Antonelli Property Maintenance, Inc. et al v. Eire Insurance Company

Filing 29

DECISION AND ORDER that Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 15 ) is DENIED. Plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 16 ) is DENIED. Plaintiff shall forward a written settlement demand to Defendant no later th an October 29, 2019, and the parties shall engage in good-faith settlement negotiations between Defendant's receipt of that written settlement demand and the occurrence of a settlement conference before the undersigned in chambers in Syracuse, New York, on November 19, 2019 at 10:00 AM, at which time counsel shall appear in person with settlement authority. Signed by Chief Judge Glenn T. Suddaby on 9/26/2019. (sal)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
___________________________________________
ANTONELLI PROPERTY MAINTENANCE, INC.;
and MICHAEL ANTONELLI,
Plaintiffs,
v.

5:18-CV-0409
(GTS/TWD)

ERIE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant.
___________________________________________
APPEARANCES:

OF COUNSEL:

KIRWAN LAW FIRM, PC
Counsel for Plaintiffs
AXA Tower I, 17th Floor
100 Madison Street
Syracuse, NY 13202

TERRY J. KIRWAN, Jr., ESQ.

MURA & STORM PLLC
Counsel for Defendant
14 Lafayette Square
930 Rand Building
Buffalo, NY 14203

SCOTT D. STORM, ESQ.
SCOTT MANCUSO, ESQ.

GLENN T. SUDDABY, Chief United States District Judge
DECISION and ORDER
Currently before the Court, in this insurance action filed by Antonelli Property
Maintenance, Inc., and Michael Antonelli (“Plaintiffs”) against Erie Insurance Company
(“Defendant”), are (1) Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and (2) Plaintiffs’ crossmotion for summary judgment. (Dkt. Nos. 15, 16.) For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment is denied, and Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment is
denied.

I.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND
A.

Plaintiffs’ Complaint

This diversity action was removed from Onondaga Supreme Court on April 4, 2018.
(Dkt. No. 1.) Generally, in their Verified Complaint, Plaintiffs claim that Defendant breached
the material terms of its New York Auto Policy, NY-FEP, Commercial Auto Policy Non-Fleet
#Q11-6730235 (“Policy One”) and/or its Fivestar Contractor’s Policy #Q35-720089 (“Policy
Two”) by failing and refusing to pay Plaintiffs’ insurance claim related to a fire and resulting
total loss of his insured 2016 Dodge Ram 3500 Megacap Shortbox Diesel Truck, causing
Plaintiffs to suffer damages in excess of $100,000.00, resulting from “the loss of the RAM and
its contents” and the cost of rental vehicles. (See generally, Dkt. No. 2 [Pls.’ Compl.].)
B.

Undisputed Material Facts on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Unless otherwise noted, the following facts were asserted and supported with accurate
record citations by Defendant in its Statement of Material Facts and expressly admitted by
Plaintiffs in their response thereto. (Compare Dkt. No. 15, Attach. 8 [Def.’s Rule 7.1 Statement]
with Dkt. No. 16, Attach. 3 [Pls.’ Rule 7.1 Resp.].)1
1.

Defendant issued Policy One for the policy period from November 17, 2016,

through November 17, 2017, to the named insured “Michael E. Antonelli, Antonelli Property
Maintenance.”
2.

Defendant issued Policy Two for the policy period from November 17, 2016,

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The Court notes that Plaintiffs admitted each of Defendant’s fourteen asserted
facts, but added, in response to the facts asserted in Paragraph Numbers 2, 4, and 6, that
“Plaintiffs are not seeking recovery for the personal property located within the truck that was
destroyed.” (See generally, Dkt. No. 16, Attach. 3 [Pls.’ Rule 7.1 Resp.].)
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through November 17, 2017, to the named insured “Antonelli Property Maintenance, Inc.”
3.

Policy One is a “commercial auto policy” providing liability coverage and

property damage coverage with respect to, among other vehicles, the 2016 Dodge Ram that was
allegedly involved in a fire loss on April 19, 2017.
4.

