Johnson v. New York State Division of Human Rights

Filing 4

ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION: It is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff's motions to proceed in forma pauperis are granted for purposes of initial review only; and it is further RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's complaints in the five (5) above-captioned actions be DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii), and it is further ORDERED that the Clerk provide Plaintiff with a copy of this Order and Report-Recommendation, along with copies of the unpublished decisions cited herein in accordance with Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam). ( Objections to R&R due by 5/24/2022, Case Review Deadline 5/27/2022). Signed by Magistrate Judge Therese Wiley Dancks on 5/10/2022. {Copy served upon pro se Plaintiff via regular mail}(pjh, )

Case 5:22-cv-00466-MAD-TWD Document 4 Filed 05/10/22 Page 1 of 15

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
ROBERT W. JOHNSON,
v.
COLLEEN McMAHON,
ROBERT W. JOHNSON,
v.
SHAWN RUSIN,

5:22-cv-00463-MAD-TWD

Defendant.
Plaintiff,

5:22-cv-00464-MAD-TWD

Defendant.

ROBERT W. JOHNSON,
v.
DAVID E. POWELL,

Plaintiff,

5:22-cv-00465-MAD-TWD

Defendant.

ROBERT W. JOHNSON,
v.
NEW YORK STATE DIVISION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
ROBERT W. JOHNSON,
v.

Plaintiff,

Plaintiff,

5:22-cv-00466-MAD-TWD

Defendant.
Plaintiff,

5:22-cv-00467-MAD-TWD

VERA HOUSE, INC, and
MARCUS OF VERA HOUSE, INC.,
Defendants.
THÉRÈSE WILEY DANCKS, United States Magistrate Judge
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER

Case 5:22-cv-00466-MAD-TWD Document 4 Filed 05/10/22 Page 2 of 15

Plaintiff Robert W. Johnson (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, commenced the five (5)
above-captioned actions on April 26, 2022, and, in lieu of paying the Northern District of New
York’s filing fee, seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). 1
I.

IFP APPLICATIONS
Plaintiff declares that he is unable to pay the filing fee for the above-captioned actions. 2

The undersigned has reviewed each of Plaintiff’s IFP applications and determines that he
financially qualifies to procced IFP. Therefore, Plaintiff’s IFP applications are granted.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Section 1915(e), the Court must dismiss a complaint filed IFP if it determines that

the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted;
or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998).
The Court must also dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, when the Court lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these
grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66,

1

The undersigned notes that by Order to Show Cause filed May 6, 2022, Chief United States
District Court Judge Glenn T. Suddaby ordered Plaintiff to show cause why he should not be
enjoined from filing any future pleadings or documents of any kind (including motions) in the
Northern District of New York pro se without prior permission of the Chief Judge or his or her
designee (except pleadings or documents in an action that is open at the time of the issuance of
the Court’s anti-filing injunction or “Pre-Filing Order,” until that action is closed). See In Re:
Robert W. Johnson, No. 22-pf-00003-GTS (N.D.N.Y.) (filed 05/06/22). Between April 26,
2022, and May 5, 2022, a period of only ten (10) days, Plaintiff filed forty-seven (47) pro se civil
rights actions in this District, including the five (5) actions at bar.
2

To that end, in each application to proceed IFP, Plaintiff declares that he is not incarcerated, he
is not employed, he has no take home wages, he has not received other income in the past twelve
months, he has no money in cash or in checking or savings account, he has no items of value, he
has no expenses, and he has no debts or financial obligations.
2

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72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,”
Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted, emphasis in original).
A claim is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544 (2007); see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (holding that “a
finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the
irrational or the wholly incredible”); Livingston, 141 F.3d at 437 (“[A]n action is ‘frivolous’
when either: (1) the factual contentions are clearly baseless . . . or (2) the claim is based on an
indisputably meritless legal theory.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Having carefully reviewed the operative pleadings, the Court finds that they consist of
purported “appeals” from decisions and/or orders recently issued by the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York (“Southern District”) and District of Connecticut.
See Johnson v. McMahon, 5:22-cv-00463-MAD-TWD (N.D.N.Y.) (operative pleading consists
of a two-page motion for default judgment from the Southern District) (filed 04/26/22); Johnson
v. Rusin, 5:22-cv-00464-MAD-TWD (N.D.N.Y.) operative pleading consists of a two-page
motion for default judgment from the District of Connecticut) (filed 04/26/22); Johnson v.
Powell, 5:22-cv-00465-MAD-TWD (N.D.N.Y.) (operative pleading consists of a two-page
motion for default judgment from the District of Connecticut) (filed 04/26/22); Johnson v. Vera
House, 5:22-cv-00466-MAD-TWD (N.D.N.Y.) (operative pleading consists of a two-page
motion for default judgment from the District of Connecticut) (filed 04/26/22); Johnson v. New
York State Division of Human Rights, No. 5:22-cv-00467-MAD-TWD (N.D.N.Y.) (operative
pleading consists of an “Appeal for Alleged Injunction” from the District of Connecticut) (filed

