Harris v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 22

DECISION and ORDER. ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings, Dkt. No. 20 , is DENIED; defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings, Dkt. No. 18 , is GRANTED; defendant's decision denying disability benefits is AFFIRMED; and Plaintiff's complaint, Dkt. No. 1 , is DISMISSED. Signed by Judge Glenn T. Suddaby on 7/1/2015. (lah)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
____________________________________________
FRANKIE HARRIS,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 6:14-CV-0664 (GTS)

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
____________________________________________
APPEARANCES:

OF COUNSEL:

FRANKIE HARRIS, PRO SE
932 Mary St.
Utica, NY 13501
U.S. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN.
OFFICE OF REG’L GEN. COUNSEL – REGION II
Counsel for Defendant
26 Federal Plaza – Room 3904
New York, NY 10278

SIXTINA FERNANDEZ, ESQ.

GLENN T. SUDDABY, United States District Judge
DECISION and ORDER
Currently before the Court, in this Social Security action filed by Frankie Harris
(“Plaintiff”) against the Commissioner of Social Security (“Defendant” or “the
Commissioner”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3), are the parties’ crossmotions for judgment on the pleadings. (Dkt. Nos. 18, 20.)1 For the reasons set forth
below, Plaintiff’s motion is denied and Defendant’s motion is granted.

1
Plaintiff commenced this action pro se, however, he was represented by counsel at the
administrative hearing and in requesting review from the Appeals Council. Plaintiff filed what was construed as a
Memorandum of Law at Dkt. No. 20.

I.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND
A.

Factual Background

Plaintiff was born on April 8, 1982. (T. 61.) He completed 10th grade. (T. 141.)
Generally, Plaintiff’s alleged disability consists of mental illness, memory loss,
depression, anxiety, and migraine headaches. (T. 140.) His alleged disability onset
date is January 1, 1997. (T. 135.) He has no past relevant work. (T. 141.)
B.

Procedural History

On October 19, 2010, Plaintiff applied Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”)
under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. Plaintiff’s application was initially denied,
after which he timely requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“the
ALJ”). On November 2, 2011, Plaintiff appeared before the ALJ, Robert C. Dorf. (T. 5471.) On November 18, 2011, the ALJ issued a written decision finding Plaintiff not
disabled under the Social Security Act. (T. 26-41.) On June 18, 2013, the Appeals
Council (“AC”) denied Plaintiff’s request for review, rendering the ALJ’s decision the final
decision of the Commissioner. (T. 1-7.) Thereafter, Plaintiff timely sought judicial review
in this Court.
C.

The ALJ’s Decision

Generally, in his decision, the ALJ made the following five findings of fact and
conclusions of law. (T. 31-37.) First, the ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since October 19, 2010, the date of the application. (T. 31.)
Second, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the severe impairments of depression and mood
disorder. (Id.) Third, the ALJ found Plaintiff did not have an impairment, or combination
of impairments, that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments located in

2 

20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix. 1. (T. 32.) Fourth, the ALJ found Plaintiff had
the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform “medium work,” except he could
perform “simple repetitive tasks at a low stress level meaning decision making [was] not
required.” (T. 33.)2 Fifth, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had no past relevant work;
however, there were jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that
Plaintiff could perform. (T. 36-37.)
II.

THE PARTIES’ BRIEFINGS ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
A.

Plaintiff’s Arguments

Plaintiff appears pro se and filed a one page letter addressed to the Social
Security Administration stating he is disabled and asking for assistance in his claim.
(Dkt. No. 20.) In the absence of a Plaintiff’s Brief, the Court assumes that the Plaintiff
generally alleges that the ALJ committed legal error and that his decision was not
supported by substantial evidence. Meglino v. Comm'r, 5:06-CV-968, 2008 WL
2097221, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. May, 19, 2008) (where pro se plaintiff failed to file a brief, the
court assumed plaintiff alleged lack of substantial evidence and ALJ error). Plaintiff did
have assistance of counsel when he requested review from the AC. In his request for
review, Plaintiff made three arguments. (T. 170-173.) First, Plaintiff argued the ALJ
improperly evaluated Plaintiff’s RFC; specifically, he failed to account for effects of his
severe mental impairment and the ALJ instead relied on his own lay interpretation of the
evidence. (T. 170-171.) Second, Plaintiff argued the ALJ improperly evaluated the
opinion evidence of Dr. Goldburt. (T. 172.) Third, Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to obtain

2
Medium work involves lifting no more than 50 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of
objects weighing up to 25 pounds. If someone can do medium work, we determine that he or she can also do
sedentary and light work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.967(c).

