Frank v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 19

MEMORANDUM & ORDER re 1 Complaint filed by John Frank. The Court GRANTS the Commissioner's prayer for judgment dismissing Frank's complaint and affirming the Commissioner's decision. Signed by Judge William G. Young on 3/4/3016. (lah)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

JOHN FRANK,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social
Security,
Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION
NO. 14-cv-00858-WGY

WILLIAM G. YOUNG, U.S. District Judge 1
March 4, 2016
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
I.

INTRODUCTION
The Plaintiff John Frank brings this action under 42

U.S.C. § 405(g) against Carolyn W. Colvin, the Acting
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the
“Commissioner”), challenging the decision of the
Commissioner denying him disability and insurance benefits
under Title II of the Social Security Act (the “Act”).

1

See

Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by
designation. See Order Reassigning Case, May 5, 2015, ECF
No. 18.
[1]

Compl., ECF No. 1; Administrative R. (“Admin. R.”) 9, ECF
No. 17-2. 2
A.

Procedural History

Frank applied for disability insurance benefits and
supplemental security income on April 21, 2013, alleging
that his disability began on April 18, 2013.
61.

Admin. R.

On August 8, 2013, both of these claims were denied.

Id. at 75.

At Frank’s request, id. at 79, a hearing

reviewing this initial decision was held before an
Administrative Law Judge (the “hearing officer”) 3 on
December 12, 2013, id. at 12.

The hearing officer issued a

decision denying Frank’s claims for benefits on January 21,
2014.

Id. at 9.

Frank requested a review of the decision,

id. at 6, which the the Appeals Council denied, rendering
the hearing officer’s decision the final disability
determination of the Commissioner, id. at 1.
Frank filed the instant action in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of New York on

2

The administrative record in this case is split
across seven docket entries, labeled ECF No. 17-1 through
17-7. For the sake of clarity, this opinion cites to the
page numbers in the continuously paginated record as a
whole, rather than to individual docket entries that
correspond to parts of the record.
3

For an explanation of the Court’s use of the term
“hearing officer,” see Vega v. Colvin, No. 14-13900-WGY (D.
Mass. Mar. 2, 2016).
[2]

July 15, 2014.

Compl., ECF No. 1. 4

an answer on March 19, 2015.
Admin. R., ECF No. 17.

The Commissioner filed

Def.’s Answer, ECF No. 16.

To date, neither party has filed

any briefs or motions.
B.

Factual Background

Frank was born on May 8, 1968.

Admin. R. 31.

He

lives with his wife and his four children in Fulton, New
York.

Id. at 31, 43, 53.

Prior to the onset of his

alleged disability, Frank earned a living cooking and
preparing food at various restaurants, including at the
Mission Restaurant for nine years.

Id. at 32. 5

Frank

stopped working in January 2013 after undergoing surgery on
his left shoulder.

Id. at 33.

While recovering from this

operation, Frank was prescribed painkillers.
205.

Id. at 33,

Ten weeks after the surgery, Frank had regained full

range of motion in his shoulder and he was cleared to
return to work; however, he testified that he still

4

The Form Complaint was filed with a Civil Cover Sheet
and a Notice of Appeals Council’s Action letter affixed.
See Compl.; Notice Appeals Council Action, ECF No. 1-1;
Civ’l Cover Sheet, ECF No. 1-2.
5

Frank quit school in the sixth grade. Admin. R. 31.
He earned a GED and received job training in the kitchen
through the prison system. Id. at 31-32.
[3]

experienced some pain when lifting his arm overhead.

Id.

at 40, 203.
On April 18, 2013, one week after Frank had resumed
working at the Mission Restaurant, he quit his job and
checked into a rehabilitation facility for his opiate
addiction.

Id. at 228.

Id. at 227-259.

He stayed there for about a month.

Thereafter, he saw a drug counselor, id.

at 278-313, and was treated by psychiatrist Cecile Matip
(“Dr. Matip”) about once per month from June 2013 to
January 2014, id. at 327-356.
In a January 2014 evaluation report, Dr. Matip
diagnosed Frank with Post-traumatic Stress Disorder
(“PTSD”) and Major Depressive Disorder.

Id. at 357-360.