3

Case 5:22-cv-00466-MAD-TWD Document 4 Filed 05/10/22 Page 4 of 15

04/26/22). 3 At the time of filing, Plaintiff was advised of the impropriety of filing such actions
in this District but insisted on doing so anyway.
Plaintiff’s extensive and abusive litigation history in the Southern District of New York
and District of Connecticut reveals that he is subject to numerous bar orders/filing injunctions.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Wolf, 1:19-cv-07337-GHW, Bar Order (S.D.N.Y.) (filed 07/13/20); Johnson
v. New York Police Dep’t, 1:20-cv-01368-CM, Bar Order (S.D.N.Y.) (filed 08/13/20); Johnson v.
Town of Onondaga, 1:19-cv-11128-CM, Bar Order (S.D.N.Y.) (filed 04/01/21); Johnson v. Vera
House, Inc., 3:22-CV-00314-SALM, Bar Order (D. Conn) (filed 04/13/22). Plaintiff is also
subject to a bar order in the Southern District of Ohio. Johnson v. Coe, Nos. 2:19-CV-02428EAS, 2:19-CV-02490-EAS, 2:19-CV-02865-EAS, Bar Orders (S.D. Ohio) (filed 08/05/19). He
has also been warned by the Second Circuit that the continued filing of frivolous appeals could
result in a filing injunction. See Johnson v. Wolfe, 2020 WL 2544909, at *1 (2d Cir. May 7,
2020). Moreover, in Johnson v. Vera House, 3:22-CV-00314-SALM, it was ordered: “If Mr.
Johnson files any action in any District Court within the Second Circuit in the future, he must
attach a copy of this Order to his Complaint. The District Courts of the Second Circuit are the
District of Connecticut; the District of Vermont; and the Eastern, Northern, Southern, and

The Court notes that a review of the District of Connecticut’s CM/ECF System confirms this
fact. See 3:22-CV-00146-SALM (D. Conn.) (filed 01/25/22; dismissed 02/17/22; notice of
possible anti-filing injunction 02/17/22); 3:22-CV-00256-SALM (D. Conn.) filed 02/14/22;
dismissed 02/17/22; notice of possible anti-filing injunction 02/17/22); 3:22-CV-00233-SALM
(D. Conn.) (filed 02/05/22; dismissed 02/17/22; notice of possible anti-filing injunction
02/17/22); 3:22-CV-00314-SALM (D. Conn.) (filed 02/28/22; dismissed 03/18/22; Order
enjoining Plaintiff from filing future civil actions in the District of Connecticut without leave of
court 03/18/22). In each of the foregoing actions filed in the District of Connecticut, United
States District Judge Sarah A. L. Merriam found that dismissal was required because the Court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the matter, Plaintiff’s IFP complaints failed to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted, and/or failed to comply with the requirements of Rule
8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
3

4

Case 5:22-cv-00466-MAD-TWD Document 4 Filed 05/10/22 Page 5 of 15

Western Districts of New York.” Johnson v. Vera House, Inc., 3:22-CV-00314-SALM, 2022
WL 829337, at *5 (D. Conn. Mar. 18, 2022) (emphasis in original). Plaintiff has also failed to
comply with that Order.
In sum, Plaintiff’s attempt to circumvent the bar orders issued by the Southern District of
New York and District of Connecticut, and the warning issued by the Second Circuit, by
commencing the five (5) above-captioned “appeals” in this District is wholly improper and
frivolous. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
Moreover, in Case 5:22-cv-00463-MAD-TWD, Plaintiff names the Honorable Colleen
McMahon, Chief United States District Judge of the Southern District of New York, as a
defendant because she “abused her immunities” and denied Plaintiff relief. 4 However, claims
against judges are barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9,
11 (1991); see, e.g., Parsons v. United States, 20-CV-7231 (LLS), 2020 WL 5634260, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2020) (dismissing claims against Chief Judge McMahon under the doctrine
of judicial immunity and as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (iii)) (citing Mills
v. Fischer, 645 F.3d 176, 177 (2d Cir. 2011) (“Any claim dismissed on the ground of absolute
judicial immunity is ‘frivolous’ for purposes of [the IFP statute].”)); Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d
757, 760 (2d Cir. 1999) (“A complaint will be dismissed as ‘frivolous’ when ‘it is clear that the