3 

testimony from a vocational expert (“VE”). (Id.) The arguments made to the AC will also
be addressed by this Court.
B.

Defendant’s Arguments

Defendant makes essentially three arguments. First, Defendant argues
substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform
medium work limited to simple repetitive tasks with no decision making required. (Dkt.
No. 18 at 12-16 [Def.’s Mem. of Law].) Second, Defendant argues the ALJ correctly
found that Plaintiff’s subjective complaints were not credible to the extent alleged. (Id.
at 16-19.) Third, and lastly, Defendant argues the ALJ properly found that Plaintiff was
able to perform work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. (Id. at
19-20.)
III.

RELEVANT LEGAL STANDARD
A.

Standard of Review

A court reviewing a denial of disability benefits may not determine de novo
whether an individual is disabled. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3); Wagner v.
Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990). Rather, the
Commissioner’s determination will only be reversed if the correct legal standards were
not applied, or it was not supported by substantial evidence. See Johnson v. Bowen,
817 F.2d 983, 986 (2d Cir. 1987) (“Where there is a reasonable basis for doubt whether
the ALJ applied correct legal principles, application of the substantial evidence standard
to uphold a finding of no disability creates an unacceptable risk that a claimant will be
deprived of the right to have her disability determination made according to the correct

4 

legal principles.”); Grey v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1983); Marcus v. Califano,
615 F.2d 23, 27 (2d Cir. 1979).
“Substantial evidence” is evidence that amounts to “more than a mere scintilla,”
and has been defined as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct.
1420, 1427 (1971). Where evidence is deemed susceptible to more than one rational
interpretation, the Commissioner’s conclusion must be upheld. See Rutherford v.
Schweiker, 685 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1982).
“To determine on appeal whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial
evidence, a reviewing court considers the whole record, examining evidence from both
sides, because an analysis of the substantiality of the evidence must also include that
which detracts from its weight.” Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1988).
If supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s finding must be
sustained “even where substantial evidence may support the plaintiff’s position and
despite that the court’s independent analysis of the evidence may differ from the
[Commissioner’s].” Rosado v. Sullivan, 805 F. Supp. 147, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). In
other words, this Court must afford the Commissioner’s determination considerable
deference, and may not substitute “its own judgment for that of the [Commissioner],
even if it might justifiably have reached a different result upon a de novo review.”
Valente v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 733 F.2d 1037, 1041 (2d Cir. 1984).
B.

Standard to Determine Disability

The Commissioner has established a five-step evaluation process to determine
whether an individual is disabled as defined by the Social Security Act. See 20 C.F.R. §

5 

416.920. The Supreme Court has recognized the validity of this sequential evaluation
process. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42, 107 S. Ct. 2287 (1987). The
five-step process is as follows:
First, the [Commissioner] considers whether the claimant is currently engaged in
substantial gainful activity. If he is not, the [Commissioner] next considers
whether the claimant has a “severe impairment” which significantly limits his
physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. If the claimant suffers such
an impairment, the third inquiry is whether, based solely on medical evidence,
the claimant has an impairment which is listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations.
If the claimant has such an impairment, the [Commissioner] will consider him
disabled without considering vocational factors such as age, education, and work
experience; the [Commissioner] presumes that a claimant who is afflicted with a
“listed” impairment is unable to perform substantial gainful activity. Assuming the
claimant does not have a listed impairment, the fourth inquiry is whether, despite
the claimant’s severe impairment, he has the residual functional capacity to
perform his past work. Finally, if the claimant is unable to perform his past work,
the [Commissioner] then determines whether there is other work which the
claimant could perform. Under the cases previously discussed, the claimant
bears the burden of the proof as to the first four steps, while the [Commissioner]
must prove the final one.
Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982).
IV.

