Plaintiff’s failure to follow
prescribed treatment under SSR 96-7p, the ALJ did not err in his credibility analysis.

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C.

Whether the ALJ’s Step Five Determination was Supported by
Substantial Evidence.

After carefully considering the matter, the Court answers this question in the
affirmative, for the reasons stated in Defendant’s memorandum of law. (Dkt. No. 12 at
10-11 [Def.’s Mem. of Law].) The Court adds the following analysis.
Because we find no error in the ALJ's RFC assessment, specifically the ALJ’s
evaluation of Dr. Coleman’s opinion, we likewise conclude that the ALJ did not err in
posing a hypothetical question to the vocational expert that was based on that
assessment. See Dumas v. Schweiker, 712 F.2d 1545, 1553–54 (2d Cir.1983)
(approving a hypothetical question to a vocational expert that was based on substantial
evidence in the record).
ACCORDINGLY, it is
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. No. 11) is
DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED that Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. No. 12)
is GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED that Defendant’s decision denying disability benefits is AFFIRMED;
and it is further is
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is DISMISSED.
Dated:

September 15, 2015
Syracuse, NY
___________________________________
Hon. Glenn T. Suddaby
Chief, U. S. District Judge

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