Case v. Colvin
Filing
14
DECISION AND ORDER granting # 11 Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings; and denying # 12 Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings. This matter is remanded to Defendant, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 405(g) for further proceedings consistent with this Decision and Order. Signed by Chief Judge Glenn T. Suddaby on 7/21/16. (lmw)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
____________________________________
JOSEPH JOHN CASE,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 5:15-CV-0419 (GTS)
CAROLYN W. COLVIN
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
____________________________________
APPEARANCES:
OF COUNSEL:
OLINSKY LAW GROUP
Counsel for Plaintiff
300 S. State Street, Suite 420
Syracuse, NY 13202
HOWARD D. OLINSKY, ESQ.
U.S. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN.
OFFICE OF REG’L GEN. COUNSEL
– REGION II
Counsel for Defendant
26 Federal Plaza, Room 3904
New York, NY 10278
DANIEL R. JANES, ESQ.
GLENN T. SUDDABY, Chief United States District Judge
DECISION and ORDER
Currently before the Court, in this Social Security action filed by Joseph John Case
(“Plaintiff”) against the Commissioner of Social Security (“Defendant” or “the Commissioner”)
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3), are the parties’ cross-motions for judgment on
the pleadings. (Dkt. Nos. 11, 12.) For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings is granted and Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is
denied.
I.
RELEVANT BACKGROUND
A.
Factual Background
Plaintiff was born on December 17, 1963. Plaintiff obtained a General Educational
Development (GED) certificate, and has past work assembling rifles. Generally, Plaintiff’s
alleged disability consists of generalized anxiety disorder, major depressive disorder, suicidal
tendencies, chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder (“COPD”), high blood pressure, coronary
artery disease, gastroesophageal reflux disease (“GERD”), chest pain, and schizophrenia.
B.
Procedural History
On August 13, 2013, Plaintiff applied for Supplemental Security Income, alleging
disability beginning on December 20, 2012. Plaintiff’s application was initially denied on
December 13, 2013, after which he timely requested a hearing before an Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”). On April 8, 2014, and July 28, 2014, Plaintiff appeared in hearings before the
ALJ, Marie Greener. (T. 46-61, 62-78.) On September 17, 2014, the ALJ issued a written
decision finding Plaintiff not disabled under the Social Security Act. (T. 16-39.) On February 5,
2015, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, rendering the ALJ’s decision the
final decision of the Commissioner. (T. 1-6.)
C.
The ALJ’s Decision
Generally, in her decision, the ALJ made the following six findings of fact and
conclusions of law. (T. 21-34.) First, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial
gainful activity since August 13, 2013, the application date. (T. 21.) Second, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff’s schizoaffective disorder, polysubstance dependence, depressive disorder, anxiety
disorder, and personality disorder are severe impairments, but that Plaintiff’s COPD, GERD,
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chest pain, high blood pressure, and coronary artery disease are not severe impairments.1 (T. 2123.) Third, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s severe impairments, alone or in combination, do not
meet or medically equal one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1.
(T. 23-27.) The ALJ considered Listings 12.03, 12.04, 12.06, 12.08, and 12.09, and 12.10. (Id.)
Fourth, the ALJ found that Plaintiff
has the residual functional capacity [“RFC”] to perform work at all
exertional levels, but is limited by a mental disorder to unskilled
work which does not require more than simple, short interactions
with supervisors, co-workers, or the public; and, although the
individual may work in proximity to others, the tasks do not require
working in conjunction with others and predominantly involve
working with objects rather than people; and he requires a low-stress
environment, by which I mean one with routine daily tasks and duties
in the same workplace, which do not significant change in pace or
location on a daily basis.
(T. 27-33.) Fifth, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has no past relevant work. (T. 33.) Sixth, and
finally, the ALJ found that there are other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy that Plaintiff can perform. (T. 33-34.)
D.