4

A review of the Southern District’s CM/ECF System confirms Chief Judge McMahon
dismissed several of Plaintiff’s actions as frivolous. See, e.g., 1:19-cv-02902-CM (S.D.N.Y.)
(filed 03/29/19; dismissed 05/22/19); 1:19-cv-07111-CM (S.D.N.Y.) (filed 07/30/19; dismissed
11/25/19); 1:19-cv-08249-CM (S.D.N.Y.) (filed 09/03/19; dismissed 01/31/20); 1:19-cv-08508CM (S.D.N.Y.) (filed 09/10/19; dismissed 11/15/19); 1:19-cv-08662-CM (S.D.N.Y.) (filed
09/18/19; dismissed 11/12/19); 1:19-cv-08832-CM (S.D.N.Y.) (filed 09/20/19; dismissed
12/03/19); 1:19-cv-09336-CM (S.D.N.Y.) (filed 10/07/19; dismissed 11/26/19); 1:19-cv-11127CM (S.D.N.Y.) (filed 12/02/19; dismissed 01/24/20); 1:19-cv-11128-CM (S.D.N.Y.) (filed
12/02/19; dismissed 01/27/20); 1:19-cv-11202-CM (S.D.N.Y.) (filed 12/05/19; dismissed
02/05/20); 1:19-cv-11831-CM (S.D.N.Y.) (filed 12/20/19; dismissed 02/14/20); 1:20-cv-01368CM (S.D.N.Y.) (filed 02/14/20; dismissed 08/13/20).
5

Case 5:22-cv-00466-MAD-TWD Document 4 Filed 05/10/22 Page 6 of 15

defendants are immune from suit.’” (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. at 327)), appeal
dismissed (Dec. 1, 2020).
Based upon the foregoing, the Court recommends that Plaintiff’s complaints be dismissed
upon initial review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).
Typically, a court should not dismiss a pro se litigant’s complaint without granting leave
to amend “when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might
be stated.” Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 704-05 (2d Cir. 1991). Inasmuch as the problem
with Plaintiff’s complaints are substantive and cannot be cured by a better pleading, the Court
recommends dismissal without leave to amend. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d
Cir. 2000).
ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motions to proceed in forma pauperis are granted for
purposes of initial review only; and it is further
RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s complaints in the five (5) above-captioned actions be
DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii),
and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk provide Plaintiff with a copy of this Order and ReportRecommendation, along with copies of the unpublished decisions cited herein in accordance
with Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days within which to file
written objections to the foregoing report. 5 Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the

5

If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order and Report-Recommendation by
mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have
seventeen days from the date the Order and Report-Recommendation was mailed to you to serve
6

Case 5:22-cv-00466-MAD-TWD Document 4 Filed 05/10/22 Page 7 of 15

Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL
PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing
Small v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)
(Supp. 2013); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, 6(a).
Dated: May 10, 2022
Syracuse, New York

and file objections. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a
Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day
that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed. R. Civ. 6(a)(1)(C).
7

Case 5:22-cv-00466-MAD-TWD Document 4 Filed 05/10/22 Page 8 of 15

Johnson v. Vera House, Inc., Slip Copy (2022)
2022 WL 829337

2022 WL 829337
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, D. Connecticut.
Robert W. JOHNSON
v.
VERA HOUSE, INC. and Marcus of Vera House, Inc.
Civ. No. 3:22CV00314(SALM)
|
Signed 03/18/2022
Attorneys and Law Firms
Robert W. Johnson, Watertown, NY, Pro Se.

ORDER ENJOINING PLAINTIFF FROM FILING
FUTURE CIVIL ACTIONS IN THE DISTRICT OF
CONNECTICUT WITHOUT LEAVE OF COURT
SARAH A. L. MERRIAM, UNITED STATES DISTRICT
JUDGE
*1 Self-represented plaintiff Robert W. Johnson
(“plaintiff”), a resident of New York State, has filed
28 actions in the District of Connecticut since January
19, 2022. In each case, he has moved to proceed in
forma pauperis. See Johnson v. Fenstermaker, et al.,
3:22CV00101(SALM) (Jan. 19, 2022); Johnson v. Pathfinder
Bank, et al., 3:22CV00109(SALM) (Jan. 20, 2022);
Johnson v. Hilton, et al., 3:22CV00110(SALM) (Jan. 20,
2022); Johnson v. Utica National Insurance Group, et al.,
3:22CV00124(SALM) (Jan. 21, 2022); Johnson v. Sugerman
Law Firm, et al., 3:22CV00126(SALM) (Jan. 21, 2022);
Johnson v. Kim, et al., 3:22CV00138(SALM) (Jan. 25, 2022);
Johnson v. Brown, et al., 3:22CV00139(SALM) (Jan. 25,
2022); Johnson v. Catalano, 3:22CV00140(SALM) (Jan. 25,
2022); Johnson v. Empower Federal Credit Union, et al.
3:22CV00141(SALM) (Jan. 25, 2022); Johnson v. EMPRO
Insurance, et al., 3:22CV00142(SALM) (Jan. 25, 2022);
Johnson v. Comfort Inn Hotel, et al., 3:22CV00143(SALM)
(Jan. 25, 2022); Johnson v. Watertown Savings Bank, et al.,
3:22CV00144(SALM) (Jan. 25, 2022); Johnson v. Chumsky,
3:22CV00145(SALM) (Jan. 25, 2022); Johnson v. Rusin,
et al., 3:22CV00146(SALM) (Jan. 25, 2022); Johnson v.
Carthage Area Hospital Inc., 3:22CV00154(SALM) (Jan. 27,
2022); Johnson v. Loewenguth, et al., 3:22CV00167(SALM)
(Jan. 28, 2022); Johnson v. Michaels & Smolak, P.C.,