Policy Two is a “contractor’s policy” providing liability coverage and business

personal property coverage to the named insured.
5.

On April 19, 2017, a fire loss allegedly occurred involving Plaintiffs’ 2016 Dodge

Ram and the “entire personal contents within” the Ram.
6.

On May 22, 2017, Plaintiffs made a claim with Defendant under the two policies

at issue with respect to the damage sustained in the fire.
7.

On July 12, 2017, Plaintiff Michael Antonelli appeared for an examination under

oath with respect to the claims, along with his attorney at that time, Christopher Gaiser.
8.

On July 17, 2017, counsel for Defendant sent a letter to Mr. Gaiser requesting

additional documents from Plaintiff Antonelli with respect to the claims.
9.

On August 1, 2017, counsel for Defendant sent a letter to Mr. Gaiser requesting

that he have Plaintiff Antonelli read the transcript of his examination under oath, sign it, and
return it to Defendant.
10.

On August 17, 2017, counsel for Defendant sent a letter to Mr. Gaiser stating that

he had yet to respond to Defendant’s counsel’s prior two letters and that, if he failed to do so
within 10 days, it could “impact his client’s right to coverage,” as that would cause them to be
“in breach of conditions precedent to coverage.”
11.

On September 11, 2017, after the passage of 25 days from the August 17, 2017,
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letter, Defendant sent a denial letter to Plaintiffs, stating that their claim under Policy Two was
denied on the basis that Plaintiffs had failed to “complete an inventory of the property that was
reportedly damaged in the fire,” had failed to respond to Defendant’s “request to produce various
documents in connection with [their] claim,” had “not returned the signed transcript of [Plaintiff
Antonelli’s] Examination Under Oath,” and “did not timely submit a sworn Proof of Loss form”
with respect to their claim.
12.

On September 13, 2017, after the passage of 27 days from the August 17, 2017,

letter, Defendant sent a denial letter to Plaintiffs, stating that their claim under Policy One was
also denied on the basis that Plaintiffs had “not promptly responded to [Defendant’s] request to
produce various documents in connection with the investigation of [their] claim and have not
returned the signed transcript of [Plaintiff Antonelli’s] examination under oath.”
13.

On September 25, 2017, 14 and 12 days after the denials, respectively, counsel for

Defendant received a letter from Mr. Gaiser dated September 21, 2017, that included the signed
transcript of Plaintiff Antonelli’s examination under oath and, as stated by Mr. Gaiser, “as much
of the requested documents as I have been provided with by Mr. Antonelli,” which amounted to
46 pages of documents. This letter further stated that Plaintiff Antonelli is “continuing to search
for all requested documents” and that the reason that no other documents were provided was
because they had been “in the subject vehicle and were destroyed by the fire.”
14.

On September 27, 2017, counsel for Defendant responded to Mr. Gaiser, stating

that the “vast majority of the documents that we previously requested from you remain
outstanding,” and that the September 21, 2017, letter and attached documents “[did] not change
[Defendant’s] coverage position with respect to the two claims at issue.” This letter further
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stated that Defendant was “presently standing on the grounds for denial set forth in its previously
issued denial letters.”
C.

Parties’ Briefing on the Motions for Summary Judgment
1.