The report also noted serious limitations in Frank’s
ability to: (1) “[u]nderstand and remember complex
instructions[,]” (2) “[c]arry out complex instructions[,]”
(3) “make judgments on complex work-related decisions[,]”
(4) “[i]nteract appropriately with the public[,] . . .
supervisor(s)[,] . . . [and] co-workers[,]” and (5)
“respond appropriately to usual work situations[.]”
358-359.

Id. at

Dr. Matip’s treatment plan for Frank involved his

attending individual psychotherapy sessions with a licensed
social worker as well as his taking prescribed antidepression and anti-anxiety medications.
[4]

Id. at 338.

At his administrative hearing, Frank testified about
how he was frequently awakened by nightmares of being
molested and abused when he was a child.

Id. at 41.

He

also testified that he was diagnosed with chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease (“COPD”) and emphysema about
ten years earlier and that he uses an inhaler if he has an
emergency.

Id. at 38-39.

Frank stated that these

emergencies can be triggered by anxiety or walking up too
many stairs.

Id.

As for Frank’s daily activities, Frank testified that
on some days, he takes his medication and watches
television.

Id. at 45.

or clean the dishes.

Sometimes he helps make the meals

Id. at 46.

pack of cigarettes a day.

Frank smokes about half a

Id. at 39.

Frank and his wife

testified that he is not able to be home alone with his
children during the day because two of his children have
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, and the full-time
responsibility of childcare can trigger his anxiety.

Id.

at 46-47, 59.
II.

DISCUSSION
A.

Standard of Review

In reviewing a final decision of the Commissioner,
this Court must evaluate whether the decision was based on
the correct legal standards and whether substantial
[5]

evidence supports the decision.

42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Clark

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 143 F.3d 115, 118 (2d Cir. 1998).
The substantial evidence standard requires “more than a
mere scintilla.

It means such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.”

Pratts v. Chater, 94 F.3d 34, 37 (2d Cir.

1996) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401
(1971)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

This standard

requires the Court to uphold the hearing officer’s findings
“[e]ven where the administrative record may also adequately
support contrary findings on particular issues . . . so
long as they are supported by substantial evidence.”
Genier v. Astrue, 606 F.3d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
B.

Social Security Disability Determination

The Social Security Act defines “disability” to
include the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical
or mental impairment which can be expected to result in
death or has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than 12 months.

42 U.S.C. §

423(d)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505 and 416.905.
addition, the Act requires that a claimant’s

[6]

In

physical or mental impairment or impairments [be] of
such severity that he is not only unable to do his
previous work but cannot, considering his age,
education, and work experience, engage in any other
kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the
national economy, regardless of whether such work
exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or
whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or
whether he would be hired if he applied for work.
Id. § 423(d)(2)(A).
Under Social Security Administration regulations,
hearing officers must follow a five-step, sequential
evaluation to determine whether a claimant is disabled.
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 and 416.920.

20

A claimant may seek review

of a hearing officer’s adverse decision from the Appeals
Council.

Perez v. Chater, 77 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 1996).

If review is granted, the decision of the Appeals Council
is the final decision of the Commissioner.

Id.

If review

is denied, then the final decision is that of the hearing
officer.

Id.

The final decision is judicially reviewable

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
III. THE HEARING OFFICER’S DECISION
In reaching the ultimate determination that Frank is
not disabled within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 423(d), the
hearing officer employed the appropriate five-step
procedure.

See Admin. R. 12-21; infra Part IV.

He

determined that Frank had not engaged in any substantial
gainful activity since April 18, 2013, his alleged
[7]

disability onset date.

Id. at 14.

The hearing officer

found that Frank suffered from the severe impairments of
major depressive disorder and PTSD.

Id. at 14.

Additionally, he found Frank to have a “left shoulder
issue, COPD and substance abuse in early remission,” which
he determined do not pose more than minimal limitations on
Frank’s ability to perform basic work activities and are
therefore not severe.

Id. at 15.

The hearing officer determined that Frank’s severe
impairments do not meet or medically equal the criteria of
listings 12.04 and 12.06 of 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1.

Id.

The hearing officer found that Frank “has

a mild restriction” in activities of daily living,
“moderate difficulties” in social functioning, “moderate
difficulties” in maintaining concentration, persistence or
pace, and that he has experienced no episodes of
“decompensation.”