3:22CV00188(SALM) (Jan. 31, 2022); Johnson v. New
York State, et al., 3:22CV00191(SALM) (Jan. 31, 2022);
Johnson v. Kent, et al., 3:22CV00192(SALM) (Jan. 31,
2022); Johnson v. Connell, et al., 3:22CV00207(SALM) (Feb.
7, 2022); Johnson v. McMahon, et al., 3:22CV00230(SALM)
(Feb. 9, 2022); Johnson v. Davidson Automotive Group,
et al., 3:22CV00231(SALM) (Feb. 9, 2022); Johnson
v. New York State Division of Human Rights, et
al., 3:22CV00232(SALM) (Feb. 9, 2022); Johnson v.
New York State, et al., 3:22CV00233(SALM) (Feb. 9,
2022); Johnson v. Powell, et al., 3:22CV00256(SALM)
(Feb. 14, 2022); Johnson v. New York State Insurance
Company, 3:22CV00257(SALM) (Feb. 14, 2022); Johnson
v. Moschouris, et al., 3:22CV00313(SALM) (Feb. 28, 2022);
Johnson v. Vera House, Inc., et al., 3:22CV00314(SALM)
(Feb. 28, 2022).
The Court has now issued Initial Review Orders in
fourteen of these cases. In each instance, the Court has
found that dismissal was required because the Court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the matter, the
Complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted, or the Complaint failed to comply with the
requirements of Rule 8. See Johnson v. Fenstermaker, et
al., 3:22CV00101(SALM), at Doc. #12 (Feb. 17, 2022);
Johnson v. Hilton, et al., 3:22CV00110(SALM), at Doc.
#11 (Feb. 17, 2022); Johnson v. Utica National Insurance
Group, et al., 3:22CV00124(SALM), at Doc. #11 (Feb.
17, 2022); Johnson v. Chumsky, 3:22CV00145(SALM),
at Doc. #11 (Feb. 17, 2022); Johnson v. Rusin, et al.,
3:22CV00146(SALM), at Doc. #11 (Feb. 17, 2022); Johnson
v. Connell, et al., 3:22CV00207(SALM), at Doc. #7 (Feb. 28,
2022); Johnson v. McMahon, et al., 3:22CV00230(SALM),
at Doc. #7 (Feb. 17, 2022); Johnson v. Davidson Automotive
Group, et al., 3:22CV00231(SALM), at Doc. #7 (Feb. 17,
2022); Johnson v. New York State Division of Human Rights,
et al., 3:22CV00232(SALM), at Doc. #7 (Feb. 17, 2022);
Johnson v. New York State, et al., 3:22CV00233(SALM),
at Doc. #7 (Feb. 17, 2022); Johnson v. Powell, et al.,
3:22CV00256(SALM), at Doc. #7 (Feb. 17, 2022); Johnson v.
New York State Insurance Company, 3:22CV00257(SALM),
at Doc. #7 (Feb. 17, 2022); Johnson v. Moschouris, et al.,
3:22CV00313(SALM), at Doc. #7 (March 18, 2022); Johnson
v. Vera House, Inc., et al., 3:22CV00314(SALM), at Doc. #7
(March 18, 2022).
*2 The Court has also dismissed another ten of plaintiff's
cases due to plaintiff's failure to file a sufficient motion to
proceed in forma pauperis, or to pay the filing fee, after

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Johnson v. Vera House, Inc., Slip Copy (2022)
2022 WL 829337

notice from the Court that his initial motion to proceed
without payment of fees and costs was insufficient. See
Johnson v. Pathfinder Bank, et al., 3:22CV00109(SALM),
at Doc. #10 (Feb. 28, 2022); Johnson v. Sugerman Law
Firm, et al., 3:22CV00126(SALM), at Doc. #9 (Feb. 28,
2022); Johnson v. Kim, et al., 3:22CV00138(SALM), at
Doc. #9 (Feb. 28, 2022); Johnson v. Brown, et al.,
3:22CV00139(SALM), at Doc. #9 (Feb. 28, 2022); Johnson
v. Catalano, 3:22CV00140(SALM), at Doc. #9 (Feb. 28,
2022); Johnson v. Empower Federal Credit Union, et al.
3:22CV00141(SALM), at Doc. #9 (Feb. 28, 2022); Johnson
v. EMPRO Insurance, et al., 3:22CV00142(SALM), at Doc.
#9 (Feb. 28, 2022); Johnson v. Comfort Inn Hotel, et al.,
3:22CV00143(SALM), at Doc. #9 (Feb. 28, 2022); Johnson
v. Watertown Savings Bank, et al., 3:22CV00144(SALM),
at Doc. #9 (Feb. 28, 2022); Johnson v. Loewenguth, et al.,
3:22CV00167(SALM), at Doc. #9 (Feb. 28, 2022). 1
1

In another four of plaintiff's cases, the Court
denied, without prejudice to re-filing, plaintiff's
motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis,
as insufficient. See Johnson v. Carthage Area
Hospital Inc., 22CV00154(SALM), at Doc. #7
(Feb. 17, 2022); Johnson v. Michaels & Smolak,
P.C., 22CV00188(SALM), at Doc. #6 (Feb. 17,
2022); Johnson v. New York State, et al.,
22CV00191(SALM), at Doc. #6 (Feb. 17, 2022);
Johnson v. Kent, et al., 22CV00192(SALM), at
Doc. #6 (Feb. 17, 2022). Plaintiff has filed a Notice
of Appeal in three of these cases.