Defendant’s Memorandum of Law

Generally, in its motion for summary judgment, Defendant asserts three arguments. (Dkt.
No. 15, Attach. 9, at 6-27 [Def.’s Mem. of Law].) First, Defendant argues that, to the extent
Plaintiffs’ claim asserts rights under Policy Two, that claim should be dismissed because
Plaintiffs have conceded that they have no claim under Policy Two for the personal property in
the Dodge Ram at the time of the fire. (Id. at 6-9.) More specifically, Defendant argues that
Policy Two does not provide automobile coverage, only coverage for personal property, and that,
in their answers to Defendant’s interrogatory, Plaintiffs acknowledged that they were not
asserting a claim for personal items destroyed in the Dodge Ram. (Id.)
Second, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ claim as to Policy One must also be dismissed
because they breached the conditions precedent to coverage on that policy by refusing to
cooperate and produce the records and documents requested by Defendant. (Id. at 9-25.) More
specifically, Defendant argues that it sent a letter requesting a list of documents following
Plaintiff Antonelli’s examination under oath, as well as a letter reminding Plaintiffs of this
request and the consequences of failing to comply, but still did not receive any response from
Plaintiffs until almost two weeks after the denial of Plaintiffs’ claims. (Id. at 13-16.) Defendant
also argues that, even though Plaintiffs did provide some documents after the denial, they still did
not provide most of the documents requested, which Plaintiffs’ counsel at that time asserted were
in the vehicle at the time of the fire and consequently destroyed. (Id. at 17.) Defendants argue
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that Plaintiffs’ assertion that these documents could not be provided because they were destroyed
in the fire is nonsensical because the type of documents requested (W2s, tax returns, a credit
report, monthly residence and cell phone statements, etc.) could all be obtained from the relevant
source of those documents even if the originals were destroyed in the fire. (Id. at 17-19.)
Defendant argues that the failure to provide the requested documents means that a condition
precedent to coverage under the policies was not satisfied and that, under New York law, an
insured’s failure to cooperate with an insurance company’s investigation of a fire constitutes a
material breach of contract. (Id. at 19-20, 22-23.)
Third, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ suit must be dismissed also because they are not
in compliance with the provisions in the policies related to the ability to sue Defendant. (Id. at
25-27.) More specifically, Defendant argues that the terms of both policies require compliance
with the terms of the policy before suit can be brought against Defendant, and that the failure to
provide the requested documents, as discussed above, is a failure to comply with the terms of the
policies. (Id.) Defendant therefore argues that Plaintiffs did not have the right to sue Defendant
under the policies.
2.

Plaintiffs’ Opposition Memorandum of Law and Cross-Motion

In opposition to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs assert three
arguments. (Dkt. No. 16, Attach. 2, at 7-20 [Pls.’ Opp’n Mem. of Law].) First, Plaintiffs argue
that Defendant has not met its burden to show that Plaintiffs willfully failed to cooperate with
Defendant’s investigation because they in fact provided all of the relevant and material
documents in their possession. (Id. at 7-10.) More specifically, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant
has a heavy burden for showing that Plaintiffs failed to cooperate, and that the duty of
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cooperation is itself a standard of substantial compliance, which Plaintiffs have met. (Id.)
Second, Plaintiffs argue that the documents that Defendant claims are outstanding are not
material or relevant to the investigation of the fire, and therefore failure to produce those
documents is not willful or a violation of the cooperation clause or any condition precedent. (Id.
at 10-18.) More specifically, Plaintiffs argue that (a) financial records are not material to the
investigation because Defendant has never claimed that the circumstances of the fire are
suspicious and Plaintiff has not submitted a claim for any business-related financial loss, (b)
residence and cell phone records are not material to the fire, (c) evidence related to the contents
of the Dodge Ram is not material because Plaintiffs are not making a claim for personal property,
and (d) evidence related to a sale of two snow blades on the date of the fire, videos or pictures of
the Dodge Ram after April 2017, financial business records from January 2016 through the date
of the fire, documentation of contracts with Morgan Management, income tax returns, and
documentation of personal property are all not germane to the investigation. (Id.) Plaintiffs also
argue that they do not know of “any and all other documents” that they believe would support
their claim that they should have produced in addition to the specific documents requested. (Id.)
Third, Plaintiffs argue that the provisions in the policies related to the right to sue
Defendant are conflicting and ambiguous. (Id. at 18-20.) More specifically, Plaintiffs argue that
Policy One’s statement that the insured must be in compliance before commencing suit is in
conflict with Policy Two’s statement that a suit must be commenced within two years of the date
of the loss, and that the requirement that the “legal liability of anyone we protect must be
determined before we may be sued . . . [which] may be made by a court of law” is ambiguous
because it seems to state that the person can in fact proceed directly to a court. (Id.) Plaintiffs
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argue that any such ambiguities or conflicts must be resolved in favor of Plaintiffs as the
insureds. (Id. at 18.)
Additionally, Plaintiffs also separately assert that they are entitled to summary judgment
because the Dodge Ram was insured under the relevant policies and was destroyed by the fire,
and Defendant has offered no proof that the fire was suspicious. (Id. at 20-21.)
3.

