Teuscher v. Astrue

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDER - That the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED and Teuscher's Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is DISMISSED. Signed by Chief Judge Gary L. Sharpe on 7/26/2012. (jel, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
________________________________
ROSE TEUSCHER,
Plaintiff,

6:11-cv-899
(GLS)

v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
________________________________
APPEARANCES:
OF COUNSEL:
FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
Office of Peter W. Antonowicz
148 West Dominick Street
Rome, NY 13440
FOR THE DEFENDANT:
HON. RICHARD S. HARTUNIAN
United States Attorney
100 South Clinton Street
Syracuse, NY 13261
Mary Ann Sloan
Regional Chief Counsel
Social Security Administration
Office of General Counsel, Region II
26 Federal Plaza, Room 3904
New York, NY 10278
Gary L. Sharpe
Chief Judge

PETER W. ANTONOWICZ

JOANNE JACKSON
Special Assistant U.S. Attorney

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. Introduction
Plaintiff Rose Teuscher challenges the Commissioner of Social
Security’s denial of disability insurance benefits (DIB), seeking judicial
review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (See Compl., Dkt. No. 1.) After
reviewing the administrative record and carefully considering the
arguments, the court affirms the Commissioner’s decision and dismisses
Teuscher’s complaint.
II. Background
On December 3, 2008, Teuscher filed an application for DIB under
the Social Security Act (“Act”), alleging disability since June 1, 2000. (See
Tr.1 at 13.) After her application was denied, Teuscher requested a hearing
before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), which was held on July 1, 2010.
(See id.) On November 5, 2010, the ALJ issued a decision denying the
requested benefits, which became the Commissioner’s final decision upon
the Social Security Administration Appeals Council’s denial of review. (See
id. at 1-5, 15-23.)
1

Page references preceded by “Tr.” refer to the Administrative
Transcript in this case. (See Dkt. No. 8.)
2

Teuscher commenced the present action by filing a Complaint on
July 29, 2011, seeking review of the Commissioner’s determination. (See
Compl. ¶ 3.) The Commissioner filed an answer and a certified copy of the
administrative transcript. (See Dkt. Nos. 7, 8.) Each party, seeking
judgment on the pleadings, filed a brief. (See Dkt. Nos. 12, 13.)
III. Contentions
Teuscher contends that the Commissioner’s decision was the product
of the application of improper legal standards and is unsupported by
substantial evidence. (See generally Dkt. No. 12.) Specifically, Teuscher
claims that the ALJ erred in: (1) failing to find that her mental impairments2
constituted severe impairments; (2) discrediting her testimony and
statements provided by her sisters regarding her complaints of pain and
functional limitations; and (3) failing to accord appropriate weight to the
opinion of the her treating physician. (See id. at 1, 7-13.) The
Commissioner counters that the ALJ’s decision applied the proper legal

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It is noted that Teuscher does not dispute the Commissioner’s
finding as to the severity of her physical impairments. Teuscher’s
argument regarding the ALJ’s alleged error at step two concerns only her
mental impairments, namely bipolar disorder and a learning disability.
(See Dkt. No. 12 at 11.) As such, the court limits its discussion to
Teuscher’s mental impairments.
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standards and is supported by substantial evidence. (See generally Dkt.
No. 13.)
IV. Facts
The evidence in this case is undisputed and the court adopts the
parties’ factual recitations. (See Dkt. No. 12 at 3; Dkt. No.13 at 2.)
V. Standard of Review
The standard for reviewing the Commissioner’s final decision under
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) is well established and will not be repeated here. For a
full discussion of the standard and the five-step process used by the
Commissioner in evaluating whether a claimant is disabled under the Act,
the court refers the parties to its previous opinion in Christiana v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 1:05-CV-932, 2008 WL 759076, at *1-2 (N.D.N.Y.
Mar. 19, 2008).
VI. Discussion
A.

Severity Determination
Teuscher contends first that the ALJ improperly evaluated the