On February 17, 2022, the Court issued a Notice to plaintiff
in a number of his dismissed cases, cautioning him that he
could be subject to an injunction prohibiting him from filing
additional cases in this District without approval of the Court,
based on his history of filing meritless cases. The Court
warned:

The Court cautions plaintiff that the
repeated filing of cases that lack
any arguable legal merit, or fail to
state a legitimate claim for relief
under federal law, will result in the
imposition of sanctions. Specifically,
the Court will enter an injunction
prohibiting the filing of further

cases without advance approval of
the Court.

Johnson v. Fenstermaker, et al., 3:22CV00101(SALM),
at Doc. #13 (Feb. 17, 2022); see also Johnson v.
Hilton, et al., 3:22CV00110(SALM), at Doc. #12 (Feb 17,
2022); Johnson v. Utica National Insurance Group, et al.,
3:22CV00124(SALM), at Doc. #12 (Feb. 17, 2022); Johnson
v. Chumsky, 3:22CV00145(SALM), at Doc. #12 (Feb. 17,
2022); Johnson v. Rusin, et al., 3:22CV00146(SALM), at
Doc. #12 (Feb. 17, 2022); Johnson v. McMahon, et al.,
3:22CV00230(SALM), at Doc. #8 (Feb. 17, 2022); Johnson v.
Davidson Automotive Group, et al., 3:22CV00231(SALM),
at Doc. #8 (Feb. 17, 2022); Johnson v. New York State
Division of Human Rights, et al., 3:22CV00232(SALM), at
Doc. #8 (Feb. 17, 2022); Johnson v. New York State, et al.,
3:22CV00233(SALM), at Doc. #8 (Feb. 17, 2022); Johnson
v. Powell, et al., 3:22CV00256(SALM), at Doc. #8 (Feb. 17,
2022).
As the Court observed in the Notice, plaintiff is a resident of
New York. His claims to date have primarily been brought
against other parties in New York, relating to events that
appear to have occurred in New York. There does not appear
to be any arguable connection to the District of Connecticut.
Plaintiff may be filing in alternative districts -- including,
but not by any means limited to, the District of Connecticut
-- because he has been barred from filing in the Southern
District of New York. See Johnson v. Town of Onondaga, No.
1:19CV11128(CM), at Doc. #7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2021).
In addition to the Notice issued by this Court in February,
plaintiff has been previously warned by a number of courts
against filing frivolous matters. See, e.g., Johnson v. Wolfe,
No. 19-3891, 2020 WL 2544909, at *1 (2d Cir. May
7, 2020) (cautioning plaintiff that the continued filing of
frivolous appeals could result in a filing injunction); Johnson
v. Coe, Nos. 2:19CV02428(EAS), 2:19CV02490(EAS),
2:19CV02865(EAS), 2019 WL 3543542, at *4 (S.D. Ohio
Aug. 5, 2019) (order declaring plaintiff a “vexatious litigator”
and imposing a filing injunction).
*3 After the Court issued its Notice, plaintiff filed a number
of appeals, as well as two additional civil matters in this Court.
See Johnson v. Moschouris, et al., 3:22CV00313(SALM)
(Feb. 28, 2022); Johnson v. Vera House, Inc., et al.,
3:22CV00314(SALM) (Feb. 28, 2022) Each of those two new
matters, like the 26 that came before them, fails to state a

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Johnson v. Vera House, Inc., Slip Copy (2022)
2022 WL 829337

claim, and does not satisfy Rule 8. One matter also lacks any
arguable basis for subject matter jurisdiction.
“Federal courts have both the inherent power and the
constitutional obligation to protect their jurisdiction from
conduct which impairs their ability to carry out Article III
functions.” In re Martin Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1261 (2d Cir.
1984). “The filing of repetitive and frivolous suits constitutes
the type of abuse for which an injunction forbidding further
litigation may be an appropriate sanction.” Shafii v. British
Airways, PLC, 83 F.3d 566, 571 (2d Cir. 1996).