ANALYSIS
A.

Whether Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s RFC Finding.

After carefully considering the matter, the Court answers this question in the
affirmative, for the reasons stated in Defendant’s memorandum of law. (Dkt. No. 18 at
12-16 [Def.’s Mem. of Law].) The Court adds the following analysis.
Defendant argues substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s exertional portion of
his RFC determination. (Dkt. No. 18 at 12-13 [Def.’s Mem. of Law].) This Court agrees.
The ALJ provided “great weight” to the consultative examiner, Aurelio Salon,
M.D. in making his RFC determination. Dr. Salon examined Plaintiff in December of
2010. (T. 261-265.) Upon examination, Plaintiff appeared to be in no acute distress, had

6 

a normal gait, could walk on heels/toes, used no assistive devices, could get on and off
the exam table without assistance, and was able to raise from his chair without difficulty.
(T. 262.) His musculoskeletal exam showed no limitations; he had full range of motion in
his cervical and lumbar spine; full range of motion in his upper and lower extremities;
and his joints were stable and non-tender. (T. 263.)
In his medical source statement, Dr. Salon opined based on his exam and
Plaintiff's self-reported history of seizure, Plaintiff had no physical limitations on his
ability to sit. (T. 264.) Dr. Salon stated Plaintiff’s ability to stand, climb, push, pull, and
carry heavy objects was restricted due to his reports of seizures. (Id.) Further, he opined
Plaintiff should avoid driving, operating heavy machinery and known respiratory irritants.
(Id.)
Plaintiff argued to the AC, the ALJ failed to include Dr. Salon’s limitations in his
RFC. (T. 171.) However, the ALJ limits Plaintiff exertionally to medium work, which is
consistent not only with Dr. Salon’s limitations, but with the other medical evidence in
the record. Overall, the ALJ’s RFC is supported by objective medical imaging and
emergency room visits, together with Dr. Salon’s medical source statement.
Regarding Plaintiff’s reports of seizures, an EEG performed on December 1,
2010 was normal with no evidence of epileptiform activity. (T. 408.) Further, a brain CT
scan and MRI were also normal. (T. 235, 408-409.) Plaintiff sought emergency room
care for complaints of arm pain, knee/ankle pain and head pain. (T. 230, 231, 235, 243.)
Plaintiff not admitted, medical imaging was not ordered, and he was given medication
and discharged home. (T. 230.) Regarding his knee/ankle pain he was observed to be
stable and ambulatory and also discharged home. (T. 233.) A CT was ordered for his

7 

complaints of head pain, but results were normal. (T. 235.) He was noted to be stable
and discharged home with instructions to follow up with his primary health care provider.
(T. 235-236.) Regarding his second ER visit due to “head pain,” he was directed to have
an MRI conducted at the Ryan Center. (T. 243.) However, Plaintiff did not have an MRI
as he was discharged from the Ryan Center for verbally abusing a resident and
threatening her. (T. 250.) An MRI was later conducted at St. Lukes-Roosevelt Hospital
Center and results were normal. (T. 408.)
Therefore, Dr. Salon’s opinion was consistent with the record and his
examination of Plaintiff. The ALJ properly afforded Dr. Salon’s opinion “great weight,”
and the exertional limitations reflected in his RFC analysis are supported by substantial
evidence. See Monguer v. Heckler, 722 F.3d 1033, 1039 (2d Cir. 1983) (a consultative
examiner’s opinion can constitute substantial evidence in support of an ALJ’s
determination).
The record is void of treatment for asthma. Plaintiff indicated he did not take
medication for asthma. (T. 149.) Dr. Salon, based on Plaintiff’s self-reporting, opined he
should avoid known respiratory irritants. (T. 264.) Regarding respiratory irritants,
“[w]here a person has a medical restriction to avoid excessive amounts of noise, dust,
etc., the impact on the broad world of work would be minimal because most job
environments do not involve great noise, amounts of dust, etc.” SSR 85-15 (S.S.A.
1985). Regarding his alleged seizures, Plaintiff’s mother indicated that he was never
diagnosed with seizures, nor does the record include a diagnosis of seizure. (T. 151.)
SSR 85-15 also states, “[a] person with a seizure disorder who is restricted only from
being on unprotected elevations and near dangerous moving machinery is an example