Defendant’s Reply Memorandum of Law and Response in Opposition
to Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion

In opposition to Plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment, Defendant argues that
the motion is unsupported and premature, noting that the parties have yet to conduct discovery on
Defendant’s other affirmative defenses that are not discussed in Defendant’s motion, and that
there is evidence suggesting possible suspicious activity related to the fire to support its
affirmative defense of fraud in particular. (Dkt. No. 17, Attach. 1, at 6-7 [Def.’s Reply Mem. of
Law].)
In reply to Plaintiffs’ opposition, Defendant asserts two arguments. (Id. at 7-17.) First,
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have conceded that they are not asserting a claim under Policy
Two and therefore any part of the claim related to Policy Two should be dismissed. (Id. at 7.)
Second, Defendant argues that, contrary to Plaintiffs’ arguments, the documents
requested were relevant and material. (Id. at 8-17.) More specifically, Defendant argues that it is
undisputed that Plaintiffs never objected to the document demands (or even responded to those
demands) prior to the denial of Plaintiffs’ insurance claims, and certainly never objected to the
demands based on grounds of materiality or relevance. (Id. at 9-11.) Defendant argues that the
documents it requested are the “sorts of documents and records that are routinely requested as

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part of an investigation into a fire with an unknown cause where human involvement has not
been eliminated as a cause,” and that the evidence already revealed through the examination
under oath indicated odd financial and other activities on Plaintiffs’ part leading up to the fire
that were suspicious. (Id. at 11-15.)
4.

Plaintiffs’ Sur-Reply Memorandum of Law and Reply to Defendant’s
Opposition to their Cross-Motion

In reply to Defendant’s reply, Plaintiffs argue that they should not be found to have failed
to cooperate or to meet the conditions precedent to the policies because they had no reason to
believe the documents requested were relevant at the time of the request given that Defendant
had not provided any indication that it suspected arson or other suspicious circumstances until
nearly a year after it made the request. (Dkt. No. 22, at 6-7 [Pls.’ Sur-Reply].)
5.

Defendant’s Sur-Reply

In reply to Plaintiffs’ sur-reply, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ argument that it did not
learn of the suspected arson or fraud until this litigation does not entitle them to relief on
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 23, at 4-8 [Def.’s Sur-Reply].) More
specifically, Defendant argues that (a) because Plaintiffs never objected to the document requests
as being not relevant or material, later learning that fraud or arson was suspected would not have
changed their actions in failing to comply with those requests, (b) Defendant was under no
obligation to share the results of the investigation with Plaintiffs as a prerequisite to them
complying with the conditions of their insurance policy, noting in particular that Plaintiffs failed
to cite legal authority supporting their argument, and (c) even if Plaintiffs were required to know
that Defendant suspected fraud at the time of the document requests, the suspicious activity

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reported in Plaintiff Antonelli’s testimony alone would have provided a sufficient basis for
making those requests. (Id.) Defendant additionally argues that Plaintiffs’ excuses for failing to
comply with the document requests are not credible, given that they have changed their reason
for failing to comply three times over the course of this briefing (i.e., they first asserted that they
could not produce the documents because they burned in the fire, then they argued that the
requested documents were not material, and then they argued that they were not required to
provide the requested documents because they had no reason to know that arson was suspected at
the time the documents were requested). (Id. at 4-5.)
D.

