Cadrette v. Astrue
Filing
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MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDER - That the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED and Cadrette's complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is DISMISSED. Signed by Chief Judge Gary L. Sharpe on 4/24/2012. (jel, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
________________________________
JASON CADRETTE,
Plaintiff,
6:11-cv-320
(GLS)
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, as
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
_______________________________
APPEARANCES:
OF COUNSEL:
FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
Office of Peter W. Antonowicz
148 West Dominick Street
Rome, NY 13440
FOR THE DEFENDANT:
HON. RICHARD S. HARTUNIAN
United States Attorney
100 South Clinton Street
Syracuse, NY 13261
PETER W. ANTONOWICZ, ESQ.
JASON P. PECK
Special Assistant U.S. Attorney
Mary Ann Sloan
Regional Chief Counsel
Social Security Administration
Office of General Counsel, Region II
26 Federal Plaza, Room 3904
New York, NY 10278
Gary L. Sharpe
Chief Judge
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. Introduction
Plaintiff Jason Cadrette challenges the Commissioner of Social
Security’s denial of Supplemental Security Income (SSI),1 seeking judicial
review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (See Compl., Dkt. No. 1.) After
reviewing the administrative record and carefully considering Cadrette’s
arguments, the court affirms the Commissioner’s decision and dismisses
the Complaint.
II. Background
On October 26, 2007, Cadrette, who suffers from, among other
things, a right shoulder ailment and affective mood disorder, filed an
application for SSI under the Social Security Act (“the Act”), alleging
disability since January 5, 2007. (See Tr.2 at 15, 119-25, 128.) After his
application was denied, (see id. at 83-87), Cadrette requested a hearing
before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), which was held on June 8,
2009. (See id. at 22-81, 88-90.) On December 22, 2009, the ALJ issued a
1
Because no application for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) appears in the record
and it is otherwise clear that Cadrette’s request for review pertains only to his application for
SSI, the court ignores the mistaken reference to DIB in his complaint. (See Compl. ¶¶ 3-4,
Dkt. No. 1.)
2
Page references preceded by “Tr.” are to the Administrative Transcript. (See Dkt. No.
9.)
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decision denying the requested benefits, which became the
Commissioner’s final determination upon the Social Security Administration
Appeals Council’s denial of review. (See id. at 1-4, 9-21.)
Cadrette commenced the present action by filing a complaint on
March 22, 2011 wherein he sought review of the Commissioner’s
determination. (See generally Compl.) The Commissioner filed an answer
and a certified copy of the administrative transcript. (See Dkt. Nos. 8, 9.)
Each party, seeking judgment on the pleadings, filed a brief. (See Dkt.
Nos. 12, 15.)
III. Contentions
Cadrette contends that the Commissioner’s decision is tainted by
errors of law. (See Dkt. No. 12 at 8-16.) Specifically, Cadrette claims that
the ALJ: (1) committed error in determining his residual functional capacity
(RFC); and (2) improperly assessed his credibility regarding nonexertional
limitations. (See id.) The Commissioner counters that the appropriate
legal standards were used by the ALJ and her decision is also supported
by substantial evidence. (See Dkt. No. 15 at 14-22.)
IV. Facts
The court adopts the parties’ undisputed factual recitations. (See id.
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at 1-11; Dkt. No. 12 at 3-5.)
V. Standard of Review
The standard for reviewing the Commissioner’s final decision under
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) is well established and will not be repeated here. For a
full discussion of the standard and the five-step process by which the
Commissioner evaluates whether a claimant is disabled under the Act, the
court refers the parties to its previous opinion in Christiana v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 1:05-CV-932, 2008 WL 759076, at *1-2 (N.D.N.Y.
Mar. 19, 2008).
VI. Discussion
A.
RFC Determination
Cadrette first argues that the ALJ erred in determining that he has
the RFC to perform light work with certain limitations. (See Dkt. No. 12 at
8-12.) In particular, Cadrette contends that the opinions of two treating
nurse practitioners, Debra Dermady and Susan Hauptfleisch, relevant to
Cadrette’s nonexertional limitations, were not given appropriate weight by
the ALJ in making her RFC determination. (See id.) Cadrette also asserts
that the ALJ relied too heavily upon evidence from nontreating sources and
substituted her own opinion for the opinions of medical experts. (See id.)