8 

of someone whose environmental restriction does not have a significant effect on work
that exists at all exertional levels.” SSR 85-15. Therefore, the ALJ did not err in failing to
expressly limit Plaintiff’s RFC regarding respiratory irritants and his alleged seizure
disorder, as any limitation would have minimal effect on the work Plaintiff could perform
and the medical evidence fails to support additional limitations.
Defendant further argues the non-exertional portion of the ALJ’s RFC analysis is
supported by substantial evidence. (Dkt. No. 18 at 13-16 [Def.’s Mem. of Law].) Plaintiff
argues in his brief to the AC: 1) the ALJ failed to include Plaintiff’s “moderate limitations”
in social functioning in his RFC analysis, 2) the ALJ failed to include all of the effects of
Plaintiff’s mental impairments in his RFC analysis, and 3) the ALJ relied on his own lay
interpretation of the medical evidence. (T. 171-172.)
The ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff could perform “simple repetitive tasks at a
low stress level meaning decision making is not required” is supported by substantial
evidence. (T. 33.)
Haruyo Fujiwaki, Ph.D. performed a consultative exam in December of 2010. (T.
256-260.) Dr. Fujiwaki opined Plaintiff’s attention and concentration were mildly
impaired. (T. 258.) He further observed Plaintiff’s recent and remote memory were
mildly impaired. (Id.) In a medical source statement, Dr. Fujiwaki opined Plaintiff was
capable of understanding simple directions and instructions; capable of simple tasks;
would have some difficulty maintaining attention and concentration; would be able to
maintain a regular schedule; would be able to learn new tasks with extended time;
would be able to perform complex tasks with difficulty and would need supervision;

9 

could make some simple decisions; may have difficulty relating with others and dealing
with stress. (T. 259.) The ALJ afforded Dr. Fujiwaki “great weight.” (T. 36.)
Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument to the AC, the ALJ’s RFC does encompass the
limitations imposed by Dr. Fujiwaki because “[t]he basic mental demands of competitive,
remunerative, unskilled work include the abilities (on a sustained basis) to understand,
carry out, and remember simple instructions; to respond appropriately to supervision,
coworkers, and usual work situations; and to deal with changes in a routine work
setting.” SSR 85-15. Further, unskilled work “ordinarily involve[s] dealing primarily with
objects, rather than with data or people.” Id. Therefore, Plaintiff’s difficulty dealing with
others is already accounted for in the very nature of unskilled work. The ALJ properly
evaluated the medical opinion of Dr. Fujiwaki and his RFC determination reflects Dr.
Fujiwaki’s limitations.
The ALJ afforded “controlling weight” to Plaintiff’s treating sources at Kings
County Hospital Center and St. Mark’s Place Institute for Mental Health (“St. Mark’s”).
(T. 35.)3 The ALJ afforded “reduced weight” to Kherma Goldburt, M.D. with St. Mark’s,
reasoning her treatment notes were inconsistent with the alleged limitations she
imposed. (Id.) Staff at St. Mark’s noted symptoms of depression, agitations and
frustration; however, noted Plaintiff was overall stable. (T. 268.) He was diagnosed with
mood disorder and prescribed Diazepam. (T. 267.) He was able to perform activities of
daily living (T. 268.) In October 2010 Plaintiff was described as having a restricted affect
(T. 274.) Plaintiff reported he felt better and his sleep improved. (T. 275.) In November
of 2010 Plaintiff’s mood was dysphoric and his affect labile. (T. 276.) He reported his

3

The decision, and Defendant’s Brief, refer to the center as “St. Mary’s Place Institute for Mental
Health;” however, the record is from “St. Mark’s.”

