Miller v. City of Ithaca, New York et al

Filing 21

SUMMARY ORDER - That the City's 17 Motion for Attorney Fees is DENIED. Signed by Judge Gary L. Sharpe on 12/22/2015. (jel, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
________________________________
CHRISTOPHER MILLER,
Plaintiff,

6:14-cv-1160
(GLS/DEP)

v.
CITY OF ITHACA, NEW YORK
et al.,
Defendants.
________________________________
SUMMARY ORDER
Plaintiff Christopher Miller commenced this action, alleging claims
pursuant to the Americans With Disabilities Act1 and the New York Human
Rights Law (NYHRL).2 Defendant City of Ithaca, New York moved to
dismiss, (Dkt. No. 14), and, shortly thereafter, Miller voluntarily dismissed
the action, (Dkt. No. 16). Pending before the court is the City’s motion for
attorney’s fees. (Dkt. No. 17.) For the reasons that follow, the motion is
denied.
The parties have a torrid past that is all too familiar to the court. In a
separate case, Miller, a former police officer, filed suit and took a jury

1

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.

2

See N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290-301.

verdict against the City and some individuals in its police department for
retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the NYHRL.
(Dkt. No. 662, 3:10-cv-597.) The instant action, commenced by filing a
summons and notice, was removed from Supreme Court in Oneida County
in September 2014. (Dkt. No. 1.) Miller alleged an ADA and companion
NYHRL claim stemming from his assertion that he was subjected to
unlawful discrimination on account of his claimed disability. (Compl., Dkt.
No. 7.) The City moved to dismiss the complaint shortly thereafter, (Dkt.
No. 14); before adjudication of that motion, Miller voluntarily dismissed the
case without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, (Dkt. No. 15).
The City seeks fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), arguing that
it is entitled to an award because Miller’s claims were frivolous or brought
in bad faith. (Dkt. No. 17.) Miller contends that the City is not entitled to
attorney’s fees because it is not a prevailing party. (Dkt. No. 19 at 1-5.)
Because the City is not a prevailing party within the meaning of the fee
shifting statute, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), the court agrees with Miller.
“‘[A] plaintiff should not be assessed his opponent’s attorney’s fees
unless a court finds that his claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or
2

groundless.’” Sista v. CDC Ixis N. Am., Inc., 445 F.3d 161, 178 (2d Cir.
2006) (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422
(1978)). Importantly here, however, “[a] notice of dismissal pursuant to . . .
Rule . . . 41(a)(1) does not constitute relief from the court on the merits of a
claim or a judicial imprimatur altering the legal relationship between the
parties such that any party may claim ‘prevailing party’ status.” Tidwell v.
Krishna Q Invs., LLC, 935 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1359 (N.D. Ga. 2012)
(collecting cases).
Here, quite simply, whether Miller’s claims were frivolous,
unreasonable, or groundless, the City is not a prevailing party such that the
fee shifting provision is triggered. Indeed, there was “no judicially
sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties.” Buckhannon
Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Virginia Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532
U.S. 598, 605 (2001). Instead, it was Miller’s voluntary dismissal that
brought a close to the action, which required no judicial approval
whatsoever. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A) (permitting voluntary
dismissal “[w]ithout a Court Order”). For these reasons, an award of fees
to the City is inappropriate.
Accordingly, it is hereby
3

ORDERED that the City’s motion for attorney’s fees (Dkt. No. 17) is
DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk shall provide a copy of this Summary Order
to the parties.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
December 22, 2015
Albany, New York

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