The Parties’ Briefings on Their Cross-Motions
Generally, Plaintiff makes four arguments in support of his motion for judgement on the
pleadings. First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s RFC determination is not supported by
substantial evidence. (Dkt. No. 11, at 1, 10-12 [Pl.’s Mem. of Law].) Within this argument,
Plaintiff argues that (1) the ALJ failed to find that Plaintiff’s GERD was a severe impairment at
step two, and (2) the ALJ’s RFC determination failed to the include the environmental
limitations opined by consultative examiner, Elke Lorensen, M.D. (Id.) Second, Plaintiff argues
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The ALJ stated that she considered Plaintiff’s allegations of generalized anxiety disorder, major
depressive disorder, suicidal tendencies, and schizophrenia in conjunction with his severe impairments of
schizoaffective disorder, polysubstance dependence, depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, and personality disorder.
(T. 22.)
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that the ALJ’s credibility determination is not supported by substantial evidence. (Id., at 1, 1214.) Third, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to develop the record by not obtaining a medical
source statement regarding Plaintiff’s GERD from treating physician, Sylvia Edwards, M.D.
(Id., at 1, 14-15.) Fourth, and finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s step five determination is
not supported by substantial evidence. (Id., at 1, 15.)
Generally, Defendant argues that the ALJ properly considered the medical evidence of
record, and the ALJ’s RFC determination is supported by substantial evidence. (Dkt. No. 12, at
5-11 [Def.’s Mem. of Law].) Within this argument, Defendant argues that the ALJ’s credibility
determination is supported by substantial evidence. (Id.)
II.
RELEVANT LEGAL STANDARD
A.
Standard of Review
A court reviewing a denial of disability benefits may not determine de novo whether
an individual is disabled. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Wagner v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 906
F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990). Rather, the Commissioner’s determination will be reversed only if
the correct legal standards were not applied, or it was not supported by substantial evidence. See
Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 986 (2d Cir. 1987) (“Where there is a reasonable basis for
doubt whether the ALJ applied correct legal principles, application of the substantial evidence
standard to uphold a finding of no disability creates an unacceptable risk that a claimant will be
deprived of the right to have her disability determination made according to the correct legal
principles.”); accord, Grey v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1983); Marcus v. Califano, 615
F.2d 23, 27 (2d Cir. 1979).
“Substantial evidence” is evidence that amounts to “more than a mere scintilla,” and has
been defined as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
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support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 1427 (1971).
Where evidence is deemed susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the
Commissioner’s conclusion must be upheld. Rutherford v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir.
1982).
“To determine on appeal whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial
evidence, a reviewing court considers the whole record, examining evidence from both sides,
because an analysis of the substantiality of the evidence must also include that which detracts
from its weight.” Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1988). If supported by
substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s finding must be sustained “even where substantial
evidence may support the plaintiff’s position and despite that the court’s independent analysis of
the evidence may differ from the [Commissioner’s].” Rosado v. Sullivan, 805 F. Supp. 147, 153
(S.D.N.Y. 1992). In other words, this Court must afford the Commissioner’s determination
considerable deference, and may not substitute “its own judgment for that of the
[Commissioner], even if it might justifiably have reached a different result upon a de novo
review.” Valente v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 733 F.2d 1037, 1041 (2d Cir. 1984).
B.
Standard to Determine Disability
The Commissioner has established a five-step evaluation process to determine whether an
individual is disabled as defined by the Social Security Act. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. The Supreme
Court has recognized the validity of this sequential evaluation process. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482
U.S. 137, 140-42, 107 S. Ct. 2287 (1987). The five-step process is as follows:
First, the [Commissioner] considers whether the claimant is currently
engaged in substantial gainful activity. If he is not, the
[Commissioner] next considers whether the claimant has a “severe
impairment” which significantly limits his physical or mental ability
to do basic work activities. If the claimant suffers such an
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impairment, the third inquiry is whether, based solely on medical
evidence, the claimant has an impairment which is listed in Appendix
1 of the regulations. If the claimant has such an impairment, the
[Commissioner] will consider him disabled without considering
vocational factors such as age, education, and work experience; the
[Commissioner] presumes that a claimant who is afflicted with a
“listed” impairment is unable to perform substantial gainful activity.