10 

sleep, energy level, and appetite were “o.k.” (T. 276.) In December Plaintiff complained
of continued feelings of dizziness and “outbursts.” (T. 278.) Dr. Goldburt noted Plaintiff’s
mood was dysphoric and anxious, and he had a restricted affect. (Id.)
In November of 2010 Dr. Goldburt completed a “Treating Physician Wellness
Plan Report.” (T. 322-324.) Therein, Dr. Goldburt opined Plaintiff would be unable to
work for at least twelve months. (T. 324.) She further stated Plaintiff would be precluded
from work based on his allegations of a head injury. (Id.) She indicated neurological
testing was recommended. (Id.) On February 7, 2011, Dr. Golburt stated Plaintiff’s
memory was impaired, but he was oriented and able to perform serial sevens. (T. 412.)
Dr. Goldburt opined Plaintiff had “marked” limitations in his ability to understand,
remember, and carry out instructions. (T. 415.) She further opined he had “marked”
limitations in his ability to interact appropriately with co-workers, supervisors, and the
public, as well as respond appropriately to changes in a routine work setting. (T. 416.)
A treating physician’s opinion is entitled to controlling weight if it “is well
supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is
not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record.” 20 C.F.R. §
416.927(c)(2). ALJ afforded Dr. Goldburt’s opinion proper weight as it is not supported
by her treatment notes or the objective medical evidence in the record as previously
discussed. Specifically, Dr. Golburt’s limitations are not supported by consultative
examiner Dr. Fujiwaki, who found only mild functional limitations. (T. 259.) Other mental
health treatment notes indicated Plaintiff had only mild limitations in his ability to follow
work rules, accept supervision, and adapt to work stress. (T. 320.) Treatment notes also
indicated moderate limitations in Plaintiff’s ability to maintain concentration. (Id.)

11 

Therefore, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC analysis regarding
Plaintiff’s non-exertional mental limitations.
B.

Whether the ALJ Properly Evaluated Plaintiff Credibility.

After carefully considering the matter, the Court answers this question in the
affirmative, in part for the reasons stated in Defendant’s memorandum of law. (Dkt. No.
18 at 16-18 [Def.’s Mem. of Law]). The Court adds the following analysis.
A plaintiff’s allegations of pain and functional limitations are “entitled to great
weight where ... it is supported by objective medical evidence.” Rockwood v. Astrue,
614 F. Supp. 2d 252, 270 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting Simmons v. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd., 982
F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir.1992). However, the ALJ “is not required to accept [a plaintiff’s]
subjective complaints without question; he may exercise discretion in weighing the
credibility of the [plaintiff’s] testimony in light of the other evidence in the record.”
Montaldo v. Astrue, 10-CV-6163, 2012 WL 893186, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15 2012).
“When rejecting subjective complaints, an ALJ must do so explicitly and with sufficient
specificity to enable the Court to decide whether there are legitimate reasons for the
ALJ’s disbelief.” Rockwood, 614 F. Supp. 2d at 270.
“The ALJ’s credibility assessment must be based on a two step analysis of
pertinent evidence in the record. First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant
has medically determinable impairments, which could reasonably be expected to
produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.” Id., at 271.
Second, if medically determinable impairments are shown,
then the ALJ must evaluate the intensity, persistence, and
limiting effects of the symptoms to determine the extent to
which they limit the claimant’s capacity to work. Because an
individual’s symptoms can sometimes suggest a greater
level of severity of impairment than can be shown by the
12 