severity of her mental impairments. (See Dkt. No. 12 at 7, 10, 11-12.) The
Commissioner counters, and the court agrees, that substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s determination that Teuscher did not have a severe
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impairment or combination of impairments prior to her date last insured.
(See Dkt. No. 13 at 1, 3-7.)
For an impairment or combination of impairments to be deemed
“severe,” it must “significantly limit[]” the claimant’s “physical or mental
ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). To meet the
duration requirement, an impairment must last, or be expected to last, for a
continuous period of at least twelve months. See id. § 404.1509. A finding
of non-severity results where the claimant suffers “only a slight abnormality
or a combination of slight abnormalities which would have no more than a
minimal effect on [his] ability to work.” Christiana, 2008 WL 759076, at *4
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The term “basic work
activities” refers to “the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs,”
including functions such as “[u]nderstanding, carrying out, and
remembering simple instructions.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b).
When evaluating the severity of mental impairments, an ALJ must
apply “a ‘special technique’ . . . at the second” step of the sequential
analysis. Dehnert v. Astrue, No. 07-CV-897, 2009 WL 2762168, at *5
(N.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
This technique first requires a determination of whether the claimant has a
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medically determinable mental impairment. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520a(b)(1). The ALJ must then rate the degree of the claimant’s
functional limitation resulting from the impairment in four areas: (1)
activities of daily living; (2) social functioning;3 (3) concentration,
persistence, or pace; and (4) episodes of decompensation. See id. §
404.1520a(c)(3). A mental impairment is generally found not to be severe
if the degree of limitation in the first three areas is mild or better and there
are no episodes of decompensation. See id. § 404.1520a(d)(1).
Here, the ALJ found Teuscher suffered from the following medically
determinable impairments: multiple thyroid disorders, mild osteopenia, mild
degenerative changes of thoracic and lumbar spine, episodes of
hypoglycemia, recurrent urinary tract infections, bipolar disorder, and mild
cognitive disorder. (See Tr. at 15-17.) However, the ALJ determined that
as of her date last insured—December 31, 2000—Teuscher’s conditions,
whether considered singly or in combination with her other impairments,
constituted only slight abnormalities which did not significantly limit her
ability to perform basic work-related activities for twelve consecutive
3

“Social functioning refers to an individual’s capacity to interact
appropriately and communicate effectively with other individuals.” Dehnert,
2009 WL 2762168, at *7 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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months. (See id. at 17-23.)
Having determined that Teuscher suffered from a medically
determinable mental impairment, the ALJ—contrary to Teuscher’s
contentions, (see Dkt. No. 12 at 11)—undertook the special analysis
required by 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(a). (See Tr. at 20-21.) Here, the ALJ
determined that Teuscher had no restriction or functional limitation of
activities of daily living. (See id. at 16.) Furthermore, in regard to her
activities of daily living, Teuscher indicated that she performed a wide
range of physical activities that are inconsistent with her claims of severe
functional limitations. (See id. at 44-46.) Specifically, Teuscher testified
that she maintained her personal hygiene, performed household chores,
drove a car, went to the grocery store, prepared meals, sang in a church
choir, and went dancing and roller skating with her husband. (See id.)
Though Teuscher testified that bipolar disorder, with most symptoms
related to episodes of depression, constituted her most significant medical
condition that prevented her from working on a full-time basis, (see id. at
36), she also indicated that she did not experience any episodes of
depression in 2000, (see id. at 45). Teuscher further admitted that she felt
she was doing “fairly well” during the period prior to her date last insured,
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and did not have any difficulty performing her activities of daily living prior
to December 31, 2000. (See id. at 45, 51.) Accordingly, substantial
evidence in the record supports the ALJ’s determination that Teuscher’s
mental impairments did not restrict her activities of daily living. (See id. at
22.)
With respect to her social functioning, Teuscher admitted that she
performed average socially in college, remained close with her family
members, and maintained a good relationship with her husband. (See id.
at 185, 188, 477.) The ALJ’s determination that Teuscher did not
experience significant difficulty interacting in public places is further
supported by the fact that Teuscher was capable of going to the grocery
store, attending medical appointments, and singing in her church choir prior
to her date last insured. (See id. at 20, 44-46.)
The ALJ additionally determined that Teuscher’s bipolar disorder and
learning disability caused no more than a “mild” limitation of her ability to
maintain concentration, persistence, or pace. (Id. at 16.) In a November
2009 report, Dr. Robert Petrie, Teuscher’s treating physician, assessed

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Teuscher as having a “poor ability”4 to deal with work stress, function
independently, maintain attention/concentration, and understand,
remember, and carry out complex job instructions prior to December 31,
2000. (See id. at 623-24.) The report, however, indicated Teuscher had a
“fair ability”5 to relate to co-workers, deal with the public, use judgment,
relate to supervisors, understand, remember, and carry out detailed, but
not complex job instructions, and understand, remember, and carry out
simple job instructions. (See id.)
Teuscher also testified that her learning disability constituted her
second most significant condition that limited her ability to work on a
full-time basis, and caused her to require extra time for exams and
assistance with papers in college. (See id. at 39.) Despite this testimony,
Teuscher completed her associate degree in physical therapy assistance in
June 2000. (See id. at 44-46, 477.) She also indicated that she performed

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A designation of “poor” indicates that the claimant’s “ability to
function in this area is seriously limited. Ability to function is less than
satisfactorily maintained for periods in excess of 2 or 3 hours per day, 5
days per week.” (Tr. at 623.)
5