The Motion Hearing of May 23, 2019, and Subsequent Status Reports

On May 23, 2019, the parties appeared at a motion hearing before the Court, during
which the parties’ representatives made arguments related to their respective motions, and the
Court (a) encouraged counsel to exchange the information and documents that are the subject of
the motions for summary judgment and that are related to an investigation of potential fraud or
arson, and (b) recommended that counsel discuss possible settlement of the case. (Text Minute
Entry filed May 23, 2019.) The Court also directed counsel to file status reports by July 23,
2019. (Id.) On July 26, 2019, Plaintiff’s counsel filed a status report indicating the following:
(a) Defendant’s counsel had requested several items; (b) he “supplied everything that [he] can,
which is most of what [Defendant’s counsel] requests”; and (c) he was waiting on the return of
an executed Cell Phone Authorization from Plaintiff Antonelli, “which should complete
Plaintiff’s responses.” (Dkt. No. 27.) On July 29, 2019, Defendant’s counsel filed a status report
indicating the following: (a) he “largely concur[red]” with Plaintiff’s counsel’s status report
(though he stated there was “perhaps room to debate whether ‘most’” of the requested material
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had been provided); (b) he was waiting to receive an authorization to obtain Plaintiff Antonelli’s
cell phone records; (c) he was waiting to receive Plaintiff Antonelli’s tax returns; and (d) upon
receipt of those pending records, he anticipated that “it will be necessary to take Mr. Antonelli’s
deposition in light of some of the new information that has already been provided.” (Dkt. No.
28.) No further status reports have been received by the Court through the date of this decision.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD GOVERNING A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, summary judgment is warranted if "the movant shows that there

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute of fact is "genuine" if "the [record] evidence is
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the [non-movant]." Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).2 As for the materiality requirement, a dispute of fact is
"material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law . . . . Factual
disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the Court must resolve all
ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the movant. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
In addition, "[the movant] bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the
basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the . . . [record] which it believes
demonstrate[s] the absence of any genuine issue of material fact." Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323-24 (1986). However, when the movant has met its initial burden, the non-movant must
2

As a result, "[c]onclusory allegations, conjecture and speculation . . . are
insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact." Kerzer v. Kingly Mfg., 156 F.3d 396, 400 (2d Cir.
1998) [citation omitted]. As the Supreme Court has explained, "[The non-movant] must do more
than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-86 (1986).
11

come forward with specific facts showing a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a), (c), (e).3
Implied in the above-stated burden-shifting standard is the fact that, where a non-movant
willfully fails to respond to a motion for summary judgment, a district court has no duty to
perform an independent review of the record to find proof of a factual dispute.4 Of course, when
a non-movant willfully fails to respond to a motion for summary judgment, "[t]he fact that there
has been no [such] response . . . does not . . . [by itself] mean that the motion is to be granted
automatically." Champion v. Artuz, 76 F.3d 483, 486 (2d Cir. 1996). Rather, as indicated above,
the Court must assure itself that, based on the undisputed material facts, the law indeed warrants
judgment for the movant. Champion, 76 F.3d at 486; Allen v. Comprehensive Analytical Group,
Inc., 140 F. Supp.2d 229, 232 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) (Scullin, C.J.); N.D.N.Y. L.R. 7.1(b)(3). What
the non-movant's failure to respond to the motion does is lighten the movant's burden.
For these reasons, this Court has often enforced Local Rule 7.1(a)(3) by deeming facts set
forth in a movant's statement of material facts to be admitted, where (1) those facts are supported
by evidence in the record, and (2) the non-movant has willfully failed to properly respond to that
statement.5

3

Among other things, Local Rule 7.1(a)(3) requires that the non-movant file a
response to the movant's Statement of Material Facts, which admits or denies each of the
movant's factual assertions in matching number paragraphs, and supports any denials with a
specific citation to the record where the factual issue arises. N.D.N.Y. L. R. 7.1(a)(3).
4

Cusamano v. Sobek, 604 F. Supp.2d 416, 426 & n.2 (N.D.N.Y. 209) (Suddaby, J.)