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The Commissioner counters that neither Dermady nor Hauptfleisch are
acceptable medical sources, and that, although the ALJ should have
assessed Dermady’s opinion in accordance with SSR 06-03p, the ALJ’s
failure to do so was, “at most, harmless error” because Dermady’s
statement was not specific as to work-related limitations resulting from
Cadrette’s pain and was not supported by other evidence in the case
record. (Dkt. No. 15 at 14-17.) Similarly, the Commissioner argues that
the ALJ properly discounted Hauptfliesch’s opinion, which largely reflects
that Cradette has “serious[]” nonexertional limitations, because it is not
supported by other evidence from acceptable medical sources. (See id. at
17-19.) The court agrees with the Commissioner that the ALJ’s RFC
determination is not tainted by error and is supported by substantial
evidence.
While the opinions of nurse practitioners are not sufficient to
establish an impairment inasmuch as nurse practitioners are not
“acceptable medical sources,” they are considered “other sources” whose
opinions may be used to show the severity of a claimant’s impairment. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1513(a), (d)(1); see Crysler v. Astrue, 563 F. Supp. 2d 418,
434-35 (N.D.N.Y. 2008). The opinions of other sources “are important and
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should be evaluated on key issues such as impairment severity and
functional effects, along with the other relevant evidence in the file.” SSR
06-03p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *3 (Aug. 9, 2006). Moreover, given the
requirement that all available evidence contained within a claimant’s case
record be reviewed in assessing the existence of a disability, see 42
U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(B), the adjudicator should generally indicate her
consideration of “other source” opinions and explain the weight assigned to
them to “ensure that the discussion of the evidence in the determination or
decision allows a claimant or subsequent reviewer to follow the
adjudicator’s reasoning.” SSR 06-03p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *6.
Discussion of these kinds of opinions is not always required, however; this
is particularly true where the “other source” fails to “render an opinion as to
the physical limitations imposed by [a particular impairment].” See, e.g.,
McConnell v. Astrue, No. 6:03-CV-0521, 2008 WL 833968, at *16
(N.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2008).
Here, the ALJ did not err with respect to the opinions of either
Dermady or Hauptfleisch. First, considering Dermady, she opined that
Cadrette’s pain is “present to such an extent as to be distracting to
adequate performance of daily activities or work,” his “[p]hysical activity,
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such as walking, standing, lifting, carrying, bending, etc. . . . increases pain
to the extent that medication and/or bed rest is necessary,” and
“medication will severely limit [Cadrette]’s effectiveness in the work place
due to distraction, inattention, drowsiness, etc.” (Tr. at 318.) Because
Dermady’s opinion, which—given the nature of the form in which it is
presented and the lack of any accompanying treatment notes—appears to
be a “mere regurgitation of [Cadrette]’s . . . subjective complaints of
symptoms,” only generically indicates the functional limitations associated
with Cadrette’s pain emanating from his shoulder impairment, the ALJ was
not required to discuss and evaluate it consistent with the factors set forth
in SSR 06-03p. See McConnell, 2008 WL 833968, at *16.
Moreover, the opinions of “acceptable medical sources”—Drs.
Kalyani Ganesh and Richard Chmielewski—were inconsistent with that of
Dermady as to Cadrette’s functional limitations and supported the ALJ’s
RFC determination. (See Tr. at 192-95, 311, 313-14.) Specifically,
Ganesh, a consultative examiner, found, among other things, that Cadrette
was in no acute pain, had a normal gait, needed no help changing for the
exam or getting on or off of the examination table, was able to rise from a
chair without difficulty, and had good range of motion and strength. (See
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id. at 193.) In sum, Ganesh found “[n]o gross physical limitation to sitting,
standing, or walking” and only “[m]ild limitation lifting, carrying, pushing,
and pulling.” (Id. at 194.) During several examinations, Chmielewski,
Cadrette’s treating physician, made similar findings regarding Cadrette’s
good range of motion in his impaired shoulder and that he had “minimal
discomfort” or “essentially no pain.” (Id. at 311, 313, 314.)
Hauptfleisch, who provided care to Cadrette relative to his mental
health impairments, (see id. at 51), opined that he had serious limitations in
his ability to: follow rules; relate to co-workers; deal with the public; use
judgment; deal with work stress; maintain attention; understand,
remember, and carry out complex job instructions; understand, remember,
and carry out detailed, but not complex, job instructions; behave in an
emotionally stable manner; and demonstrate reliability. (See id. at 250-51.)