A designation of “fair” indicates that the claimant’s “ability to
function in this area is limited but satisfactorily maintained only up to 5
hours per day, 5 days per week.” (Tr. at 623.)
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above average academically, (see id. at 188), previously completed
associates degrees in nursing and recreation leadership, (see id. at 30),
and effectively managed her finances prior to her date last insured, (see id.
47-48).
Finally, the ALJ determined that the record was devoid of any
evidence indicating episodes of decompensation prior to Teuscher’s date
last insured. As the ALJ noted, the medical record shows that, despite
hospitalizations for hallucinations and delusions in July 1987 and January
1990, Teuscher did not require further hospitalization or emergency
treatment prior to her date last insured. (See id. at 40- 41, 48-50.)
Between June 1, 2000 and December 31, 2000—the period at issue
here—Teuscher was not prescribed any medications to treat her mental
impairments. (See id. at 223, 477.) Teuscher admitted that she did not
suffer any periods of depression in 2000, and that she did not begin regular
mental health counseling until after January 2001. (See id. at 21, 41,45.)
Further, several of Teuscher’s treating sources responded to the
Commissioner’s request for medical records by indicating that they did not
have medical evidence relevant to the adjudicative period. (See id. at 614.)
In sum, after applying the “special technique” at the second step of
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the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ determined that Teuscher had
no more than a minimal limitation of her ability to perform basic
work-related activities. (See id. at 22.) Accordingly, the ALJ applied the
correct legal standard in evaluating the severity of Teuscher’s mental
impairments, and his determination that Teuscher's mental impairments
were not severe is supported by substantial evidence.
B.

Credibility Determination
Teuscher argues next that the ALJ improperly discredited her

testimony and the statements provided by her two sisters, Christine
Boulanger and Marie Robertson, regarding her complaints of pain and
functional limitations. (See Dkt. No. 12 at 10.) The Commissioner
counters, and the court agrees, that the ALJ properly assessed the
credibility of Teuscher and her sisters. (See Dkt. No. 13 at 7-10; see also
Tr. at 19-22.)
Once an ALJ determines that the claimant suffers from a “medically
determinable impairment[] that could reasonably be expected to produce
the pain alleged,” he “must evaluate the intensity and persistence of those
symptoms considering all of the available evidence; and, to the extent that
the claimant’s pain contentions are not substantiated by the objective
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medical evidence, the ALJ must engage in a credibility inquiry.” Meadors
v. Astrue, 370 F. App’x 179, 183-84 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting 20 C.F.R. §
404.1529(c)(1), (c)(3)(i)-(vii)). In performing this credibility analysis, the
ALJ “must consider the entire case record and give specific reasons for the
weight given to the [claimant’s] statements.”6 SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL
374186, at *4 (July 2, 1996).
In this case, the ALJ determined that Teuscher’s “use of medication
and course of treatment [were] inconsistent with her claims of significant
functional limitations for the period prior to her date last insured.” (See Tr.
at 19.) As previously noted, between June 1, 2000 and December 31,
2000, Teuscher was not prescribed any medications to treat her mental

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In addition to the objective medical evidence, the ALJ must
consider the following factors in making his credibility determination:
(1) claimant’s daily activities; (2) the location, duration,
frequency, and intensity of the pain; (3) precipitating and
aggravating factors; (4) the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side
effects of any medications taken to alleviate the pain; (5) any
treatment, other than medication, that the claimant has received;
(6) any other measures that the claimant employs to relieve the
pain; and (7) other factors concerning the claimant’s functional
limitations and restrictions as a result of the pain.
Meadors, 370 F. App’x at 184 n.1 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i)(vii)).
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impairments, (see id. at 223, 477), did not require hospitalization or
emergency treatment, (see id. at 40-41, 48-50), and did not begin regular
mental health counseling until after January 2001, (see id. at 41). Further,
several of Teuscher’s treating sources responded to the Commissioner’s
request for medical records by indicating that they did not have medical
evidence relevant to the adjudicative period. (See id. at 614.)
Additionally, the ALJ properly determined Teuscher’s claims of
significant functional limitations were inconsistent with her own testimony of
her activities of daily living. (See id. at 20.) Though Teuscher stated that
her bipolar disorder constituted her most significant condition that
prevented her from working, (see id. at 36), she testified that she did not
experience any problems related to depression in 2000, cared for her
home, went to the grocery store, prepared meals, drove a car, managed
her finances, cared for her appearance and personal hygiene, and
engaged in hobbies such as dancing, roller skating, and singing in a church
choir, (see id. at 44-46). With regard to her learning disorder, Teuscher
successfully completed her third associate degree in June 2000. (See id.
at 45-46.)
In assessing Teuscher’s credibility, the ALJ additionally determined
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that her statements of physical pain and limitations were inconsistent with
objective medical evidence in the record. (See id. at 19.) Though
Teuscher complained of tiredness, fatigue, depression, and difficulty
sleeping, she did not seek further treatment for hypothyroidism. (See id. at
19, 476-78.) Despite complaints of lower back pain, Teuscher did not
receive significant treatment for osteopenia or degenerative changes of her
thoracic and lumbar spine. (See id at 19, 468-69, 520.) Medical reports
also indicate that Teuscher’s recurrent urinary tract infections quickly
improved with appropriate medical treatment (see id. at 20, 527), and her
hypoglycemic episodes “appeared better controlled” after modifications to
her diet (see id. at 20, 541).
Furthermore, the ALJ also appropriately discredited the statements of
Teuscher’s sisters after determining that they were inconsistent with both
the medical record and Teuscher’s testimony. (See id. at 22.) The events
described in Boulanger’s statement—recounting episodes where Teuscher
became extremely depressed while caring for her first husband, and
planning her second husband’s birthday party—occurred outside of the
adjudicative time period. (See id. at 168.) Similarly, Robertson’s account
of Teuscher’s unrealistic desire to author a book which would solve “most
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of life’s problems,” occurred in 1987. (See id. at 48-49, 160.) Finally,
Robertson’s statement, describing Teuscher’s frequent depressive
episodes, is inconsistent with Teuscher’s testimony that she did not suffer
any serious episodes of depression in 2000. (See id. at 45, 51, 160.)
Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision that statements from Teuscher and
her sisters lacked credibility is supported by substantial evidence in the
record.
C.