Assuming the claimant does not have a listed impairment, the fourth
inquiry is whether, despite the claimant’s severe impairment, he has
the residual functional capacity to perform his past work. Finally, if
the claimant is unable to perform his past work, the [Commissioner]
then determines whether there is other work which the claimant could
perform. Under the cases previously discussed, the claimant bears
the burden of the proof as to the first four steps, while the
[Commissioner] must prove the final one.
Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982), accord, McIntyre v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 146,
150 (2d Cir. 2014). “If at any step a finding of disability or non-disability can be made, the SSA
will not review the claim further.” Barnhart v. Thompson, 540 U.S. 20, 24 (2003).
III.
ANALYSIS
For the ease of analysis, Plaintiff’s arguments will be reorganized and consolidated
below.
A.
Whether the ALJ’s Step Two Determination That Plaintiff’s GERD Was Not
a Severe Impairment Was Supported by Substantial Evidence
After carefully considering the matter, the Court answers this question in the affirmative
for the reasons stated in Defendant’s memorandum of law. (Dkt. No. 12, at 5-7 [Def.’s Mem. of
Law].) To those reasons, the Court adds the following analysis.
According to Social Security Regulations, “[a]n impairment or combination of
impairments is not severe if it does not significantly limit a [claimant’s] physical or mental
ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.921(a). The regulations define “basic work
activities” as the “abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs,” with examples including the
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following: (1) physical functions such as walking, standing, lifting, pushing, pulling, carrying or
handling; (2) capacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking; (3) understanding, carrying out, and
remembering simple instructions; (4) using judgment; (5) responding appropriately to
supervision, co-workers and usual work situations; and (6) dealing with changes in a routine
work setting. 20 C.F.R. § 416.921(b). Accordingly, the severity of an impairment is determined
by the limitations imposed by the impairment, and not merely by diagnosis of the impairment.
Ellis v. Comm’r, 11-CV-1205, 2012 WL 5464632, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2012) (citing
Coleman v. Shalala, 895 F. Supp 50, 53 [S.D.N.Y. 1995]); see also McConnell v. Astrue, 03-CV0521, 2008 WL 833968 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2008).
“The second step requirement under the prescribed disability analysis is truly de minimis,
and intended only to screen out the truly weakest of cases.” Davis v. Colvin, 11-CV-0658, 2013
WL 1183000, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2013) (citing Dixon v. Shalala, 54 F.3d 1019, 1030 [2d
Cir. 1995]). When an ALJ finds that one or more of a plaintiff’s impairments are severe, an error
in the severity analysis at step two may be harmless because the ALJ continued with the five-step
analysis and did not deny the claim based on lack of a severe impairment alone. Ellis, 2012 WL
5464632, at *5; Tyron v. Astrue, 10-CV-0537, 2012 WL 398952, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2012);
Kemp v. Comm’r, 10-CV-1244, 2011 WL 3876526, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2011).
When “an ALJ has omitted an impairment from step two of the sequential analysis, other
courts have declined to remand if the ALJ clearly considered the effects of the impairment in the
remainder of his analysis.” Chavis v. Astrue, 07-CV-0018, 2010 WL 624039, at *12 (N.D.N.Y.
Feb. 18, 2010); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.923 (stating that the ALJ is required to consider the
“combined effect of all of [a plaintiff’s] impairments without regard to whether any such
impairment, if considered separately would be of sufficient severity”). Here, a review of the
entire decision indicates that the ALJ’s step two finding was supported by substantial evidence
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and that the ALJ properly considered the effects of Plaintiff’s combined impairments in the
remainder of the sequential analysis.