[A] district court, in determining
whether or not to restrict a litigant's
future access to the courts, should
consider the following factors: (1)
the litigant's history of litigation
and in particular whether it entailed
vexatious, harassing or duplicative
lawsuits; (2) the litigant's motive in
pursuing the litigation, e.g., does the
litigant have an objective good faith
expectation of prevailing?; (3) whether
the litigant is represented by counsel;
(4) whether the litigant has caused
needless expense to other parties or
has posed an unnecessary burden on
the courts and their personnel; and
(5) whether other sanctions would be
adequate to protect the courts and
other parties. Ultimately, the question
the court must answer is whether a
litigant who has a history of vexatious
litigation is likely to continue to abuse
the judicial process and harass other
parties.

except the handful of cases that were appealed before the
entry of a dismissal order, was dismissed either as a result
of defects in the application to proceed in forma pauperis, or
at the Initial Review stage, as lacking merit. A review of the
national PACER Case Locator reveals that plaintiff has also
filed at least 100 cases across the country in the past several
years, including 15 cases in the District of Vermont in the
month of February 2022, and at least eight in the District of
New Jersey this year. As previously noted, other courts have
been forced to limit plaintiff's access because of his abuse of
the system.
The second factor likewise weighs strongly in favor of a
filing injunction. Plaintiff cannot have an “objective good
faith expectation of prevailing[.]” Safir, 792 F.2d at 24.
In the Initial Review Orders in plaintiff's prior cases, the
Court articulated the defects in plaintiff's complaints and
the requirements for pleading in federal court. For example,
the Court has previously instructed plaintiff that a complaint
must contain sufficient information to put a defendant on
notice of the claims against him. The Court has informed
plaintiff that a complaint must allege concrete harm, and that
this Court will dismiss frivolous suits. The Court has also
informed plaintiff that any complaint must comply with the
requirements of Rule 8. Despite these prior orders, plaintiff
continues to file facially defective pleadings. Accordingly, the
Court concludes that plaintiff does not have an objective good
faith expectation of prevailing on his claims.
*4 The third factor, whether plaintiff is represented by
counsel, weighs against an injunction, because plaintiff is
self-represented.

Despite ample notice that the filing of frivolous actions will
not be permitted, plaintiff has not been deterred. The Court
therefore considers, in light of the Safir factors, whether an
injunction barring plaintiff from filing further actions without
leave of the Court is appropriate.

The fourth factor, “whether the litigant has caused needless
expense to other parties or has posed an unnecessary burden
on the courts and their personnel[,]” Safir, 792 F.2d at 24,
weighs strongly in favor of an injunction. While this Court has
addressed all of plaintiff's claims at the initial review stage,
such that no defendant has been required to appear and answer
his complaints, the same has not always been true in other
courts. See, e.g., Johnson v. Adams No. 19-4061 (2d Cir. Dec.
6, 2019); Johnson v. Performant Recovery, Inc., et al., No.
4:19CV05789(SBA) (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2019); Johnson v.
Performant Recovery, Inc., et al., No. 20-15022 (9th Cir. Jan
7, 2020). Thus, plaintiff has caused “needless expense” to
other parties. Safir, 792 F.2d at 24.

The first factor weighs strongly in favor of an injunction.
Johnson has filed 28 cases in this District. Each of these cases,

Moreover, even here in the District of Connecticut, where
defendants have not been required to respond because the

Safir v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 19, 24 (2d Cir. 1986).

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Johnson v. Vera House, Inc., Slip Copy (2022)
2022 WL 829337

complaints were dismissed at the Initial Review stage or for
failure to pay the required filing fee, plaintiff has undoubtedly
“posed an unnecessary burden on the courts and their
personnel[.]” Id.
Finally, the fifth factor weighs in favor of an injunction
because “other sanctions would be [in]adequate to protect
the courts and other parties.” Safir, 792 F.2d at 24. Plaintiff
claims to be indigent; although he spends a great deal of
money on postage for his court filings, he claims to have no
source of financial support and no expenses. Thus, financial
sanctions would be meaningless and unenforceable. Plaintiff
has been undeterred by the prior orders of this and other
courts. No amount of explanation has affected plaintiff's
determination to continue asserting meritless claims. See
Johnson v. Adams, No. 19-4061, 2020 WL 2968458, at *1
(2d Cir. May 7, 2020) (“Appellant has filed several frivolous
matters in this Court[.] Appellant has previously been warned
against filing new frivolous appeals. Accordingly, Appellant
is warned that the continued filing of duplicative, vexatious,
or clearly meritless appeals, motions, or other papers could
result in the imposition of both a monetary sanction and a
sanction that would require Appellant to obtain permission
from this Court prior to filing any further submissions in
this Court[.]” (citations omitted)); Johnson v. New York
State Ins. Fund, No. 19CV11831(CM), 2020 WL 764036,
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2020) (noting plaintiff's “pattern
of vexatious and frivolous litigation[,]” and the prior orders
entered in the Southern District of New York which “directed
Plaintiff to show cause why a filing injunction should not
be imposed[ ]”); Johnson v. May, No. 1:19CV01390(JBM)
(TSH), at Doc. #4 at 7 (C.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 2019) (“Plaintiff is
cautioned that there must be a basis in law and fact for each of
his claims as well as a basis to allege those claims against the
named defendants. If there is no basis for a claim or a basis to
allege a claim against any particular defendant, Plaintiff may
be sanctioned.”). The Court therefore finds that no sanctions
short of a filing injunction would be effective. Cf. United
States v. McLaughlin, No. 3:17CR00129(MPS), 2019 WL
5538112, at *3 (D. Conn. Oct. 25, 2019); Miller v. Stallworth,
No. 3:19CV00484(CSH), 2019 WL 3080913, at *2 (D. Conn.
Jul. 15, 2019); Tibbetts v. Stempel, No. 3:97CV02561(CFD),
2005 WL 2146079, at *8 (D. Conn. Aug. 31, 2005), aff'd sub
nom., Tibbetts v. Dittes, 167 F. App'x 851 (2d Cir. 2006); In re
Martin-Trigona, 592 F. Supp. 1566, 1569-70 (D. Conn. 1984),
aff'd, 763 F.2d 140 (2d Cir. 1985).