objective medical evidence alone, an ALJ will consider the
following factors in assessing a claimant’s credibility: (1)
claimant’s daily activities; (2) location, duration, frequency,
and intensity of claimant’s symptoms; (3) precipitating and
aggravating factors; (4) type, dosage, effectiveness, and
side effects of any medication taken to relieve symptoms; (5)
other treatment received to relieve symptoms; (6) any
measures taken by the claimant to relieve symptoms; and
(7) any other factors concerning claimant’s functional
limitations and restrictions due to symptoms.
Id.
Here, the ALJ determined Plaintiff’s statements regarding the intensity,
persistence and limiting effects of his symptoms were “not credible to the extent they
[were] inconsistent with the [RFC] assessment.” (T. 35.)
To be sure, although a “[plaintiff’s] credibility may be questioned if it is
inconsistent with the medical evidence . . . , it is improper to question the plaintiff's
credibility because it is inconsistent with the RFC determined by the ALJ.” Gehm v.
Astrue,10-CV-1170, 2013 WL 25976, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2013); see also Patterson
v. Astrue,11-CV-1143, 2013 WL 638617, at *14 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2013) (“This
assessment of plaintiff's credibility is formed only on the basis of how plaintiff's
statements compare to the ALJ's RFC assessment. The ALJ's analysis is therefore
fatally flawed, because, it demonstrates that she improperly arrived at her RFC
determination before making her credibility assessment, and engaged in a credibility
assessment calculated to conform to that RFC determination.”). Courts have concluded
that despite this language, an ALJ’s credibility determination may still be proper, if the
ALJ provided a detailed discussion of Plaintiff’s credibility “explicitly and with sufficient
specificity to enable the court to decide whether there are legitimate reasons for the
ALJ’s disbelief.” Rockwood, 614 F. Supp. 2d at 270. Further, it is the function of the

13 

ALJ, not the reviewing courts to resolve evidentiary conflicts and to appraise the
credibility of witnesses, including the plaintiff. Carroll v. Sec’y of Health and Human
Servs., 705 F.2d 638, 642 (2d Cir. 1982).
Although the ALJ improperly concluded the Plaintiff statements were not credible
because they were inconsistent with his RFC determination, the ALJ did provide a
discussion which allowed this Court to determine the legitimate reasons for the ALJ’s
disbelief. The ALJ properly evaluated Plaintiff’s testimony, which was contradicted by
medical findings or was internally inconsistent. The ALJ also provided a detailed
summation and discussion of the medical evidence in the record. (T. 32-35.) Further, as
outlined above, the ALJ’s RFC determination was consistent with the findings of Dr.
Salon, Dr. Fujiwaki, and objective medical evidence.
Overall, Plaintiff alleged he was unable to work due to almost non-stop shaking,
or tremors, in his head and body. However, as the ALJ addressed in his decision,
Plaintiff’s testimony contradicted his allegations of disability. At the hearing he testified
that he could walk 100 city blocks, which is approximately one mile. (T. 67.) He further
testified he could lift 100 pounds, worked out daily, and could do 500 push-ups. (Id.)
Plaintiff stated he was experiencing tremors during the hearing; however, the ALJ noted
for the record that no shaking was visible. (T. 69.) Socially, Plaintiff had good familial
relations, attended his medical appointments and went out alone, although he did get
lost occasionally. (T. 32.) Plaintiff testified he lived with his mother, niece, daughter, and
daughter’s mothers; however, he did not participate in their care. (T. 62.)
In Plaintiff’s Disability Report he indicated he was unable to conduct personal
care due to shaking, unable to walk more than two city blocks due to shaking, and had

14 

no social activities due to shaking. (T. 163.) However, this testimony is inconsistent with
Plaintiff’s hearing testimony and the objective physical medical reports in the record.
Therefore, given the medical evidence and Plaintiff’s testimony, the ALJ properly
evaluated Plaintiff’s credibility and properly determined Plaintiff’s statements were not
credible.
C.

Whether the ALJ Properly Found Plaintiff Was Able to Perform Work
that Exists in Significant Numbers in the National Economy.

After carefully considering the matter, the Court answers this question in the
affirmative, in part for the reasons stated in Defendant’s memorandum of law. (Dkt. No.
18 at 19 [Def.’s Mem. of Law]). The Court adds the following analysis.
As discussed in Part IV.A and B, the ALJ’s RFC analysis was supported by
substantial evidence. Further, the ALJ conducted a proper credibility analysis.
Therefore, considering Plaintiff’s RFC, age, education, and work experience at step five,
the ALJ properly found Plaintiff not disabled. (T. 36-37), see 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(f).
ACCORDINGLY, it is
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. No. 20) is
DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED that Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. No. 18)
is GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED that Defendant’s decision denying disability benefits is AFFIRMED;
and it is further is
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is DISMISSED.
Dated:

July 1, 2015
Syracuse, NY

15