(citing cases).
5

Among other things, Local Rule 7.1(a)(3) requires that the non-movant file a
response to the movant's Statement of Material Facts, which admits or denies each of the
movant's factual assertions in matching numbered paragraphs, and supports any denials with a
12

Similarly, in this District, where a non-movant has willfully failed to respond to a
movant’s properly filed and facially meritorious memorandum of law, the non-movant is deemed
to have “consented” to the legal arguments contained in that memorandum of law under Local
Rule 7.1(b)(3).6 Stated another way, when a non-movant fails to oppose a legal argument
asserted by a movant, the movant may succeed on the argument by showing that the argument
possess facial merit, which has appropriately been characterized as a “modest” burden. See
N.D.N.Y. L.R. 7.1(b)(3) (“Where a properly filed motion is unopposed and the Court determined
that the moving party has met its burden to demonstrate entitlement to the relief requested therein
. . . .”); Rusyniak v. Gensini, 07-CV-0279, 2009 WL 3672105, at *1, n.1 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 30,
2009) (Suddaby, J.) (collecting cases); Este-Green v. Astrue, 09-CV-0722, 2009 WL 2473509, at
*2 & n.3 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2009) (Suddaby, J.) (collecting cases).
III.

ANALYSIS
After careful consideration, the Court denies both parties’ motions for summary

judgment. As discussed above in Part I.C. of this Decision and Order, the parties acknowledge
that there is outstanding evidence relevant to the decision on the insurance claim underlying this
action, and that Plaintiffs have either now provided evidence identified in Defendant’s motion for

specific citation to the record where the factual issue arises. N.D.N.Y. L. R. 7.1(a)(3).
6

See, e.g., Beers v. GMC, 97-CV-0482, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12285, at *27-31
(N.D.N.Y. March 17, 1999) (McCurn, J.) (deeming plaintiff’s failure, in his opposition papers, to
oppose several arguments by defendants in their motion for summary judgment as consent by
plaintiff to the granting of summary judgment for defendants with regard to the claims that the
arguments regarded, under Local Rule 7.1[b][3]; Devito v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 02-CV0745, 2004 WL 3691343, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2004) (McCurn, J.) (deeming plaintiff’s
failure to respond to “aspect” of defendant’s motion to exclude expert testimony as “a concession
by plaintiff that the court should exclude [the expert’s] testimony” on that ground).
13

summary judgment, or the parties are in the process of exchanging those records. Additionally,
Defendant has indicated that it is also actively pursuing further discovery (in the form of
deposition testimony from Plaintiff Antonelli) as a result of the more recently obtained
information and documents. Given the fact that the parties recognize that discovery was
incomplete at the time the motions for summary judgment were submitted to the Court, and that
the parties continue to seek specific and relevant evidence that may very well raise genuine
disputes of material fact as to the core issues involved in Plaintiff’s claims, the Court denies both
parties’ motions for summary judgment as premature. See Toussie v. Allstate Ins. Co., 213 F.
Supp. 3d 444, 445 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (noting that “courts routinely deny motions for summary
judgment as premature when discovery over relevant matters is incomplete”); accord, Petaway v.
Osden, 17-CV-0004, 2017 WL 4678188, at *1 (D. Conn. Oct. 17, 2017); cf. Vega v. Rell, 611 F.
App’x 22, 26 (2d Cir. 2015) (rejecting plaintiff’s arguments that the motion for summary
judgment was premature where plaintiff had not pointed to any specific discoverable information
he hoped to still obtain that would have raised a material issue of fact).
ACCORDINGLY, it is
ORDERED that Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 15) is DENIED;
_______
and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 16) is
DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff shall forward a written settlement demand to Defendant no
later than October 29, 2019, and the parties shall engage in good-faith settlement negotiations
between Defendant’s receipt of that written settlement demand and the occurrence of a settlement
14

conference before the undersigned in chambers in Syracuse, New York, on November 19, 2019
at 10:00 AM, at which time counsel shall appear in person with settlement authority.
Dated: September 26, 2019
Syracuse, New York

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