*5 THEREFORE, the Court hereby imposes the following
PERMANENT INJUNCTION as against plaintiff Robert
W. Johnson:
Robert W. Johnson is hereby permanently enjoined from
bringing any future case as a self-represented plaintiff in the
District of Connecticut without leave of the Court.
To seek leave of the Court to file a new action in this
District, Mr. Johnson shall file a motion of no more than
three pages captioned “Application Pursuant to Court Order
Seeking Leave to File.” He shall attach to this motion as
“Exhibit 1” the proposed Complaint he seeks to file. He shall
attach as “Exhibit 2” to the motion a copy of this Order.
The Clerk of the Court shall not file any future submission
from Mr. Johnson of any kind, with the sole exception of a
Notice of Appeal from this Order, without the approval of
the assigned judge. If Mr. Johnson files any submission, the
Clerk shall provide the submission to the assigned judge to
determine whether it complies with this Order.
If Mr. Johnson files any action in any District Court within
the Second Circuit in the future, he must attach a copy
of this Order to his Complaint. The District Courts of the
Second Circuit are the District of Connecticut; the District of
Vermont; and the Eastern, Northern, Southern, and Western
Districts of New York.
Failure to comply with this Order will be sufficient grounds
for this Court to deny any motion by Mr. Johnson for leave
to file.
Nothing in this Order shall be construed as having any effect
on Mr. Johnson's ability to defend himself in any criminal or
civil action brought against him. Nothing in this Order shall be
construed as denying Mr. Johnson access to the courts through
the filing of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus or other
extraordinary writ. Nothing in this Order shall be construed
as denying Mr. Johnson access to the United States Courts of
Appeals. Nothing in this Order shall be construed as affecting
any pending action previously brought by Mr. Johnson in any
forum.
It is so ordered this 18th day of March, 2022, at New Haven,
Connecticut.

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Johnson v. Vera House, Inc., Slip Copy (2022)
2022 WL 829337

All Citations
Slip Copy, 2022 WL 829337
End of Document

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Case 5:22-cv-00466-MAD-TWD Document 4 Filed 05/10/22 Page 13 of 15

Johnson v. Wolfe, Not Reported in Fed. Rptr. (2020)
2020 WL 2544909

2020 WL 2544909
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Robert W. JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Catherine O’Hagan WOLFE,
et al., Defendants-Appellees.
19-3891
|
May 7, 2020
Attorneys and Law Firms
Robert W. Johnson, Pro Se
S.D.N.Y. – N.Y.C., 19-cv-7337, Woods, J.
Present: Pierre N. Leval, Raymond J. Lohier, Jr., Joseph F.
Bianco, Circuit Judges.
Opinion
*1 Appellant, pro se, moves for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis. Upon due consideration, it is hereby ORDERED
End of Document

that the motion is DENIED and the appeal is DISMISSED
because it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); see also 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e).
Appellant has filed several frivolous matters in this Court,
including his appeals docketed under 2d Cir. 19-1688,
19-2174, 19-2235, 19-3657, 19-3889, 19-3891, and 19-4062.
Appellant has previously been warned against filing new
frivolous appeals. See 2d Cir. 19-4062, doc. 22; 2d Cir.
19-3889, doc. 49. Accordingly, Appellant is warned that
the continued filing of duplicative, vexatious, or clearly
meritless appeals, motions, or other papers could result in the
imposition of both a monetary sanction and a sanction that
would require Appellant to obtain permission from this Court
prior to filing any further submissions in this Court (a “leaveto-file” sanction). See In re Martin-Trigona, 9 F.3d 226, 229
(2d Cir. 1993); Sassower v. Sansverie, 885 F.2d 9, 11 (2d Cir.
1989) (per curiam).
All Citations
Not Reported in Fed. Rptr., 2020 WL 2544909

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Case 5:22-cv-00466-MAD-TWD Document 4 Filed 05/10/22 Page 14 of 15

Parsons v. United States, Slip Copy (2020)
2020 WL 5634260

2020 WL 5634260
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, S.D. New York.
Tyler Joseph PARSONS, Plaintiff,
v.
The UNITED STATES of America's, Executive
Branch; Judge McMahon, the United States
of America's Judicial Branch, Defendants.
20-CV-7231 (LLS)
|
Signed 09/18/2020
Attorneys and Law Firms
Tyler Joseph Parsons, New York, NY, pro se.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short
and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.
The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint
must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that
is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the
plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court
to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the
alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court
must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does
not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal
conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal
conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court
must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not
merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.

LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge:
*1 Plaintiff, appearing pro se, brings this action alleging
that Defendants violated his “rights to a speedy and fair
trial.” (ECF No. 2 at 2.) By order dated September 11,
2020, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed without
prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (IFP).

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of
the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co.,
141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss
a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the
Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris
v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them
to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman
v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in
original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at
475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Tyler Joseph Parsons, using the Court's general
complaint form, brings this complaint, invoking the Court's
federal question jurisdiction.
He alleges the following: “I, Tyler Parsons, was denied my
constitutional rights regarding a fair and speedy trial upon
dismissal of my filed case.” (ECF No. 2 at 5.) He does not
specify the case that he is referencing. In the Relief section of
his complaint, Plaintiff writes:

regarding the original filing, I noted
that no more than 1 to 2 hundred
thousand dollars was owed to me.
After these complications I have filed
to plea for double this amount.

(Id. at 6.)
A review of the Court's records reveals that on September
23, 2019, Plaintiff filed a case in this Court against the
“United States of America Federal Government (FL, IL,
NY),” alleging that his rights to “life, liberty, and the pursuit
of happiness” were violated by his “being abducted and

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Parsons v. United States, Slip Copy (2020)
2020 WL 5634260

humanly trafficed.” Parsons v. United States, ECF 1:19CV-8828, 2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2019). By order dated October
25, 2019, Chief Judge McMahon dismissed Plaintiff's case as
frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). Id. at ECF No.
4.
*2 It appears therefore that Plaintiff brings this new action
because he disagrees with Judge McMahon's October 25,
2019 decision. On November 7, 2019, Plaintiff filed a notice
of appeal in that case, but because he failed to pay the filing
fee or file an application to proceed IFP on appeal, his appeal
was dismissed. See Parsons v. United States, No. 19-3880 (2d
Cir. Mar. 4, 2020).

DISCUSSION
The Court construes Plaintiff's action as an attempt to
challenge Judge McMahon's October 25, 2019 dismissal of
his prior action. See Parsons, ECF 1:19-CV-8828. Plaintiff
names the Executive Branch of the United States government
as a Defendant, but he does not include any allegations against
any members of the Executive Branch.
Plaintiff's claims against Chief Judge Colleen McMahon
must be dismissed. Judges are absolutely immune from
suit for damages for any actions taken within the scope
of their judicial responsibilities. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S.
9, 11 (1991). Generally, “acts arising out of, or related to,
individual cases before the judge are considered judicial in
nature.” Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2009).
“Even allegations of bad faith or malice cannot overcome
judicial immunity.” Id. (citations omitted). This is because
“[w]ithout insulation from liability, judges would be subject
to harassment and intimidation....” Young v. Selsky, 41 F.3d
47, 51 (2d Cir. 1994). In addition, as amended in 1996, § 1983
provides that “in any action brought against a judicial officer
for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity,
injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory
decree was violated, or declaratory relief was unavailable.”
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Judicial immunity does not apply when the judge takes action
“outside” his judicial capacity, or when the judge takes action
that, although judicial in nature, is taken “in absence of
jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 9-10; see also Bliven, 579
F.3d at 209-10 (describing actions that are judicial in nature).
End of Document

But “the scope of [a] judge's jurisdiction must be construed
broadly where the issue is the immunity of the judge.” Stump
v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978).
Plaintiff's claims against Chief Judge McMahon arise of out
of her rulings and actions while presiding over Parsons,
ECF 1:19-CV-8828; such rulings and actions were within
the scope of her judicial capacity and jurisdiction. The Court
therefore dismisses Plaintiff's claims against Chief Judge
Colleen McMahon and “The United States of America's
Judicial Branch” under the doctrine of judicial immunity and
as frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (iii); Mills
v. Fischer, 645 F.3d 176, 177 (2d Cir. 2011) (“Any claim
dismissed on the ground of absolute judicial immunity is
‘frivolous’ for purposes of [the in forma pauperis statute].”);
Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 760 (2d Cir. 1999) (“A
complaint will be dismissed as ‘frivolous’ when ‘it is clear
that the defendants are immune from suit.’ ” (quoting Neitzke
v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989))). Plaintiff's claims
against “The United States of America's, Executive Branch”
are dismissed as barred by sovereign immunity and as
frivolous. See United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538
(1980) (quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586
(1941)) (“The United States, as sovereign, is immune from
suit save as it consents to be sued ..., and the terms of its
consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction
to entertain the suit.”).
*3 District courts generally grant a pro se plaintiff an
opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects but leave
to amend is not required where it would be futile. See Hill v.
Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123–24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v.
Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Because the defects in
Plaintiff's complaint cannot be cured with an amendment, the
Court declines to grant Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's complaint, filed IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1),
is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (iii).
SO ORDERED.
All Citations
Slip Copy, 2020 WL 5634260
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