Treating Physician’s Opinion
Finally, Teuscher argues that the ALJ improperly granted greater

weight to the opinions and findings of a state agency medical consultant
than of her treating physician. (See Dkt. No. 12 at 10.) The Commissioner
counters, and the court agrees, that the ALJ properly accorded controlling
weight to the opinion of the state agency medical consultant, T. Harding,
M.D. (See Dkt. No. 13 at 6-7.)
Controlling weight will be given to a treating physician’s opinion that
is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial
evidence.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); see Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d
28, 32 (2d Cir. 2004). However, an ALJ may accord less deference to the
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opinion of a treating physician where evidence in the medical record tends
to “contradict” the physician’s opinion. See Waverick v. Astrue, 420 F.
App’x 91, 93 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2)(i)-(ii),
(d)(3)-(6)). In such instances, an ALJ is entitled to rely upon the opinions of
a state agency medical consultant regarding what a claimant can still do
despite any impairments. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(b)(6), 404.1513(c).
The “opinions of non-examining sources may even override the treating
source’s opinions provided they are, as here, supported by evidence of
record.” Hill v. Astrue, No. 5:11-cv-00026, 2012 WL 2178925, at *8
(N.D.N.Y. June 13, 2012).
Here, evidence in the medical record is at odds with Dr. Petrie’s
opinion that Teuscher suffered from a severe impairment prior to her date
last insured. Dr. Petrie’s conclusion that Teuscher was seriously
debilitated due to the effects of bipolar disorder, hypothyroidism, and
fibromyalgia contradicts Teuscher’s testimony and medical history
regarding her medical conditions during the relevant time period. (See Tr.
36-40, 44-48.) As previously discussed, although bipolar disorder, with
most symptoms related to episodes of depression, constituted Teuscher’s
most significant condition prior to her date last insured, she testified that
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she did not experience any episodes of depression in 2000. (See id. at 36,
45.) Despite some complaints of tiredness, fatigue, depression and
difficulty sleeping when her thyroid levels were low, the record is devoid of
any evidence indicating that Teuscher received any further treatment for
hypothyroidism outside of her regular medication regimen. (See id. at 47678.) Finally, despite her reports of symptoms such as joint pain, anxiety,
and mood swings, Teuscher was not diagnosed with fibromyalgia until May
2001. (See id. at 30-40.)
Evidence received from Teuscher’s treating and examining sources
also contradict Dr. Petrie’s opinions of Teuscher’s impairments. Dr. Petrie
admitted that because he did not see Teuscher for the period at issue, and
did not begin treating her until October 2003, he based his opinions on
Teuscher’s functional limitations from office notes and records in his
possession. (See Dkt. No. 12 at 8.) When the Commissioner requested
records from other treating sources listed by Teuscher, several sources
responded that they did not have any medical evidence relevant to the
adjudicative period. (See Tr. at 614.)
Because the ALJ properly articulated the substantial evidence in the
medical record which contradicted Dr. Petrie’s opinion, the court finds no
17

error in his attribution of greater weight to Dr. Harding’s opinion. See
Waverick, 420 F. App’x at 93 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2)(i)-(ii),
(d)(3)-(6)).
D.

Remaining Findings and Conclusions
After careful review of the record, the court affirms the remainder of

the ALJ’s decision as it is supported by substantial evidence.

VII. Conclusion
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED and
Teuscher's Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is DISMISSED; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk close this case and provide a copy of this
Memorandum-Decision and Order to the parties.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
July 26, 2012
Albany, New York

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