Id. at 15-16. 6

6

In making his determination that Frank has “moderate
difficulties” in social functioning, the hearing officer
cited to evidence and opinions from the reports of Dr.
Jeanne Shapiro (“Dr. Shapiro”) as well as the Function
Report completed by Frank. Admin R. 15. In finding
“moderate difficulties” in “concentration, persistence or
pace,” the hearing officer cited to evidence and opinions
from the reports of Dr. Shapiro, Frank’s Function Report,
and testimonial evidence from Frank at his hearing. Id.
Considering these findings -- specifically that Frank’s
mental impairments did not result in at least two “marked”
limitations in the categories considered -- the hearing
[8]

As to Frank’s residual functional capacity, the
hearing officer found that Frank:
has the residual functional capacity to perform a
full range of work at all exertional levels and
he retains the ability to understand and follow
simple instructions and directions; perform
simple tasks with supervision and independently;
maintain attention/concentration for simple
tasks; regularly attend to a routine and maintain
a schedule; relate to and interact with others to
the extent necessary to carry out simple tasks,
but he should avoid work requiring more complex
interaction or joint efforts with other coworkers
to achieve work goals, and he should have no more
than occasional, brief interaction with the
public. He can handle reasonable levels of
simple, work-related stress, in that he can make
decisions directly related to the performance of
simple work, and he can handle usual workplace
changes and interactions associated with simple
work.
Id. at 17.

In making this determination, the hearing

officer considered Frank’s testimony as well as the
opinions of various medical sources.

He assigned “some

weight” to the opinions of consulting psychologist Dr. V.
Reddy, Dr. Jeanne Shapiro, and Dr. Matip, and identified
certain of their observations that were entitled to less
weight.

See id. at 17-18.

The hearing officer found that Frank could not perform
his past relevant work as a cook, but that, given Frank’s

officer determined that the “‘paragraph B’” criteria were
not satisfied. Id. at 16.
[9]

residual functional capacity, age, education, and work
experience, there exist jobs in significant numbers in the
national economy that Frank can perform.

Thus, the hearing

officer concluded that Frank is not disabled.
IV.

Id.

ANALYSIS
Frank has not filed a brief in this action and

therefore has not challenged the hearing officer’s decision
on any particular grounds.

Accordingly, this Court reviews

the hearing officer’s decision for compliance with the
appropriate legal standards and basis in substantial
evidence of record.

See McEaney v. Commn’r of Soc. Sec.,

536 F.Supp.2d 252, 257-58 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing Machadio
v. Apfel, 276 F.3d 103, 108-109 (2d Cir. 2002)).

Because

this Court concludes that the hearing officer properly
undertook the five-step sequential evaluation process, 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4), and that her finding at each step
is supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s
decision must stand.
A.

Substantial Gainful Activity

The first step of the social security disability
evaluation is to determine whether the claimant is engaged
in substantial gainful activity.

Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i).

Substantial gainful activity is defined as work that
“[i]nvolves doing significant and productive physical or
[10]

mental duties” and “[i]s done (or intended) for pay or
profit.”

Id. § 404.1510.

If the claimant is engaged in

such activity, then he or she is not disabled.
404.1520(a)(4)(i).

Id. §

Here, the hearing officer found that

Frank had “not engaged in substantial gainful activity
since April 18, 2013, the alleged onset date,” Admin. R.
14, and therefore the hearing officer’s determination at
step one did not render Frank ineligible for disability
benefits.
B.

Medical Severity of Impairments

Steps two and three of the sequential evaluation
concern the medical severity of a claimant’s impairments.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii)-(iii).

A hearing officer’s

analysis may terminate at one of these steps in two
scenarios.

First, if a claimant suffers no severe

impairments, he or she is not disabled.
404.1520(a)(4)(ii).

Id. §

Second, if a claimant suffers from an

impairment listed in the regulations’ appendix, 20 C.F.R.
Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App’x 1 (the “Appendix”), then he or she
is disabled.

Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii).

If neither of

these circumstances are present -- that is, the claimant
suffers from a severe impairment, but such impairment does
not satisfy the criteria of one of the Appendix listings -then the hearing officer must proceed to evaluate the
[11]

claimant’s residual functional capacity and move on to step
four of the sequential inquiry.
1.

Step Two Analysis

At step two of the disability determination
evaluation, the hearing officer considers whether the
claimant has a medically severe impairment.
404.1520(a)(4)(ii).