At step two, the ALJ found that there was no medical evidence that Plaintiff had any
significant functional limitations due to GERD. (T. 22.) The ALJ noted that the medical
evidence of record showed that Plaintiff’s GERD had improved with treatment and was under
good medical management. (Id.) On August 12, 2013, Plaintiff reported to Dr. Edwards that his
GERD symptoms were relieved by taking omeprazole once daily, and rated the severity of his
condition at zero. (T. 343.) The ALJ noted that, on October 12, 2013, Plaintiff reported that he
experienced only mild epigastric discomfort on a sporadic basis. (T. 22.) Accordingly, the
ALJ’s step two determination that Plaintiff’s GERD was not a severe impairment was supported
by substantial evidence.
Additionally, the ALJ considered the effects of Plaintiff’s GERD in the remainder of her
analysis and properly noted that, in determining the RFC, she must consider “all of the
claimant’s impairments, including impairments that are not severe.” (T. 21, 31-32.) Moreover,
the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s schizoaffective disorder, polysubstance dependence, depressive
disorder, anxiety disorder, and personality disorder were severe impairments, and therefore the
ALJ did not deny benefits based on lack of a severe impairment. (T. 21-23.) Accordingly, even
if the ALJ’s failure to find Plaintiff’s GERD severe at step two of the sequential analysis was
error, it would be harmless. Ellis, 2012 WL 5464632, at *5; Tyron, 2012 WL 398952, at *3.
Therefore, remand is not necessary on this basis.
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B.
Whether the ALJ Was Required to Recontact Dr. Edwards Regarding
Plaintiff’s GERD
After carefully considering the matter, the Court answers this question in the negative for
the reasons stated in Defendant’s memorandum of law. (Dkt. No. 12, at 12-13 [Def.’s Mem. of
Law].) To those reasons, the Court adds the following analysis.
The ALJ has an affirmative duty to develop a claimant’s complete medical history. 20
C.F.R. § 416.912(d); Lamay v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 562 F.3d 503, 508-09 (2d Cir. 2009). By
statute, an ALJ is required to develop a claimant’s complete medical history for at least twelve
months before an application for benefits was filed, and for a longer period when there is reason
to believe that additional information is necessary to reach a decision. DeChirico v. Callahan,
134 F.3d 1177, 1184 (2d Cir. 1998). This duty exists even when a claimant is represented by
counsel, due to the non-adversarial nature of a benefits proceeding. DeChirico, 134 F.3d at
1184; Lamay, 562 F.3d at 509.
Recontacting medical providers is necessary when the ALJ cannot make a disability
determination based on the evidence of record. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920b(c)(1). Additional evidence
or clarification is sought when there is a conflict or ambiguity that must be resolved, when the
medical reports lack necessary information, or when the reports are not based on medically
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920b(c)(1)-(4); Rosa
v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 1999); Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 505 (2d Cir. 1998).
However, reviewing courts hold that an ALJ is not required to seek additional information absent
“obvious gaps” in the administrative record that preclude an informed decision. Rosa, 168 F.3d
at 79 n.5; see also Hart v. Comm’r, 07-CV-1270 2010 WL 2817479, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. July 16,
2010). In this matter, the Court finds that there were no obvious gaps in the administrative
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record that would preclude the ALJ from making an informed assessment of Plaintiff’s GERD
for the following two reasons.
First, the ALJ reasonably relied on the statement of Plaintiff’s counsel that the record
concerning Plaintiff’s physical impairments was compete, and no additional evidence was
required regarding Plaintiff’s GERD. (T. 65.) At the initial hearing on April 8, 2014, Plaintiff’s
counsel stated that there were outstanding records from St. Joseph’s Comprehensive Psychiatric
Emergency Program (“CPEP”), St. Joseph’s Family Practice, and Syracuse Behavioral Health.
(T. 49-50.) At a supplemental hearing on July 28, 2014, Plaintiff’s counsel stated that the record
was complete except for Plaintiff’s mental health records from St. Joseph’s CPEP, which the
ALJ subsequently obtained. (T. 65, 388-96.)
Second, the record contained (1) Plaintiff’s treatment records for GERD from Dr.
Edwards, discussed above in Part III.A. of this Decision and Order, and (2) a consultative
examination and opinion of Plaintiff’s physical limitations from Dr. Lorensen, discussed below
in Part III.C. of this Decision and Order. (T. 327-30, 335-65.) On November 27, 2013, Dr.