Hauptfleisch also found that Cadrette could not relate to supervisors at all,
but that he was able to understand, remember, and carry out simple job
instructions and relate predictably in social situations for five hours per day,
and he could function independently and maintain personal appearance for
up to eight hours per day. (See id.) In evaluating Hauptfleisch’s opinion,
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the ALJ properly considered the factors set out in SSR 06-03p.3 (See id. at
19.) The ALJ accorded the opinion “little weight,” but, ultimately, was not
dissuaded from giving “great weight” to a less restrictive opinion provided
by Dr. Alan Dubro. (Id.) Dubro opined that Cadrette
is capable of following, understand[ing],
remembering, and attending to directions and
instructions. He can perform simple and complex
tasks independently. He is able to maintain attention
and concentration for rote tasks. He is capable of
regularly attending to a routine and maintaining a
schedule. He is capable of making appropriate
decisions. He is able to learn rote tasks. [He] has
displayed interpersonal difficulties that have led to
him being incarcerated in the past.
Results of the examination appear to be consistent
with behavior problems, but in itself, this does not
appear to be significant enough to interfere with
[Cadrette]’s ability to function on a daily basis.
(Id. at 199.) Dubro’s opinion of Cadrette’s nonexertional limitations—and
to a lesser, but not insignificant extent, the opinion of Hauptfleisch—is
reflected in the RFC determination, finding that Cadrette can perform light
work with restrictions on, among other things, his interaction with
supervisors, co-workers, and the general public. (See id. at 17.)
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For example, the ALJ considered, among other things, the length and frequency of
treatment, the consistency of the opinion with other evidence, and how well Hauptfleisch
explained her opinion, (see Tr. at 19)—all of which are relevant and appropriate factors for
evaluating other source opinions. See SSR 06-03p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *4-5.
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Accordingly, the ALJ applied the proper legal standards and her RFC
determination is supported by substantial evidence.
B.
Credibility Determination
In an argument partially reliant on the foregoing one that the RFC
determination was erroneous, Cadrette contends that the ALJ “improperly
evaluated [his] allegations of non-exertional limitations.” (Dkt. No. 12 at
13-16.) Specifically, Cadrette claims that the ALJ erred by finding him not
credible as to his subjective statements regarding symptoms despite the
fact that his testimony was consistent with the opinions of Dermady and
Hauptfleisch, and the record demonstrated that his behavior was generally
volatile. (See id.) In response, the Commissioner argues, and the court
agrees, that the ALJ’s credibility determination is supported by substantial
evidence. (See Dkt. No. 15 at 19-22.)
An ALJ must consider a claimant’s subjective complaints of
limitations resulting from his impairments, including those from pain, in
gauging his RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(3). However, “[a]n
individual’s statement as to pain or other symptoms shall not alone be
conclusive evidence of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A). The
Commissioner is obligated to evaluate all of a claimant’s symptoms,
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“including pain, and the extent to which [those] symptoms can reasonably
be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other
evidence.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(a).
Ultimately, “[t]he reasons for the credibility finding must be grounded
in the evidence and articulated in the determination or decision.” SSR 967p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34483, 34485-86 (July 2, 1996). Thus, “after weighing
the objective medical evidence in the record, the claimant’s demeanor, and
other indicia of credibility,” an ALJ may reject the claimant’s subjective
allegations regarding limitation as long as she sets forth her “reasons with
sufficient specificity to enable [the court] to decide whether the
determination is supported by substantial evidence.” Lewis v. Apfel, 62 F.
Supp. 2d 648, 651 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
Here, the ALJ properly found Cadrette’s subjective reports of his
symptoms incredible. (See Tr. at 18.) During the hearing, Cadrette
testified, and the ALJ acknowledged, that he is in constant pain and cannot
stand contact with people in the workplace, yet he does not like to be
isolated either. (See id. at 40, 42, 43, 54-55.) As the ALJ explained,
Cadrette’s testimony was belied by the above-referenced evaluations of
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Ganesh and Dubro. (See id. at 18-19.) Moreover, Cadrette’s testimony
was inconsistent, and he even acknowledged to the ALJ that he was not
truthful about his participation in two softball leagues. (See, e.g., id. at 43,
54-55, 60.) Thus, the ALJ’s credibility determination is amply supported by
substantial evidence in the record.
VII. Conclusion
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED and
Cadrette’s complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is DISMISSED; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk close this case and provide a copy of this
Memorandum-Decision and Order to the parties.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
April 24, 2012
Albany, New York
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