20 C.F.R. §

This step is generally limited to

“screen[ing] out de minimis claims,” Dixon v. Shalala, 54
F.3d 1019, 1030 (2d Cir. 1995).

The “mere presence of a

disease or impairment, or establishing that a person has
been diagnosed or treated for a disease or impairment” is
not, however, itself sufficient to render a condition
“severe.”

Coleman v. Shalala, 895 F.Supp.50, 53 (S.D.N.Y.

1995).
In the present case, the hearing officer determined
based on medical reports and testimonial evidence that
Frank’s major depressive disorder and PTSD were “severe”
impairments under the regulations.

Admin. R. 14.

The

hearing officer found that Frank’s alleged left shoulder
issue, COPD, and substance abuse in early remission did not
impose more than minimal limitations on Frank’s ability to
perform basic work activities and therefore were not severe

[12]

impairments.

Id. at 14-15.

These findings are supported

by substantial evidence in the record. 7
2.

Step Three Analysis

At step three of the evaluation, the hearing officer
must determine whether a claimant’s impairments meet or
medically equal the criteria of an impairment listed in the
Appendix.

If they do not, then the hearing officer must

proceed to determine the claimant’s residual functional
capacity, which is then incorporated into the step-four
analysis.
a.

Appendix Listings

The hearing officer considered Frank’s condition in
connection with the impairments listed in subsections 12.04
and 12.06 of the regulations, and found that Frank’s

7

With regard to the left shoulder, Frank’s medical
record shows that ten weeks after he underwent surgery, he
was medically cleared for “full duty” with “no
restrictions,” and his doctor remarked that Franks
“look[ed] great.” Id. at 203. In finding that Frank’s
COPD did not present more than minimal limitations, the
hearing officer relied on Frank’s own testimony that he
takes medication for the condition, is only bothered by
extreme temperatures or going up too many flights of
stairs, and carries an inhaler which he can use if an
emergency arises. Id. at 14-15, 38-40. As for Frank’s
substance abuse, Frank testified, and the record confirms,
that he relapsed only once after his April 2013 treatment,
in June 2013, and has not had any similar episodes since
that time. Id. at 42-43.
[13]

impairments did not meet the criteria in either of these
listings. 8
Each of the hearing officer’s findings under this step
is properly supported by medical evidence in the record as
well as Frank’s testimony. 9

Moreover, the hearing officer’s

conclusion that Frank does not have “marked restriction of
activities of daily living” or “complete inability to
function independently outside the area of [his] home,” 20
C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App’x 1, is supported by Frank’s
testimony and that of his wife that Frank attends meetings
and appointments, occasionally goes grocery shopping, and
attends his children’s school functions.
b.

Admin. R. 40-57.

Residual Functional Capacity

8

Subsection 12.04 of the relevant regulations provides
guidance on evaluating affective disorders. 20 C.F.R. Pt.
404, Subpt. P, App’x 1. In order for a claimant’s
impairment to be deemed “severe,” the hearing officer must
find that the criteria listed in paragraphs A and B are
satisfied, or that criteria in paragraph C are satisfied.
Id. Subsection 12.06 covers anxiety disorders. Id. An
impairment meets the severity requirements of that
subsection when the criteria listed in paragraphs A and B,
or paragraphs A and C, are satisfied. Id.
9

For example, the hearing officer supported his
determination that Frank only has moderate difficulties in
social functioning with reference to reports from Dr.
Shapiro stating that Frank “gets along with friends and
family some of the time” and appeared “relaxed and
comfortable” or “calm.” Admin. R. 15. The hearing officer
also cited Frank’s own statement in his Functioning Report
that he does not have problems getting along with friends,
neighbors, or others, and that he has never lost a job
because of problems getting along with people. Id.
[14]

Having found that Frank’s impairments do not satisfy
the criteria of one of the listings in the Appendix, the
hearing officer properly proceeded to evaluate Frank’s
residual functional capacity.

A claimant’s residual

functional capacity is “the most [he] can do despite [his]
limitations.”

20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1).