Lorensen diagnosed Plaintiff with GERD, but did not identify functional limitations resulting
from the impairment.2 (T. 329-30.) The Court notes that Dr. Lorensen’s opinion is consistent
with Dr. Edwards’s treatment notes indicating that Plaintiff’s GERD symptoms were relieved by
taking omeprazole once daily, and that Plaintiff rated the severity of his GERD at zero and
experienced only mild epigastric discomfort on a sporadic basis. (T. 22, 343.)
An ALJ is entitled to rely on the opinions of both examining and non-examining State
agency medical consultants, because those consultants are deemed to be qualified experts in the
field of social security disability. 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(b)(6), 416.913(c), 416.927(e); also Frey
2
Dr. Lorensen opined that Plaintiff had “no gross physical limitations” but should avoid exposure to
smoke, dust, and other respiratory irritants.” (T. 330.)
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ex rel. A.O. v. Astrue, 485 F. App’x 484, 487 (2d Cir. 2012) (“The report of a State agency
medical consultant constitutes expert opinion evidence which can be given weight if supported
by medical evidence in the record.”); Little v. Colvin, 14-CV-63, 2015 WL 1399586, at *9
(N.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2015) (“State agency physicians are qualified as experts in the evaluation of
medical issues in disability claims. As such, their opinions may constitute substantial evidence if
they are consistent with the record as a whole.”). Accordingly, the ALJ properly relied on Dr.
Lorensen’s opinion concerning Plaintiff’s GERD.
For these reasons, the ALJ was not required to recontact Dr. Edwards regarding
Plaintiff’s GERD, and remand is not required on this basis.
C.
Whether the ALJ Erred in Assessing the Medical Opinion Evidence in
Determining Plaintiff’s Physical RFC
After carefully considering the matter, the Court answers this question in the affirmative
for the reasons stated in Plaintiff’s memorandum of law. (Dkt. No. 11, at 11-12 [Pl.’s Mem. of
Law].) To those reasons, the Court adds the following analysis.
RFC is defined as
what an individual can still do despite his or her limitations . . . .
Ordinarily, RFC is the individual’s maximum remaining ability to do
sustained work activities in an ordinary work setting on a regular and
continuing basis, and the RFC assessment must include a discussion
of the individual’s abilities on that basis. A regular and continuing
basis means 8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work
schedule.
Melville v. Apfel, 198 F.3d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 1999); 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a). “In assessing a
claimant’s RFC, the ALJ must consider all of the relevant medical and other evidence in the case
record to assess the claimant’s ability to meet the physical, mental, sensory and other
requirements of work.” Domm v. Colvin, 12-CV-6640, 2013 WL 4647643, at *8 (W.D.N.Y.
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Aug. 29, 2013) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.945[a][3]-[4]). The ALJ must consider medical opinions
and facts, physical and mental abilities, non-severe impairments, and the plaintiff’s subjective
evidence of symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(b)-(e). Finally, an ALJ’s RFC determination “must
be set forth with sufficient specificity to enable [the Court] to decide whether the determination
is supported by substantial evidence.” Ferraris v. Heckler, 728 F.2d 582, 587 (2d Cir. 1984).
When controlling weight is not afforded to the opinion of a treating physician, or when
assessing a medical opinion from a source such as a consultative examiner, the ALJ should
consider the following factors to determine the proper weight to afford the opinion: (1) the
source’s examination or treatment relationship with the plaintiff, including the length, nature,
and extent of the treatment relationship, (2) the opinion’s supportability, (3) the opinion’s
consistency with the record as a whole, (4) the source’s specialization, if any, and (5) other
factors, such as the source’s knowledge of disability programs and familiarity with the case
record. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c); Halloran, 362 F.3d at 32 (listing regulatory factors).
On November 27, 2013, consultative examiner, Dr. Lorensen, diagnosed Plaintiff with
COPD, GERD, and coronary artery disease (status post myocardial infarction). (T. 329.) Dr.