In arriving at

Frank’s residual functional capacity, quoted supra Part
III, the hearing officer here appropriately considered and
weighed the opinions of Frank’s treating physicians,
consistent with the treating physician rule. 10

10

The hearing

Under the “treating physician rule,” a hearing
officer must give controlling weight to the opinion of a
claimant’s treating physician as to the nature and severity
of a claimant’s impairment so long as it is “well-supported
by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques and is not inconsistent with the other
substantial evidence in [the] case record.” 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(d)(2); see also Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117,
128 (2d Cir. 2008). The treating physician’s opinion “is
not afforded controlling weight where . . . the treating
physician issued opinions that are not consistent with . .
. the opinions of other medical experts . . . for [g]enuine
conflicts in the medical evidence are for the Commissioner
to resolve.” Burgess, 537 F.3d at 128.
If a hearing officer decides that a treating
physician’s opinion is not to be given “controlling”
weight, she must then determine the proper weight to give
that opinion by evaluating (i) the frequency of examination
and the length, nature, and extent of the treatment
relationship; (ii) the evidence in support of the opinion;
(iii) the opinion’s consistency with the record as a whole;
and (iv) whether the opinion is from a specialist covering
the particular medical issues. Burgess, 537 F.3d at 129;
see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)-(5). The hearing
officer “must comprehensively set forth [her] reasons for
[15]

officer did not err by assigning the opinion of treating
physician Dr. Matip as to Frank’s “marked limitations” in
socialization only “some weight,” Admin. R. 17, because
this finding is inconsistent with the record as a whole,
including, for example, Dr. Shapiro’s opinion, see id. at
266-67 (finding Frank to be “cooperative with an adequate
manner of relating, social skills and overall presentation”
and to possess adequate “expressive and receptive
language,” “coherent and goal-directed” thought processes,
a full range” of affect, a “calm” mood, and “intact”
attention and concentration).

Moreover, the hearing

officer considered each of the requisite factors in
determining how much weight to assign to Dr. Matip’s
opinion, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)-(5), and adequately
explained his reasoning, see Admin. R. 17-19.

The hearing

officer also provided “good reasons,” as required by the
regulations, for according the opinion of Dr. Shapiro “some
weight.”

See Admin. R. 17-19.

As the hearing officer

points out, Dr. Shapiro did not cite evidence to support
the one marked limitation she found, id. at 18, and she

the weight assigned to a treating physician’s opinion.”
Burgess, 537 F.3d at 129 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2).
[16]

described Frank as calm, relaxed and comfortable, id. at
267.
There is also substantial evidence to support the
hearing officer’s finding that Frank’s statements
concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects
of his symptoms are not entirely credible.

Where the

record evidence does not support a claimant’s testimony,
the hearing officer must employ a two-step analysis to
evaluate the claimant’s reported symptoms.

See 20 C.F.R. §

404.1529; SSR 96–7p, 1996 WL 374186 (July 2, 1996).

First,

the hearing officer must determine whether, based on the
objective medical evidence, a claimant’s medical
impairments “could reasonably be expected to produce the
pain or other symptoms alleged.”
SSR 96–7p.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a);

Second, the hearing officer must evaluate the

intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of those
symptoms to determine the extent to which the symptoms
limit the claimant’s ability to do work.

See id.

Frank made various claims about the experience and
effects of his mental conditions, stating that he does not
like to go out, has difficulty paying attention and trouble
with authority figures, has problems with short-term
memory, and takes naps during the day because of sleeping
disorders.

Admin. R. 161-69.

The hearing officer found

[17]

that Frank’s medically determinable impairments could
reasonably be expected to cause the symptoms he alleges,
but declined to fully credit Frank’s statements concerning
their severity and the functional limitations they
precipitate.

Id. at 19.

There is substantial evidence to support the hearing
officer’s conclusion.

For example, Dr. Shapiro’s

examination of Frank revealed that Frank could engage in
social interactions and was calm, relaxed, and comfortable,
his speech was intelligible, and his thought processes were
coherent and goal-oriented.

Id. at 66.

Frank also

demonstrated the ability to perform simple counting, and
Dr. Shapiro noted Frank’s attention and concentration are
intact.

Id.

In addition, Frank’s Global Assessment of

Functioning (“GAF”) scores of 55-60 from his treating
social workers are consistent with no more than moderate
symptoms or moderate difficulty.

Id. at 74, 127.

Thus,

the hearing officer' did not err in determining that
Frank’s reports of the effects of his symptoms on his
ability to work were not entirely credible.
C.

Ability to Perform Past Relevant Work

Step four of the disability analysis asks whether a
claimant is capable of performing his past work, despite
his or her impairments.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv).
[18]

If a claimant’s residual functional capacity allows the
claimant to perform his or her past relevant work, then the
claimant is not disabled.

Id.

Here, the hearing officer

determined that Frank’s residual functional capacity
precluded him from performing his past work as a cook, and
accordingly moved on to the final step of the disability
evaluation.
D.

Admin. R. 19.

Ability to Adjust to Other Work

At the fifth and final step of the sequential
evaluation process, the hearing officer must consider
whether, given a “claimant’s residual functional capacity
and his age, education, and work experience . . . he can
make an adjustment to other work[,]” in which case the
claimant is not disabled.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v).

This involves consideration of both exertional and
nonexertional limitations. 11

In making their determination

at step five, hearing officers may rely on the Medical
Vocational Guidelines (the “Vocational Guidelines”), 20
C.F.R. Pt. 404, without vocational expert testimony, so

11

Exertional limitations affect an individual’s
“ability to meet the strength demands of jobs[,]” and in
turn limit the individual to jobs at a certain “exertional
levels (sedentary, light, medium, heavy, and very
heavy)[.]” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1569a(a). Nonexertional
limitations, in contrast, are those that affect some other
job demand besides strength. Id. § 404.1569a(c).
[19]

long as those guidelines “adequately reflect a claimant’s
condition.”
1986).

Bapp v. Bowen, 802 F.2d 601, 605 (2d Cir.

Such is generally the case when a claimant suffers

exertional impairments only, and the relevant factors (age,
education, work experience, residual functional capacity)
line up with an entry in the Vocational Guidelines.

See

Hendrickson v. Astrue, Civ. No. 5:11-927, 2012 WL 7784156,
at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2012).

If a claimant also suffers

nonexertional impairments, and those impairments
“significantly limit the range of work permitted by his
exertional limitations[,]” reliance on the Vocational
Guidelines is improper.

Bapp, 802 F.2d at 605-606

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 12
Where a claimant suffers non-exertional limitations
only, the hearing officer is directed to consider the
effect of such nonexertional limitations on the claimant’s
occupational base, and the question of “whether the person
can be expected to make a vocational adjustment considering
the interaction of his or her remaining occupational base
with his or her age, education, and work experience.”
85-15, 1985 WL 56857 (Jan. 1, 1985).

12

SSR

In cases where the

A nonexertional limitation is “significant” if it
“so narrows a claimant’s possible range of work as to
deprive him of a meaningful employment opportunity.” Bapp,
802 F.2d at 606.
[20]

claimant’s nonexertional limitations stem from a mental
impairment that is insufficient to render a finding of
disabled at any earlier step in the sequential evaluation,
but that nonetheless “prevent[s] the [claimant] from
meeting the mental demands of past relevant work and
prevents the transferability of acquired work skills, the
final consideration is whether the person can be expected
to perform unskilled work.”

Id.

This final scenario is the one the hearing officer was
presented with here.

The hearing officer determined that

Frank had no exertional limitations (i.e., he could perform
work at any exertional level).

Admin. R. 17, 20.

He then

concluded that although Frank suffers nonexertional
limitations that “compromise[]” Frank’s job performance
capacity, Frank is still capable of performing unskilled
work, and thus is not disabled.

See id. at 20 (finding

Frank’s “[nonexertional] limitations have little or no
effect on the occupational base of unskilled work at all
levels”).

It was appropriate for the hearing officer to

rely on the Vocational Guidelines because he properly
determined that Frank’s nonexertional impairments did not
significantly diminish Frank’s occupational base.

[21]

Given

the nature of unskilled work 13 and Frank’s residual
functional capacity, this conclusion is supported by
substantial evidence.
V.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the

Commissioner’s prayer for judgment dismissing Frank’s
complaint and affirming the Commissioner’s decision, ECF
No. 16.
SO ORDERED.

/s/ William G. Young
WILLIAM G. YOUNG
DISTRICT JUDGE

13

“The basic mental demands of competitive,
remunerative, unskilled work include the abilities (on a
sustained basis) to understand, carry out, and remember
simple instructions; to respond appropriately to
supervision, coworkers, and usual work situations; and to
deal with changes in a routine work setting.” SSR 85-15.
[22]