Lorensen opined that Plaintiff had “no gross physical limitations” identified upon examination,
and Plaintiff should avoid smoke, dust, and other respiratory irritants.3 (T. 330.) In determining
that Plaintiff has the physical RFC to perform work at all exertional levels, the ALJ afforded
some weight to Dr. Lorensen’s opinion. (T. 27, 32.) However, the ALJ rejected Dr. Lorensen’s
opinion that Plaintiff should avoid smoke, dust, and other respiratory irritants. (Id.) The ALJ
reasoned that she found no support in the evidence of record for Dr. Lorensen’s opinion that
Plaintiff should avoid exposure to respiratory irritants, and Plaintiff’s lung examination by Dr.
3
SSR 85-15 instructs that, “[w]here an individual can tolerate very little noise, dust, etc., the impact
on the ability to work would be considerable because very few job environments are entirely free of irritants,
pollutants, and other potentially damaging conditions.” SSR 85-15, 1985 WL 56857 (1985).
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Lorensen was normal. (T. 32.) Yet the ALJ failed to cite, and the record does not contain, a
medical opinion to dispute Dr. Lorensen’s opinion that Plaintiff should avoid smoke, dust, and
other respiratory irritants. (Id.) Therefore, the ALJ improperly relied on her own view of the
medical evidence to discredit Dr. Lorensen’s opinion. (Id.)
“The ALJ is not permitted to substitute his own expertise or view of the medical proof for
the treating physician’s opinion or for any competent medical opinion.” Greek v. Colvin, 802
F.3d 370, 375 (2d Cir. 2015), see also Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 79 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[T]he
ALJ cannot arbitrarily substitute his own judgment for competent medical opinion.”); Balsamo v.
Chater, 142 F.3d 75, 81 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[W]hile an [ALJ] is free to resolve issues of credibility
as to lay testimony or to choose between properly submitted medical opinions, he is not free to
set his own expertise against that of a physician who [submitted a medical opinion to] or testified
before him . . . . In the absence of supporting expert medical opinion, the ALJ should not have
engaged in his own evaluations of the medical findings.”).
Moreover, as discussed above in Part III.C. of this Decision and Order, additional
evidence or clarification is sought when there is a conflict or ambiguity in a medical opinion that
must be resolved, when the medical reports lack necessary information, or when the reports are
not based on medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. 20 C.F.R. §
416.920b(c)(1)-(4); Rosa, 168 F.3d at 80. Therefore, even if the ALJ properly identified a
conflict in Dr. Lorensen’s opinion that Plaintiff should avoid exposure to respiratory irritants, the
ALJ should have recontacted Dr. Lorensen for clarification rather than rely on the conflict to
reject Dr. Lorensen’s uncontradicted medial opinion. Beckwith, 2015 WL 860763 at *6; see also
Balsamo, 142 F.3d at 81.
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For these reasons, remand is required for the ALJ to reevaluate Dr. Lorensen’s opinion.
The ALJ should first recontact Dr. Lorensen for clarification to resolve any conflict or ambiguity
in Dr. Lorensen’s opinion. The ALJ should then reevaluate Plaintiff’s physical RFC based on a
proper evaluation of Dr. Lorensen’s opinion, and in light of any new evidence obtained.
D.
Whether the ALJ’s Credibility Analysis and Step Five Determination Are
Supported by Substantial Evidence
For the reasons discussed above in Part III.C. of this Decision and Order, this matter is
being remanded for the ALJ to reevaluate Dr. Lorensen’s opinion and Plaintiff’s physical RFC.
Therefore, remand is also necessary for a new credibility analysis and step five determination
against that backdrop.
ACCORDINGLY, it is
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. No. 11) is
GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED that Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. No. 12) is
DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED that this matter is REMANDED to Defendant, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
405(g), for further proceedings consistent with this Decision and Order.
Dated: July 21, 2016
Syracuse, New York
______________________________________
Hon. Glenn T. Suddaby
Chief U.S. District Judge
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